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The Danube–Oder–Elbe Canal attracted a great deal of 
attention throughout the twentieth century. Its promo-
ters defined it as a tool for integrating a divided Europe. 
Although the canal was situated almost exclusively on 
Czech territory, it promised to create an integrated wa-
terway system across the Continent that would link Black 
Sea ports to Atlantic markets. In return, the landlocked 
Czechoslovakian state would have its own connections to 
the sea. Today, the canal is an important building block 
of the European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways. 
This book explains the crucial role that experts played 
in aligning national and transnational interests and in-
frastructure developments. It builds on recent inves-
tigations into the hidden integration of Europe as an 
outcome of transnational networking, system-building, 
and infrastructure development. The book analyzes the 
emergence of a transnational waterway expert network 
that continued to push for the development of the ca-
nal despite unfavorable political circumstances. The book 
shows how the experts adapted themselves to various 
political developments, such as the break-up of the 
Austrian–Hungarian Empire, the rise of the Third 
Reich, and integration into the Soviet Bloc, while still 
managing to keep the Canal project on the map. This 
book provides a fascinating story of the experts who 
confronted and contributed to different and often con-
flicting geopolitical visions of Europe.
The canal was never completed, yet what is more re-
markable is the fact that the canal remained on various 
agendas and attracted vast resources throughout the 
twentieth century.
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 Introduction 9
Chapter 1 Introduction
“This (the Danube Oder Elbe canal) is a European affair. It makes no sense as a 
national project. We cannot afford it; such a project is tens or hundreds of bil-
lions of crowns. If the European Union recognizes the project is reasonable and 
is ready to finance it, then it might be realized”. Thus argued Pavel Drobil, Czech 
Environment Minister on August 16, 2010. Drobil agitated for a bold decision: 
Three months earlier, on May 26, 2010, the caretaker government of the Czech 
republic, led by Prime Minister Jan fischer, decided to extend the building ban in 
the corridor of the proposed route of the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal.1 The admin-
istration took the last possible opportunity to close the debate that had re-opened 
several years earlier when the Czech republic entered the European Union (EU). 
Despite long-running controversy over the idea of building a canal, national au-
thorities, sensing a great funding opportunity from the EU Cohesion fund, re-
vived the century-old vision of building a canal to link the Elbe, Oder, and Danube 
rivers.2 The proponents saw the opportunity to correct a well-known mistake made 
by William shakespeare, who in The Winter’s Tale famously (and inaccurately) re-
fers to Bohemia as having a coastline. Proponents of the canal wanted to fulfill an 
old dream to situate Bohemia on European coasts.3 
responding to protests from ecological organizations and in an effort to firm 
up the idea, the proponents established an inter-sector governmental committee 
to evaluate the project.4 Environmentalists countered that the canal’s construction 
would endanger water quality in all three river basins as well as their local wa-
ter cycles. sketching an image of a gigantic concrete trough slicing deep trenches 
1 Czech newspapers such as the leading economic daily Hospodářské noviny, reported on the decision on 
24 or 25 May. “Vláda schválila další ochranu pro území kanálu Dunaj-Odra-Labe,” Hospodářské noviny, 24 
May 2010.
2 “We count on an 85% contribution from the Cohesion fund,” said Viktor Meca of the Transport Minis-
try back in 2005. “Plánovaná stavba kanálu ohrozí přírodu,” Hospodářské noviny, 13 May 2005.
3 Not surprisingly, this error is extremely popular among historians – one of the best works on Czech history 
available in English, written by Derek sayer, quotes it directly in the title. so does an article on the Czecho-
slovak naval fleet in the interwar period. In this book, such an allusion seems even more appropriate – in-
deed, the only coastlines of the Czech lands are the coasts of Europe. Derek sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia: A 
Czech History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); stefan Albrecht, “Böhmen Liegt am Meer,” 
Österreichische Osthefte 46, no. 4 (2004): 515-534.
4 Czech republic Government resolution no. 561/2006 on the territorial development policy of the Czech 
republic.
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through the landscape, opponents of the project argued that, once constructed, the 
canal would deprive the lower Morava-Danube junction of its natural cleansing 
and flood-control capacity. The projected canal would cause the Morava flood-
plain and the Oder meanders to vanish from the map altogether. furthermore, the 
environmentalists felt that river transport would fail to be competitive with other 
modern modes of freight transportation, thus removing the very economic justifi-
cation for the potential natural hazards.5 Paradoxically, the canal promoters’ main 
argument for constructing the canal had been environmental. They saw the pro-
posed waterway as a tool of complex water management using natural forces while 
simultaneously stabilizing the water balances; it would secure optimal conditions 
for the area’s sustainable development. The canal, they said, would furthermore 
dramatically diminish air pollution by reducing road traffic in the area.6
5 Milan Janák, Kanál Dunaj-Odra-Labe: příležitost, nebo hrozba? Stanovisko Koalice pro život řek Dunaje, 
Odry a Labe (Brno: hnutí Duha, 2004).
6 see the document prepared by Ekotrans Moravia in 1990: “Vodní cesta Dunaj-Odra-Labe, příspěvek k 
Figure 1.1 – This map illustrates the location of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal (DOE) in Europe’s 
natural river system. The red-dotted line indicates the European watershed, dividing the conti-
nent into a northern and a southern part. The DOE canal was designed to overcome this water-
shed. Source: Drawn by the author [Jiří Janáč].
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Both groups sought to mobilize the European authorities i.e. the EU. Environ-
mentalists referred to Brussels, proposing the unification of national legislation and 
standards in accession countries. With regard to water bodies, such aims were 
articulated in the Water framework Directive of 2000.7 On the other hand, the 
canal promoters pointed to the European Commission White Paper on transport, 
a document outlining key priorities for transport policy from 2001 to 2010. This 
document stated that a key aim was to foster waterway transport as a dynamic 
alternative in a sustainable transport chain, and considered the canal project 
worthy of additional study.8 As a prospective crucial element of the envisioned 
European waterway network, the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal was included in the 
Czech republic’s EU accession treaty.9 
Not only the people involved viewed the canal project as a truly European affair. 
On second glance, Minister Drobil’s perspective was indeed correct. The canal, de-
signed to overcome the main European watershed between three European seas, had 
never been an exclusively national affair. for most of the twentieth century, the entire 
canal route was situated within a single state (the Austrian Empire, Czechoslovakia, 
and, for a few years, the Third reich), but because of the international nature of 
water bodies, the canal’s planning had never been never a matter of national policy. 
By connecting the two rivers, the canal would establish a network stretching across 
large parts of the continent. Indeed, the twentieth-century history of the Danube-
Oder-Elbe Canal project, first enacted by a special law in 1901, records the history 
of an emerging waterway network in Europe, often imagined but never realized. 
These plans tell a story of alignment between various perceived regional and na-
tional interests and other transnational (border-crossing) geopolitical frames. The 
canal was never just a canal. It featured in the successive dreams of Mitteleuropa 
(Central Europe), Grossraumwirtschaft, sovietisation, and Europeanization, all of 
which embodied the wishes of various powers to control the region.
The canal, never built but debated for over a century, provides an excellent 
opportunity to study the intermeshing of historical ideas of a region, nation, and 
Europe not as abstract ideals but as a concrete project. This book focuses on how 
evropské integritě” (MZA, h42, b. 338).
7 Maria Kaika, “The Water framework Directive: A New Directive for a Changing social, Political and 
Economic European framework,” European Planning Studies 11, no. 3 (2003): 299-316.
8 European Commission, White Paper: European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide (Luxem-
bourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001), http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
strategies/doc/2001_white_paper/lb_com_2001_0370_en.pdf. 13-14. Accessed 26 May 2008. 
9 Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Czech republic, the republic of Estonia, the republic of Cyprus, 
the republic of Latvia, the republic of Lithuania, the republic of hungary, the republic of Malta, the 
republic of Poland, the republic of slovenia, and the slovak republic to the European Union, (European 
Parliament, 2003), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/default_en.htm. Accessed 25 
May 2007.
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and why a single waterway situated within the Czech borders was linked to creat-
ing these ideals and frameworks, deeply embedded in the geopolitical agendas 
behind them. Czech hydraulic engineers who promoted the idea and worked on 
the canal design claimed and mobilized these political frameworks to get the canal 
built. They offer an excellent entry into the case, articulating relations between 
various frameworks. Therefore, besides looking at the history of waterway net-
works, the thesis will also explore the role of experts. 
Infrastructure Historiography
The literature on the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal project is rich and has touched on 
several aspects. Nevertheless, the scholarship shows some major gaps. from the 
institutional history perspective, the canal was studied as case study of two NGOs 
involved in its preparation.10 regional historians have also devoted attention to the 
various canal plans in the local context.11 Other studies have viewed the canal as 
an example of political bargaining between Czechoslovakia and its neighbors, in-
cluding the Third reich with its Nazi racial policy against the Czech nation.12 In a 
laudable effort to see the inter-war canal debate as the creation of Central Europe, 
another study depicts the issue as a conflict of contradictory national interests.13 
still another attempt, though modest in its achievements, has sought to apply an 
environmental history perspective and inquire into the relations between the canal 
project and the natural environment. Unfortunately, the author Josef Bartoš has 
refrained from applying any theoretical concepts, simply condemning the project 
as a threat to nature.14 Most commonly, the canal’s histories have been written by 
10 Both articles follow the narrative contained in the archives. Kateřina smutná, “Podíl společnosti 
dunajsko-oderského průplavu na na přípravě průplavního propojení Labe, Odry a Dunaje,” Dějiny věd 
a techniky 1989, no. 4 (1989): 223-235; Zdeněk Bičík, “spolek pro stavbu labsko-oderského průplavu v 
Pardubicích,” in Plavba a obchod po Labi: sborník příspěvků z 1. mezin. symposia o dějinách labské plavby 
v Děčíně 1969, ed. helena smíšková and Miloslav Košťál, Rozpravy Nár. techn. muzea v Praze (Prague: 
Národní technické muzeum, 1971), 47-53.
11 Mostly regarding consequent spatial planning issues. Josef Bartoš, “Projekty průplavu Odra-Labe-
Dunaj na střední Moravě v letech 1938-1945,” Střední Morava 6, no. 11 (2000): 37-46; Josef Bartoš, “Město 
Olomouc a projekty kanálu Odra-Labe-Dunaj,” Střední Morava 7, no. 12 (2001): 17-26.
12 Andělín Grobelný, “Projekty odersko-dunajského průplavu a československo-německá jednání v 
meziválečném období,” Ostrava: Sborník příspěvků k dějinám a výstavbě města, no. 10 (1979): 312-334; 
Andělín Grobelný, “Místo odersko-dunajského průplavu v nacistických projektech přestavby vnitrozemské 
vodní sítě v letech 1939-1941,” Časopis Slezského muzea 29, no. 1B (1980): 231-241.
13 Ivan Jakubec, “Idea dunajsko-oderského průplavu v 19. a 20. století a její proměny,” in Integration und 
Desintegration in Mitteleuropa. Pläne und Realität, ed. Marcella rossová (Prague; München, 2009), 235-256.
14 Josef Bartoš, “historické varianty spojení řek Odry, Labe a Dunaje,” in Vodní cesta D-O-L. Historie, 
ekologie, krajina: historická a současná studie a výběr příspěvků ze semináře Vodní cesta D-O-L: Ekonomie, 
ekologie, krajina v rámci EDO Olomouc 2003, ed. Michal Bartoš (Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého v Olo-
mouci, 2004), 7-37.
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engineers, who focus on technicalities and boast the project’s positive effects. They 
claim that time and time again the canal fell victim to ignorance, narrow-minded-
ness, and politicians’ incompetence.15 These papers are full of technical details and 
follow the logic of linear and unidirectional technological progress, which acts in 
these writings as a major force behind changes in canal design. Altogether, a lot of 
paper has been filed in this case, building historical arguments for or against the 
canal project. however, some crucial questions remained unanswered or, more 
precisely, have not been asked.
Existing accounts of the canal’s past suffer from two biases which have been 
ingrained in waterway histories in general. Although the particular research field 
has been out of fashion since World War I due to waterways’ “unattractive and old-
fashioned image,” there is a growing body of works dealing with or closely related 
to inland navigation.16 Given the truly international character of rivers that flow 
without respect for borders, the national bias of the majority of these historical 
writings is quite remarkable. Thus far neither the border-crossing nature of riv-
ers nor the border-crossing aspects of inland navigation have been given their 
rightful place in the narratives.17 This paradox can be partly explained by examin-
ing the structure of waterway networks. Unlike other forms of transport, naviga-
ble rivers and canals never became a completely integrated network; therefore, 
the economic impact of canals was mostly regional.18 however, “methodological 
15 They provided a standardized “promoting progress against the odds” narrative. Most were published 
in periodicals; the most notable exceptions being the following monographs, all written by hydraulic en-
gineers actually working on the DOE canal projects: Jaroslav Kubec, Josef Podzimek, and františek Nepil, 
Křižovatka tří moří: vodní koridor Dunaj-Odra-Labe (Prague: Your ArTillery, 2007); Josef Bartovský, Vodní 
cesty a vodohospodářské plánování v Čechách a na Moravě. Přehled a bilance práce dvou generací, další 
úkoly dvouletka a pětiletka (Prague: společnost Dunajsko-oderského průplavu, 1946); Jaroslav Čábelka, 
“Velký průplav v srdci Evropy – vodohospodářsko dopravní soustava Dunaj-Odra-Labe,” in Plavba a 
obchod po Labi: sborník příspěvků z 1. mezin. symposia o dějinách labské plavby v Děčíně 1969, ed. helena 
smíšková and Miloslav Košťál, Rozpravy Nár. techn. muzea v Praze (Prague: Národní technické muzeum, 
1971), 11-40; Antonín smrček, Nástin historie vodní cesty Dunaj – Odra – Labe v souvislosti s úpravou řeky 
Moravy (Prague: privately printed, 1940).
16 Gerald Crompton, “‘The Tortoise and the Economy’: Inland Waterway Navigation in International 
Economic history,” Journal of Transport History 25, no. 2 (2004): 1-22, here 15.
17 This is the case with general transport history. Gijs Mom, “What Kind of Transport history Did We 
Get?” Journal of Transport History 24, no. 2 (2003): 121-138; simon P. Ville, Transport and the Development 
of the European Economy, 1750-1918 (New York: st. Martin’s Press, 1990). An example of the persistence of 
such attitudes can be found in: Gerald Crompton, ed., Canals and Inland Navigation, studies in transport 
history (Aldershot: scolar Press, 1996).
18 Gerard Turnbull, “Canals, Coal and regional Growth during the Industrial revolution,” The Economic 
History Review 40, no. 4 (1987): 537-560. for the highly challenged process of integration of the Danube 
and rhine river basins into a single waterway system, see Guido Thiemeyer, “Die Integration der Donau-
schifffahrt als Problem der europäischen Zeitgeschichte,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 49, no. 2 (2009): 
303-318; Guido Thiemeyer and Isabel Tölle, “supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? Die Beispiele der Zen-
tralkomission für die rheinschiffahrt und des Octroivertrages 1804-1851,” Journal of European Integration 
History 17, no. 2 (2011): 177-196.
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nationalism” also played its part; consider for instance Eckoldt’s compendium 
of German rivers.19 Eckoldt included the Elbe and other streams flowing across 
various national boundaries throughout the last millennia, yet he treated German 
hydraulic engineering as a relatively autonomous and from the rest of the world 
isolated phenomenon.
Only recently have water histories taken a transnational perspective and started 
to follow their research objects across political boundaries. These recent studies 
include the examination of transnational organizations like Thiemeyer’s study of 
the Danube governance, which analyzes the transformation of river systems into a 
transnational infrastructural network.20 such a transnational approach to history 
allows historians to reflect on and go beyond the confines of the nation. While the 
notion of “transnational” often acquires various and sometimes conflicting mean-
ings, the approach’s scholarly contribution remains undisputed.21 Nations are not 
a natural form of the modern world nor are they an inevitable analytical frame of 
historical process. With respect to literature, the notion of transnational in this 
book is important but is employed rather implicitly to describe processes cutting 
across national borders. 
The second bias in the current conceptualization of canals and navigable rivers 
as an economic activity of inland water transport (or inland waterborne traffic – 
IWT) has only reinforced the first bias. Best examples would be works from the 
1990s, an edited volume on the economic performance of the IWT sector in times 
of industrialization by Armstrong and Kunz and an analysis of tariff policy on the 
Elbe during in the inter-war period by Jakubec. In the first case, the nation state 
forms the unit of analysis, while in the second, nation states are main actors. Both 
authors focus on the economic aspects of operating inland navigation, while leav-
ing aside other facets of waterways.22
however, as the review of such canal histories shows, waterways cannot be re-
duced to simple carriers of goods. Even if understood as transport infrastructures, 
the analysis of their performance would have to include issues such as techno-
logical equipment, interferences with other water uses or competition with other 
forms of transport. In order to decipher the complexity of actors and interests 
19 Martin Eckoldt and hans-Georg Braun, Flüsse und Kanäle. Die Geschichte der deutschen Wasserstrassen 
(hamburg: DsV-Verlag, 1998).
20 Thiemeyer, “Die Integration der Donau-schifffahrt als Problem der europäischen Zeitgeschichte.”
21 Erik van der Vleuten, “Technological history and the Transnational Challenge: Meanings, Promises, 
Pitfalls,” Technology and Culture, no. 4 (2008).
22 Andreas Kunz and John Armstrong, eds., Inland Navigation and Economic Development in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Mainz: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1995); Ivan Jakubec, Železnice a labská plavba ve 
střední Evropě, 1918-1938: dopravněpolitické vztahy Československa, Německa a Rakouska v meziválečném 
období (Prague: Karolinum, 1997).
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involved in waterway construction and operation, and to identify major actors in 
the process, science and technology studies provide a useful instrument. The Large 
Technical system (LTs) concept is based on the idea that technological systems 
are complex entities consisting of technical artifacts, institutional and legislative 
frameworks, and other components. This concept was originally coined by Thomas 
hughes and later adapted to encompass the key collective actors engaging with 
the system in its sociotechnical complexity. Thus it does not distinguish between 
traditional analytical categories of a priori technical, social and political aspects of 
the system. There are several examples available to conceptualize nationally framed 
water-management systems in terms of LTs. Van der Vleuten and Disco proved that 
such an approach is not only feasible, but could be extremely valuable.23 In water 
management as well as in inland navigation, key actors in the system development 
process, so called system builders, had to combine myriads of components to make 
entire water management systems or shipping on a waterway feasible and profitable.
One more category should be added to the sociotechnical: Nature. from the 
mid-twentieth century onwards, waterways received some attention in the context 
of environmentalism as elements of the natural environment.24 Environmentally in-
formed writings on rivers as waterways have generally addressed regulations in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the subsequent excessive harnessing of the 
power of rivers in the mid-1900s.25 These works tend to tell the story of progress, the 
technological taming of former wild streams. however, as sarah Pritchard demon-
strated in her masterpiece on the post 1945 history of the river rhone, nature was not 
simply tamed – it afforded material constraints to technological development and 
use.26 furthermore, she shows how changes in political discourse on rivers and water 
influenced the continuous material transformation of the rhone. Pritchard devel-
oped a synthesis of LTs tradition with environmental history, situating nature as an 
independent phenomenon on a par with sociotechnical systems. Building on similar 
arguments, some scholars positioned the study of waterways within an emerging 
historical sub-discipline of water history – which, in their approach, roughly stands 
23 Erik van der Vleuten and Cornelis Disco, “Water Wizards: reshaping Wet Nature and society,” History 
& Technology 20, no. 3 (2004): 291-309; Cornelis Disco and Erik van der Vleuten, “The Politics of Wet 
system Building: Balancing Interests in Dutch Water Management from the Middle Ages to the Present,” 
Knowledge, Technology & Policy 14, no. 4 (2002): 21-40.
24 Disco and van der Vleuten, “The Politics of Wet system Building,” 39.
25 The most notable examples related to Europe are: David Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: Water, 
Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (New York: Norton, 2006); Christof Mauch and Thomas 
Zeller, Rivers in History: Perspectives on Waterways in Europe and North America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).
26 sara B. Pritchard, Confluence. The Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhône (Cambridge: 
harvard University Press, 2011).
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for nature.27 It is in this stream of scholarship that this book is situated.
Indeed, the two biases, lack of cultural perspective and methodological national-
ism, can be overcome if we apply the concept of co-construction. The move towards 
sociotechnical analysis required the development of new analytical tools. In order to 
understand the interaction between cultural processes and technological artifacts, 
scholars in science and technology studies adopted a linguistic approach. They see 
discursive practices of historical actors as crucial variables in providing meaning to 
the material world. By deriving their meaning from culture, technological artifacts 
actually become an active part of it. Existing literature focuses predominantly on 
“co-construction” of national identities and symbolic technological projects, not of-
fering any solid methodology.28 The search to apply this approach to waterways leads 
us back to Pritchard. While she focused on co-construction of the rhone and post-
war france, this book focuses on the Donau Oder Elbe canal (DOE) and Europe. 
The designers of the DOE, as well as those transforming the rhone, had to align 
changing discourses with technological changes and the natural environment of re-
spective streams. 
The history of waterways forms part of a broader history of European infra-
structures. In 2005, Thomas J. Misa and Johan schot articulated a powerful his-
toriographical argument in favor of studying technological change, including in-
frastructures such as waterways, as a means of understanding the formation of 
Europe. In order “to situate technology in a broader social and cultural analysis of 
Europe,” they proposed the concept of “hidden (technological) integration/disin-
tegration” and expressed it in contrast to the general image of European integra-
tion as a nation-states-led process of political and economic convergence start-
ing in the immediate post-war period. from the position of transnational history, 
Misa and schot challenged both the spatio-temporal framework of the process 
and the position of nation states and their political representations as the basic 
units of inquiry and virtually the only relevant actors in the study of integration. 
At the same time, they challenged the widespread assumption that connected the 
integration of the continent with the emergence of the EU and its predecessors.29
27 Terje Tvedt et al., A History of Water, 3 vols. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).
28 schueler discusses at length the theoretical debates behind the issue of co-construction as well as exist-
ing historical literature on the topic; Judith schueler, Materializng Identity: The Co-Construction of the 
Gotthard Railway and Swiss National Identity (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), 28.
29 Thomas Misa and Johan schot, “Inventing Europe: Technology and the hidden Integration of Europe,” 
History & Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-19, here 3. see also Johan schot, “Transnational Infrastructures 
and the Origins of European Integration,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the 
Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas fickers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
82-112. 
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Misa and schot’s starting point was that the processes of integration (as well as 
fragmentation) on the continent began much earlier than the standard narrative 
on European integration suggests. Indeed, for instance, the integration of infra-
structures (including waterways) on the continent is a long-term process dating 
back to at least the mid-1800s. furthermore, integration processes were driven 
and performed with different visions of integration in mind, which means it is not 
possible to work with any “pre-defined” spatial or territorial concept of Europe. 
finally, transnational collaboration, which carried forward the integration pro-
cesses, was frequently pursued by non-state actors; in the field of technology, these 
were mostly expert networks whose activities were not fully under the control of 
national authorities. Therefore, while the role of nation states must not be under-
played, its assumed primacy does need to be questioned.
Misa and schot tried to direct the history of technology towards a study of 
the “emergence of Europe” in the twentieth century as an outcome of contested 
processes of linking and delinking infrastructures, and the circulation and appro-
priation of knowledge and artifacts. Emphasizing the non-theological character of 
the integration process, they proposed looking at the various technology develop-
ments as Europe-building practices, which enacted different and often conflict-
ing visions of Europe. Interpreting the linking and delinking in this way enables 
Figures 1.2 – The conflicting image of waterways as industrial highways and clean technology. The first image, used 
on the cover of the leaflet published by Ostrava mining company in 1966 to promote the construction of the canal 
emphasizes the industrial background landscape. The second photograph shows the Elbe meandering through 
Northern Bohemia around 1946. Source: Ostrava hledá přístup k moři (Ostrava Seeks Access to Sea, 1966, NAČR, 
FMZO, odd. 20, b. 65); NAČR, CPU, b. 96.
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the researcher to see the process of co-constructing European polity and identity. 
from this perspective, political post-war integration represented just one episode 
in the long-term process of the construction of Europe and one particular vision 
of Europe. 
This new vision on how to write European history drew on new developments 
in infrastructure studies. following the “transnational turn” that has taken place in 
historiography since the 1990s, historians of infrastructures have shifted their re-
search focus to the formation of transnational networks and systems. Until the late 
1990s, almost all the existing literature on infrastructures in Europe was confined 
to the national perspective and mostly offered accounts of negotiations among the 
perspectives and interests of great powers – namely, Germany, Britain, and france 
– thus excluding large parts of Europe.30
Over the past seven years or so, a distinctive body of literature on “transna-
tional infrastructures and the shaping of contemporary Europe” emerged, to 
which this research aims to contribute. historians connected with the Tensions 
of Europe research network have made significant contributions to this subfield 
of the history of infrastructures and the history of Europe. Erik van der Vleuten 
and Arne Kaijser edited a seminal collection concentrating on the infrastructural 
networking processes in Europe since the 1850s. They studied infrastructures such 
as the large technical system,31 based on the idea that infrastructures are complex 
entities consisting of technical artifacts, institutional and legislative frameworks, 
and other components.32 Although their study claimed to have a European focus, 
it nevertheless mainly included case studies from the western (in the Cold War 
sense) part of the continent.33 The book helped develop a new field and identified 
promising research sites – most prominently international organizations. 
A group of researchers based at Eindhoven University in the Netherlands 
launched a successor project (the TIE project) focusing directly on the role of 
transnational organizations in the development of European transport systems.34 
30 This shift to a transnational perspective was inspired by globalization studies and the concept of a 
networked society. Armand Mattelart, Networking the World, 1794-2000 (Minneapolis, Mn.: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000); Paul Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: force, Time, and social Organiza-
tion in the history of sociotechnical systems,” in Modernity and technology, ed. Thomas J. Misa, Philip 
Brey, and Andrew feenberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 185-226.
31 Erik van der Vleuten, “Understanding Networked societies: Two Decades of Large Technical systems 
studies,” in Networking Europe: transnational infrastructures and the shaping of Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Erik 
van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, History & Technology (sagamore Beach, MA: science history Publica-
tions, 2006), 279-314. 
32 Thomas Parke hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: 
Johns hopkins University Press, 1983).
33 Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, eds., Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the 
Shaping of Europe 1850-2000 (sagamore Beach, MA: science and history Publications, 2006).
34 The “Transnational Infrastructures and the rise of Contemporary Europe” research project has a well 
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This project studied organizations such as the European Conference of Transport 
Ministers (ECMT) or the Bureau International des Autoroutes as arenas in which 
international collaboration and transnational, “European” standards were articu-
lated and negotiated. These international organizations, which were dedicated to 
infrastructural integration, aimed to facilitate the construction of trans-border in-
terconnections and acted at continental or regional level as “system builders;” that 
is, crucial actors who aligned diverse interests and technical constraints towards 
realization of the integrated system. At these organizations, different interests – 
internationalist, nationalist and sectoral – were aligned and negotiated, together 
with diverging perceptions and visions of Europe. recently published results of-
fer an alternative history of European infrastructures not based on the idea of 
dominating nation states and their foreign policies or on tracing the prehistory of 
post-war EEC/EU common transport policy. They tell the story of the contested 
shaping of European systems and their governance.35
The study of European system builders revealed crucial aspects of the con-
struction of transnational infrastructural systems in Europe. The most critical 
factor in establishing the system involved setting common parameters. however, 
this was never simply a technical issue, as various social, cultural, and political 
factors usually come into play. The parameters comprised a set of measures aimed 
at facilitating the trans-border operation of a given infrastructural system. This 
not only required the simple material inter-linking of existing national or local/
regional systems and their technical compatibility, but also the establishment of 
transnational regulatory regimes.
furthermore, the negotiations at these various organizations also involved the 
scope of the integration; that is, the spatial extent of the network. To some degree, 
this was a consequence of negotiations with various conflicting interests and tech-
nological demands. Many European international organizations embodied and 
promoted a certain wider geopolitical agenda; typical examples are the ECMT or 
maintained and regularly updated website: http://www.tie-project.nl/. Accessed 2 May 2012.
35 The Eindhoven group produced a series of articles, edited volumes, and books (PhD theses). see, 
among others, Erik van Der Vleuten et al., “Europe’s system Builders: The Contested shaping of Trans-
national road, Electricity and rail Networks,” Contemporary European History 16, no. 3 (2007): 321-347. 
A special issue of Journal of Transport History entitled “European Infrastructures,” edited by Johan schot, 
28, no. 2 (2007); an edited volume by Alexander Badenoch and Andreas fickers, Materializing Europe: 
Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). And five 
monographs: Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity 
Networks, (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008); frank schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the 
Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008). Irene Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe: Transna-
tionalism and railways in the Interbellum (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); suzanne Lom-
mers, Europe – On Air: Interwar Projects for Radio Broadcasting (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2012); schueler, Materializng Identity: The Co-Construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss National 
Identity (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008). 
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Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), which operated on opposite 
sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War.
however, the politically induced territorial delimitation of the developed sys-
tem did not necessarily have the desired effect. Besides the official goals declared by 
the given international body, experts participating at these organizations pushed 
their own specific agenda, for which schot and Lagendijk coined the term “tech-
nocratic internationalism.” having to cope with two limitations – one concerning 
their actual capability to influence the general mission of these organizations and 
the other related to the minimal decision-making power of these organizations – 
experts had developed strategies to pursue their own interests. In particular, they 
attempted to present their agenda as purely technical in order to keep politicians 
and diplomats disinterested. These experts preferred to advance their own vision 
of the network, based on the presumption that inherent factors of each network-
technology should delimit the final shape of the network and not politics.36 This 
leads us to the question of how the present book contributes to this new historiog-
raphy on the co-construction of infrastructures and Europe.
Canal as a Laboratory of Europe
As indicated, the entire twentieth century has been marked by initiatives attempt-
ing to interconnect the Danube basin and Black sea ports via a waterway network 
to both the Baltic and North sea markets using a canal connection between the 
Morava, Oder, and Elbe. The DOE project promised to connect the three seas 
through the Moravian Gate, the lowest point of the watershed. In itself, this ge-
ographical position was a justifiable argument for constructing the canal. The 
Moravian Gate provided the most economical option for extending and intercon-
necting the three rivers and their inland navigation networks. from the perspec-
tive of European transnational system-builders, DOE was an obvious solution to 
the natural limitations of the region’s inland waterway network. 
however, DOE was developed at the junction of transnational system building 
and national network development. As the Moravian Gate is situated on Czech 
national territory, developers of the canal also had to take into account the na-
tional perspectives on the project. Nil Disco, in his analysis of transnational as-
pects of the West European waterway network construction identified the crucial 
problem they faced relating to a particular feature of waterways and especially 
36 Johan schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Eu-
rope on Motorway and Electricity Networks,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 196-217.
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trans-watershed canals: they incited conflict between those who controlled access 
to the sea and those who had the authority to extend the navigability of a certain 
river or a waterway system further inland. The former would profit greatly from 
the construction, while the latter would have to bear the costs.37 finding them-
selves in the latter position, Czech experts had to develop strategies for advertising 
and “selling” the canal as both a transnational and national project that would 
remain firmly embedded in Czechoslovak nation-building efforts. Therefore, this 
book does not concentrate on international organizations per se, but rather on the 
interaction between them and the national authorities in charge of construction 
and preparatory works. several scholars have shown that the tension and negotia-
tions visible in the negotiations at the (transnational) system builders’ level could 
also be fruitfully examined from the national perspective.38 
In the case of the DOE canal, transnational system builders used four different 
integration frameworks to legitimize the need for transnational integration at the 
time, each of which was linked to a specific vision of Europe: Mittel-Europeanization, 
Nazification, sovietization, and Europeanization. The frameworks represented not 
only distinctive spatial delimitations of the proposed waterway network, but also 
specific sets of values and ideas. They were not simply the products of transnational 
infrastructure network planners, but reflected existing political concepts of organ-
izing territories served by the projected canal. Broader political agendas blended 
with the creation of infrastructural networks. hence, transnational system build-
ing processes embodied both the deliberate and the unintentional materialization of 
specific political goals and their underlying cultural and social context.39
Coming back to the notion of co-construction, experts changed the canal de-
sign in response to discursive shifts in meanings – as a transport route binding 
territory, as flood protection control, as an axis of national economic development 
or a tool of sovietization. The experts reacted to specific cultural values attached to 
water and waterways by the ideological underpinning of different frameworks. At 
37 Cornelis Disco, “from sea to shining sea: Making Ends Meet on the rhine and the rhone,” in Ma-
terializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and 
Andreas fickers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 353-397.
38 Léonard Laborie, “A Missing Link? Telecommunications Networks and European Integration 1945-
1970,” in Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Erik 
van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, History & Technology (sagamore Beach, MA: science history Publica-
tions, 2006), 187-215; Gijs Mom, “roads without rails: European highway-Network Building and the 
Desire for Long-range Motorized Mobility,” Technology & Culture 46, no. 4 (2005): 745-772.
39 As far as deliberate use of such power is concerned, van Laak claimed that infrastructures acquire a 
certain flavor of the imperial. Besides connecting, they “also exclude and segregate and establish a new 
hierarchy.” Dirk van Laak, “Technological Infrastructure: Concepts and Consequences,” ICON. Journal of 
the International Committee for the History of Technology 2004, no. 10 (2004): 53-64, here 55. for a general 
discussion on the issue of materialization, see Tony Bennett and Patrick Joyce, Material Powers: Cultural 
Studies, History and the Material Turn (London: routledge, 2010). 
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the same time, the canal project operated not only as a mirror, but also as a carrier 
of these frameworks, as various activities undertaken by promoters of the project 
implicitly performed and re-produced values, ideas and visions inherent in the 
given framework.
The application of these frameworks also provides a form of periodization, each 
period starting with the emergence of a new framework. These periods resonate 
with general political history, although one must recognize that these frameworks 
often co-existed for some time. The first chapter deals with the framework labeled 
Mittel-Europeanization. In spatial terms, the notion is hard to define, though 
most contemporary authors agreed that it comprises the territories between the 
Danube, the rhine and the Vistula. On the one hand, the idea of Mitteleuropa 
represented the most ambitious version of German national territory, on the other 
hand regional articulation of the idea of Europe. In order to describe the integra-
tion process advanced in the name of Mitteleuropa and to cover both these mean-
ings of the concept, Mittel-Europeanization is given preference over its English 
translation – Central-Europeanization. since the 1870s, associations promoting 
the integration and standardization of transport networks in the area competed 
first with the imperial plans of Austria and Germany and later with Pan-European 
and national sentiments.
A different, racial form of Pan-Germanism dominated the Nazi period, and 
the territorial shape of the envisioned network switched to the ever-expanding 
German larger economic area, Grossraum. Chapter two deals with the process of 
Nazification; it is full of internal controversies, as signified by the discrepancy be-
tween Nazi ideology and its imperial ambitions. Unlike its predecessor, Nazification 
was enforced, though not strongly resisted. It aimed to create a Grossraum water-
way network, centralized and built according to prescribed standards, reaching 
from the Atlantic to the Black sea.
The third chapter focuses on the post-war socialist integration promoted by 
the new transnational system builder, Comecon. As the canal found itself on the 
Eastern side of the Iron Curtain, this period marked an introduction of soviet 
methods and practices. Therefore, it is fair to speak of the sovietization of the 
canal project. The notion of sovietization is rather ambiguous; here it is used to 
describe many different processes relating to the expansion of soviet style com-
munism. This consisted of general re-orientation towards the East, regarding both 
the spatial delimitation of the envisioned network and the image of water and 
waterways. This process did not go unchallenged and could hardly be compared 
to Nazification concerning its content and form of realization.
Concurrently with plans for a separate East European waterway network, the 
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United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (established in 1947) envisioned 
a pan-European network, which was later adopted by the EU. The Europeanization 
of the canal thus started almost simultaneously with its sovietization. Chapter four 
looks at the cooperation and joint planning performed across the seemingly Iron 
Curtain. While ideas on European integration had already appeared before World 
War II, only after 1947 did they lead to the formulation of a program for waterway 
integration. 
Each of the four frameworks represented a specific setting for interplay be-
tween national and transnational perspectives. Under every single framework, a 
new design was developed in an attempt to align the specific requirements of na-
tional representation with the specific vision of a transnational waterway network. 
Each chapter opens with more detailed historiographical surveys discussing every 
one of these frameworks and their ideological background. One reason for mov-
ing the thorough analysis of these concepts from the introduction to the chapters 
is the fundamentally different setting of these debates. 
This book aims to help re-incorporate the former communist part of Europe 
into the European history of infrastructures. The existing literature offers fairly 
thorough accounts of the processes of hidden integration in Western Europe. 
These analyses marginalize the developments in the Eastern bloc after World War 
II, almost as if they were non-European.40 This is somewhat paradoxical, given that 
the hidden integration concept explicitly attempts to overcome the preoccupation 
of European infrastructure studies with post-war Western political integration. 
This concept also calls for re-incorporating the East into the picture by challenging 
the firmness and impermeability of the Iron Curtain. The DOE project is a perfect 
case study for doing just that, situated as it is on the historical border between East 
and West.41 DOE constitutes a socio-technical laboratory on a small spatial scale, 
and at a junction uniting various visions of Europe. Despite a history full of inter-
ruptions, it has never disappeared from the agenda of both national and transna-
tional planners, which means it provides a relatively stable point from which to 
promote the hidden integration of a new Europe.
40 for the case of infrastructures, see: Van der Vleuten et al., “Europe’s system Builders”; Johan schot, 
“Building Europe on Transnational Infrastructures,” Journal of Transport History 28, no. 2 (2007): 167-171. 
Not explicitly applying the concept, but working in the same direction, Vleuten and Kaijser, Networking 
Europe.
41 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (stan-
ford, Calif.: stanford University Press, 1994).
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Sources
The simple fact that the canal has not yet been built, offers a unique opportunity 
to study how its design process reflected and interacted with the wider process 
of integration and fragmentation of Europe. Once enacted by law as part of the 
envisioned Austrian imperial waterway network, the canal retained its momen-
tum throughout the twentieth century. Mitteleuropean/Grossraumwirtschaft/
Comecon/European network planners always picked up the idea and built on ear-
lier attempts to construct the canal. As scholar Alec Badenoch put it, the outcome 
of past projects, visions, and fantasies smoothed the path for future construction, 
and the international cooperation in preceding periods leaves a lasting mark on 
future European planning.42 Viewing the twentieth-century history of the “dis-
course on Europe” through the lens of archival records of this single infrastruc-
tural project brings to the foreground all the fragmentation, disintegration, exclu-
sion, and conflicts in the process of long-term hidden integration in Europe. On 
the one hand, the DOE project suffered from the tension between national and 
transnational system building. On the other hand, it also benefited from the ex-
istence of these two perspectives, since it provided continuity of the canal idea at 
times when either national or transnational organizations lost interest.
There is a line in the British television series “Yes, Minister” in which the state 
secretary proposes to use “the marvelous winter” of 1967 as a convenient excuse 
for missing documentation on governmental expenditure. In that year, he says, 
“we lost no end of embarrassing files” in the floods.43 The analogously marvelous 
summer of 2002 could be blamed for a massive loss of sources on the history of 
the DOE. The Archives of the Czech National Technical Museum are only slowly 
recovering from the floods, as well as part of the library at the Prague Water 
research Institute and the Czech statistical Office, which I have visited in relation 
to this research. 
furthermore, archival work with relatively recent material in the Czech ar-
chives, while offering plenty of academic stimulation, is very time-consuming. In 
the mid-1980s, Milada Efmertová noted that she could not study the complete re-
cords of the state Planning Office (sPÚ 1949-1959) because materials were not yet 
42 see Badenoch’s account of the pre-war London-Istanbul road and its later realization as route E-5. 
Alexander Badenoch, “Touring Between War and Peace: Imagining the ‘Transcontinental Motorway’, 
1930-1950,” Journal of Transport History 28, no. 2 (2007): 192-401. In his article, Badenoch opposed the 
available historiography by exploring the road’s symbolic dimensions, interpreting it as a relative success 
because the discourses set to work on behalf of that project affected the later, completed visions and plans 
for European infrastructural building.
43 The quotation is from the episode “Yes Minister: The skeleton in the Cupboard (#3.3)” (1982).
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accessible.44 Twenty years later, the situation has only changed to a limited extent. 
since 1989, archival material and documents relating to communist repression 
have been made easily accessible, while other documentation from the communist 
period waits in deposits.45 Prague might be the only post-communist European 
capital where Comecon files are not available or put in order.46 It was only towards 
the last few months of this project that some crucial files became available, when 
Ministry of Transport papers (period after 1960) were transferred to the archives. 
On this subject, I would like to thank to the archivists of the National Archive in 
Prague, Miroslav Kunt and his colleague Bohuslav Brom, for their help in search-
ing through the archival groups not yet equipped with an inventory (some having 
just been moved from their original institutes).
The crucial archival group devoted entirely to the DOE, was established by a 
government resolution of 1952 to gather and store in one place documents re-
lated to the canal for possible future use. since then, the group currently stored at 
the Moravian Land Archive has been continually updated. At the Prague National 
Archive, I viewed the files of various ministries (such as the inter-war Czechoslovak 
Ministry of Trade and the socialist Ministry of foreign Trade) and those of the 
Directorate for Waterway Construction (1903-1949) and the Communist Party, as 
vital (and available) sources of post-war history.
Besides natural disasters and national history policies, also institutional 
changes complicated the search for material. National tension between Czechs 
and slovaks led to the Navigation Department of the Transport research 
Institute (VÚD) being transferred from Prague to Žilina (in slovakia), then to 
Bratislava, and finally partially back to Prague; all of this had disastrous effects 
on the material. While Bratislava VÚD stores some files from when it employed 
Jaroslav Kubec in the 1980s,47 the Czech Dopravní knihovna (Transport Library, 
former part of the Ministry of Transport, which stores most VÚD research re-
ports) offers only fragments. The files belonging to the socialist water structure 
44 Marcela Efmertová, “K institucionálnímu vývoji výzkumně-vývojové základny slaboproudé elektro-
techniky v Československu v letech 1945-1965,” Studie z dějin techniky, no. 1 (1988): 291-446, here 296.
45 such preoccupation has produced several undesired results. first, inaccessibility of materials on social 
and economic history complicates a full understanding of the communist period; secondly, in the light of 
the records of repressive apparatus the communist régime appears to be strong and well organized – which 
is at least disputable. see the Introduction in: Jiří Kabele and Martin hájek, Jak vládli? Průvodce hierar-
chiemi reálného socialismu, Knihy dokumenty (Brno: Doplněk, 2008), 11-13. for a more general critique of 
the prevailing totalitarian interpretation of the communist regime, see Michal Pullmann, “sociální dějiny a 
totalitněhistorické vyprávění,” Soudobé dějiny 15, no. 3-4 (2008): 703-717.
46 Based on my own research and archival visits and also on reliable information obtained from col-
leagues, I am assured that in sofia, Berlin, Warsaw, and Budapest, such documents are open to study and 
relatively easily available.
47 According to information from Mr. Žitňanský, this is mostly print documentation.
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designing agency hydroprojekt, are stored partly at NAČr in Prague, partly at 
MZA Brno (documents of hydroprojekt branch in Blansko). some files remained 
in the company archive of its successor, Pyöry Brno, and the surviving but now 
private hydroprojekt in Prague. While hydroprojekt engaged in canal planning 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, none of these firms could find anything on the 
subject in their archives (except “lists” of shredded materials).48 similarly, nothing 
survived at the archived materials of the Ministry of Agriculture, forestry, and 
Water Management, which was assigned the task of coordinating the governmen-
tal committee on the evaluation of the canal between 1968 and 1972.49 The lack of 
materials required an additional search for sources. My visit to the Archive of the 
Czech Academy of sciences proved particularly fruitful.
The only institute offering materials for virtually the entire period investigated 
is the Archive of the Ministry of foreign Affairs. Its materials covers the activities 
of Czechoslovak delegates in international organizations such as The League of 
Nations, Danube Commission, or the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE). I studied UNECE materials at the UNOG Archive in the Palace 
of Nations in Geneva. In order to obtain detailed information on technologi-
cal developments in inland navigation, I examined the Permanent International 
Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC) collection stored in Delft 
University of Technology’s library. 
As an auxiliary source, a set of interviews was conducted with engineers in-
volved in the DOE design process. Because the government halted the projects in 
1972 before detailed on-site works began, the group of direct participants remain-
ing since the 1940s is rather small. Among those interviewed were Messrs. Jaroslav 
Kubec, Evžen Polenka, and Václav Plecháč. Apart from state archives, many docu-
ments were from other sources, particularly after 1970, for which materials are 
rare and the general thirty-year rules apply. 
48 There are over 600 boxes of materials without any inventory at NAČr. None of hydroprojekt’s succes-
sive organizations kept any list of files handed in to the archive. filip Paulus of NAČr has been extremely 
helpful in locating files; nonetheless, all efforts were ultimately fruitless.
49 Information from archivist františek frňka (Department 4 of NAČr).
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Chapter 2  
Mittel-Europeanization on Waterways 
While a Central European railway network has been fully developed, every-
body has completely forgotten about the inland waterways. There the prob-
lem of the Central European Waterways arises.1
Looking at a standard map of what is now Europe, you would hardly notice any 
signs of a waterway network in the middle. A mountainous belt reaching from 
the swiss Alps through Bavaria and Czechoslovakia to the Carpathians forms a 
watershed that divides Europe without leaving much space for anything aspiring 
to be called “the Middle.”2 The watershed actually is the center; all other parts in-
evitably belong to either the river basin or the waterway systems. hence, the call 
to improve the unified Central European Waterway network was not so much a 
complaint about the state of affairs at the time, but an articulation of a vision of 
Central European integration in terms of waterways.
Other visionaries articulated the need to overcome the main continental 
watershed in a continental rather than regional context. Count Coudenhove-
Kalergi, the famous inter-war prophet of a united Europe, analyzed its spatial 
divisions. he identified two detached river basins as core regions dividing the 
continent into a western and an eastern part, the center of which was their inter-
section, which included the states whose territories drained both the rhine and 
the Danube. however, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that Europe became smaller 
after World War I, when the Ussr left the European scene, and the notion of 
Central Europe became redundant. Germany and switzerland joined the indus-
trial West (Industrie-Europa) and Austria moved to the agrarian Danubian East 
(Korn-Europa). Applying the watershed metaphor, Coudenhove-Kalergi spoke of 
a Rhein-Europa and a Donau-Europa.3
1 It reads better in German: Daraus entsteht das mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenproblem. Elemér hantos, 
“Einleitung: Mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenpolitik,” in Mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenpolitik: Referate 
und Beschlüsse der Mitteleuropäischen Wasserstrassenkonferenz, Budapest, 11.-13. Mai 1929, ed. Elemér 
hantos (Vienna: Braumüller, 1929), 1-10, here 2.
2 Even fifty years later, engineer hoblík stated that regarding navigation regulations, “the Danube and the 
Elbe are two different worlds;” report on the Czechoslovak waterway program for UNECE August 15, 1955. 
(AMZV, MO-OMO, box 65).
3 richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, “rhein und Donau,” Paneuropa 7, no. 10 (1931): 285-290, here 287.
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The most striking feature of the concept of the Central European waterway 
network was indeed its material non-existence. Professor Elemér hantos of the 
University of Budapest made this point clear at the opening of the Mitteleuropäische 
Binnenschiffahrtkonferenz in Budapest in 1929. hantos defined Central Europe as 
the area consisting of the river-basins of the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, Weser, rhine, 
and the (disconnected) Danube.4 The Danube waterway, disconnected from all 
other river basins in the region, remained underdeveloped compared to the rhine. 
however, hantos’ conclusion differed from Coudenhove-Kalergi. In his speech, 
the hungarian economist identified an engineering challenge that, if taken up, 
would help create a Central Europe. he called for the construction of artificial 
navigation canals, because “the dominant position of the Danube in the Central 
European transport system is contingent on the establishment of a waterway net-
work interconnecting the Central European river basins.”
The hungarian economist wed the construction of the infrastructure to a po-
litical program for an integrated Central Europe. he urged the quick realization 
of the plans for the Danube-Oder-Elbe (DOE) and rhine-Main-Danube (rMD) 
canals, considering both links crucial for a Central European waterway network. 
Once realized, these would enhance the riparian states’ economies, thereby but-
tressing the region’s overall prosperity. Both men believed that modern transport 
infrastructures induce “time-space convergence of neighboring countries,” which 
must be followed by political rapprochement to avoid conflicts.5 Transport issues 
were typically emphasized features of the proposed transnational cooperation 
schemes because everybody perceived them as apolitical and mutually profitable. 
While formulated in contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe, hantos’ pro-
gram for regional integration represented a particular application and form of the 
integrative processes in Europe; we should not dismiss it as negative or a blind al-
ley. This chapter will illustrate the use of the canal designing process as a platform 
for negotiating the varying Central-European integration framework.
On Mittel-Europeanization
The idea of Central Europe is an extremely slippery concept. The difficulty lies 
in the discursive qualities of the seemingly descriptive geographic notion. It is 
heavily laden with hidden connotations and political agendas. Accordingly, his-
torians have argued that Central Europe should be understood exclusively as a 
4 hantos, “Einleitung: Mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenpolitik,” 1. 
5 richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Evropa (Prague: Panevropa, 1993), 18.
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normative category, expressing a specific ambition.6 some even suggest that noth-
ing like Central Europe actually exists.7 The ambivalence is clearly articulated in 
the contemporary linguistic opposition of the two notions of Central Europe. 
While Central Europe (or Střední Evropa) translates into German as Mitteleuropa, 
scholars have discouraged using the terms interchangeably, at least since 1945. 
The literature associates the image of Mitteleuropa with German imperialism. In 
contrast, střední Evropa in Czech discourse generally has a positive connotation.8 
robin Okeye sought to overcome its ideological use by defining the term as a spa-
tially dynamic historical region; as a framework of interaction:
[A] transitional zone of mountains, basins and counter-flowing river sys-
tems, shaping a pattern of ethnic splintering implausible in the vast plains 
of the continental east or extensive peninsulas of the Atlantic west … Over 
against this ethnic kaleidoscope, the German people was able to consoli-
date itself, before moving south-east and east ...9 
In so doing, Okeye demarcated tidal Central Europe (or Mitteleuropa) as the lands 
and peoples whose fortunes have been “crucially bound up with Germany’s.”10 
While such a definition removes some problems for historians and provides a 
methodologically acceptable definition of Central Europe as an analytical cate-
gory, it also abstracts from the normative visions and projects the idea of Central 
Europe far back into history, before the idea even emerged. Understandably per-
haps, the shift of meaning, out of its historical original context, is not acceptable 
to most historians. 
6 This term often serves as a carrier of undeclared political agendas. Proclaiming a given area or country as 
a “center” either means freeing it from the (backward) East or incorporating it into the German “sphere.” 
for analyses of such instrumental usage of the term by intellectuals and historians trying to promote 
the idea of the Great Germany or de-orientalize former communist countries, see (among others): Peter 
Bugge, “The Use of the Middle: Mitteleuropa vs. stredni Evropa,” European Review of History 6, no. 1 
(1999): 15-35; steffen höhne, “Mitteleuropa. Zur konzeptuellen Karriere eines kulturpolitischen Begriffs,” 
Bohemia 41, no. 2 (2000): 279-294; Jacques Le rider, Mitteleuropa: Auf den Spuren eines Begriffes: Essay 
(Vienna: Deuticke, 1994).
7 such an attitude often mocks the paradoxical division of the continent into two halves: the West and the 
Center. The most famous expression of such a vision was found in the works of hungarian historian Peter 
hanak. While most of his colleagues agreed that if Central Europe as a region did exist, it only did so in 
terms of cultural proximity, hanak argued that such proximity is not generally perceived and the idea of 
the “center” works only to distance itself from the East. Peter hanak, “Gab es eine Mitteleuropäisch Iden-
tität in der Geschichte?” Europäische Rundschau 14, no. 1 (1986): 115-123.
8 Bugge, “The Use of the Middle.”
9 robin Okey, “Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions,” Past and Present 137 (1992): 
102-133, here 105.
10 When the notion of Central Europe appears in this text as an analytical description (therefore not 
explicitly linked with authors and bearers of a particular perspective on the subject), I refer to Okeye’s 
definition. Ibid., 106.
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Most historical studies present Mitteleuropa as a German nationalist articu-
lation of the idea of Europe, and are predominantly concerned with its intri-
cate relationship with German nationalism. scholars have generally considered 
Mitteleuropa as a form of the Grossdeutsch conception of German national terri-
tory. from this point of view, the German project of Central European integration 
is often described as antithetical to the peaceful process of international European 
integration after 1945.11 Only recently has attention been paid to the existence 
of Central European integration before World War II that has not been partial 
to German hegemonic enterprise. Other studies have taken a different approach, 
exploring the existence or reproduction of transnational structures and ties. 
however, these studies use nation states as the unit of analysis instead of following 
the chosen structure.12 This can be partly attributed to the “floating borders” of the 
region and its modern division into East Central Europe and its largely forgotten 
western counterpart, and partly to the domination of national shaping of history.13
In order to overcome the conceptual and linguistic ambiguities of the concept, 
this book adopts the approach advanced by historians Johan schot and Thomas 
Misa when studying the process of Europeanization. They propose to focus on 
social actors’ definitions.14 from this point of view, the Mitteleuropa/Stredni 
Evropa dichotomy is a struggle between various actors and shaping the future spa-
tial and political organization of the area. Attempts to construct Central Europe/
Mitteleuropa as part of the broader integration processes can be labeled Mittel-
Europeanization. This term is part of the formation of Europe and its specific re-
alization on a smaller spatial scale. There are three key reasons to prefer “Mittel-
Europeanization” over “Central-Europeanization”: first, the term represents the 
crucial role of German culture in the process; second, and more specifically, it 
combines the two facets of the process: simultaneous building of a transnational 
11 Delanty interpreted Mitteleuropa as “anti-Europe,” in terms of an identity project opposing the ideas of 
the European Union. similarily, Elvert saw the hegemonic Mitteleuropa project as antithetical to the liberal 
Europe of post-war European federalists. Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (New 
York: st. Martin’s Press, 1995), 131; Jürgen Elvert, Mitteleuropa!: Deutsche Pläne zur europäischen Neuord-
nung (1918-1945), historische Mitteilungen, 35 (stuttgart: f. steiner, 1999), 392-393.
12 A typical example is the analysis of trade patterns in Danubian states after the breakup of the habsburg 
Empire. The authors simply reconstruct the Danubian monarchy on the territorial grid of the successor 
states without actually examining the Donauraum or Mitteleuropa as historical regions. They concluded 
that historically developed trade patterns proved highly resistant to changes in political borders and 
alliances, and the region remained closely integrated in economic terms throughout the interwar years, 
despite fierce political conflicts. stefan Karner, Ingrid Kubin, and Michael steiner, “Wie real war ‘Mit-
teleuropa’? Zur wirtschaftlichen Verflochtenheit des Donauraumes nach dem ersten Weltkrieg,” Viertel-
jahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 74, no. 2 (1987): 153-185.
13 The division of Central Europe was elaborated by Polish emigré historian Oskar halecki in the 1950s. 
Oskar halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History (London; New York: sheed & Ward, 1950).
14 Thomas Misa and Johan schot, “Inventing Europe: Technology and the hidden Integration of Europe,” 
History & Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-19.
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region and German nation state; and third, it emphasizes that this regional inte-
gration frame was not just an evolutionary stage of European integration, but also 
its alternative.
Before moving to the history of the canal, it is useful to delve deeper into the 
various historical interpretations which this chapter explores. The idea of Central 
Europe emerged as an integrative concept in the early nineteenth century. German 
geographer August Zeune coined the term “Mitteleuropa” (Central Europe) in 
1808 simply to describe the area between the Mediterranean and the North sea. 
After the Napoleonic Wars, however, intellectuals started to divide the continent 
into the civilized Atlantic West and the semi-barbarian backward East. By this time, 
the idea of the center lost its value-neutrality.15 In 1810, an influential member of 
the emerging German national movement, friedrich Ludwig Jahn, referencing the 
recently (1804) abolished holy roman Empire, called for the establishment of a 
new German Empire in the geographical area between france and russia. Jahn felt 
that the center, freed of the two superpowers on the East and West, represented the 
natural territory of the German nation state.16 When in 1866 Otto von Bismarck 
established the kleindeutsch alternative to the German national territory, it tempo-
rarily closed discussions about the grossdeutsch (Central European) option. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, however, the idea gained new momentum in the 
form of German imperialism.
Three decades after Jahn, economist friedrich List famously formulated a vi-
sion of German economic hegemony over the Eastern part of the continent based 
on a central-periphery pattern of Europe.17 he identified the European East as an 
open “frontier” of the German settlement, analogous to the British colonies or 
the American West. While addressing the possibility of German expansion to the 
east of Europe, he proposed that the regions east of the hungarian border, includ-
ing the entire Black sea, be chained to the Mutterland and to each other by the 
network of railways and waterways.18 List felt that such infrastructural unification 
15 On the origins of such orientalisation of Eastern Europe (the discursive construction of Eastern Europe 
as inferior to the West), see Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of 
the Enlightenment (stanford, Calif.: stanford University Press, 1994).
16 There is no general consensus regarding the first use of the term. Geographers argue it was first used by 
their colleague A. Zeune (1808), while Jahn is generally acknowledged as having knotted together all three 
constitutive layers of the concept: German Nationalism; the idea of the centre as being superior to the 
margins (east or west); and European geography. hans-Dietrich schultz and Wolfgang Natter, “Imagining 
Mitteleuropa: Conceptualisations of ‘Its’ space In and Outside German Geography,” European Review of 
History 10, no. 2 (2003): 273-292, here 275; Le rider, Mitteleuropa, 49.
17 List considered German leadership to be a natural result of the cultural and economic superiority of 
Germans over slavs; he did not operate with notions of racial or ethnic predispositions. Bo stråth, “Mit-
teleuropa: from List to Naumann,” European Journal of Social Theory 11, no. 2 (2008): 171-183, here 176.
18 Elvert, Mitteleuropa!, 23. In his opus magnum, published in 1841, List addressed the role of infrastruc-
tures, such as “improved river navigation, improved highways, steam navigation and railways,” which he 
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would lead to the establishment of a deutsch-ungarischer Wirtschaftsraum (eco-
nomic area) between the North, Baltic, and Black seas; that is, the seas that the 
DOE canal also sought to connect.19
The rise in publications dealing with central-European themes reached its 
peak at the outbreak of the World War I when friedrich Naumann published his 
Mitteleuropa (Central Europe). According to Naumann and officials of the two 
Central European Empires, the war coalition helped amalgamate the region.20 
however, the outcome of the war and the Paris Peace Conference rendered their 
visions of union between Germany and Austria-hungary irrelevant.
from the very beginning, however, the German Mitteleuropa project not only 
mobilized integrative forces and produced processes that led to closer cooperation 
and the creation of integrated space. It simultaneously spurred resistance and na-
tionalist isolationism on the part of the non-German people inhabiting the area. 
In the 1840s, Czech historian and politician františek Palacký responded to List 
and Jahn’s visions by designing a concept of regional cooperation based on the 
transformation of the Austro-hungarian Empire into a federalized system to en-
sure small nations’ rights of self-determination and protect them from enforced 
Germanization.21 revival of the concept of Mitteleuropa within German public 
discourse in the early years of World War I gave birth to the so-called “fear of 
Mitteleuropa.” That fear, representative of the region’s small nations was relayed to 
the Allies.22
By the end of World War I, three basic Central European integration concepts 
competed for the future organization of the area. The “long” nineteenth century 
gave birth to a wide range of German Mitteleuropa projects, ranging from the lib-
eral federative visions of List and Naumann to the explicitly imperial conception 
believed to “constitute the fundamental elements of improved systems of agriculture and of civilization;” 
friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (London; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1909), paragraph I.X.8.
19 henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945 (The hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1955), 12.
20 friedrich Naumann, Central Europe (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1917), 1-5. Even the military plans of the 
two Empires reflected growing Mitteleuropean sentiments. Petr Prokš, “Projekt ‘německé’ Mitteleuropy ve 
válečných plánech Německa a rakouska-Uherska (1914-1916),” Slovanský Přehled 88, no. 4 (2002): 473-
498. 
21 In his influential treatise published in 1865 as a set of journal articles, Palacký envisioned the future 
political role of the habsburg monarchy in securing the existence of small nations and their natural equal 
rights. františek Palacký, Idea státu rakouského (Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého, 2002).
22 Meyer coined the notion of the “fear of Mitteleuropa” when he accused representatives of small nations 
at the Paris Peace Conference, primarily the Czechoslovak delegates Masaryk and Beneš, of exaggerating 
the significance of the more-or-less innocent dreams of a few Germans and turning them into a collective 
nightmare. Meyer noted that “mistaken conceptions and fears of an era, or a people, can be as influen-
tial in determining the course of history as political or economic facts.” Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German 
Thought, 344.
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related to Jahn’s visions, which survived within right wing intellectual circles until 
the Nazis incorporated it in their foreign policy.23 In 1917, Czech politician and 
philosopher Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk responded to German ambitions from a 
“slavonic standpoint,” proposing a union of nations between the major powers 
of russia and Germany. After World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, the 
centuries-old economic ties throughout the former habsburg Empire transformed 
into the idea of Donauraum. This concept became especially popular in the former 
imperial centers of Vienna and Budapest. Voices suggested that regional coopera-
tion in the area between france, Turkey, and russia should be integrated within 
the broader pan-continental or universal framework of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
Pan-Europe or the League of Nations.
Most historical writings on Central European integration visions of the inter-
war era present a single narrative of failure.24 Echoing the metaphor used by Czech 
historian Jan Křen, historical literature often depicts Central Europe as a “region 
of vain federalization.”25 Inter-war Mitteleuropeanists have been marginalized as 
historically insignificant due to lack of success in their endeavors. To some extent, 
historiography uncritically overtakes the perspective and views held by contempo-
rary actors – mainly representatives of nation states. Typical in this sense is hantos’ 
evaluation and his activities in a report for the Czechoslovak Minister of foreign 
Affairs from the late 1920s and in current historiography.26 from a national view-
point, these mitteleuropeanists were indeed an insignificant group of eccentrics. 
They lacked any actual influence and achieved nothing of their program.
23 Mommsen actually built his narrative on the history of the idea of Mitteleuropa in pre-World War I 
Germany around such duality. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, “Die Mitteleuropaidee und die Mitteleuropapla-
nungen im Deutschen reich vor und während des Ersten Weltkrieges,” in Mitteleuropa-Konzeptionen in 
der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. richard G. Plaschka, horst haselsteiner, and Arnold suppan 
(Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995), 3-24.
24 Many reviewers of volumes on the interwar visions of Europe and Central European federation plans 
questioned the actual significance of such ideas and initiatives, given their minimal achievements and re-
sults. several works addressing the issue from national/international perspectives have appeared recently. 
heinz Duchhardt and Malgorzata Morawiec, eds., Vision Europa: Deutsche und Polnische Föderationspläne 
des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2003); heinz Duchhardt and István Németh, 
eds., Der Europa-Gedanke in Ungarn und Deutschland in der Zwischenkriegszeit (Mainz: P. von Zabern, 
2005); Marta Goňcová, ed., Střední Evropa a evropská integrace (Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2006). 
25 Jan Křen, Dvě století střední Evropy (Prague: Argo, 2005), 23.
26 In his report to Prague, hugo Vavrečka, the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Vienna (1925-1932), charac-
terized hantos as an extremely ambitious person who supported Central European integration in order to 
“get some official position” and whose activities “are of no special significance.” from a transport history 
perspective, Czech economic historian Ivan Jakubec appreciated hantos’ plans to solve the critical situa-
tion at a multilateral level, but noted that they were “unacceptable” for most successor states. Letter from 
Vavrečka (AMZV, odb.IV, b. 1095, september 11, 1929); Ivan Jakubec, Železnice a Labská plavba ve střední 
Evropě, 1918-1938. Dopravněpolitické vztahy Československa, Německa a Rakouska v meziválečném období 
(Prague: Karolinum, 1997), 56.
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Through the lens of the DOE canal, however, we can study the integration pro-
moters’ activities from a transnational rather than a national perspective. In his 
pleas for trans-border cooperation among Central European peoples, friedrich 
Naumann proposed a list of transnational common policies, such as joint boards 
for railways and the control of rivers. however, he noted that instead of all the 
common policies, such a list should contain those few areas that remain under 
national control.27 In the light of the history of European integration, the impor-
tance of Mitteleuropa resides in the relationship between various forms of Central-
Europeanism and other integration frameworks and efforts. 
here, we again encounter the basic dichotomy of the history of Mitteleuropa: 
either a specific variety of the German nation-building process or a stage in the 
history of European integration. In 1955, henry Cord Meyer challenged the as-
sumption of a direct link between the Nazi idea of Grossraumwirtschaft and the 
German idea of Mitteleuropa. Meyer saw the 1871 establishment of the German 
Empire as a time of birth; the year 1918 and the Paris Treaty as the death of the 
idea, before it was revived in 1933 in a mutated racist version.28
recent contributions to the debate have concluded that there were intellectual 
and personal links between Mitteleuropa and Nazi ideology. Jürgen Elvert em-
phasizes the point by correlating it to the rather dated Meyer volume. Elvert drew 
a clear line of continuity for the idea throughout the 1920s, presenting a picture 
of the century-long development of the two-fold German Mitteleuropa concep-
tion from the early nineteenth century until the end of the Third reich. from 
the point of view of integration history, Elvert devoted a large part of his book 
to evidence that the inter-war Mitteleuropa thinkers (both federalists and racists) 
deserve no credit for the federalization process that took place after World War II; 
the federal structure they proposed was an implicitly non-democratic totalitarian 
folk-alliance.29 similarly, Bo strath recently suggested the link between Naumann’s 
otherwise liberal Mitteleuropa and the national socialist ideology by singling out 
the attempted bringing together of nation (in the meaning of state – Kaiserreich) 
and society (Volk – the actual nation) in a form that appealed to the Nazis.30
from an infrastructural perspective, Mittel-Europeanization seems to be a 
hidden, projected integration of the area between the rhine, the Vistula, and the 
27 Naumann, Central Europe, 31.
28 Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought, 291-325.
29 Elvert, Mitteleuropa!, 392-393. Mazower, on the other hand, saw continuities between the two, or more 
precisely between the German Neurodnung visions of Europe and post-war Europeanism. Most notable 
is the Europakreis club, where architects of post-war Europe such as Ludwig Erhard met with leading Nazi 
economists. Indeed, one’s position depends on his or her general perspective – Mitteleuropean or Euro-
pean. Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis ruled Europe (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 571.
30 stråth, “Mitteleuropa,” 182-183.
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Danube. That process started in the late nineteenth century. While the Mitteleuropa 
concept had not been adopted by the Kaiserreich as a political doctrine, it had be-
come increasingly associated with elements of imperialist thinking. In 1904, the 
Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftsverein (Central European Economic Association) 
was founded as a pressure group aiming to impose an informal German Empire 
over south-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, followed by the Near East and even-
tually even the far East; these areas were to be dominated gradually, first in eco-
nomic terms and later in political and military terms.31 Nonetheless, the single 
result was the construction of the famous Baghdad railway.32 A growing number 
of competing integration concepts characterized the inter-war period. After the 
initial era saw stabilization of the new successor states, the need for broader eco-
nomic cooperation led to various visions and cooperation projects in the region. 
however, the rise of National socialism in Germany caused liberal Mitteleuropa 
plans to give way to a non-democratic and racist perspective on the organization 
of Central Europe. 
Building Mitteleuropa on Waterways before Versailles
At the conclusion of World War I, rudolf Kjellén presented a solution to the press-
ing question of Europe.33 The swedish social scientist and author of probably “the 
most circulated geopolitical work through history,” opened his 1917 essay entitled 
Problem of the Three Rivers by showing how the unhappy fate of the continent 
has been inseparably intertwined with the course of three streams: the Vistula, 
the rhine, and the Danube. Kjellén identified these rivers as crucial friction lines 
(Reibungsfläche) that divided Europe into three distinctive cultural areas. To the 
west of the rhine lies the territory of the romans; to the south of the Danube is 
the Balkans, with its strong oriental influence; and to the east of the Vistula lie 
the vast plains of russia.34 however, the ongoing war brought a solution to these 
permanent tensions. A fourth independent region finally emerged in the formerly 
31 Agreements on customs and direct foreign investments were seen as the carriers of economic ties, 
which would eventually lead to political and military dependence on Germany. Mommsen, “Die Mit-
teleuropaidee.”
32 sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2010).
33 Between 1914 and 1935, Kjellén’s Grossmaechte der Gegenwart was published twenty-five times in 
Germany. Ola Tunander, “swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century: rudolf Kjellén’s ‘The state as a 
Living Organism’,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 3 (2001): 451-463, here 451.
34 rudolf Kjellén, “Das Problem der drei flusse. Geopolitische Konturen,” in Deutschland, aber wo liegt 
es?: Deutschland und Mitteleuropa: Analysen und historische Dokumente, ed. hans Ester, hans hecker, and 
Erika Poettgens (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: rodopi, 1993), 117-146, here 121-123.
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unstable no-man’s land in the middle. In Kjellén’s view, the war-induced coales-
cence between Austria-hungary and the German Empire produced the situation 
that solved the problem of Europe – “and this situation is Mitteleuropa.”35
Kjellén felt that such a connection was not just an abstract sum of invisible 
ties. he saw Mitteleuropa materializing in the form of the trans-watershed canal, 
linking the river basins of the three rivers into a single network. Kjellén believed 
that the DOE canal, launched by the 1901 Austrian Water Act, had the capacity 
not only to establish a coherent Central European Waterway network by intercon-
necting the distantly separated and isolated river basins, but also to co-produce a 
stable and sustainable core region in the heart of the continent. Kjellén believed 
the scheme had already been solved technically and theoretically and was close 
to final realization, given the intimate political relations between Germany and 
Austria at that time. In the canal project, Kjellén saw “technology, economy and 
politics” coming into close interplay in a final step in the process of regionalization 
in Europe.36
from Kjellén’s determinist “organic state” position, the German-led unification 
of the continent through waterways seemed inevitable. A harmonious march of 
technology, economy, and politics would, in the foreseeable future, inevitably lead 
to the coalescence of the space between france, russia, and Turkey. As determined 
by its geography, ethnography and economy, this space would be, if not governed, 
then certainly dominated by Germans. 
Kjellén had the facts right. In 1917, Central Europe was divided into the sepa-
rate river basins of the Danube, the rhine, and the Vistula, with the Oder and 
Elbe lying between the rhine and the Vistula. There were also activities in mo-
tion that aimed to interconnect these rivers in a coherent network. The so-called 
“renaissance of Canals,” fueled  by the re-discovered competitiveness of inland 
waterborne transport, and simultaneously by the symbolic power of water routes 
(as expressed by Kjellén), had been brought about in the last decades of the nine-
teenth century and led to demands for unification and cooperation on a larger 
scale.37 In 1873, Zentralverein für Hebung der deutschen Fluß- und Kanalschifffahrt 
35 Kjellén’s analysis is actually more detailed and complex and, especially in the case of the Danube, he 
acknowledges it is not a simple interracial/cultural border. Ibid., 129.
36 Ibid., 127. Kjellén was not alone in ascribing considerable powers to rivers. Other scholars such as 
Eugeniusz romer, the founder of Polish geography (and geopolitics), have acknowledged the role of rivers 
in the formation of national territory at that time. It had much to do with the concept of natural (and 
cultural) borders developed by the source of Kjellén’s inspiration, friedrich ratzel, and further developed 
by his disciple Karl haushofer. Eugeniusz romer, Rola rzek w historyi i geografii narodów (Lwów: privately 
printed, 1901).
37 Gerald Crompton, “‘The Tortoise and the Economy’: Inland Waterway Navigation in International 
Economic history,” Journal of Transport History 25, no. 2 (2004): 1-22, here 15.
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(later Zentral Verein für Deutschen Binnenschiffahrt, ZVfB) organized a congress 
of hydraulic engineers that witnessed the first attempts to unify standards of canal 
construction and administration of waterways in the recently established German 
national territory.38 Consequently, the length of waterways in Germany doubled 
between 1875 and 1914.39
38 Leo sympher, “Abmessungen neuer hauptwasserstraßen,” Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung 38, no. 7-8 
(1918): 30-35.
39 In the late nineteenth century, waterways in central Europe experienced a “renaissance” that peaked in 
Germany between 1895-1905 when waterborne transport grew faster than either the production of coal 
or railways. Prussia, like Austria, was a latecomer to this trend due to the strong position of its agricultural 
producers. Andreas Kunz, “The Performance of Inland Navigation in Germany, 1835-1935,” in Inland 
navigation and Economic Development in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. Andreas Kunz and John Arm-
strong (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1995), 47-78, here 54.
Figure 2.1 – In 1881, Galician industrialist Romuald Coppieters mapped all the existing and 
planned waterways in Europe, demonstrating the clear contrast between East and West: a dense 
versus a less developed waterway network. As the title of his map suggests, Coppieters projected 
the German notion of Mitteleuropa on the waterway network, with the West representing every-
thing west of Germany, and the rest as the Center with open eastern borders. Source: Romuald 
Coppieters de Tergonde, Neu projectirte Canalbauten, Schiffahrtsverbindungen durch Ausbau 
eines Donau-Oder, San-Dniester, und Moldau-Elbe-Donau-Canals und deren volkswirthschaftli-
che Bedeutung für Oesterreich-Ungarn (Vienna: published privately, 1881).
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A decade later, the first meeting of the Permanent International Navigation 
Congresses (PIANC) took place in Brussels in 1885. The sessions focused in part 
on standardizing the basic parameters of the envisioned trans-continental network. 
however, what first appeared as a technical task – namely, the design of a uniform 
vessel for future trans-watershed canals – proved to be a highly political issue. A lo-
cal boat type had evolved in each river basin and delegates tended to pursue their par-
ticular local interests. The PIANC resolutions first recommended the french 370t type 
and then, soon thereafter, the German 400t vessels (1886 Vienna). The hosts simply 
dominated the debate: what seemed optimal in 1885 at a congress in Brussels found 
little support a year later in Vienna.40 
German influence not only dominated PIANC, but naturally also at a regional level. 
The “renaissance of Canals” spilled over to neighboring states. Waterways re-appeared 
on the Austrian government’s agenda in 1893, when the Ministry of Trade in Vienna 
established a Department for research and Construction of Canals. The German in-
fluence was clear when the terms and conditions of the competition were established 
for the Danube-Vltava canal project issued the same year. The parameters required 
vessels with a cargo carrying capacity of around 600t, the same as those the German 
authorities had chosen earlier for the Dortmund-Ems Canal and Mittellandkanal.41 
The activity of the new office culminated in 1901 when the Austrian Parliament 
issued its Waterways Act. The document outlined an imperial waterway system that 
promised to make the Danube the realm’s main transport artery. The proposed net-
work aspired to reach as far as the Dniester, thus linking even the most distant regions 
of the Austrian part of the dual monarchy (Cisleithania) to the coherent network. Not 
surprisingly, the standards chosen by the Danubian monarchy were those that com-
plied with the Danubian 675t vessels. 
The DOE formed a core for the entire scheme. Paradoxically the plan remained 
disconnected from the Oder. following the constraints of imperial geography, after 
overcoming the watershed between the Baltic and Black seas through the Moravian 
Gate, the canal route turned eastwards along the isohypse towards the Vistula river 
basin and the city of Cracow in Austrian Galicia, instead of descending to the German 
Oder. While the law governing the project listed the connection between the Danube 
and the Oder, what Austrian authorities pursued in practice should actually be called 
the Danube-Vistula canal.42
40 Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses, Programmes of the Proceedings, Names 
of the Reporters, Suggestions and Conclusions of XII International Navigation Congresses 1885-1912 (Brus-
sel: Office of the secretary General, 1913), 7, 19.
41 Jan Kaftan, “Geschichtliches, gegenwärtige Lage, technische und wirthschaftliche Bedeutung des Pro-
jekts,” in Das Donau-Moldau-Elbe-Kanalprojekt (Berlin: siemenroth und Troschel, 1897), vol. 1, 11. 
42 Moravian engineer smrček rearticulated his vision of the DOE in order to align it with official policy 
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   38 11/5/2012   1:33:44 PM
 Mittel-Europeanization on Waterways  39
Likewise, the lavishly designed inland navigation development program sanc-
tioned by the Prussian Waterways Act of 1905 failed to link the Austrian Danube-
Vistula canal. The Act actually set the parameters for canalizing the upper Oder 
in a way that effectively compromised the possible future realization of the DOE 
interconnection.43 While Austrian coal miners did not want to open the Viennese 
market to Prussian and silesian competitors, the Prussians analogously protected 
Berlin. In fact, the Act even incorporated the canalization of the Oder up to the 
port of Kozle (Cosel in German). It sought to balance more substantial invest-
ments in the western part of the country, especially the construction of the link 
between the rhine and Berlin (and the Elbe), the Mittelandkanal.44
and referred to the Elbe branch of the DOE as the Pardubice-Cracow canal. Antonín smrček, Der Par-
dubitz-Prerau-Krakauer-Kanal und seine Zusammenhang mit dem Donau-Oder-Kanal von Anton Smrček 
(Berlin: Troschel, 1904).
43 While the Act authorized the construction of the Mittellandkanal connecting Berlin to rhine for 1000t 
vessels, and generally applied the Dortmund-Ems 600t standard (Berlin-sttetin connection), the dimen-
sions for the upper Oder were limited to 450t. hans-Joachim Uhlemann, “Kurfürst – Könige – Kaiser: 
Eine kurz gefasste Geschichte des Wasserstraßenbaus der hohenzollern,” Navalis 2, no. 2 (2005): 4-15, here 
13-14; Martin Eckoldt, Flüsse und Kanäle: Die Geschichte der deutschen Wasserstrassen (hamburg: DsV-
Verlag, 1998), 285-287.
44 Georg Gothein, a member of the Prussian Diet and a representative of silesian industry in various wa-
terway initiatives, repeatedly criticized the marginalization of Eastern parts of Germany (East Prussia and 
Upper silesia) in the state investment and transport policy. Alastair P. Thompson, Left Liberals, the State, 
and Popular Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 320.
Figure 2.2 – The 1901 Austrian Waterways Act proposed constructing an imperial network in Cisleithania. The 
red line indicates the planned canals. The DOE, here the Danube-Vistula canal, starts at Vienna, then heads north 
before splitting into the Elbe and Vistula branches. The system was designed to connect the major cities in the 
Austrian part of the dual monarchy: Bohemian Prague via the Danube-Vltava canal, Galician Lemberg, Cracow, 
Linz, and Vienna. Source: ATMB, Smrček, b. 136.
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such incompatibility of waterway development projects occurred despite ini-
tiatives to unify regional networks. In 1896, ZVfB became “Mittel-Europeanized.” 
It began to gather local and national organizations that supported either indi-
vidual canal projects or other navigational improvements in the German and 
Austrian Empires in order to develop a program for a transnational network in the 
region. The initiative resulted  in the establishment of the independent Deutsch-
Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Verband für Binnenschiffahrt (DOUV), which consti-
tuted a communication platform for experts and interest groups and a regional 
counterpart to the universal (albeit rather European) PIANC.45 Leading Prussian 
45 Of the 37 governments subscribing to PIANC in the pre-war era, 21 were European and some were 
colonies (particularly french). The even stronger domination of Europeans among the list of participants 
Figure 2.3 – “While the German and Austrian imperial plans for a waterway network recognized the interna-
tional character of the Danube and Elbe, they never intended to grant the Oder the same status. The map shows 
the disconnection of both systems on the upper Oder. Remarkably, the DOE, although granted Austrian national-
ity, is presented as a part of the German network unlike other sections of the proposed Austrian network or, for 
instance, the mouth of the Rhine. Source: Faber, Eduard. Denkschrift zu dem technischen Entwurf einer neuen 
Donau-Main-Wasserstrasse von Kelheim nach Aschaffenburg (Nürnberg: Verein für Hebung der Fluss- und 
Kanalschiffahrt in Bayern, 1903).
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waterways engineer, Leo sympher, presided over DOUV for several years and was 
General secretary of the PIANC congress in Düsseldorf in 1902. Czech engineers 
Antonín smrček and Antonín Klír, who officially represented Austrian institu-
tions, both participated in DOUV and in PIANC sessions before becoming leaders 
of the Danube-Oder project in Czechoslovakia.46
Apart from developing and promoting individual canal projects, DOUV ex-
plicitly called for standardization of the navigational parameters for future canal 
constructions and river improvements in the region.47 The chosen vessel type re-
flected the situation in Germany and was based on boats and construction types 
that prevailed on the rhine, the Oder, the Elbe, and the upper Danube, and has 
accordingly been dubbed “central European” on occasion.48 The two imperial net-
works, however, implemented no such recommendation. 
The transnational institution was unsuccessful in persuading the empires to 
develop a common waterways policy. It did, however, play an important role in ad-
justing the routing and technical layout of the DOE/Danube-Vistula canal through 
the Moravian Gate. In 1906, smrček challenged the version pursued by the Vienna 
Directorate and proposed a series of locks instead of a boat lift system. As spokes-
man for locally-interested parties who preferred a multi-functional project over 
the quick transit route, smrček managed through his actions at the 1905 PIANC 
meeting in Milan and the 1906 DUOV conference to establish ties that eventually 
had a decisive effect on the conflict.49 To solve the problem the Directorate set up 
and reporters on the discussed issues is apparent in the proceedings. In contrast, DOUV clearly articulated 
its regional focus. At the founding conference of the new organization in september 1896 in Dresden, 
participants identified interconnection of the German rivers (rhine, Oder, Elbe) to the Danube as their 
main goal and a necessary pre-condition for overall development of involved states. “Erster Verbandstag 
des Deutsch-Österreichisch-Ungarischen Verbandes für Binnenschiffahrt,” Centralblatt der Bauverwaltung 
16, no. 40 (1896): 440-441. 
46 Antonín Klír graduated as hydraulic engineer from Prague Technical University in 1885, and was a 
professor there from 1909. Tomáš. Zach, “Prof. Ing. Dr. Antonín Klír – český technik – profesor vodního 
stavitelství ČVUT,” Sborník Muzea Dr. Bohuslava Horáka, no. 16 (2004): 45-63.
47 Initially, the most promoted projects were those connecting the Elbe and the Oder to the Danube 
(Danube-Vltava and Danube-Oder canals), and the rhine-Main-Danube canal. Among the first 24 leaflets 
published in the DUOV series, which essentially covered the first two congresses in 1896 and 1897, no 
other project received as much attention as these three. 
48 Carl V. suppán, Normal-Binnenschiffstyp für die Verbandsländer, Deutsch-Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer 
Verband für Binnenschiffahrt. Verband-schriften Nr. XXXIX: “Mitteilungen über die derzeitige und ang-
estrebte schiffbarkeit der hauptströme und ihrer Nebenflüsse” (Berlin: siemenroth und Troschel, 1898). 
smrček used the label “Mitteleuropean” in his call for the revision of the Austrian waterway scheme and its 
adjustment in favor of the “einheitliche mitteleuropäische schiffs-Type,” Antonín smrček, Der Pardubitz-
Prerau-Krakauer-Kanal und seine Zusammenhang mit dem Donau-Oder-Kanal Von Anton Smrček (Berlin: 
Troschel, 1904), 4. 
49 smrček described the dispute in: Antonín smrček, Der Stand der wichtigeren Kanalprojekte Donau-Elbe, 
Donau-Oder und Donau Weichsel: Bericht, erstattet auf dem VII. Verbandstage zu Stettin am 26. Juni 1906 
(Gross Lichterfelde: Troschel, 1909), 15-37.
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an international committee consisting of Austrian, Czech, Polish (Austrian), and 
German experts. In 1908, after a week-long on-site investigation, this body opted 
for smrček’s project.50
At the end of World War I, railways and ground transport suffered considerably 
from the lack of manpower, fuel, and machinery. As Kjellén noted, the waterways 
profited from the difficulties facing their competitors. In the eyes of German and 
Austrian journalists, the Danube and its tributaries offered promising and rela-
tively cheap access to the agrarian products of the Balkans, and the planned links 
of the German waterways network to the Danube Basin gained considerable atten-
tion.51 Leo sympher, the recently appointed head of the Waterway Construction 
Department at the German Ministry of Public Works pursued the issue. After his 
promotion to the office in 1915, sympher began to endorse the vision of the future 
German network designed for 1000t vessels.52 however, the spatial framework of 
such a network was rather Mittelleuropean in nature. The Danube-Oder connec-
tion was an integral part of sympher’s synthetic treatise on the future of German 
waterborne transport.53 
The construction of waterways, especially the trans-watershed canals connect-
ing Northern Germany to the Danube, became one of the central themes of the 
Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschafts-Konferenz organized in Budapest in 1916.54 The 
war led to coalescence between the Central European Empires, as envisioned in 
1915 by Naumann and observed in 1917 by Kjellén, and strengthened the position 
of Mitteleuropean initiatives such as Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsverein (MEW), 
the organizer of the conference. MEW, which was established in 1904 in Berlin 
by Brno-born professor of economics Julius Wolf, aimed to promote the eastward 
expansion of German industry and commerce. 
50 Antonín smrček, Nástin historie vodní cesty Dunaj – Odra – Labe v souvislosti s úpravou řeky Moravy 
(Prague: privately printed, 1940), 10.
51 This argument appears repeatedly in favor of the rhein-Main-Danube canal. henry Cord Meyer, “Mit-
teleuropa in German Political Geography,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 36, no. 3 
(1946): 178-194, here 186-187.
52 sympher, “Abmessungen”.
53 Two major works on German water management can be quoted as examples from this period, both 
of which included the Danube-Oder connection as an integral part of the German network. The volume 
co-edited by soldan even includes an article on the connection through Moravia written by smrček. Leo 
sympher, Die zukünftige Entwicklung der Deutschen Wasserwirtschaft (Berlin: C. heymann, 1918); Leo 
sympher and Wilhelm soldan, Die Wasserwirtschaft Deutschlands und ihre neuen Aufgaben (Berlin: r. 
hobbing, 1921).
54 Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsvereine in Deutschland, Österreich und Ungarn: Verhandlungen der Mit-
teleuropäischen Wirtschafts-Konferenz in Budapest 1916, vol. 18, Veröffentlichungen des Mitteleuropäis-
chen Wirtschaftsvereins in Deutschland (Leipzig: Deichert, 1917).
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In the wake of the general upheaval of Mitteleuropeanism, the Austrian wa-
terway scheme received considerable public attention.55 Although the Austrian 
Directorate for the Construction of Waterways did not participate in the MEW 
conference, it did start to reconsider its imperial waterway scheme with regard to 
its possible connection to the German network and consequent technical adjust-
ments. In the spring of 1917, the private and public parties interested in the wa-
terway development met in Ústí nad Labem, a city in Bohemia on the river Elbe 
close to the German border. Delegates from within the state and regional land 
administration, as well as from technical schools and business associations located 
along the planned waterways, formed an Oesterreichischen Arbeitsausschusses 
für die herstellung eines Grossschiffahrtsweges Elbe-Oder-Donau, inspired by the 
German Elbe-Oder-Donau-Verein established a few kilometers down the Elbe in 
Dresden a few months earlier.56 The core of the membership overlapped with the 
Austrian part of DOUV, although the latter had not convened since 1913.57
A general shortage of finance and manpower prevented the plans from being 
put into practice. Yet, meetings between the Austrian Ausschuss and its German 
counterparts (in the Elbe and Oder basins) were responsible for the introduc-
tion of sympher’s 1000t vessel standard in Austria. In Prague in 1917, and a year 
later in Dresden, they met to set the standards for the future construction of what 
they called the Central European Waterway Network.58 The negotiations led to 
55 Among the many new publications on the topic was a contribution by a member of the habsburg fam-
ily, army general Archduke heinrich ferdinand. In his brief treatise on the transport question in Central 
Europe, Gottfried Zoepfl (a DOUV leader), promoted canal constructions as a natural step forward in the 
inevitable process of Grossdeutsch unification of both empires. heinrich ferdinand Erzherzog von Oester-
reich, Die Wasserstrasse mitteleuropas (Vienna: Deuticke, 1917); Georg Thilo, Die zukünftige Stellung der 
Binnenschiffahrt in der Weltwirtschaft, ihre Bedeutung für den mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsbund (Berlin: 
Gea-Verl., 1916); Gottfried heinrich Lorenz Zoepfl, Mitteleuropäische Verkehrspolitik: Vortrag gehalten bei 
der 25. Jubiläumsversammlung des Bayerischen Kanalvereins in Nürnberg am 2. September 1917 (Berlin: C. 
heymann, 1918).
56 August Karst, Was will der Elbe-Oder-Donau-Verein? Eine Werbeschrift, vol. 2, Veröffentlichungen des 
Elbe-Oder-Donau-Vereins in Dresden (Dresden: heinrich, 1918).
57 A simple comparison of the lists of participants makes this continuity clear – the main difference was 
a higher proportion of Bohemian participants. Deutsch-Oesterriechisch-Ungarischer Verband für Bin-
nenschiffahrt, Bericht über den Verlauf des VIII. Verbandstages in Linz, 23. bis 26. Juni 1909 (Groß-Lichter-
felde: Troschel, 1911), 180-193; Osterreichischen Arbeitsausschusses für die herstellung eines Grossschif-
fahrtsweges Elbe-Oder-Donau, Die Gründung des osterreichischen Arbeitsausschusses für die Herstellung 
eines Grossschiffahrtsweges Elbe-Oder-Donau (reichenberg: privately printed, 1917), 4-9.
58 After 1918, Czech hydraulic engineers complained that there was no official documentation on the 
meetings in Prague and Dresden in the Directorate for Construction of Waterways’ archives at its Vienna 
headquarters. Czechoslovak authorities were only informed about these two sessions by way of a treatise 
published by friedrich Gebers, chairman of the Dresden meeting and director of the Schiffbautechnische 
Versuchanstalt in Vienna. It seems that these two meetings were a German initiative and that neither the 
Czech engineers at the Prague branch of the Directorate nor delegates of national Czech interest groups 
were involved. The last paragraph of their “complaint” says: “That’s how Mitteleuropa was being construct-
ed. The republic, however, will go its own way.” (NAČr, MVP, b. 156, June 20, 1920).
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agreement on the recommended type of vessel for the envisioned Mitteleuropean 
network. such a vessel was to be 67 meters long (without rudder) and 9 meters 
wide (without flank protection); its draft was to be not greater than 1.8 meters 
and the highest construction on board not higher than 3.8 meters above water 
level. furthermore, in order to enable exceptional passage of longer boats or boats 
with deeper loaded drafts, the dimensions of the canals, especially navigational 
structures such as locks and weirs, should allow for the passage of boats 80 meters 
long and 2 meters deep.59 such measurements conform with the German boats 
59 report on the need to revise dimensions of vessels by J.f. Meierle, then the Czechoslovak representative 
in Vienna responsible for dividing the Austrian Directorate’s materials and property among the successor 
Figure 2.4 – “ In World War I, German and Austrian authorities developed plans for a common 
waterway network, while explicitly embracing the idea of Mitteleuropa. At the Elbe-Oder-Donau 
Conference in Wroclaw on March 22, 1917, Schneller von Mohrtahl of the Ministry of Trade 
presented his vision of the waterway network that sought to compete with maritime shipping on 
the route between the Orient and the North Sea coast. Roman numerals on the map indicate the 
number of locks, Arabic numerals the number of kilometers on any given stretch of the waterway 
network. Source: Otto Schneller von Mohrthal, Der Anteil der österreichischen Schiffahrtskanäle 
am Mitteleuropäischen Wasserstrassennetz (Vienna: printed privately, 1917), annex.
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employed on the Elbe, while an exception was made to ensure the canal would 
also be navigable for the lower Danubian ships, providing the critical stretch of 
the Danube on the hungarian-Czechoslovak border was improved or the water 
level was high enough. This occasion, which actually preceded the political frag-
mentation of Central Europe, marked the turning point in actualizing the Mittel-
Europeanization of waterways, although the Austrian authorities failed to come 
up with any authoritative decision on the matter.60 By the end of World War I, all 
national waterway development programs in the region operated with a unified 
standard.
De-Austrianization: Shaping the Czechoslovak State61 
With the creation of independent Czechoslovakia, the complexity of a landlocked 
nation grew stronger in Czech society.62 As the industrial heart of the former em-
pire, Czechoslovakia was now an export-oriented economy that had been sud-
denly cut off from sea ports, and therefore world markets. Because production 
capacities far exceeded the potential for domestic consumption, securing access to 
the sea became the top priority for Czechoslovak representatives at the Paris Peace 
Conference.63 Karel Kramář, the first Czechoslovak prime minister and leader of 
the Czechoslovak delegation in Paris, referred to the issue in the Czechoslovak 
Parliament on september 30, 1919, saying: 
We are in the center of Europe and all that is needed for the wealth of the 
nation and what is a vital condition for the export capability of the nation 
– free access to a sea – we utterly lack. One of the most important tasks 
of our activity at the Paris Peace Conference was to secure for the Czech 
states after World War I (NAČr, MVP, b. 156, December 21, 1919).
60 With the exception of the “ad hoc” Ministerial Decree 943/I, dated May 26, 1917, by which the Prague 
branch was instructed to employ 1000t vessels as a standard for any structures constructed on the Elbe in 
the future (NAČr, MVP, b. 156).
61 re-orientation of transport policies to serve the new national territory was occasionally dubbed “de-
austrianization” (odrakouštení). National daily newspaper Lidové Noviny referred to Kráčmer’s call for 
revising the Austro-hungarian waterways scheme in these terms. “Průplav Plzeň-Praha-Brno-Bratislava,” 
Lidové Noviny, 18 October 1923.
62 This was part of national mythology even before that. see the well-known short story entitled Water 
Spirit, written by distinguished nineteenth-century Czech writer Jan Neruda, in which the main character 
frequently repeats the line “No sea. Why have we no sea?” Promoters of the canal were quick to take 
advantage of such sentiments, including smrček, who called his 1919 article propagating waterways “Brno 
and Olomouc – future sea ports.” Jan Neruda, Prague Tales (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
1996), 174; Antonín smrček, “Brno a Olomouc – mořskými přístavy,” Zemědělská politika 18, no. 1 (1919): 
34-35.
63 Jakubec, Železnice a Labská plavba, 19-21.
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state such a position which would in the future replace this lack of access 
to the sea.64 
such geopolitical considerations had already played a major role during the ter-
ritorial delimitation of the new Czechoslovak state, although they did not exclu-
sively follow the official imperatives of ethnic or historical borders. In addition to 
the politicians, specialists from various professions also took part in the discus-
sions at Versailles, including Viktor Dvorský, geographer and founder of Czech 
Geopolitics, and Antonín smrček, a prominent DOE supporter. While Dvorský 
and smrček both fully supported the idea of making the Danube the southern 
border of the new state, as well as the need for free access to the sea through the in-
ternationalization of central European rivers, their opinions on the adoption of the 
Austrian waterways scheme conflicted. In the interconnection of the Danube, the 
Oder and the Elbe, Dvorský saw the exact same qualities that Kjellén had ascribed 
to the project; namely, the establishment of conditions that would automatically 
lead to a German-ruled Central Europe. smrček, on the other hand, believed the 
project would be the first step towards Moravia and Czechoslovakia becoming the 
heart of a prosperous and cooperating (Central) Europe.65 
from smrček’s perspective, promoting Czechoslovakia as a crossroads of 
European waterways did not contradict the geopolitical wellbeing of the nation. 
On the contrary, his 1919 treatise on the new Czechoslovak republic’s economic 
situation already expressed what had to be done. he emphasized the vital impor-
tance of internationalized transport routes for landlocked Czechoslovakia, whose 
foreign trade was absolutely dependent on transit through foreign territories. 
smrček proposed the internationalization of all Central European rivers of in-
ternational importance: the rhine, the Elbe, the Danube, the Oder, the Vistula, 
and even the Dniester.66 he also suggested establishing exterritorial Czechoslovak 
maritime ports in the estuaries of all these rivers except the Dniester and the rhine, 
and also in Trieste.67 furthermore, in order to secure the successful construction 
and operation of the DOE and the profit it would bring to the nation, smrček pro-
posed delineating the Czechoslovak borders in a way befitting the canal project 
(see figures 2.5 and 2.7).
64 “Těsnopisecká zpráva o 77. schůzi národního shromáždění republiky Československé v Praze v 
úterý dne 30. září 1919,” Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna, http://www.psp.cz/
eknih/1918ns/ps/stenprot/077schuz/s077005.htm. Accessed 11 October 2010.
65 In 1926, Dvorský finally articulated his opinion openly on the subject. Viktor Dvorský, “K otázce 
vodních drah uvnitř Československé republiky,” Sborník československé společnosti zeměpisné 32 (1926): 
116-120.
66 Antonín smrček, Hospodářské úkoly československé republiky (Č. Budějovice: J. svátek, 1919), 52-53.
67 Ibid., 44-48.
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Ultimately, the Versailles Treaty secured access to the vital infrastructural 
waterway links for all interested parties (not only riparian states), by introduc-
ing an international regime on the main central European rivers – the rhine, the 
Danube, the Oder, and the Elbe. All three of the main flows that the DOE should 
interconnect appeared on the list. Czechoslovakia was also entitled to lease its 
own national sections in the ports of hamburg (Elbe) and sczecin (Oder) and, 
by way of war reparations, received a part of the former German fleet on both 
rivers. Paradoxically, the navigable part of the Oder was situated exclusively in 
German territory. seeking a guarantee for the extension of the navigable route, 
Czechoslovakia considered putting the canalization of the then non-navigable 
stretch between the German port of Kozle (Cosel) and the Czechoslovak city of 
Ostrava on the agenda of the recently-established International Commission of 
the river Oder (CIO) in the form of a “travail d’intérêt priomordial.”68 such efforts 
were unsuccessful, not only because the internationalization of the given stretch 
68 Letter from the Ministry of Trade to the Ministry of Public Works concerning the extension of a navi-
gable Oder (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 1767, february 3, 1923).
Figure 2.5 – Delineating the state to fit the canal? In 1919 Smrček proposed drawing the 
Czechoslovak borders in a way that would put control over the entire route of the future DOE 
in Czechoslovak hands. Both banks of the lower Morava lay on Czechoslovak territory and the 
northern border extended to Ratbor, allowing the young state access to navigate the Oder and the 
Vistula. The diplomats in Versailles decided otherwise. The hand written notes on the map are 
those of Smrček. Source: ATMB, Smrček, b. 132.
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did not impose an obligation for its canalization, but also as the river did not al-
low for canalization due to it being a Gebirgsfluss (mountain river).69 Because the 
realization of the extension, either in the form of canalization or a lateral canal, 
would affect the water regime on the river, the CIO kept an eye on the project 
from the time of its tenth meeting at which Bohuslav Müller presented the idea.70 
69 Argumentation repeated in 1930 by Georg Gothein at the conference Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstag 
in Wroclaw. Quoted in the report on the conference for the Ministry of Trade; Středoevropská hospodářská 
konference (MPOŽ, b. 2486, no. 39606/30), 15.
70 Müller, since the early 1920s Czechoslovak delegate for International river Commission, was born 
in Prague and graduated as a hydraulic engineer. he served at the Austrian Ministry of Public Works in 
Vienna from 1911 and after 1918 was transferred to a similar position in Prague.
Figure 2.6 – 1930 League of Nations map showing the upper Oder and the troublesome interna-
tionalization of the river. The Oder was internationalized downstream from the confluence with 
the Opavice (Oppa), although the navigable part of the river only reached the German port of 
Kozle (Cosel). This decision made Czechoslovakia a riparian state, entitled to claim a share of the 
German Oder fleet as a part of World War I reparations, even though the entire navigable stretch 
of the Oder was located on German territory. Source: Commission Internationale de l’Oder, 
Protocoles du voyage d’études, Mai-Juin 1930 (Strasbourg: League of Nations, 1930), 35.
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however, the commission did not actively pursue the idea and merely supervised 
its development.71
The river Commissions, established in 1919, introduced international ad-
ministration to the nationalized territory of the former Austro-hungarian states 
and in Germany. This naturally provoked protests from Germany.72 The country 
felt heavily under-represented in the commissions. Its concerns were justified, 
given that the share of riparian states in the international river Commissions was 
rather low: twenty-five percent in CED, seventy-three percent in CID, forty-five 
percent in OIC, sixty percent in EIC, and seventy percent in CCNr (by 1929).73 
such arrangements should have secured the position of a small country like 
Czechoslovakia, as well as a general environment for cooperation in this interna-
tional project of improvement on the rivers, and should also strengthen the posi-
tion of western European countries in the region.74 
Delegates in the commissions constituted a more-or-less stable group. The same 
individuals usually represented their countries in all commissions and together 
formed a group of river diplomats who traveled from one river basin meeting to 
another. Originally, the Czechoslovak Government (rada ministrů) appointed 
Antonín smrček as the Czechoslovak delegate to the Allied Danube Commission 
(October 22, 1919), which on July 19, 1920 became the Commission Internationale 
de Danube (CID). Two other commissions with Czechoslovak participation, those 
for the Oder and the Elbe, were appointed with Antonín Klír and Jan Vladimír 
hráský, both professors of hydraulic engineering.75 shortly thereafter, however, a 
special office was created for the Czechoslovak delegate in the river Commissions, 
with the status of minister plenipotentiary, led by Bohuslav Müller, a hydraulic 
engineer returning from public service in Vienna.76 
71 The information on the project was again reported to the CIO in 1930. Commision Internationale de 
l’Oder, Protocoles du voyage d’études (Mai-Juin 1930) (strasbourg,1930), 9-10.
72 Jakubec, Železnice a Labská plavba, 25-26.
73 fritz Krieg, “Das Weltbinnenschiffahrtsrecht und die ströme Mitteleuropas,” in Mitteleuropäische 
Wasserstrassenpolitik: Referate und Beschlüsse der Mitteleuropäischen Wasserstrassenkonferenz, Budapest, 
11.-13. Mai 1929, ed. Elemér hantos (Vienna: Braumüller, 1929), 81-101, here 89.
74 Only france and Great Britain participated in all five International Commissions: CIO, CID, CIE, CCNr 
(rhine) and CED (Commission European de Danube – a body controlling the mouth of the river). Zas-
toupení československé repoubliky v mezinárodních komisích říčních (AMZV, IV., b. 130, May 9, 1927).
75 Letter from the Czechoslovak delegation informing the ministry that Klír had become a member of the 
Commission on the Elbe. studijní transitní komise v Paříži, vyslání zástupce (NAČr, MVP, b. 159, March 20, 
1920).
76 In 1920, hugo Vavrečka, Czechoslovak consul in hamburg and former representative of the republic 
at the economic section of the Paris Peace Conference, urged Minister of foreign Affairs Eduard Beneš to 
create a single central authority for the Czechoslovak participation in river Commissions. In reaction to 
this letter and to similar developments in other participating countries, the government agreed to create 
such a body on October 20, 1920. former secretary to the Ministry of Public Works engineer Bohuslav 
Müller was appointed head of the body and granted the status of minister plenipotentiary. Zastoupení 
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Diplomats and political delegates depended heavily on technical experts. 
following the examples of countries such as romania, Yugoslavia, and france, 
the young nation appointed hráský, Klír, and smrček as delégues-adjoints, special-
ists in the given waterway.77 In a dispute with the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
over the appointment of a substitute for the Czechoslovak delegate at the Danube 
Commission, Dostálek (minister of public works) said, “The mandatory tasks of 
the Commission are almost exclusively construction and navigational questions 
and … Czechoslovakia would thus be unable to influence the negotiations without 
appointing a technical delegate.”78
While the Paris Peace Conference was discussing internationalization, 
Czechoslovakia took over the Austrian waterways program. On June 11, 1919, 
the Parliament passed Law no. 33, by which the administration of the planned 
constructions situated in Czechoslovak territory fell under the authority of the 
Water Management Department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Public Works 
(Ministerstvo veřejných prací, MVP). The former Prague branch of the Austrian 
Directorate for the Construction of Waterways was elevated to the role of central 
national agency and retained its original name in the Czech version: Ředitelství 
vodních cest (ŘVC). While Czechoslovakia inherited almost the entire agenda of 
the late imperial waterway office, it only employed half as many people.79 Accord-
ingly, the originally lavish scheme was informally cut down to a point where the 
Danube-Oder-Elbe canal was the only viable project.80
v mezinárodních říčních komisích (AMZV, IV, b. 130, July 6, 1920). 
77 This concept was developed by france and widely copied. The main representatives were Colonel John 
Grey Baldwin (Great Britain), Arthur seeliger (Germany), Bohuslav Müller (Czechoslovakia), Carlo 
rossetti (Italy), Constantin Contzescu (romania), and Jules Brunet (Belgium). hungary and Yugoslavia 
changed their representatives, while france divided the responsibilities between Lacroix (CID, CED) and 
Gout (CIO, CIE). Later, a sixth Commission was established to control water use in former Transleithania: 
the international Commission on the régime of the Danube (CrED). Zastoupení československé repoub-
liky v mezinárodních komisích říčních (AMZV. IV., b. 130, May 9, 1927).
78 Jmenování náhradních delegátů v mezinárodní komisi dunajské. Předsednictvu ministerské rady 
(AMZV, IV., b. 130, December 3, 1937).
79 Virtually every waterway included in the Austrian Waterway Act of 1901 was located in Czechoslovak 
territory. such a state of affairs was not a coincidence, but a result of political bargaining whereby the 
Austrian government traded the 1901 Act for the support of Czech and Moravian MPs to construct Alpine 
railways. Zdeněk V. Tobolka, “Jak vznikl vodocestný zákon z roku 1901,” Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe 
1 (1940): 9-12; Ivan Jakubec, “Říšský vodocestný zákon č. 66/1901 jako fenomén hospodářských dějin a 
DVT?,” Rozpravy NTM 189 (2004): 53-58; Ivan Jakubec, “Vodocestný zákon a jeho realizace,” in Vodní 
dílo v krajině. Konference na lodi, ed. Lukáš Beran and Ladislava Valchářová (Prague: Výzkumné centrum 
průmyslového dědictví ČVUT, 2006), 54-65. 
80 The original scheme was reduced to the DOE. The 1901 Austrian Waterways Act considered two al-
ternative solutions for overcoming the Black sea/North sea watershed in Czechoslovak territory. The first 
was to transect the Šumava Mountains and connect the Vltava to the Danube along the old schwarzenberg 
timber floating canal, which had been constructed back in the late eighteenth century. The second option 
was to link the cities of Pardubice (on the Elbe) and Přerov (on the Morava river and the Danube-Oder 
canal. The Vltava-Danube canal was no longer considered a viable alternative and did not appear in the 
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The adoption of the Austrian scheme went virtually unchallenged. The first 
head of the ministry, františek staněk, was a long-time acquaintance of Antonín 
smrček from the Parliament of Cisleithania in Vienna, where both served sev-
eral terms before the war. A network of contacts at the highest level enabled 
smrček to push forward the canal agenda in the new Czechoslovak Government.81 
furthermore, the unique position of hydraulic engineers contributed to the smooth 
acceptance of the project they pursued. In times of growing pressure on soil and 
water resources, the hydraulic engineers promised to dry out waterlogged areas, 
protect fields and settlements from flooding and, following the rise of electricity, 
their expertise in damming offered a cheap source of energy. hydraulic engineers 
seemed to be best suited to improving the well-being of the nation by controlling 
nature.82 A telling sign of their special social status was the fact that Professor 
smrček from Brno Technical University, and also his counterpart from Prague, 
Professor Jan Vladimír hráský, were elected to the Austrian Reichsrat more than 
once.83 Despite withdrawing from the political scene after 1918, both remained 
sought after as counselors and authorities.84 
There was a significant dispute over the institutional framework and delegation 
of competencies, however. A resolution of the Czech technical experts meeting 
(Všetechnická veřejná schůze), held immediately after the coup d’état in the autumn 
of 1918, requested the establishment of a special Ministry for Water Management 
and Electrification (Ministerstvo vodohospodářské a elektrisační). Under the head-
ing Vodohospodářská akce, the group, led by hráský, outlined the water manage-
ment program for the new state. Building on their experiences with the Austrian 
system, organically developed and therefore rather complicated and ineffective, 
discussion (NAČr, MVP, b. 156, March 20, 1920).
81 With the help of Minister staněk, smrček co-organized a meeting of hydraulic engineers and DOE 
canal supporters with the government in Bratislava in february 1919. Confirming telegramm (TMB, 
smrček, b. 132, January 30, 1919).
82 There is a lack of hydraulic engineering studies in Bohemia. however, historians have devoted con-
siderable attention to their German counterparts, especially in environmental history. rita Gudermann, 
“Conviction and Constraint. hydraulic Engineers and Agricultural Amelioration Projects in Nineteenth-
Century Prussia,” in Germany’s Nature: Cultural Landscapes and Environmental History, ed. Thomas M. 
Lekan and Thomas Zeller (New Brunswick, NJ: rutgers University Press, 2005), 33-55; David Blackbourn, 
“‘Time is a Violent Torrent’: Constructing and reconstructing rivers in Modern German history,” in Riv-
ers in History: Perspectives on Waterways in Europe and North America, ed. Christof Mauch and Thomas 
Zeller (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 11-25.
83 Both smrček (1859-1951) and hráský (1857-1939) served as MPs in Vienna between 1907 and 1918, 
having been members of the Bohemian and Moravian Diets, respectively. 
84 sixty-year-old Professor smrček decided to focus on his professional career and duties in the hydraulic 
Laboratory at Brno University of Technology, which he established in 1917. he considered his political 
mission to have been accomplished with the establishment of the independent state. An entry in smrček’s 
notebook dated May 17, 1919 (TMB, smrček, b. 119) says, “responding to questions by influential politi-
cians as to whether I would stand as MP, I said no.”
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   51 11/5/2012   1:33:47 PM
52 European Coasts of Bohemia
the group called for central planning and organization of water management at 
state level. As of 1912, when the undirected organic development of the water gov-
ernance system in Bohemia peaked, no fewer than seven mutually independent 
institutions claimed authority over water flows and resources.85 In his proposal, 
hráský defined five justifiable but often conflicting claims for water control (flood 
protection of fields, settlements; use of water for amelioration; water supply; in-
land navigation; and power production enterprises) that needed to be aligned by 
the overriding state authority.86
however, the attempt to achieve a special water management ministry failed. 
The state administration was organized not on the principle of water, but on the 
standard division of economic sectors; accordingly, a water-related agenda re-
mained split between the MVP and the Ministry of Agriculture. As complex water 
structures, waterways interact with other forms of water use and agricultural cir-
cles claimed control over the lower part of the Morava river as a primary source 
of water for irrigation.87 Besides that, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of 
railways claimed some authority over the operation, construction, and planning 
of waterways as transport infrastructures. Thus, the Directory for the Waterways’ 
position as central state agency for waterways development was contested as was 
its canal department as special unit for further preparing the DOE project. 
Despite the failure to constitute a ministry of their own, hydraulic engineers 
formed a strong and respected lobby within the state structures. former Czech of-
ficials of the Vienna Directory achieved leading positions, as did their colleagues 
from former Bohemian and Moravian institutions. Emil Zimmler, former techni-
cal director of ŘVC’s Prague branch, was appointed the first head of MVP’s Water 
85 following the water downstream, the uppermost parts of the watershed were governed by C.K. lesnicko-
technické oddělení pro hrazení bystřin under the Austrian Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerstvo orby); 
smaller rivers came under the Kulturně-technická kancelář of the Agricultural Council of the Bohemian 
Kingdom (established in 1884 on the basis of the Austrian Amelioration Act). The non-navigable rivers 
suitable for rafting were managed by Odbor pro vodní stavby of the Land Committee of the Bohemian Diet 
(since 1884). The lower and navigable stretches of rivers fell under the Imperial Governors’ Office – the 
Department for Water Constructions (delegated to the Austrian Ministry of Public Works). To this list, the 
two Waterways Acts added three more governing bodies. On the basis of the Act on canalizing the Vltava 
and Elbe from České Budějovice/Budweiss to the German border, the Commission for the Canalization 
of the rivers Vltava and Elbe in Bohemia (1) was established, presided over by the governor and divided 
between the Imperial and Bohemian authorities (1896). The 1901 Waterways Act led to the establishment 
of the Prague branch of the Directorate for the Construction of Waterways (2) and of the Land Commis-
sion for regulation of rivers in the Bohemian Kingdom (3). Pamětní spis spolku architektů a inženýrů 
v království českém ve příčině jednotné organisace vodohopodářské činnosti v království českém (ATMB, 
smrček, b. 132, March 1, 1912).
86 Jan Vladimír hráský, “Aktualita podniků vodocestných a zákonné jich zajištění,” Věstník vodního 
hospodářství 1, no. 1 (1919): 6-7.
87 see the discussion on multi-functionality of water systems in the Introduction. 
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   52 11/5/2012   1:33:48 PM
 Mittel-Europeanization on Waterways  53
Management Department.88 Meanwhile, the Waterways section was headed by 
an engineer, Eduard Bazika, from the central Viennese Directorate. More impor-
tantly, from the very beginning, hydraulic engineers led the introduction of the 
technocracy movement’s ideas and its institutionalization in Czechoslovakia. The 
Masaryk Academy of Labor (MAP), a state-funded national center for the tech-
nical branches of science, named after the first and then serving state president, 
was initially led by Antonín Klír, professor of hydraulic engineering at Prague 
Technical University (1920-1923).89 from his position at the ministry, Zimmler 
promoted the waterways agenda; at a meeting held on March 20, 1920 to discuss 
the dimensions for canalizing the Middle Elbe, he successfully persuaded dele-
gates from other institutions to support his views on the national network. The 
basic technical dimensions conformed to sympher’s 1000t standard vessel.90
The canal question gained momentum in the early years of the republic. By 
April 1919, the ŘVC had already asked its former Vienna-based headquarters for 
DOE documentation developed after November 1, 1918, and finally bought it for 
150,000 Austrian crowns in 1920. Czechoslovakia simply inherited older files. As 
Zimmler argued, the Morava-Elbe connection, which had been marginalized until 
1918, then “got international” and the Vienna-based ŘVC started to work on it 
properly.91 In 1921, inspired by the German debate on the rhine-Main-Danube 
canal, MVP established the Canal Department (průplavní oddělení) within ŘVC, 
consisting of eleven engineers and four draftsmen focusing directly on the DOE 
project.92 In the same year, Prague became a true capital city, also for inland navi-
gation, as the canalization of the Vltava river between Prague and the Elbe was 
finally accomplished. It had been more than twenty years since the work began. 
The current minister of public works celebrated the event as representing the con-
nection of Prague to “worldwide shipping routes.”93
The canal-supporting NGOs relentlessly continued to promote the idea. 
They recruited members from the areas along the proposed route of the canal, 
88 The implementation of a relatively high centralization of water management was a clear success for the 
hydraulic engineers. Before that, the water management agenda was divided among the industrial and 
trade departments of the Austrian Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
89 Masarykova Akademie Práce was established in January 1920 to promote scientific management at 
national level. Emilie Těšínská, “Vznik Masarykovy akademie práce: technokratické tendence a účast 
přírodovědců,” in Technokracie v českých zemích (1900-1950), ed. Jan Janko and Emilie Těšínská (Prague: 
Archiv Akademie věd České republiky: Institut základů vzdělanosti Univerzity Karlovy, 1999), 103-135. 
Another hydraulic engineer, Emil Zimmler, presided over the Academy from 1926 to 1932.
90 NAČr, MVP, b. 156, March 20, 1920.
91 The Czechoslovak Ministry of finance delayed the process. funds required on August 9, 1919 were 
granted only on January 19, 1920. Průplav Pardubicko -přerovský, opatření plánů (NAČr, MVP, b. 156). 
92 ŘVC’s 1922 Annual report (NAČr, GŘVC, b. 429).
93 Český svět k slavnostnímu zahájení plavby Prahou (Prague: Šolc a Šimáček, 1921).
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advancing from the German borders upstream along the Elbe to the Czechoslovak 
hinterland. The main organizations were Elbe-Verein from Ústí nad Labem, 
Středolabský komitét from Kolín, and Spolek pro stavbu průplavu Pardubice-Přerov 
from Pardubice. On the Oder, it was Vodohospodářský svaz pro povodí Odry v 
Opavě, based in Moravská Ostrava and supported by the local steelworks; the 
main organization on the Morava was Moravský říční a průplavní spolek, led by 
smrček; and in the Danubian valley, the slovak Vodohospodárský sväz pre povodí 
Dunaja from Bratislava dominated. In these organizations, the local chambers of 
commerce and municipalities aligned with leading hydraulic engineers such as 
smrček and hráský. In order to keep the idea of the canal alive, they held annual 
Water Management Conventions (Vodohospodářské/Vodocestné sjezdy). Naturally, 
these took place in cities along the canal route: first in Plzeň in 1919, then Ústí nad 
Labem (1921), Olomouc (1922), Brno (1923), Kolín (1924), Ostrava (1925), and 
so on. from 1922 onwards, the association of NGOs interested in the canal pub-
lished its own journal, Věstník pro vodní hospodářství – the only specialist maga-
zine on water management published in the Czech language.94
Nonetheless, the initial interest in the canal faded quickly. Instead of integrat-
ing the Central European waterway system, integration of the still-fragmented 
Czechoslovak railway network became the issue of the day.95 Although the Waterways 
Conventions managed to keep the public informed and interested, they were de-
creasingly efficient in terms of gathering political support. With each passing year, 
the number of important political figures such as ministers and MPs attending the 
event diminished. The canal project was also losing its appeal due to the generally 
low costs of alternative transport during the economic boom of the 1920s, which 
reduced the image of inland waterborne transport as being the cheapest. In 1923, 
as a reaction to this declining political support, the MVP ordered ŘVC and other 
institutions to gather and develop materials in support of constructing waterways in 
Czechoslovakia, especially those emphasizing its economic viability.96 
however, a crucial hindrance to the development of the canal project came in 
the form of a challenge to its ability to serve the nation. During the early years of 
the republic, when its transport policy and the future shape of infrastructural net-
works were being debated and drafted, Moravian hydraulic engineer Josef Kráčmer 
94 Věstník pro vodní hospodářství was a professional technical journal on water management, published 
between 1922 and 1939. In World War II, it was replaced by Plavební cesty Dunaj – Odra – Labe (1941-
1951), published by the society for the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal. 
95 Ivan Jakubec, “Úvahy o dopravně-politických otázkách česko-slovenských vztahů 1918-1938,” Sborník 
vojenské akademie v Brně. Řada C – společenskovědní (1994): 243-249.
96 In his capacity as head of the ministerial department, engineer Emil Zimmler issued order 6-280/5 
dated November 1, 1923 (NAČr, ČPÚ, b. 19).
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presented a brand new “de-Austrianized” national waterways network scheme for-
mulated in opposition to the traditional concept of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal.97 
Kráčmer’s plan was a response to the popular geopolitical associations with the 
“fear of Mitteleuropa” and works of scholars such as Kjellén or Dvorský, who ar-
gued that from a geopolitical point of view, the DOE canal would serve German 
rather than Czechoslovak interests. Once constructed, the DOE would link the 
German Oder to the Danube and Balkan markets via an international waterway 
better suited to the type of commodities traded along this route than railways, 
which had to pay for transit through Austria and hungary. This critique largely 
echoed the German proponents of the DOE project’s arguments, but adopted a 
more negative tone.98
furthermore, the national considerations also had implications for Czecho-
slovakia’s internal policy. Ethnically, Germans dominated in the borderlands of the 
republic and the DOE linked these regions through the ethnically Czech hinter-
land. Therefore, Kráčmer maintained, the whole idea conflicted with the official state 
policy and, to a certain extent, symbolized the Germanization of Central Europe in 
contrast to the existence of an autarkic and sovereign nation. Kráčmer’s proposal 
was aimed directly at the long-term development of the ethnic Czechoslovak na-
tion: “how many German factories would be connected by the canal on the stretch 
between Děčín and Ostrava? And how many Czech ones? – not more than a 
third ...”99 Indeed, Kráčmer’s plan was driven predominantly by political objectives 
and he paid much less attention to financial and technical considerations.100
The attempt to revise the Austrian scheme received considerable attention. 
Among Kráčmer’s supporters were several political figures of national importance, 
primarily the mayor of Prague, and representatives of major industrial cities such 
as Brno and Plzeň, which the new routing promised to put directly on the canal 
route. Kráčmer envisioned a waterway running in an east-west direction across 
the country, parallel to the Danube.101 The suggested solution would not only place 
the Canal or the republic at the crossroads of Europe, as supporters of the original 
97 Josef Kráčmer (1883-1951) was a hydraulic engineer and long-time employee of Moravský zemský úřad 
Brno (Moravian Provincial Office).
98 Max Conntag, “Welche wirtschaftliche Bedeutung hat für Deutschland eine Wasserstrassenverbindung 
zwischen der Donau und dem Oder-Elbe-gebiet gegenüber einer solchen zwischen der Donau und dem 
rhein?” Zeitschrift für Binnenschiffahrt offprint (1920).
99 The forging of the Czechoslovak nation is usually described as either a natural result of cultural unity or 
an improvised reaction to the outcomes of World War I. Milan Zemko and Valerián Bystrický, Slovensko v 
Československu: 1918-1938 (Bratislava: Veda, 2004).
100 As such, his efforts sit alongside other initiatives aiming to forge the Czechoslovak nation, many of 
which were rather unrealistic.
101 Josef Kračmer, Studie průplavního spojení Plzeň-Praha-Brno-Ostrava-Bratislava jakožto základu 
českého řešení vodocestné sítě (Prague: privately printed, 1923).
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Austrian routing promised, but also the largest Czechoslovak cities: “Prague and 
Brno will become the biggest ports in Central Europe.” According to the plan, 
Prague would be connected by water to the international market in five direc-
tions: “through Berounka and a new canal to regensburg and the upper Danube; 
to the middle Danube by the Vltava and a canal across the Šumava mountains, 
to the Elbe via the Vltava, and to the Oder and the lower Danube via the new 
Figure 2.7 – Waterways were not only a matter of foreign but also domestic policy, as Josef 
Kračmer argued. He called for de-Austrianization – and thus de-Germanization – of the project. 
Instead of border regions with a German majority (upper picture), the DOE was to bring prosper-
ity to the country’s central regions where Czechs lived. Source: Kračmer, Josef. “Jak se bojuje proti 
revisi vodních cest a novým jejich návrhům.” Technický obzor 32, no. 17 (1924): 291-295, here 
302.
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canal through Brno.”102 Indeed, the municipalities, led by Prague, even established 
an association supporting Kráčmer’s project, calling it “canal Plzeň-Prague-Brno-
Ostrava and Brno-Bratislava.”103
The main dispute took place at the Waterways Convention (Vodocestný sjezd) 
in Kolín in January 1924.104 smrček fiercely opposed Kráčmer’s plan, describing it 
as a completely misguided conception, and critically challenged Kráčmer’s pro-
fessional capabilities, arguing that Kráčmer had spent his entire career working 
in the field of water supplies.105 however, smrček, while he believed that “even if 
elaborated with utmost perfection,” the proposal ”stood no chance to get executed 
in competition with the Pardubice-Přerov connection,” he did admit it had some 
charm: “It is vital to say openly to those seduced on the wrong way that they are 
ready to fight for irrelevant, though attractive phantom.106
The key argument against Kráčmer’s vision emphasized the “naturalness” of 
the traditional solution, the core of which lay in smrček’s belief that the primary 
motives of a waterway scheme should follow environmental constraints not politi-
cal aims. At the convention, smrček successfully mobilized social capital gathered 
in support of the DOE since imperial times. some traditional canal supporters 
took the attempted revision as an attack on their position; for instance, old NGOs 
operating in favor of the DOE and their supporters and host municipalities.107 
however, others simply did not understand the nature of the argument for change, 
given that the canal idea was far from the list of government priorities and that, 
without the state, there was no chance of actually achieving such a huge invest-
ment. 
Mittel-Europeanization beyond the State? 
After 1919, the Transport Committee of the Paris Peace Conference became the 
Advisory and Technical Committee on Communications and Transit (CCT), a 
102 Josef Kračmer, “Jak se bojuje proti revisi vodních cest a novým jejich návrhům,” Technický obzor 32, 
no. 17 (1924): 291-295.
103 The first meeting of the association took place at Prague Town hall on November 23, 1923. Among 
the participants was Kliment Velkoborský, a young engineer of the Czech Navigation Office and later the 
leading advocate of the canal in the 1950s (NAČr, ČPU, b. 19).
104 Generally speaking, all the presenters supported smrček’s standpoint (ATMB, smrček, b. 25).
105 After the debate in the journal Technický obzor in 1924, Kráčmer left the scene and his ideas were 
never revived, although his “national” critique of the DOE resonates in the literature.
106 Kračmer, “Jak se bojuje proti revisi,” 292.
107 The regional weekly of Eastern Bohemia and the city of Pardubice (located on the Elbe and the origi-
nal DOE route) described Antonín smrček’s speech on the superiority of the “natural” routing as “the total 
fiasco of Kráčmer’s plan.” “Velký vodocestný sjezd v Kolíně,” Východ, 26 January 1924.
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permanent body of the League of Nations. It summoned the first conference on 
transport and transit to Barcelona in 1921.108 The event fell within the general 
shift in international politics from a principle of the balance of power between 
empires towards a transnational regime foreshadowed by the Treaty of Versailles. 
The League provided a new mechanism for international cooperation and stimu-
lated cooperation on various technical and economic issues. The architects of the 
League felt that politics and economics formed an inseparable unity.109 The latter 
ultimately became the cornerstone of the League’s activities.110 The Barcelona first 
General Conference on Communications and Transit was one of the first major 
meetings that the League organized.
This conference articulated in general terms the principle of free navigation on 
all rivers that provided more than one country with sea access.111 The Convention 
and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern repre-
sented a major outcome and success of the conference not only in inland naviga-
tion. however, putting the convention’s 24 articles into practice required a great 
deal of elaboration. To this end, a special Committee for Inland Navigation was 
created within CCT, focusing on the technical and legal practicalities of intercon-
nected national waterway systems, including the operation and mandate of the 
international river Commissions.112 Besides regular work, part of CCT’s advisory 
agenda was forming a special committee to inspect the state of the waterways in 
Poland in 1926. As a low-lying country, Poland had great potential for a network 
of inland navigable waterways over long distances, connecting the large hinter-
land to the seaports. however, the improvement of rivers was hampered by the 
108 One of the many technical expert committees the League organized that operated as intermediaries 
between governments and the secretariat and offered technocratic, apolitical solutions to various prob-
lems. Charles howard Ellis, The Origin, Structure & Working of the League of Nations (London: G. Allen & 
Unwin, 1928), 476-480.
109 The opinion put forward by, among others, robert Cecil and Jan smuts. Ibid., 467.
110 frank schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: 
Aksant, 2008), 76.
111 Thus, the convention extended the principle of free navigation beyond the few rivers nominated in the 
Treaty of Versailles. It now included international canals but also national waterways that completed inter-
national ones. Police and navigational prescriptions apply to all vessels navigating on the same waterways, 
regardless of the flag they fly. Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of Interna-
tional Concern, League of Nations document C.479. M.327. 1921. VIII.
112 Many experts also took part in the one or more river Commissions. These included Baldwin, ros-
setti, seeliger, and Krbec, although the latter only attended as an official of the Minister Plenipotentiary 
Bohuslav Müller, not as a regular member; material on CCT at the Ministry of foreign Affairs (AMZV, II, 
b. 618+619; AMZV, IV., b. 1107). In 1924, at the CCT’s 6th session, the original Committee for Transport 
by Water split into the special Inland Navigation Committee and the Committee for Ports and Maritime 
Navigation. frank schipper, Vincent Lagendijk, and Irene Anastasiadou, “New Connections for an Old 
Continent: rail, road and Electricity in the League of Nations Organisation for Communications and 
Transit,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander 
Badenoch and Andreas fickers (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 113-143, here 120.
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need to unite all the systems of the former empires (russia, Austria-hungary, and 
Germany).113 In the same year, an American named Walker D. hines, a former 
arbitrator on river shipping in Europe under the peace treaties, was chosen as a 
neutral delegate to inspect the state of shipping on European rivers.114 Both special 
committees prepared exhaustive reports, but did not incite the broader debate on 
Central European waterways within the League.
The explicit plan for the European waterway regime appeared on the CCT 
Committee for Inland Waterways’ agenda in 1932, in the wake of the Great 
Depression and political integration plans such as Briand’s Initiative.115 A Belgian 
delegate named Alexandre Delmer, motivated by the problems arising from navi-
gation on the physically interconnected but otherwise separate waterways of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and france, proposed unification of the policy regulations. 
however, European states did not seem interested in opening their national water-
ways to international regulation and competition. By the early 1930s, only four out 
of twenty-nine states granted equal rights to foreign vessels on their national wa-
ters and only a few others expressed willingness to do so in the future.116 Although 
the committee wanted to pursue the idea, it decided to restrict the unification to 
technicalities such as signaling or organizing traffic, while ignoring more politi-
cally sensitive issues.117 hence, attempts to adopt European navigation regulations 
did not meet with success. Even the Barcelona Convention, despite being accepted 
by twenty-nine votes to one, was not at that time ratified by the riparian states of 
the rhine and Danube.118 
Czechoslovak delegates had their say in CCT negotiations. While Czechoslovak 
participation remained very limited throughout the 1920s, at the seventeenth ses-
sion held in 1932, Vojtěch Krbec joined the Committee on Inland Waterways and 
Václav roubík joined the roads Committee.119 Even then, discussions held at CCT 
113 LoN publication C.25.M.15. 1927, VIII.
114 hines travelled down the rhine and Danube by boat, meeting with local representatives, port officials, 
businessman and politicians. his reports on the Danube identified the break-up of Austria-hungary and 
the subsequent installation of customs barriers as the principal reason behind the fifty percent decline in 
volume of traffic compared to the pre-war situation; LoN publication C 444/a/M 164/a/1925, VIII, dtd 
20.8.1925 (AMZV, IV, b. 1105). 
115 An issue partly addressed but not solved at the unsuccessful International Conference for the Unifica-
tion of fluvial law at Geneva in 1930. sPIN-TN Network, The Integration of European Waterways (2004), 
http://www.ccr-zkr.org/files/histoireCCNr/17_the-integration-of-european-waterways.pdf. 31. Accessed 
14 January 2009.
116 report by Krbec (AMZV, II, 617, December 27, 1933).
117 Ibid.
118 Only when planning to deepen unification did the committee realize that national governments were 
widely ignoring the Barcelona Convention. 1301/II-4/34 (AMZV, II, 617, December 27, 1933).
119 The exception was Dr. Lankáš, who was on the railway Committee between 1921 and 1932. Besides 
subcommittees, there were also temporary commissions. regarding waterways, the most important were 
the Committee on river Law (sitenský) and the Committee on Combined Transport (Lankáš), (AMZV, II, 
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and its subsidiary bodies remained concealed to some extent from Czechoslovak 
hydraulic engineers and the interested public. Although trained as an engineer, 
Krbec was more of a career diplomat and did not enter the debates on the waterway 
program in Czechoslovakia. In fact, the MVP complained that it did not receive 
information on CCT activities.120 Czechoslovakia was rather reserved regarding 
Delmer’s proposal because, “till the construction of the planned canals,” the issue 
did not interfere with national interests.121 Despite that, the MVP expressed mixed 
feelings regarding the initiative, as it would have definitely limited national sov-
ereignty once the canals were constructed.122 Krbec considered attempts to unify 
regulations to be useless because of the protectionism the majority of European 
states practiced on their national waterways. he was also confused about the scope 
of the suggested unification: the committee intentionally did not specify whether 
the regime should cover the entire continent or only interconnected systems.123
Dominant protectionist policies presented considerable obstructions to CCT’s 
attempts to construct a European waterway network. These issues were further 
amplified by indirect communication with local initiatives supporting waterways 
projects. While the negative stance towards Delmer’s plan did not mark an end 
to CCT’s efforts at European unification, the demise of Arthur seeliger and his 
German countrymen from CCT in the autumn of 1933 did deal a final blow to any 
serious work on the issue.124
The League launched its pan-European cooperation activities immediately af-
ter the war. The idea of Mitteleuropean integration, however, was only revived 
in the mid-1920s. In 1925, a group of Viennese businessmen centered around 
Julius Meinl established the Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstagung (MWT – since 
1928 Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag), a transnational body aiming to promote 
economic integration in Central Europe, which was suffering economically from 
b. 617, July 11, 1932). In 1938, Krbec briefly chaired the entire CCT. In 1920 Krbec was transferred to the 
Ministry of foreign Affairs on the advice of Colonel fierlinger from the MVP and appointed permanent 
secretary to the Czechoslovak delegate on the river Commissions, nominated by the Ministry of foreign 
Affairs. he was later appointed Czechoslovak consul in Trieste (1930-1935) and hamburg (1935-1939). In 
World War II, Krbec chaired a department at ŘVC, then joined the renewed Ministry of foreign Affairs 
and retired in 1949. Information extracted from his personal file at the Archive of the Czech Ministry of 
foreign Affairs.
120 Letter from Krbec to the Ministry of foreign Affairs (AMZV, II, 617, December 13, 1933).
121 Information on the eighth session of the Inland Navigation Committee for MZV, prepared by roubík 
(AMZV, II, 617, November 22, 1933).
122 roubík refered to the commercial treaty with hungary, which included a special paragraph on the 
issue. (AMZV, II, 617, November 22, 1933).
123 When Krbec raised the question at the CCT committee meeting, the response was to “wait and see” 
how governments would react. report by Krbec (AMZV, II, 617, December 30, 1933).
124 Letter from Krbec to the Ministry of foreign Affairs (AMZV, II, 617, february 14, 1934).
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political fragmentation.125 Intellectually, the mission and structure of the organiza-
tion were developed by the Arbeitskomitee chaired by Elemér hantos, economist 
and former hungarian Minister of Trade. Naturally, MWT promoted reconstruc-
tion of the economic ties within the Donauraum, but simultaneously advanced a 
much broader integration concept that stretched from the Baltic sea to the Black 
sea.126 In order to gain support from governments in the region, the MWT re-
mained rather unspecific in terms of its definition of Central Europe. such an 
arrangement should have made the MWT acceptable for successor states as well 
as for both former empires.127 This decision, together with the organizational 
structure following the national principle, allowed delegates to project their own 
national perspective onto MWT’s general mission. The particularly influential 
Deutsche Gruppe pursued the economic unification of Central European states 
and its potential extension to all European states, while the official Czechoslovak 
version of Central Europe excluded its western neighbor.128 Although the MWT 
informed Central European governments about its meetings and invited them to 
participate, it remained a non-governmental institution, partly due to its unclear 
concept of Central Europe. The deliberate choice to leave the notion open should 
have enabled the cooperation of all states in the region. however, diplomats found 
such a standpoint rather suspicious.129
The MWT shifted towards friedrich Naumann’s Pan-German Mitteleuropa 
after the accession of Berhard von Bühlow to the German foreign Ministry in 
125 The literature often dismisses the organization as a tool of German imperialism, which paved the way 
to the Grossraumwirtschaft policy and military expansion of the Third reich in the Balkans and Eastern 
Europe. however, in the first period of its existence (1925-1930), the organization remained focused on 
the cooperation and development of international trade in broadly defined Central Europe, which encom-
passed the former Austro-hungarian Empire, Germany, the rest of the Donauraum, Poland and switzer-
land. Elemér hantos, “Wirtschaftliche Tagung,” Paneuropa 3, no. 13/14 (1926): 41-43.
126 Drahomír Jančík, “Československo a Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag ve Vídni,” Sborník Vojenské 
akademie v Brně. Řada C (1994): 119-128, here 119.
127 hantos attempted to use economic ties to bridge the political divide between the two conceptions of 
regional integration (German Mitteleuropa and “anti-German” Central Europe). In order to keep both 
sides interested, hantos’ own vision or delimitation of the region remained necessarily blurred. Nils Mül-
ler, “Die Wirtschaft als ‘Brücke der Politik’: Elemér hantos’ wirtschaftspolitisches Program in den 1920er 
und 1930er Jahren,” in ‘Mitteleuropa’ und ‘Südosteuropa’ als Planungsraum, ed. Carola sachse (Göttingen: 
Wallstein, 2010), 87-114.
128 Carola sachse, “‘Ehe von schornstein und Pflug’: Utopische Elemente in den raumvorstellung des 
Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstags in der Zwischenkriegszeit,” in ‘Mitteleuropa’ und ‘Südosteuropa’ als 
Planungsraum, ed. Carola sachse (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 49-86, 54.
129 Governments were usually represented by ministry observers who were interested in the discussed 
themes, and by members of the local embassies. The 1926 meeting was attended by official representatives/
observers (mostly embassy officials) of Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, romania, and 
Yugoslavia (by then still the kingdom of serbs, Croats, and slovenes); that is, all Danubian countries plus 
Poland; Zpráva o středoevropském dopravním zasedání ve dnech 2.-5. října 1926 ve Vídni (NAČr, MPOŽ, 
b. 1800).
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1928. The Deutsche Gruppe gradually took over the leadership of the organiza-
tion and put aside hantos’ idea of a customs union of succession states, which 
Germany regarded as dangerous.130 Disappointed by this development, hantos es-
tablished a brand new organization – the Mitteleuropa-Institut zur Förderung der 
wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Annäherung – in Brno, Vienna, and Budapest.131 
German business circles reacted by establishing their own Mittel-Europa Institutes 
in Dresden and Berlin. There was another change in MWT leadership in 1931, 
when industrialist Tilo von Wilmowsky replaced veterans like Georg Gothein 
and Gottfried Zoepfl, which marked the final reorientation towards the Anschluss 
Grossdeutsch policy. however, the MWT never became a totally monolithic or-
ganization and various lines of thought and concepts of Mitteleuropa co-existed 
within its structure.132 
Given the overall orientation towards economic integration, inquiries into 
transport issues naturally gained a prominent position on the MWT agenda. 
The second annual conference was devoted to transport issues (Verkehrstagung, 
1926), the next one to the closely related problems of tourism (3rd congress, 1927), 
the fourth to the “Donauproblem” (4th congress, 1928), and finally, in 1929 in 
Budapest, the main theme was the problem of inland waterborne transport in the 
region. According to Josef fuxa, unofficial delegate of the Czechoslovak Ministry 
of Trade, the organizing committee of the Mitteleuropäische Verkehrstagung 
(Vienna, October 1926), chose transport as the central theme because of its per-
ceived apolitical character and obvious need for transnational standardization and 
cooperation.133 however, the issue was highly politicized and discussions were far 
from smooth. for example, the Czechoslovak representative felt that the resolu-
tion criticizing the current state of navigation on the Danube was thoroughly po-
litical and directed against the successor states.134
130 Elvert, Mitteleuropa!, 107; Vlastislav Lacina, “hospodářská dezintegrace střední Evropy po první 
svìtové válce a snahy o opětné sblížení v letech 1924-1930,” Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 15, no. 7 (2007): 
272-281, here 278.
131 Müller, “Die Wirtschaft als ‘Brücke der Politik’.”Czechoslovak diplomat Vavrečka sarcastically noted 
that the name chosen for the organization reflected hantos’s ambitions as a scientist. Letter from Vavrečka 
(AMZV, odb.IV, b. 1095, september 11, 1929).
132 Dagmar Moravcová, Československo, Německo a evropská hnutí 1929-1932 (Prague: Institut pro 
středoevropskou kulturu a politiku, 2001), 281.
133 The discussions dealt with different modes of transport separately. Typically, delegates critically evalu-
ated the current situation then suggested improvements. The themes largely resembled those discussed at 
the LoN, whose representative heinrich rheinhardt also attended the congress. Debate on inland naviga-
tion dealt exclusively with the Danube. Zpráva o středoevropském dopravním zasedání ve dnech 2.-5. října 
1926 ve Vídni (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 1800), note on the choice of transport on page 3.
134 report by Ministry of Trade official Antonín hanáček: středoevropský dopravní sjezd ve Vídni. Duna-
jská otázka (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 1800).
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Waterways remained overshadowed by railways and received significant atten-
tion for the first time in 1928 during the MWT conference on the Donauraum. 
Georg Gothein, former MP for Wrocław and representative of the Hansa-bundes, 
an organization promoting liberal trade, presented his view on the economic vi-
ability and usefulness of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal.135 he expressed his strong 
belief in the positive economic role the connection might play in creating a uni-
fied Central European market.136 similarly, Czechoslovak delegate hans singule 
devoted part of his report to the canal plans.137
More detailed discussions took place a year later at the Budapest Conference 
on Inland Water Transport. On that occasion the conflict regarding the MWT’s 
mission culminated and the event, although prepared under the auspices of the 
MWT, was a private initiative of hantos. Nevertheless, the meeting was well at-
tended by German and Austrian engineers, who clearly demonstrated their dis-
satisfaction with Germany’s position on the Danube and, playing the unity card, 
criticized the fact that Mitteleuropa was giving away its property to foreign na-
tions for nothing.138 A proposal was made to establish a special Central European 
Association of Navigation societies as a sub-section of the German Zentral Verein 
für Deutsche Binnenschiffahrt. The idea was eventually rejected due to the problems 
caused by using the term Mitteleuropean and a solution was postponed.139 Two of 
the resolution’s ten points emphasized how the development of waterways (respec-
tively, construction of the canals) could contribute to the harmonious coexistence 
and mutual apprehension among central European nations.140 Czechoslovakia’s 
representative at the meeting, Antonín smrček, called for the construction of 
trans-watershed connections according to unified (but not specified) standards. 
hantos respected smrček enormously, addressing him as the “Altmeister der mit-
teleuropäische Wasserstrassen,” and offered him a leading position in the Brno 
135 By then a German city on the middle Oder known as Breslau. 
136 In his speech, Gothein mentioned the need for standardization and argued in favor of sympher’s 1000t 
vessels (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 2486). Gothein’s apology for the canal was later published in Zeitschrift für Bin-
nenschiffahrt (1930).
137 Moravcová noted the negative attitude of the German Trade Ministry towards the Canal, based on 
the presumption that after completion, it would “strengthen the position of the Czechoslovak fleet on the 
Oder; “Moravcová, Československo, Německo a evropská hnutí, 163; Jančík, “Československo a MWT,” 124. 
According to hanáček’s report, hans singule was neither an engineer nor a state official, but a journalist. 
138 In the words of the ministerial counselor from regensburg, fritz Krieg, “how long must the law of 
parity and equality of all subjects of international law be infringed? how much longer must Mitteleuropa 
alone keep its currents, the heart of its territories, open to foreign ships?” Krieg, “Das Weltbinnenschif-
fahrtsrecht,” 94.
139 Together with other German delegates, Zoepfl proposed the revival of the DUOV, while hantos and 
hungarian and romanian delegates defended the Donauraum concept of Central Europe. hantos, “Ber-
icht über den Verlauf,” 184-186.
140 Elemér hantos, Mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenpolitik: Referate und Beschlüsse der Mitteleuropäischen 
Wasserstrassenkonferenz, Budapest, 11. bis 13. Mai 1929 (Vienna; Leipzig: W. Braumüller, 1929), 188-189.
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branch of the Mitteleuropäische Institut.141 smrček accepted and became its vice-
president.142
half a year later smrček presented a more elaborate proposal for the stand-
ardization of waterways. In a lecture on the state of Central European waterways, 
delivered at the Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstagung in Wroclaw in 1930, he con-
tended:
the interconnected Central European Canal network should, at least on 
its main transversal lines, be constructed in such a way that allows the 
economically most expedient ships, the 1000t type already introduced on 
the new German canals, to go anywhere.143 
he was clearly stating that the proposed Central European Waterway network 
should follow the standards set by the German authorities for the newly-built ca-
nals. The organizers of the event could not have been more pleased by this. The 
Deutsche Gruppe moved the fifth MWT congress from Vienna to Wroclaw in or-
der to detach from hantos and his adherents, and intentionally devoted part of the 
program to the subjects covered by his Budapest conference.144 
simultaneously, a transnational organization devoted exclusively to the ques-
tion of inland navigation in Central Europe emerged at the turn of the dec-
ade. At its annual meeting in December 1929, the Moravian river and Canal 
society (Moravský říční a průplavní spolek, MŘPs) discussed aligning with the 
Mitteleuropäischer Binnenschiffahrtsverband (MVB – Central-European Inland 
141“Einleitung: Mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenpolitik,” in Mitteleuropäische Wasserstrassenpolitik Refer-
ate und Beschlüsse der Mitteleuropäischen Wasserstrassenkonferenz, Budapest, 11-13. Mai 1929, ed. Elemér 
hantos (Wien; Braumüller, 1929), 1-10, here 2. hantos and smrček met for the first time at the first Gen-
eral Meeting of the newly established institute in Brünn on september 10, 1929. rainer, president of the 
Brno Institute, knew hantos from MWT meetings and invited smrček to his office to meet hantos before 
the session. Letter from rainer to smrček (TMB, smrček, b. 133, september 6, 1929).
142 Miroslav Jeřábek, Za silnou střední Evropu: Středoevropské hnutí mezi Budapeští, Vídní a Brnem v letech 
1925-1939 (Prague: Dokořán, 2008), 66.
143 In his speech, smrček mentioned the late Ministerialrat sympher and defined the two Hauptkanale of 
the proposed regional network – the old Austrian Donau-Oder-Elbe-Vistula and the rhine-Main-Danube. 
Antonín smrček, “Vorschläge in Bezug auf eine raschere Durchführung der Mitteleuropäischen Kanalpro-
jekte (Oder-Donau-Elbe, rhein-Main-Donau, Donau-Weichsel),” in Bericht über die Verhandlungen der 
fünften Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstagung in Breslau 1930 (Berlin; Gruenewald: W. rothschild, 1930), 
129-139.
144 Moravcová, Československo, Německo a evropská hnutí, 165, 203. Among the four topics discussed, the 
two dealing with transport issues were no. 3 railways and no. 4 waterways (Erleichterungen und Vereinfa-
chungen in der mitteleuropäischen Binnenschiffahrt), for which smrček was chosen as main speaker. Other 
speakers were German Ministerialrat fritz Krieg, Živko Jovanovič from Yugoslavia, and Adolf stern, direc-
tor of the Bratislava Chamber of Commerce. hungary was represented by Oberbergrat Ernö haidegger, 
and Austria by Strombaudirektor Ludwig salcher from Vienna and fuhrman, Ministerialrat from Vienna 
and director of the Directorate for the Construction of Waterways. Liste der Angemeldeten redner für die V. 
Mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftstagung in Breslau (TMB, smrček, b. 125).
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Water Transport Association). This body deliberately built on the work of its pre-
war predecessors, the Deutsch-Oesterreichisch-Ungarisch-Schweizerischen Verband 
für Binnenschiffahrt (DOUV),145 and invited its former members to work together. 
Under the presidency of smrček, the Moravians followed the major Czechoslovak 
canal promoting groups by unanimously accepting the invitation. While some 
voices contested the adherence to the new organization on the basis of its German 
domination, the vote was only a formality, as smrček had already been appointed 
MVB vice-chairman.146 
At the MVB founding conference held in stuttgart in May 1930, the first speaker, 
Gottfried Zoepfl, emphasized continuity with the pre-war DUOV. Zoepfl himself 
was living proof of this link. A professor of economics from Vienna, Zoepfl was 
not only a member of the DUOV, but had also been the editor of its publications 
back in 1897.147 he had also proposed the establishment of the new organization in 
Budapest a year before. In stuttgart he met with his colleagues from the imperial 
era, former employees of the Imperial Directorate for Construction of Waterways 
like smrček or Czerkawski, who were now representatives of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, respectively. 
Discussions regarding the aims and operation of the new organization opened 
with a debate on its position towards the MWT, the main organization promot-
ing regional economic integration in Central Europe. The German delegates, es-
pecially Georg Gothein, ex-reichsminister and prominent MWT member, pressed 
for closer cooperation and a future merger with the MWT, highlighting the simi-
lar membership and analogous organizational structure of both organizations.148 
smrček, on the other hand, emphasized the apolitical status of the MVB, which he 
thought should provide independent expert solutions and keep its distance from 
politics. smrček felt that the MWT, at least since its split with hantos, represented 
145 The revived DUOV met at the International Exhibition of Inland Navigation and Utilization of hydro-
Power in Basel in 1926. The fact that Czechoslovak representatives were not invited clearly demonstrates 
the ethnically German character of the event, at which delegates from switzerland, Germany, Austria, and 
hungary participated. After the meeting Czechoslovak Germans, who led the North-Bohemian Chamber 
of Commerce located in Liberec/reichenberg, took up the task of inviting Czechoslovak canal associa-
tions. At “political level” German ZVfB, located in Berlin, was assigned with full revival of the DUOV 
under a new, Mitteleuropean identity. Emil Zulkowsky, “středoevropský svaz pro vnitrozemní plavbu,” 
Věstník pro vodní hospodářství 9, no. 10 (1927): 165-166, here 165.
146 The entire process of “joining” the MBV started in 1927 at the informal meeting organized by the 
North Bohemian Chamber of Commerce. Ibid. There, the invitation was accepted and the 1929 vote 
taken in all participating associations, was little more than a formality. “Zpráva o konání valné hromady 
průplavního spolku v Přerově,” Věstník pro vodní hospodářství 12, no. 1 (1930): 14.
147 Zoepfl also edited the minutes of the stuttgart meeting.
148 Gothein, a founding member of the pre-war DOUV, attended the conference as representative of the 
silesian Schlesischer Oder-Verein from Wroclaw/Breslau. I. Verbandstag des Mitteleuropäischer Binneschif-
fahrtsverbandes 15.-17. Mai 1930 Stuttgart. Verzeichnis der Teilnehmer (TMB, smrček, b. 25, 1930), 38.
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a controversial side to Central European integration. The MBV Board ultimately 
accepted smrček’s proposal to postpone the issue of adherence to the MWT, take 
it off the agenda, and concentrate first on stabilizing the organization.149 
The membership of the MVB territorially roughly corresponded to its pre-
war predecessor. The participating organizations were mainly German, with 
Austria, switzerland, and hungary represented by a single institutional member 
and Czechoslovakia by three organizations closely linked with the DOE project: 
MŘPS, Spolek pro výstavbu kanálu Pardubicko-přerovského, and Vodohospodářský 
svaz pro povodí Odry v Opavě. Czechoslovakia was the second-most represented 
country at the meeting.150 Among more than five hundred delegates attending the 
conference, thirty-eight represented Czechoslovakia (compared to eighteen swiss, 
fourteen Austrians, and nine hungarians). Besides the leading NGOs closely 
tied to individual navigation projects, the delegates included state officials and 
representatives of other organizations involved in inland navigation in Central 
Europe.151 The International river Commissions of the rhine and the Elbe depu-
tized their general secretaries, Von Wesendock and Jan hostie, respectively, while 
smrček acted as delegate of the Danube Commission. Interestingly, Elemér hantos 
attended the event; not as an official representative of the Mitteleuropa-Institut, but 
as emeritus state secretary.152 
At the plenary session, smrček remained faithful to his belief in the organiza-
tion’s apolitical mission and restricted himself to purely technological subject mat-
ter – an analysis of technical problems of waterways and their development – and 
he clearly stated that all administrative issues and organization of inland navi-
gation were not his concern. he outlined three crucial areas requiring attention: 
construction of waterways, improvement of trans-shipment and other freight ma-
nipulation, and construction of vessels. smrček again argued in favor of sympher’s 
1000t vessels as a standard for future waterway navigation structures in Central 
Europe.153
149 Niederschrift über die Vorstand- und Ausschuss-Sitzung des Mitteleuropäischen Binnenschiffahrtsver-
bandes am 15.Mai 1930 zu Stuttgart (TMB, smrček, b. 25, June 14, 1930), 5.
150 According to the agreements made on the first day of the meeting, Czechoslovakia was to supply 
the second highest share of the organization’s planned budget (fifteen hundred out of six thousand rM). 
Delegates from france and the Netherlands, countries that were not granted membership, also attended. 
I. Verbandstag des Mitteleuropäischer Binneschiffahrtsverbandes 15.-17. Mai 1930 Stuttgart. Verzeichnis der 
Teilnehmer.
151 Václav roubík and Eduard Bazika from MVP; Antonín hanáček represented the Ministry of Trade. 
Ibid.
152 Ibid., 39.
153 smrček’s stuttgart speech manuscript: Technické problémy vodních cest a vnitrozemské plavby, 
předneseno na prvním sjezdu středoevropského svazu pro plavbu vnitrozemní ve Štutgartě 16.května 1930 
(TMB, smrček, b. 25).
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The stuttgart Conference marked both the beginning and the end of the 
Mitteleuropean transnational initiative to construct a regional waterway network 
in Central Europe. Political developments in the region negatively affected the fur-
ther operation of the Verband and the first conference remained the only one. The 
second meeting of the executive committee, held in Mannheim in 1932 during the 
German Zentral Verein Convention, proved to be a fiasco. Effectively, the fact that 
only German and Czechoslovak delegates appeared ushered in an epoch of bilat-
eral Czechoslovak-German cooperation on the DOE project. In 1931, the MWT 
started its metamorphosis into a tool of the German economic Grossraumwirtschaft 
policy in Central and southeastern Europe.154 simultaneously, without govern-
mental support, the activity of the MI in Brno slowly declined after 1932.155
Experiencing the frantic activities of the transnational community, smrček be-
came highly critical of the Czechoslovak authorities’ aloof attitude towards the 
waterways program. By comparing Czechoslovakia with the states that regularly 
invested in improving their waterways network such the UsA, france, and es-
pecially Germany, smrček showed how ignorant behavior could slow the pro-
gress and hamper the prosperity of the country.156 As his fellow professor Emil 
Zimmler put it, “the sluggish attitude of Czechoslovak authorities toward water-
ways” might “result in an unpleasant surprise when Germany once again starts 
calling for the connection to the Danube and the Orient.”157 Although such a state-
ment invokes the image of marching armies, Zimmler highlighted the possibility 
that Czechoslovakia could be by-passed either by the German-Polish-romanian 
waterway project connecting Prussia and silesia to the Black sea through Poland 
and romania (the Oder-Vistula-Dniester-Prut canal), or by the so-called Trans-
European Canal connecting the Vistula and the Dnieper via the Bug and the 
Pripyat.158
154 Carl freytag, “‘Die Tür zwischen Deutschland und Donauraum ist geöffnet’: südosteuropa-Konzepte 
und Positionierung Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstags nach dem ‘Anschluss’ Österreichs 1938,” in ‘Mit-
teleuropa’ und ‘Südosteuropa’ als Planungsraum, ed. Carola sachse (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 141-166, 
here 143-144.
155 Jeřábek, Za silnou střední Evropu, 240.
156 Antonín smrček, Provádění vodních staveb na Moravě – uvázlo : jinde zato – zejména v cizině – 
pokračují se zvýšenou energií (Brno: privately printed, 1926).
157 Quoted in: Otto Cvrk and Eustach Mölzer, Obtíže vodních cest (Prague: Práce, 1946), 20. see also 
smrček’s speech at the second meeting of the Brno based Mitteleuropean Institute: Protokol o druhé schůzi 
představenstva Středoevropského ústavu ku podpoře hospodářského a kulturního sblížení v Brně, konané dne 
30. dubna 1930 (Brno: privately printed, 1930).
158 for the Polish project see Maksymilian Matakiewicz, “Droga wodna Baltyk-Morze Czarne, przez 
Wisle-san Dniestr-Prut i Dunaj, z polaczeniem do Lwowa,” Przeglad Techniczny offprint (1927). The 
Trans-European canal was an extension of the transversal Mittellandkanal to the East. Via the upgraded 
old Korolevskiy Canal built in 1848, it promised to connect the Baltic to the Black sea by way of Vistula, 
Bug, Pripyat, and Dnieper. see the report by henryk herbich (1896-1968), a Polish hydraulic engineer em-
ployed in the interwar period at the Polish Ministry of Public Works. East Central Europe: 1. Utilization 
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In 1931, the Czechoslovak Parliament finally responded and passed the new law. 
It included a special paragraph on the construction of the national Czechoslovak 
Waterway Network, based on reconsideration and nationalization of the old 
Austrian project.159 The Act on the State Fund for Making the Rivers Navigable, 
Construction of Ports, Reservoir Dams, and Utilization of Hydro-power contained 
a small paragraph concerning the construction of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal.160 
The Act established a separate fund for Water Management (Vodohospodářský 
fond) committed to financing the canalization of rivers and preparatory works for 
trans-watershed canals. however, the eventual construction of the DOE was not 
included. regarding the technical part of the proposed network, the basic meas-
ures conformed with sympher’s 1000t standard vessel. smrček had successfully 
opposed proposals for much smaller dimensions, which would have limited inter-
national transit and therefore had supporters among those who feared a German-
led Mittel-Europeanization.161
however, hydraulic engineers and the canal lobby did not see the Act as an as-
surance of positive development. The vast majority of canal-interested players saw 
the state’s lack of direct involvement as a sign of persistent ambivalence, and con-
sidered the Act nothing more than a formal gesture towards silesian industry and 
other interested parties, including the German state. At the Czechoslovak Waterway 
Convention in Pardubice in the summer of 1931, smrček again called for broader 
international cooperation and agreement on the standard type of vessels.162
Apart from the standard pool of supporters, a new private player stepped into 
the spotlight during the negotiations on the Czechoslovak Water Act: industrialist 
Tomáš Baťa. he saw the Great Depression as an opportunity for expansion. his 
family firm was based in Zlín, a city not far from the Morava river, which meant it 
could have benefited from the canal. Baťa’s support for the new Water Act critically 
and development of water resources, 2. Planning of inland waterways and hydroelectric schemes, study 
dated March 13, 1943 (UNOG, GIX 15-1 35-1).
159 smrček’s crucial role in preparing the new law was also highlighted by the MP for southern Moravia 
Jáša at the Czechoslovak Parliament’s first debate on the law on 8 May 1929: “In this sense, Professor 
smrček’s great idea remains topical: for years he has kept on drawing attention to the fact that our country 
and its industry needs above all access to the world markets, to the sea. Our improved and regulated 
rivers should provide a major tool to achieve such a goal.” “Těsnopisecká zpráva o 46. schůzi posla-
necké sněmovny národního shromáždění republiky Česko-slovenské v Praze ve čtvrtek dne 8. května 
1930,” Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna, http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/
stenprot/046schuz/s046006.htm. Accessed 12 October 2010.
160 Zákon ze dne 27. března 1931, č. 50 sb. z. a n., o státním fondu pro splavnění řek, vybudování 
přístavů, výstavbu údolních přehrad a pro využitkování vodních sil.
161 smrček, Nástin historie vodní cesty.
162 Antonín smrček, “Proč je třeba plavebního spojení Labe s Dunajem a Vislou? – směrnice pro jeho 
provedení,” Věstník pro vodní hospodářství 13, no. 5-7 (1931): 102-106, here 104.
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   68 11/5/2012   1:33:49 PM
 Mittel-Europeanization on Waterways  69
affected its final form.163 Not particularly interested in transit, Baťa emphasized 
the role of the canal in providing a cheap transport route that connected his town 
(Zlín is not indicated on most canal maps, but is located on the tributary entering 
the Morava just above Napajedla, close to Otrokovice) to the Danube, making the 
markets downstream and the Black sea ports more accessible, while simultane-
ously securing cheap upstream transportation of various raw materials. Baťa also 
emphasized the local developmental functions of the canal, especially flood pro-
tection and irrigation. In order to speed up transport and limit the extra costs as-
sociated with transshipment, Baťa proposed a “light” version of river regulation.164
163 Baťa’s influence over the state administration was undoubtedly strong. hugo Vavrečka, an architect 
of the Czechoslovak state, and ambassador to Vienna in the second half of the 1920s, left public service 
in 1931 to became director of one of Baťa’s companies. for more on Baťa in Interwar Czechoslovakia, see: 
Marek Tomaštík, Tomáš Baťa – doba a společnost (Brno: Viribus Unitis, 2007).
164 A description of Baťa’s development plans for the region can be found in: Ondřej Ševeček, Zrození 
Baťovy průmyslové metropole. Továrna, městský prostor a společnost ve Zlíně 1900-1938 (České Budějovice 
Veduta, 2009).
Figure 2.8 – Detail from the undated waterway map of Central Europe from the ŘVC archives, 
covering the full Czechoslovak waterway program: the DOE, canalization of the Vltava upstream 
from the Elbe and the river Váh in Slovakia. The projected national grid on the map shows how 
the Paris Treaty complicated infrastructural development in the region – compare with figures 2.3 
and 2.4. The pencil line indicates the actual border between Poland and Germany and, together 
with the printed border line, delineates the Upper Silesia region that voted for loyalty to Germany 
in 1921. The map also shows the short-lived state border between Russia and Ukraine. Note 
that the author designed the map to include Paris (Paříž, in the left margin); perhaps in order to 
emphasize the westness of the network and its non-German character. The dotted line just below 
the city of Plzeň (Pilsen) in Bohemia delimits “territory controlled by the canal.” Source: Vodní 
cesty ve Střední Evropě (NAČR, GŘVC, b. 412, undated).
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Baťa was also concerned whether the project would be feasible; in the case of 
the fully fledged transit canal, this was a valid question, for both political and eco-
nomic reasons. The utilization of the existing river bed, however, would make the 
project both cheaper and more feasible, above all in political terms, as canalization 
of the Morava could be seen as the first step in the construction of the DOE; at the 
same time, however, it would not allow for any transit transport (and the feared 
German Mittel-Europeanization) due to the lack of a connection to the Oder. In 
1930, during discussions on the Water Act, Baťa took up the treatise on the canali-
zation of the Morava from the Danube upstream to the city of Olomouc developed 
in the early 1920s and published it as an appendix to his own position paper on the 
Morava river problems.165 The publication initiated discussion of the possibility of 
canalizing the river, which had previously been considered unsuitable for naviga-
tion. Engineer stanislav suk, architect of the canalization project, proposed reduc-
ing the length of the river from 247km to 160km by channelizing the winding 
course and canalizing the shortened river with a series of relatively low barrages 
(2.3m) with navigation locks. The Waterway Act reflected the debate over canali-
zation and commissioned the Directorate for Construction of Waterways (ŘVC) 
to study the canalization of the Morava from Olomouc down to the Danube, as-
sessed in comparison to the canal solution.166
A new branch of the ŘVC led by engineer Jaroslav hudlický was established in 
Olomouc to conduct this task. On July 1, 1935, a year later than the schedule au-
thorized under the Act of 1931, hudlický presented his final report.167 A solution 
was designed for vessels of 1000t as determined by the Water Act. however, apart 
from the transportation function emphasized by the chosen parameters, other 
interests were taken into account especially concerning agriculture, hydropower, 
and the requirements for the planned industrialization of rural regions along the 
river. In order to minimize costs, hudlický strove to employ those parts of the river 
that were already regulated (both projected and already executed regulations) to 
165 Baťa selected suk’s study written in 1919, as an “expert” opinion supporting his own visions. In 
order to pursue his goals, Baťa hired prominent Czechoslovak engineer and geologist Quido Záruba-
Pffefermann to prepare the detailed revision of suk’s project. When Zaruba did so, Baťa disregarded his 
work as not respecting the task. The real problem was that the desired harmonization of functional uses 
of the canal, which Baťa had dreamed of, was actually impossible. In the flatland, the canal would simply 
either drain the fields (when countersunk) or drench them (when elevated). Even if these two challenges 
were overcome using a series of very small locks, the canal would be virtually unusable for transportation. 
Záruba prepared two variants, with twelve and nine grades respectively (suk operated twenty-two). None 
of the variants met Baťa’s demands in all respects. Antonín smrček, “splavnění řeky Moravy od Olomouce 
k ústí do Dunaje se souběžným řešením průplavu,” Věstník pro vodní hospodářství offprint (1933).
166 hudlický, 1937 lecture for the Association of Engineers in Olomouc. Jaroslav hudlický: Přednáška pro 
sIA v Olomouci, 1937 (NAČr, MVP, b. 292).
167 ŘVC’s technical report on canalization of the Morava, 1936. splavnění Moravy: Technická zpráva 
(NAČr, MVP, b. 292).
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the highest possible extent.168 The report found that the middle Morava was best 
suited for canalization. The upper stretch of the river was considered too steep and 
the lower stretch too flat. Canalization of the upper section of the Morava would 
require extreme elevation of water level above the ground, which would have a 
negative effect on the river flow of tributaries, especially the Bečva. Canalization 
of this part of the river would equally cause problems with infrastructural cross-
ings, because at least “one ferrous railway bridge, eight ferrous road bridges and 
four concrete road bridges would have to be lifted up.” 169 The report deemed the 
lowest part of the river unsuitable for canalization for a wider range of reasons. It 
was clear to hudlický that both agricultural and navigational uses “cannot be satis-
fied at once.”170 Navigation required localization of the first weir to be as close to 
the Danube as possible which would create an 18km long, elevated reservoir, thus 
rendering large areas of land unsuitable for agricultural use. Moving the weir fur-
ther away from the Danube, however, would allow the Danube waters to flow up 
the Morava riverbed, causing a deposit of sediments when the water level dropped 
and the subsequent creation of a delta between the first weir and the Danube.171 
furthermore, while the flat terrain along the river prevented the use of high weirs 
due to agricultural concerns, too many short locks would slow down navigation 
to an unreasonable extent. Another argument against canalization of the lowest 
stretch of the Morava was that the Czechoslovak left bank of the river would be 
situated below water level, which would not allow industrial establishments, while 
the other, Austrian bank, would be ideal for industrial development.
The report recommended canalization as the optimal solution for the middle 
part of the river. The advantages were clear. The lateral canal with a constant down-
hill grade would require a large reservoir to be constructed somewhere upstream. 
furthermore, the inevitable elevation of the canal route above ground level would 
enlarge the inundation area, while dredging the canal into the ground would result 
in draining the adjacent fields. Lateral canals would connect the canalized middle 
Morava at both ends to the rest of the DOE, just below the confluence with the 
Bečva to the north and above the confluence with Dyje in the south. hudlický 
recommended a series of weirs and locks with a fall of three to ten meters.
168 This is in sharp contrast to suk’s canalization plan, proposed by Baťa, which on many accounts did not 
adhere to existing regulations. stanislav suk, “Technická zpráva ku povšechné studii pro úpravu vodních 
poměrů řeky Moravy v trati od Kroměříže k ústí do Dunaje u Děvína,” in Základ pro úpravu vodního 
hospodářství na Moravě, ed. Tomáš Baťa (Zlín: T. & A. Baťa, 1930), 8-20.
169 ŘVC’s technical report on canalization of the Morava, 1936. splavnění Moravy: Technická zpráva 
(NAČr, MVP, b. 292).
170 Ibid.
171 As in the suk project (10km). suk, “Technická zpráva,” 17-18.
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however, the governmental-level debate made the report redundant, due 
to the Ministry of Agriculture’s strong opposition to canalization.172 While the 
Ministry of Public Works remained open to alternatives, the Ministry of Trade 
strongly supported the idea of canalizing the Morava in the same way as the Elbe 
(riverbed only). The ministry’s aim was to extend the Danube waterway into the 
Czechoslovak hinterland via the Morava (and, concurrently, by canalizing the Váh 
in slovakia). Czechoslovak connection to the three seas was secured by its posi-
tion on the Danube, Elbe, and Oder rivers, and from the perspective of the na-
tional economy, there was no need to actually interconnect the rivers. Thus, the 
Ministry of Trade did not see a future link to the Oder that would allow for the 
transit function of the DOE canal as a priority.173 On the other hand, the Ministry 
of Agriculture completely rejected the canalization of the Morava. Czechoslovak 
agro-engineers argued that canalizing any stretch of the river would cause prob-
lems with runoff of waste water, hamper the water regime, and generally worsen 
environmental quality by turning the river flow into dead water. Put simply, the 
Ministry of Agriculture felt it was impossible for agriculture and transport to share 
the same infrastructure due to contradictory demands.174 
While canalization of the Morava could be debated nationally, extending the 
navigable Oder into Czechoslovakia required cross-border cooperation. The first 
bilateral talks between Germany and Czechoslovakia on the DOE canal occurred 
in the second half of the 1920s. The activities of Waterways Conventions and lead-
ing hydraulic engineers within the state ranks such as Zimmler, resulted in the 
signing of the protocol on extending the navigable Oder to Ostrava in 1926.175 
The North Moravian branch of the ŘVC in Moravská Ostrava prepared drafts for 
canalizing the Czechoslovak stretch of the International Oder and its connection 
to the DOE, inspired by smrček’s 1923 proposal. Although the German authori-
ties did not adhere to the agreement nor prepare the waterway project on German 
territory within the agreed time, in 1929 they eventually provided sufficient docu-
mentation on the planned connection between the Czechoslovak border and the 
navigable Oder.176 
172 One significant outcome of the 1935 debate was the Journal of Masaryk Academy of Labor’s special 
issue devoted to the canal. This was just another platform for the usual suspects: smrček, hanáček, Bar-
tovský, Zimmler and Lorenz, Sborník MAP, no. 52 (1935).
173 The Ministry of Trade’s response to the Chamber of Commerce memorandum on the DOE canal 
(NAČr, MVP, b. 292, september 29, 1936).
174 The Ministry of Agriculture’s response (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 2543, June 16, 1936).
175 The Protocol agreed on October 19, 1926 regarding consideration of proposals for constructing the 
canal linking the Danube and the Oder on the German-Czechoslovak border (AMZV, IV, b. 169; October 
19, 1926).
176 The official exchange of documentation was rather slow and MVP only received the German project in 
1929, when ŘVC entered direct negotiations with its German counterpart, Oderstrombauverwaltung- Was-
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The project to canalize the Czechoslovak Oder was finally completed in 1930. 
This was just in time for the inspection by the International Oder Commission, 
which traveled the river from source to mouth. The Czechoslovak authorities pre-
ferred to canalize the river rather than construct a lateral canal. In the undermined 
terrain of the North Moravian coal basin, it would have been difficult to find safe 
routing for the canal. furthermore, the existing infrastructure, not only roads and 
railways but infrastructure related to industrial water use, would make such con-
struction even more complicated. The navigability of the Czechoslovak Oder from its 
confluence with the Opavice to the city of Bohumín on the Czechoslovak-German 
border was to be secured by constructing a single weir in Koblov.177 Construction 
works began in 1931, financed through the Water Management fund, which had 
been established within the framework of the Czechoslovak Water Act.
serbauamt Ratbor. 
177 Letter from the Czechoslovak representative in CIO, Bohuslav Müller, requesting background materi-
als (NAČr, MVP, b. 156, May 15, 1930).
Figure 2.9 – In 1937, Czechoslovakia opened a new weir on the river Oder by Koblov. The 
hydraulic structure was hailed as a first step towards realization of the DOE. The ceremony was 
a national event with all the important figures in the Czechoslovak water engineering community 
attending, including Smrček and Bartovský. Source: ATMB, Smrček, b. 134.
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During the debate on extending the navigable Oder into Czechoslovakia, bilat-
eral negotiations gradually developed into a wider trans-border cooperation be-
tween both state and non-state players. In 1929, representatives of Czechoslovak 
institutions were invited to the German cities of Wroclaw and Opole to lecture on 
the Czechoslovak waterways program.178 In 1931, private and public interested 
parties from Czechoslovakia and Germany came together to form the Danube-
Oder-Elbe Committee (Dunajsko-odersko-labský komitét, DOEK), a non-govern-
mental organization estsablished to construct the canal. This organization was 
largely comprised of former representatives at the MWT, PIANC or MVB.179 The 
usual protagonists, such as Georg Gothein and Antonín smrček, stood at its cra-
dle.180 In addition to experts, the membership consisted mainly of large indus-
try from silesia and chambers of commerce from cities lying on the Oder and 
Morava from stettin to Olomouc. In addition to international conferences, the 
national branches of the new organization held separate meetings in both coun-
tries. Despite the participation of state institutions, the DOEK activities remained 
fruitless, except for keeping the canal idea alive and mobilizing the social capital. 
however, when faced with the rise of Nazism in Germany and its far-reaching 
geopolitical visions, the Czechoslovak players slowly started to realize, as smrček 
put it, that the Czechoslovak state’s ignorant position was hazardous and that the 
canal would be built “either by us, or over us.”181
Indeed, German authorities changed their attitude and, after years of rather 
uncommitted “cooperation,” openly stated their support for the canal project. 
such a change of opinion was at least partly inspired by DOEK activities. In 1936, 
the German ambassador in Prague came to the Ministry of foreign Affairs with 
a formal Aide-Mémoire referring to the 1935 DOEK meeting in Wroclaw. In this 
document, the ambassador proposed launching official international negotiations 
178 Director of the ŘVC branch in Moravská Ostrava, and ministry official Johan f. Meierle lectured 
regularly in silesia and was invited to lecture on the Czechoslovak waterway program by Verkehrsverien für 
Ratibor Stadt und Land; Consent for Meirele’s lecture by MVP (NAČr, MVP, b. 193, November 15, 1929).
179 Letter from the Wroclaw Chamber of Commerce dated October 27, 1932, addressed to Antonín 
hanáček, with annexes (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 2479).
180 At the DOEK meeting in 1932 in Głuchołazy (Bad Ziegenhals), Gothein presented his vision of the 
DOE as a waterway governed like an “international river” accommodating 1000t vessels. Georg Gothein, 
“Zur frage der Abmessungen eines Donau-Oder-Elbe-Kanals”, “Zur frage des Betriebs auf einem Donau-
Oder-Elbe-Kanals,” (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 2479).
181 In this sense, smrček compared the DOE to the Gotthard railway and presented Moravian Vales and 
Moravian Gate as being naturally predestined for the construction of the waterway link (reviving the old 
argument of “naturalness,” he had used against the revisionists in the early 1920s; page12 of the report). At 
the meeting, smrček also noted how the possible waterway connection and transit were seen as “threaten-
ing” the state, while existing railway transit and planned road transit did not arouse such sentiments (page 
8). report on the meeting of Danube-Oder-Elbe Committee in Prague on October 20, 1936 (NAČr, MVP, 
292).
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on the technical features of the project.182 Nonetheless, German support remained 
conditional. Germany would cooperate on the canalization of the upper Oder be-
tween Cosel (Kozle) and Moravská Ostrava, provided Czechoslovakia made deci-
sive moves towards completing the link down to the Danube.183
The situation became more complicated in November 1936, when Germany 
withdrew from all river Commissions.184 The revival of the traditional bilateral 
cooperation, transferring the river administration back from international to na-
tional authorities, also meant the restitution of German domination on the Elbe 
and the Oder, because Germany, as a downstream country, controlled access to the 
sea. following the German withdrawal, International Commissions on both riv-
ers were abolished because the participating Western governments either openly 
supported Germany or applied the appeasement policy.185 Czechoslovak business 
circles reacted by calling for the immediate construction of the DOE canal. had it 
been completed, the canal would have secured reciprocal relations on waterways 
between Czechoslovakia and Germany. Without the canal, Czechoslovakia had 
nothing to offer in exchange for free shipping on German waterways when it came 
to inland navigation.186
shortly after its withdrawal from the commissions, Germany invited 
Czechoslovakia to a bilateral meeting of experts on inland navigation. The delega-
tion, led by engineer Josef Bartovský, visited the construction site of the rothensee 
boatlift, which connected the Elbe to the Mittellandkanal. While the formal agenda 
covered German plans to re-construct the Elbe, informal negotiations suggested 
Germany would reject any attempt to establish a formal agreement guaranteeing 
freedom of shipping for Czechoslovak vessels. 187 In return, the Czechoslovak dele-
gation showed the same reluctance regarding the DOE project, which, as Minister 
182 Aide-mémoire October  22, 1936 (NAČr, MVP, b. 292).
183 former German minister of transport, Julius Krohne, openly stated this position at the Danube-Oder-
Elbe Committee meeting in Prague on November 19, 1935, when he called for a clear statement from the 
Czechoslovak authorities, without which Germany could not proceed with the canalization of the Oder 
upstream to the Czechoslovak border. report on the meeting (NAČr, MPOŽ, b. 2543), 4. for a detailed 
discussion of German archival material on this subject, see: Andělín Grobelný, “Projekty odersko-duna-
jského průplavu a československo-německá jednání v meziválečném období,” Ostrava: Sborník příspěvků k 
dějinám a výstavbě města, vol. 10 (1979): 312-334.
184 The decision to withdraw from the commissions was announced in a note on November 14. smlouva 
o mezinárodnosti řek na německém území – výpověď (AMZV, IV, b. 130, November 14, 1936).
185 The British delegation felt that when Germany withdrew and Italy would not attend the next meeting, 
a satisfactory settlement depended on direct negotiations between the governments involved. however, 
there were only two riparian states: Czechoslovakia and Germany (AMZV, IV, b. 130, December 29, 1936).
186 Memorandum Národohospodářského svazu Moravskoslezského v Moravské Ostravě (NAČr, MVP, b. 
292, february 25, 1937), 5. 
187 Germany presented its extensive plan to upgrade the river from the coast to the Czechoslovak border 
for 1200t vessels before 1942. Technické otázky labské. styk s Německem. Prohlídka technických prací na 
německém Labi (AMZV, IV, b. 130, October 5, 1937).
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Dostálek concluded in his report on the meeting to the Ministry of foreign Affairs, 
“is now more topical than ever ... when silesian coal is about to lose the Berlin 
market to the Ruhrgebiet, after the Mittelandkanal is open, they (Germans) need 
to get access to the Danubian markets.”188 
The move towards the actual preparation of the canal project announced by 
the DOEK, started to take shape in the summer of 1937. At this time the former 
minister of foreign affairs and current president of state, Edvard Beneš, visited 
Moravská Ostrava, the biggest industrial center on the Czechoslovak Oder. here, 
representatives of various local industries and interest groups confronted him with 
the canal plans. Beneš responded by openly declaring support for the project.189 
Only a few days later, Josef Bartovský presented a “state of affairs” report on 
the DOE canal. On september 10, 1937, the head of the MVP’s Inland Navigation 
Department stressed that, after the conclusion of the canal/riverbed dilemma, the 
remaining issue was the crossing of the canal with the Morava. Nationalization 
of the Austrian project resulted in relocation of the lowest section of the canal to 
the left, Czechoslovak, bank of the river.190 This information was accompanied by 
a letter urging the government to make a quick decision on state participation in 
the funding of the canal construction.191 The Ministry of railways tried to slow 
down the process by requiring that the canal be discussed by the recently estab-
lished National Transport Planning Committee (Komise pro sdělání dopravního 
plánu), where the railway specialists would easily overpower the supporters of the 
waterway. While canal promoters successfully deflected such an attack, the debate 
among government departments became tedious. The leading representative from 
the Ministry of Trade noted: “nobody achieves anything unless the sectoral inter-
ests are harmonized.”192
The canal debate was gaining momentum. Two months later, on November 11, 
journalists (and hydraulic engineers) celebrated the completion of the weir Koblov-
on-Oder as the cornerstone of the DOE canal.193 Organizations supporting the 
188 Technické otázky labské. styk s Německem. Prohlídka technických prací na německém Labi (AMZV, 
IV, b. 130, October 5, 1937). Jan Dostálek (1883-1955), a construction engineer, represented the Czecho-
slovak Popular Party in coalition governments throughout the 1930s as minister of Public Works (De-
cember 7, 1929-september 22, 1938) with a short break when he led the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(february 2, 1934-May 28, 1935).
189 “Prezident ve Vítkovicích”, Národní listy, 24 August 1937.
190 stav přípravných prací kanálu Odersko-dunajského (NAČr, MVP, b. 292, september 10, 1937).
191 In return, the government asked other ministries for their opinions. however, the required informa-
tion was not gathered before the end of the year (NAČr, MPV, b. 292, December 29, 1937). 
192 he presented this report at the Czechoslovak session of the Danube-Oder Committee meeting organ-
ized by the Central Czechoslovak Chambers of Commerce in Prague in April 1937 (NAČr, MPOŽ, 2543).
193 The canalization of the Czechoslovak Oder started in 1931, with Koblov the only weir on the Czecho-
slovak stretch of the river. This was the very first step in making the Oder navigable on Czechoslovak terri-
tory. “První krok k uskutečnění Dunajsko-oderského průplavu,” Lidové Noviny, 19 December 1937.
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canal held a celebratory convention for the opening of the weir. All the usual par-
ticipants of Waterways Conventions attended. Also notable was the strong position 
of slovakia, which became very active and interested in the waterways program in 
1937.194 Last but not least, one of the speeches at the meeting signified the final 
transition from the transnational to the German-led bilateral form of organization 
of Central Europe. Josef Volenec, a hydraulic engineer from Ostrava and long-
time supporter of the canal, revived the almost forgotten idea of regional coop-
eration within the MBV. Despite admitting that the formerly inter/trans-national 
organization had been incorporated in the recently established German imperial 
waterway administration, he advocated the organization as the only one capable of 
satisfying “our [Czechoslovak] demands,” unlike other geographical frameworks 
of cooperation, such as the Danubian Donauraum or the Little Entente.195
During the Czechoslovak president’s visit to Ostrava, representatives of the lo-
cal mining and metallurgical industries (Vítkovické horní a hutní těžířstvo) – cru-
cial members of the DOEK – declared their support for the construction of the 
DOE canal in the form of a one million-crown donation. The gesture was read-
ily accepted and, within a few months, the brand new organization was estab-
lished: the Danube-Oder-Elbe society (Společnost Dunajsko-Oderského průplavu, 
DOECs).196 Its founders faced a two-fold challenge. first, they needed to formu-
late an achievable and sufficiently specific strategy for the realization of the canal. 
At the same time, they had to devise a mechanism for close cooperation with state 
authorities responsible for the project, in order to avoid possible duplicity of ef-
forts. furthermore, private industries, as investors, wanted to maintain control 
over the project.
The founding meeting of the DOECs held in Prague on february 5, 1937, es-
tablished several specialist committees. The DOECs organizing committee devel-
oped a plan to combine state institutions, private participants, and large industry 
in a working conglomerate. In the summer of 1938, the MVP agreed on terms 
194 slovakia was officially one of four autonomous lands of the Czechoslovak state, along with Bohemia, 
Moravia-silesia, and ruthenia. In the summer of 1937, the capital of slovakia, Bratislava, hosted a large ex-
hibition devoted to the waterways and the Danube. In November, the local Chamber of Commerce organ-
ized a debate on the canal issue and the slovak parliament subsequently granted two hundred thousand 
CZK for preparatory works on the DOE in slovak territory. The project was backed by influential slovaks: 
Josef Kállay, former Czechoslovak Minister of slovak Affairs (1921-1927) and influential banker; and 
Kornel stodola, member of the Czechoslovak parliament (1920-1925), senator (1925-1938) and president 
of the Bratislava Chamber of Commerce. see Kállay’s article in slovenský deník, December 10, 1937.
195 report from the working meeting of the Moravian-silesian-slovak water associations, held on Decem-
ber 18, 1937 at Moravská Ostrava town hall. Zápis z pracovní schůze předsednictev vodohospodářských 
spolků moravsko-slezsko-slovenských, konané dne 18. prosince 1937 v zasedací síni městské radnice v Mor. 
Ostravě (TMB, smrček, b. 133): 9.
196 společnost Dunajsko-oderského průplavu: stanovy, (NAČr, MVP, 292, November 23, 1937).
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of cooperation and DOECs committed itself not only to financially support the 
institution and the canal-supporting campaign in the media, but also to take re-
sponsibility for technical surveys and background materials. As a result, the new 
Canal Group (Průplavní skupina) was created at the ŘVC, housed and paid for by 
DOECs.197 
The DOECs technical committee, presided over by ministerial official Bartovský, 
met for the first time in early April, 1937. They discussed Professor smrček’s paper, 
which provided a summary of the current state of the project accompanied by a 
schedule for the canal construction. his paper summed up what was later referred 
to as the “Czechoslovak lock variant” of the Danube-Oder connection. More pre-
cisely, based on the results of twenty years of MVP, ŘVC and Water Management 
fund operations, smrček compiled an “inverted draft” of the general design. In 
order to identify the individual steps that would lead to the realization of the pro-
ject and their sequence, smrček identified gaps in the existing documentation. 
he proposed a four-step strategy. firstly, the largest vessel type and the routing 
on the lower Morava between Děvín and Otrokovice required immediate atten-
tion. secondly, the general technical standards of the canal had to be precisely 
specified (locks, etc.) and the water supply for the entire route needed to be solved. 
This would enable execution of the third step: the launch of the preparatory phase 
of construction works on the lower Morava from Děvín (Danube) to hodonín 
(geological examination, detailed surveying, land expropriation, etc.). The fourth 
and final step was simultaneous construction of the remaining parts of the canal. 
however, smrček concluded that it was vital, even for the execution of the first 
step, to secure unconditional support from the Czechoslovak Government.198
Indeed, many issues concerning the technical layout of the canal remained 
unresolved. smrček, moreover, was not sufficiently acquainted with all the facets 
of the negotiations and conflicts caused by the project at various levels of state 
197 The department consisted of former employees of the ŘVC branch in Olomouc, established there on 
the basis of the 1931 Water Act to enquire into the possibility of canalization of the Morava (two engineers 
and one assistant), six engineers and three auxiliary workers hired by DOECs, and officials transferred 
there either from the former Czechoslovak institutions in slovakia and ruthenia or from institutions dis-
banded after the establishment of the Protectorate (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of foreign Affairs). The 
department started operations in March 1939, only a few days before German troops marched into Prague. 
for example, Vojtěch Krbec, Chairman of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications 
and Transit of the League of Nations, spent the war years as head of the fifth section of the Navigation 
department – construction. Výroční zpráva k II. řádné valné hromadě sDOP konané dne 22. listopadu 
1939 (TMB, smrček, b. 133), 6-8.
198 The report reads like a questionnaire for the public authorities. smrček enumerated many as-yet-un-
resolved questions requiring immediate attention to ensure the project could proceed. for example, which 
variant of routing in the silesian coal basin (if any) has been chosen? What were the official results of the 
canalization/canal debate? Návrh časového postupu a pořadí přípravných prací pro brzkou realisaci stavby 
průplavu dunajsko-oderského (TMB, smrček, b. 128, March 30, 1938).
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administration, and private industries. In his ambiguous role as leading state of-
ficial and DOECs representative, Bartovský organized a meeting of the ŘVC and 
MVP at Olomouc in the summer of 1938, to discuss and evaluate smrček’s report 
and prepare a more detailed and informed analysis of the current state of the pro-
ject, focusing on major conflicts and the most problematic parts of the existing 
canal design.199 The final document divided the entire route between the Danube 
(village of Děvín) and the Oder (the town of Bohumín) into twelve sections.200 
This paper represented the first official draft of a national version of the Danube-
Oder canal. 
199 Protokol sepsaný 9.6.1938 v Olomouci (MZA, h42, b. 275, June 9, 1938). One identified weak points 
was water provision for the canal. In July 1938, ŘVC together with MVP and DOECs organized a field trip 
to see the actual sites of the projected water reservoirs in Northern Moravia. Protokol sepsaný ve dnech 
20-22 července 1938 v Moravské Ostravě (MZA, h42, b. 275, July 22, 1938).
200 from the Danube by Děvín, the canal continues on the left (Czechoslovak) bank of the Morava and 
crosses it by aqueduct between Kostice and Brodské. It then continues on the right bank past the city of 
hodonín (moved out of the center – Austrian project) to Baťov-Otrokovice, a city created recently around 
Baťa factories, where the canal again crosses the river and a port is situated. from Baťov, the new routing 
followed the old Austrian one around the city of Přerov (planned port and starting point for the future 
Elbe branch) to hranice. here, instead of using the already infrastructurally overused Bečva valley, ŘVC 
proposed an alternative routing on a hillside to Německý Jeseník. from there to Mariánské hory, the route 
again followed the old Austrian project. The final descent to the Oder and the city of Moravská Ostrava 
was approved earlier by national authorities; only the precise position and dimensions of the Vítkovice 
port were not yet clear. Ibid.
Figure 2.10 – The national waterway networks as envisioned by industrialist Jan Antonín Baťa. He saw the water-
ways, especially the DOE, as national projects to unite Czechoslovak territory. To achieve that, Baťa added the 
south Slovak canal (the line along the southern border of Slovakia) to the original waterway scheme as proposed by 
the Czechoslovak Act of 1931. Source: Jan Antonín Baťa, Budujme stát (pro 40,000,000 lidí) (Zlín: Tisk, 1937), 49.
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Germany’s growing political offensive did not revive fears of Mittel-Euro-
peanization. In a tense pre-war atmosphere, the symbolic power of the canal as a 
large-scale national technology project simply overshadowed the threat of its pos-
sible Germanizing impact. On the contrary, the national press depicted the recently 
completed Koblov weir and the Kružberk reservoir as parts of the canalization of 
the Oder being decisive steps towards a bright future for the nation, a nation that 
would soon be located on the European waterway crossroads. Jan Antonín Baťa, 
successor to the now-deceased Tomáš Baťa as head of the family firm, published 
a treatise emphasizing the need to build a national infrastructural network for 
the future “40 million Czechoslovaks,” including a chapter on the DOE and other 
planned waterways.201 Various municipalities, regional associations and interested 
private parties published memoranda appealing for the construction of the canal.202 
On April 26, 1938, the Czechoslovak Parliament passed a resolution supporting 
the canal project.203 Milan hodža, Czechoslovak prime minister and tireless ad-
vocate for Central Europe economic integration,204 in an interview with the lead-
ing daily Národní listy, even reversed the negative stigma of the DOE, express-
ing the belief that the “canal as the common economic enterprise would converge 
our fatherland with the German reich in a march towards common civilization 
aims.”205 however, the international situation was escalating quickly; the Munich 
Agreement and subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia proved hodža wrong: 
the convergence actually preceded the construction of the canal.
Conclusion
In the circumstances of post-war Central Europe, the slow progress of the canal pro-
ject was by no means surprising. On the contrary, given the tense relations in the re-
gion and dominant perspective on waterways as tools of geopolitics, it is surprising 
201 The population of Czechoslovakia at that time was approximately fifteen million. stanislav holubec 
recently analyzed Baťa’s plan in his study of the ideology of Tomáš and Jan Antonín Baťa. holubec suggests 
that strong utopian and technocratic tendencies, especially visible in the work of Jan Antonín, were influ-
enced by the modernization and rise of both the UsA and Ussr and also by Italian fascism. stanislav hol-
ubec, “silní milují život. Utopie, ideologie a biopolitika baťovského Zlína,” Kuděj 11, no. 2 (2009): 30-55.
202 Memorandum severomoravsko-slezského svazu průmyslníků (NAČr, MVP, b. 292, september 8, 
1937), Memorandum národohospodářského sboru moravskoslezského v Ostravě (NAČr, MVP, b. 292, 
february 25, 1937); Národohospodářský sbor pro Valašsko a přihlehlé kraje (NAČr, MVP, b. 292, October 
14, 1937), Labsko-vltavský sbor národohospodářský v Praze (NAČr, MVP, b. 292, December 2, 1937).
203 resoluce 147 schůze sněmovny Ns rČs April 26, 1938 pro DOL (AMZV, IV, 170).
204 Marta Goňcová, “Dr. Milan hodža a pokusy o integráciu strednej Európy 1918-38,” in Češi a Slováci a 
východní Evropa ve 20. století, ed. stanislav Vodička and Vladimír Goněc (Brno: Vojenská akademie, 1994), 
161-165.
205 Milan hodža quoted in newspapers: “Průplav Odra-Dunaj,” Národní listy, 5 february 1938.
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that the project not only survived on the agenda of state institutions, but actually 
moved towards realization, albeit slowly. In addition to the engineers relentlessly 
driving the project, the general economic situation also affected the process. During 
the Great Depression, leading Czechoslovak industrialists sought cheap transpor-
tation, and investment in waterway infrastructure seemed an appropriate option. 
Equally, the significant drop in international trade revived calls for economic coop-
eration in the region. Thus, the early 1930s represented a heyday for the canal, with 
initiatives coming from outside (MWT, MVB, Mitteleuropa-Institut, International 
Labor Organization) and from within (Baťa).206 Close contacts established at inter-
national negotiations on the canalization of the Czechoslovak Oder, and also during 
meetings at transnational, mostly Mitteleuropean, level (such as the MWT or MBV), 
stirred the trans-border cooperation of locally-interested parties, which ultimately 
played an important role in the revival of the project in 1937. At the same time, a 
comprehensible vision of the DOE as a national symbolic project appeared. facing 
the threat of war, industries, engineers, and the state seemed to finally align their 
former conflicting interests: the DOE project, with strong support from Germany, 
drew closer to realization in the inter-war period. 
The image of the canal as a tool of Mittel-Europeanization of the defined 
territory largely affected Czechoslovak decision-making on the issue. The most 
striking feature of the period, as seen from the perspective of the canal, was the 
almost complete lack of international diplomatic debate. Between the wars, the 
Czechoslovak state followed the example of its imperial predecessor and left the 
practical negotiations to the interested parties and experts. Virtually all trans-bor-
der communication and cooperation regarding the construction and operation of 
the canal remained restricted to non-governmental parties. The protocol of 1926, 
together with exchanges of diplomatic notes in the 1930s, represented rather mod-
est exceptions to the rule. Between 1925 and 1932, the state proved to be more 
concerned with its own consolidation than with any form of transnational and 
international cooperation, especially compared to the lively transnational coop-
eration of non-state parties.
206 In the wake of the Great Depression, the International Labor Organization (Abb. ILO) launched a 
project on Pan-European infrastructural development. Its architects tried to direct the development and 
employment-supportive policy of individual states towards transnational European networks, following 
the 1930 Briand plan for European union. In the first and rather hastily produced reaction to the call for 
submission of eligible projects, the Czechoslovak Ministry of social Welfare offered three infrastructural 
projects of international importance. The DOE canal appeared on the list alongside the construction of 
long-distance roads and the damming of the Berounka river. however, it disappeared from the debate 
before the next round of negotiations; letter to Albert Thomas dated June 24, 1932, signed by Minister Dr. 
Ludwig Czech (AMZV, II, b. 627).
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The leaders of the Czechoslovak state, most prominently Edvard Beneš, always 
felt that the canal project was a step towards realizing a German Mitteleuropa. 
While smrček was able to protect the original canal route from technically unjus-
tified “nationalization,” he did not succeed in his fight against the ideas that trig-
gered the push for such change in the first place. The Great Depression brought a 
new and strong impetus for integration in the region, but the “fear of Mitteleuropa” 
effectively prevented such plans coming to fruition.207 In the end, the wide range 
of Central European integration models debated in the period was reduced to a 
simple question: with or without Germany? The answer from the Czechoslovak 
side remained strictly negative towards any cooperation with its western neighbor 
until the late 1930s.
Nonetheless, foreign policy requirements had a limited effect on private players’ 
actions. Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers gradually developed a specific strategy 
to counter the fear of Germanization by canal and created an image of the DOE as a 
tool to influence the inevitable Mittel-Europeanization (German controlled network 
construction) of the region and benefit from it. The former highly national position 
held for instance by smrček in 1919, eroded over time. When the state proved to be a 
hindrance to the DOE, smrček considered the canal a far more promising means of 
ensuring security and prosperity than the independent state – and, unlike the state, 
one that would endure.
While the historical literature on the process tends to construct a set of conflict-
ing visions of Central Europe, engineers working on the DOE seemed to ignore such 
political antagonism. Of course, politics regularly and inevitably interfered with the 
“scientific” network planning, on both the national and international stage. When 
the MBV considered its affiliation to the MWT, Czechoslovak engineers objected, 
using an argument similar to the one they raised against the “nationalized” routing 
of the canal; namely, that politics should not meddle with purely technical matters. 
Considering their profession to be apolitical, the engineers bridged the conflict be-
tween the German and non-German perceptions of Mitteleuropa.
Notwithstanding the political tensions between the Czechoslovak and German 
visions of Central Europe, which considered the construction of the canal vir-
tually impossible during the inter-war period, Czechoslovak engineers man-
aged to harmonize the Czechoslovak canal project with the German plan for the 
207 Beneš simply saw Germany and the Mitteleuropa plans as a major threat to Czechoslovak sovereignty 
and blocked any attempts on cooperation in the region, which included Germany. In a 1931 telegram to 
Vienna, Beneš clearly specified his position, stating: “we can take part in a united Europe with france, 
Belgium and Poland, but not in Mitteleuropa without them.” Quoted in: Drahomír Jančík, “Celní unie 
v úvahách o středoevropské hospodářské integraci (1918-38),” in Československo a střední Evropa v 
meziválečném období, ed. Jaroslav Pátek (Prague: Karolinum, 1993), 61-91, here 62.
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Mitteleuropean network. People like smrček and Zimmler, who operated across 
the political and spatial hierarchies, played a crucial part in such a transnational 
standardization from below. somewhat paradoxically, the ŘVC eventually pro-
moted the material Mittel-Europeanization of Czechoslovak territory so feared by 
the political national representation. 
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Chapter 3  
Canal as Artery for Nazi Expansion
Some members of the [Czechoslovak] parliament had the opportunity to see 
the advancement of waterway constructions in Germany. Huge investments 
are directed into waterways there. Germany does not fear, as we do, that 
by constructing waterways, the future of the railways might be endangered. 
Germany is fully aware of the national economic importance of waterways 
and does not regret any costs. Canals are being built there, connecting one 
river to the other …
Mr. Josef Chalupník, Prague, December 15, 19371
In December 1937, during a Czechoslovak parliamentary hearing on the state 
budget, a silesian MP named Josef Chalupnik tried to persuade the National 
Government of the need for transport infrastructure investments in general and 
the vital importance of constructing the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal in particular. 
reading between the lines, the strong and rather explicit message was: follow the 
courageous and progressive example of Germany, let’s do it the German way! 
The German annexation of so-called sudetenland (border regions of former 
Czechoslovakia with an ethnically German majority) changed the territorial shape 
of the country. The annexation also transformed the atmosphere in society. The 
Munich Agreement, signed by the leading European powers in the early hours of 
september 30, 1938, turned the independent Czechoslovak state into a defenseless 
island surrounded by Nazi Germany. The truncated republic lingered on under 
the shadow of Nazism and the previously feared Germany suddenly became the 
official exemplar of successful organization of state affairs.2
1 Josef Chalupník was a social-democratic MP and later senator, union leader, and mayor of Vítkovice 
(1918-1924); after its incorporation into the city of Moravska Ostrava, also mayor there (1935-1939). Blažena 
Przybylová and Josef Šerka, Muži s mocí. Portréty představitelů města Ostravy 1918-1989 (Šenov u Ostravy: 
Tilia, 1999), 26-28. Quoted from “Těsnopisecká zpráva o 95. schůzi senátu Národního shromáždění repub-
liky Československé v Praze ve středu dne 15. prosince 1937,” Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní 
knihovna, http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1935ns/se/stenprot/095schuz/s095004.htm. Accessed 11 October 2010. 
2 fascination with German success was common in a country abandoned by democratic leaders. Jan 
Gebhart and Jan Kuklík, Druhá republika 1938-1939. Svár demokracie a totality v politickém, společenském 
a kulturním životě (Prague; Litomyšl: Paseka, 2004).
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This development had a direct and instant effect on the Danube-Oder-Elbe 
(DOE) canal negotiations. Borders now interrupted the canal route, previously 
located exclusively on Czechoslovak territory. Together with the antecedent Nazi 
Anschluss of Austria (March 1938), the annexation of Czechoslovak sudetenland 
put both ends of the proposed artificial waterway into German hands (the upper 
Oder in Czechoslovak silesia, as well as the mouth of the Morava into the Danube by 
Děvín, lay within the lands ceded to Germany).3 The same was true for the summit 
reservoir, although its connection to the upper Oder remained on Czechoslovak soil. 
The redrawing of the map also caused other indirect complications. By occupying 
part of the Upper Oder river basin, Germany separated the planned water reser-
voirs of spálov and Kružberk from the part of the canal these structures should sup-
ply with additional water. similarly, the relegation of parts of southern Moravia to 
Germany affected the proposed branch canal to the city of Brno, which now passed 
through German territory.4 furthermore, following the German example, Poland 
occupied the Czechoslovak right bank of the Oder between Moravská Ostrava 
and Bohumín.5 According to a report for the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal society 
(DOECs), only 149km of the originally planned total of 260km of the route from 
Bohumín (Czechoslovak-German border) to Děvín (Czechoslovak-Austrian border 
and to the mouth of the Danube) remained on Czechoslovak territory.
Practical application of the Munich Agreement required detailed negotiations 
of various issues affected by the annexation. Among other things, re-shaping na-
tional territory affected the national transport networks, as parts of the existing 
and planned main lines lay on the territories relegated to Germany. The agreement 
originally envisioned forming an international committee to prepare a detailed 
plan for the annexation of Czechoslovak borderlands and oversee the process. 
According to the third supplement to the Agreement, the committee should also 
act as arbitrator in the event of a disagreement between the parties.6 By the end 
3 In November 1938, the official name of the country changed to Czecho-slovakia. The hyphen illustrates 
the upheaval of nationalist tendencies in the public space and the relatively quick collapse of the idea 
of Czechoslovakism. The autonomy of slovakia as well as ruthenia was declared by the special Act on 
November 22, 1938. Ibid., 88. here we use the old form (Czechoslovakia) throughout the text for the sake 
of clarity.
4 report on the effects of the land taking the water supply for the DOE canal and on the shortening of 
the canal route in Czechoslovakia. The DOECs’s central committee met to discuss the report prepared 
by hudlický (officially an employee of the ŘVC as head of the Olomouc branch) at a special meeting on 
November 10, 1938. Zpráva o vlivu zabrání území na zásobování průplavu vodou a o zkrácení průplavní 
trasy v Čsr (MZA, h42, b. 4).
5 Poland invaded the northern parts of Moravia and slovakia with an alleged majority of ethnically Polish 
people. Gebhart and Kuklík, Druhá republika, 24-26. for the Polish perspective see: Jerzy Tomaszewski, 
“The Aims of Polish foreign Policy before Munich,” in Mythos München = Le mythe de Munich = The myth 
of Munich, ed. fritz Taubert (München: r. Oldenbourg, 2002), 123-127.
6 The full text of the Munich Agreement is available elsewhere; e.g., Bořivoj Čelovský and Pavel stránský, 
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of October 1938, however, the committee had been confined to the role of a mere 
diplomatic stand-in and Germany took the lead.7 
The agenda items for the German-Czechoslovak talks on inland navigation 
Mnichovská dohoda 1938 (Šenov u Ostravy: Tilia, 1999), 387-389.
7 Gebhart and Kuklík, Druhá republika, 22.
Figure 3.1 – After the 1938 Treaty of Munich, the planned DOE route became interrupted by 
national borders. The map prepared as an evaluation tool to measure the impact of the Treaty 
on the DOE project shows how both planned and existing national infrastructural grids (the 
dashed line indicates railways) were fragmented beyond practical use. The red line indicates 
Czechoslovakia’s new borders. The dotted line shows the alternative German canal route, linking 
it to the Danube in Vienna. All the DOE branches, including the side-canal to Brno, intersect on 
German territory. Source: MZA, H42, b. 93.
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in Berlin in the autumn of 1938, clearly documented the form of the negotia-
tions. The first point required Czechoslovak resignation from the International 
Commissions of the Elbe and Oder. Under point five, the Czechoslovak inland 
fleet committed to adapting to German navigational standards and administrative 
rules and to the development of Czechoslovak transport with German seaports. 
furthermore, Germany re-repatriated the part of the Czechoslovak fleets on the 
Oder, Elbe and the Danube that was created after World War I. The cooperation 
on the development of the Elbe, Oder and Danube (points 2 and 3) and construc-
tion of the Danube-Oder Canal (point 4) were the only items without apparent 
negative consequences for Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak delegates faced constant 
pressure from the German authorities, who presented their proposals in the form 
of claims and orders. furthermore, while experts in both parties were able to find 
acceptable solutions, the German claims tended to increase. As one Czechoslovak 
representative noted, “negotiations in [technical] subcommittees would continue 
smoothly, but the results achieved were always turned down by the [German] 
powers that be.”8 
The German authorities considered that their priority was the construction 
of the DOE canal. Point four of the above-mentioned list makes this clear. The 
proposal they put forward in Berlin on November 16 consisted of five points, 
stating “mutual, sincere interest” in the development of the project and setting 
the framework for future discussions on routing and technical issues. The first 
point of the so-called Protocole affirmed the common decision of both parties to 
build the canal and to finance construction on their respective territories. The sec-
ond point envisioned the establishment of a bilateral commission of experts that 
would administer the project development and later on its potential execution. 
The fourth and fifth points presented an illusion of mutual respect and coopera-
tion, acknowledging reciprocal relations in future navigation on the canal, as well 
as initial German acceptance of the future construction of the branch connecting 
the Danube-Oder canal to the Elbe. however, the third point openly established 
the superiority of German administration in all decision-making as regards plan-
ning, construction, and operation of the future canal.9
8 report on the Czechoslovak navigation experts meeting held on November 22 in Berlin. Zápis o poradě 
čs.plavebních expertů, konané dne 22/XI.38 v budově Čs. vyslanectví v Berlíně (MZA, sDOP, b. 122, 
November 25, 1938), 5-6. 
9 The protocol was accompanied by a list of so-called “Explanations” (Erläuterungen zum Deutsch-
Tschechoslowakischen Protokoll über den Bau eines Oder-Donau – Kanals), which reacted to three issues 
raised during the talks: (1) the first point of the protocol does not eliminate the possibility of establishing 
a Czechoslovak-German company to build and operate the canal as suggested by Czechoslovak delegates; 
(2) the head of the planned central Czechoslovak-German canal-building authority would be appointed 
by the German government and the deputy by Czechoslovakia; (3) the German side had no objection 
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Czechoslovak canal experts could only fully enter negotiations after signing the 
Protocol. Neither the representatives of the Ministry of Public Works’ Navigation 
Department nor of the ŘVC participated in these talks in Berlin.10 however, 
they did dominate the Czechoslovak section of the Expert Commission for the 
Construction and Operation of the Oder-Danube Canal, established as a result of 
the talks.11 Josef Bartovský, in his capacity as head of the Navigation Department, 
organized a preparatory meeting before the first session scheduled for December 
20 in Berlin. Naturally, Bartovský wanted to discuss the Czechoslovak position 
with other individuals and institutions interested in the canal issue and focused 
on the DOECs. The main causes for concern were rumors of an alleged German 
alternative route. Bartovský opened by presenting a summary of anticipated de-
mands. firstly, the German authorities had allegedly decided to make a detour 
around the city of Moravská Ostrava, thereby depriving the city of cheap trans-
port and an additional water supply. secondly, at the southern end of the canal, 
Germany preferred the old Austrian trajectory along the left bank of the Morava 
at the confluence with the Danube in Vienna, which omitted Bratislava. Bartovský 
was not so naïve as to believe that the routing would be negotiable. Nonetheless, 
together with specialists from other ministries and DOECs delegates at the meet-
ing, he prepared a list of points that would prevent the most negative effects of 
the putative German alternative; in particular, ensure that the city of Moravská 
Ostrava remained directly connected to the canal.12
In Berlin, Bartovský soon realized that the rumors were correct. The meeting 
was chaired by Johannes Gährs, undersecretary at the reich Transport Ministry 
who had been responsible for hydraulic architecture since 1921. The German del-
egation included Georg franzius, a leading official from the Wroclaw based Oder 
Authority, fuhrmann, director of the Vienna Directorate for the Construction 
to the possible construction of the canal branch to Brno. The document was signed by Division General 
Karel husárek, Czechoslovak Minister of Public Works, and Johannes Gährs of the German Ministry of 
Transport; Die deutsche-tschechoslowakisches Protokol über den Bau eines Donau-Oder Kanals (MZA, 
h42, b. 275).
10 With the exception of rudolf Zástěra. The talks addressed the practicalities of inland navigation relating 
to the Czechoslovak fleet’s operations, not investment plans. several navigation specialists attended these 
meetings including rudolf Zástěra (Ministry of Public Works); františek sitenský (Ministry of Trade); 
Jozef Karlický from the Bratislava branch of the Navigation Office; Antonín hanáček, former navigation 
specialist at the Ministry of Trade and then-director of the Czechoslovak Elbe shipping Company; Vojtěch 
Krbec, former head of the League of Nations Inland Transport Committee; and Jindřich Choleva, head of 
the Czechoslovak delegate office at the International river Commission. for discussions on the division of 
the Oder fleet and technical issues, Czechoslovakia was represented by Karlický, sitenský, and Zástěra.
11 German version: Sachverständigen – Komission für den Bau und Betrieb des Oder-Donau-Kanal; Czech 
version: Komise znalců pro stavbu a provoz odersko-dunajského průplavu.
12 Minutes of an inter-ministerial meeting. Záznam o meziministerské poradě (MZA, h42, b. 275,  
December 16, 1938).
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of Waterways, with ministerial councilors fritz Krieg and hans hoebel. The 
Czechoslovak side was represented by delegates of the ministries involved: 
Bartovský and rudolf Zástěra of the Ministry of Public Works, Václav Topol of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and engineer Jozef Karlický of the Navigation Authority 
in Bratislava.
The initial results were positive: both sides agreed on the “Mitteleuropean” 
1000t vessel-type (lock width 12m and depth 3m), despite the fact that the locks 
on the German Oder between Cosel and Wroclaw, built according to the Prussian 
1905 Waterways Act, would have to be enlarged. The Czechoslovak delegation pre-
sented the design to their German colleagues who scrutinized the Czechoslovak 
project and suggested adjustments aimed at aligning the canal with the German 
standards of the day. The Germans also pursued changes motivated by the Nazi 
Grossraumwirtschaft policy.
regarding the routing, members of the commission shared the opinion that a 
study in situ must precede any further decisions. Nevertheless, the German del-
egates indeed preferred Vienna over Bratislava (for economic reasons) and pro-
moted the feared detour around Ostrava, although they agreed to build a port in 
Moravská Ostrava connected to the canal by a special branch. A proposed trans-
position of the canal route in the Oder valley from the right bank of the river to 
the left was a reaction to the Polish annexation of the right bank.13 The German 
delegates also raised the question of the riverine variant, but eventually accepted 
the Moravian agricultural circles’ argument for the lateral canal along the Morava. 
The main dispute was the canal’s general dimensions especially concerning the 
type and number of locks. The Germans demanded the locks be eliminated by in-
stalling ship lifts at both ends of the summit reservoir, in order to speed up transit 
traffic. Emphasizing the role of the canal as crucial transport infrastructure of the 
Grossraumwirtschaft, the Germans also required a limited number of twin barge 
train locks, each with a fall of at least nine meters; that is to say, significantly higher 
than the Czechoslovak proposal of three to ten meters.14 furthermore, the cross-
section of the waterway should follow the example of the recently-completed north 
German Mittellandkanal; in other words, significantly larger than that proposed in 
the Czechoslovak project.15 Nonetheless, when Karlický asked about the possible 
13 Although not voiced in this way at the meeting, subsequent developments favored such presumptions; 
that is, a return to the original Czechoslovak right-bank variant after the occupation of Poland.
14 Germans based their estimate on the Institut für Konjunkturforschung report (Institute for Business 
fluctuation research) which showed annual transit on the canal to be between 10 and 15 million tons.
15 In dredged parts, the width was 37m and the middle depth 3.5m. In parts elevated above the ground, 
the corresponding dimensions were 41m x 4.0m (former Czechoslovak projects operated at 34m). Jan 
rosík, “O příčném profile průplavu,” Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe 1, no. 5-6 (1940): 103-109, here 107. 
Experience in the German waterway program also influenced the suggested use of clay for sealing banks.
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agricultural application of the project, the German response was not entirely dis-
approving – on the condition that neither agricultural facilities nor their water 
consumption would clash with or slow down transportation.16 On the other hand, 
the Germans rejected plans to install electric plants on weirs along the canal route, 
claiming these could potentially conflict with inland water transport.
Enlarged transit capacity would require additional water sources. The German 
delegation suggested holding further talks on the issue in Wroclaw between the 
Czechoslovak authorities and the German Directorate for the Oder river Basin. 
for the time being, the delegates generally accepted the Czechoslovak solution of 
water supply, including the projected dams on the now-German left bank of the 
Oder. Bartovský returned from Berlin extremely optimistic and looked forward 
to “bestowing tasks to the officials immediately after New Year’s Eve”. The com-
mission meeting set the agenda for the future – a list of open issues included the 
type of locks, routing (especially in the Ostrava mining region) and financing, 
especially of the “enlargement” of the planned constructions on Czechoslovak ter-
ritory, etc.17 In his report for DOECs, Bartovský expressed the belief that construc-
tion work could start within two years. At the same time, he asked the society to 
continue covering the operation of the enlarged Canal Department of the ŘVC; 
otherwise, he would have to deal with the Ministry of finance, which could slow 
down the course of action considerably.18 
Despite the form of the agreement and the atmosphere in which it was 
signed, the Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers welcomed the Protocol and Expert 
Commission. They believed it to be the decisive step towards the long-desired re-
alization of the project. Antonín smrček, in an interview for Lidové Noviny, wel-
comed the agreement and called for maximum exploitation “of the opportunity 
to influence the routing on our territory” and of the economic potential of the ca-
nal.19 While such an attitude might appear to exhibit a strange lack of loyalty to the 
state he once fervently helped build, it is important to realize that smrček was first 
16 report of the commission of experts’ first meeting on the construction and operation of the Danube-
Oder canal, held in Berlin on December 20 and 21, 1938; Zpráva o I. zasedání komise znalců pro stavbu 
a provoz odersko-dunajskho průplavu konaném v Berlíně ve dnech 20 a 21 prosince 1938 (MZA, h42, b. 
275).
17 Czechoslovak delegates attempted to explain that because it was Germany that would profit from the 
enlarged carrying capacity of the canal, it should cover the extra costs for the enlargement on Czechoslo-
vak territory (estimated Czechoslovak transport would not exceed 1-1.5 million tons annually, which was 
ten times less than the German plan).
18 German delegates were even more optimistic and urged the development of the general design to en-
able construction works to start in 1939. Bartovský also mentioned his meeting with the retired minister 
Krohne, who assured him that the German claim for eighty-five percent of the Czechoslovak river fleet 
was negotiable. Poznámka pro spis (MZA, h42, b. 275, December 22, 1938). 
19 he was eventually proved wrong on both points: the routing was determined by the German authorities 
and the canal was not executed. “Dunajsko-oderský průplav v popředí,” Lidové Noviny, 17 Nov 1938.
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and foremost an engineer, who saw his opus magnum close to realization. Only a 
few months previously, he had clearly revealed the hierarchy of his affiliations: “if 
there is a European interest … our state must not be the barrier for the navigation 
connection.”20 having said that, who and what was the Europe he had in mind? 
On Nazification 
The events of mid-March 1939 opened the door for the far-reaching adoption of 
Nazi values and methods in preparing the DOE canal. The Expert Commission 
meeting, originally scheduled in Prague at the beginning of March, had to be post-
poned because Prague was hosting a visit from a different department of the German 
Government at the time.21 On March 16, 1939, Adolf hitler with his host arrived 
in Prague, where he declared Bohemia and Moravia a German protectorate. A day 
earlier, the fascist government declared the independent slovak state. The end of 
the second republic also meant the beginning of direct Nazification of the country.
The concept of Nazification was developed by contemporaries during and im-
mediately after World War II as a tool to describe the gradual social process of 
adoption, voluntary or enforced, of the Nazi ideology and related practices and 
symbols. It served the needs of de-nazification, and thus focused predominantly 
on German territories. In this chapter, its original meaning is expanded to cover 
also the processes beyond the core territory of the reich. In the history of the 
1930s, Germany Nazification meant the formation of social consensus behind 
hitler. In the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, on the territory occupied by 
Nazi Germany, Nazification was an exogenous phenomenon, a process aimed at 
transforming the newly acquired territories as part and parcel of hitler’s Empire.
The Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia, or Europe for that matter, did not come 
with a well-defined concept of how to organize the newly acquired territories. 
Klaus hildebrand, prominent historian of the Third reich, divided Nazi foreign 
policy into three mutually antagonistic currents, two of which he saw as having 
successfully gained considerable acclaim among the political elite. While the first 
of these currents represented traditional imperialistic ambitions, articulated in the 
form of a conventional Machtpolitik, the second was based on racial-Darwinism, 
20 Protocol of the second meeting of the DOECs’ technical committee, held on June 15, 1938. Protokol o 
druhé schůzi technického odboru konané dne 15. června 1938 (TMB, smrček, b. 133).
21 report on the commission of experts’ first meeting to discuss the construction and operation of the 
Danube-Oder canal, held in Berlin on December 20 and 21, 1938; Zpráva o I. zasedání komise znalců pro 
stavbu a provoz odersko-dunajskho průplavu konaném v Berlíně ve dnech 20 a 21 prosince 1938 (MZA, 
h42, b. 275), 10.
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its ultimate goal being domination by the Aryan race over the various geographi-
cally defined Lebensraum (living space).22 These two rival concepts competed over 
the shape and orientation of Nazi-ruled Europe and also over the future of the 
Protectorate.
While it is possible to foresee the ultimate goals of the Nazi vision for the future 
organization of the continent being defined by ideological racial imperatives, the 
actual politics was created on a day-to-day basis and subject to change depending 
on the current situation on the war fronts and the atmosphere within Germany. 
Instead of the uncompromising imposition of the Nazi regime with its racial values 
and principles, societies under Nazi rule experienced diverse and locally specific 
forms of Nazification. At any given time and place, Nazification reflected constant 
tension between the demands of racial ideology and the imperatives of imperial 
policy, thus the process acquired different forms.23 
While these notions show some continuity and connection with Naumann’s 
concept of German Mitteleuropa, none of them can be identified as its direct 
and linear descendant.24 The Nazi vision of Europe stood in sharp contrast to 
certain ideas of inter-war liberal (Mittel) European federalists such as hantos or 
Coudenhove-Kalergi. since the early 1930s, Mitteleuropa disappeared from public 
discourse as the integrative (normative) concept and remained in use almost ex-
clusively as a vague analytical geographical term.25 The proponents of a German-
dominated federation, based on the variously defined superiority of German cul-
ture, gradually freed up space for the Nazi concept of a racially-based Germanic 
reich. The change in MWT’s (Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag) form and policy 
after the take-over by pro-Nazi industrialists in the 1930s, which might be labeled 
Nazification, clearly illustrates such a shift. similarly, the spatial imagination of 
contributors to the journal Volk und Reich reflects the process.26
22 hildebrand thought the socialists represented by the stresser brothers were the weakest. Over and 
above the three currents, hildebrand, as intentionalist in the debate over the Sonderweg, saw the dominant 
figure of hitler as a relatively autonomous and ultimately decisive agent. Klaus hildebrand, The Foreign 
Policy of the Third Reich (London: Batsford, 1973), 14-18.
23 This was actually true for the situation in Nazi Germany. steven P. remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The 
Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, Mass.: harvard University Press, 
2002), 245.
24 see Chapter 1 for a discussion on the continuity of Mitteleuropa concepts in the inter-war period.
25 Elvert, while trying to prove a clear continuity, actually implicitly opposed such an assertion. While the 
first half of his treatise is based on newspapers, etc., for the second half (from the mid-1930s), he had to 
delve deep in the archives to find remarks about Mitteleuropa. Jürgen Elvert, Mitteleuropa!: Deutsche Pläne 
zur europäischen Neuordnung (1918-1945), historische Mitteilungen, 35 (stuttgart: f. steiner, 1999).
26 Ulrich Prehn, “Die ‘Entgrenzung’ des Deutches reiches: Europäische raumordnungsentwürfe in der 
Zeitschrift Volk und reich (1925-1944),” in ‘Mitteleuropa’ und ‘Südosteuropa’ als Planungsraum, ed. Carola 
sachse (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 169-196, here 175.
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The foremost challenge to older conceptions was the ideological position for-
mulated by Alfred rosenberg, leading Nazi propagandist and author of the in-
famous articulation of Nazi ideology. rosenberg saw Europe as an arena for the 
final battle between declining roman Catholicism, represented by france, and the 
righteous ascent of the Nordic race, represented by Germany, which also had to 
defend the eastern border of Nordic civilization against the soviet danger (slavic 
Marxist-Jewish conspiracy). rosenberg felt that Germany, especially its racial and 
ideological purity, was predestined to save Europe.27
however, there was a second reason for the fall of Mitteleuropa in German think-
ing. Its objectives simply became too narrow for the offensive Nazi politics. Elvert 
spoke in this context about the expansion from volkische Mitteleuropa towards 
germanische Europa.28 Other authors refer to the transition to Kontinentaleuropa.29 
The final limits of Nazi territorial ambitions were neither clear nor consistent over 
time.30 Nazi leaders generally preferred to remain unclear in terms of their visions 
and, to a certain extent, programmatically concealed their ultimate goals.31
from the 1930s onwards, there were attempts to align Lebensraum and 
Mitteleuropa more closely by simply making race central to the envisioned organi-
zation of the heart of the continent. A prominent outcome of such inclusion was 
Carl schmitt’s theory of the Grossraum – as an economic macro-region (Europe) 
dominated by a racially defined German state at its core.32 furthermore, the tradi-
tional concept of Mitteleuropa existed alongside the Grossraum vision, even after 
1940.33 The conflict (or alliance) between the two concepts can also be seen in 
the above-mentioned dichotomy of Nazi foreign policy. Elvert provided further 
evidence of the continuity of concepts (at least of the spatial imagination inherent 
within them) by pointing to the parallels between ideas and practices the German 
authorities pursued during World War I in the areas east of Germany, and the vi-
sions of Nazi planners after 1933. 
27 Michael heffernan, The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics (London: Arnold, 1998), 145-146.
28 Elvert, Mitteleuropa!, 391.
29 Prehn, “Die Entgrenzung,” 175.
30 heffernan, The Meaning of Europe, 146.
31 Mazower quotes a Goebbels interview dated April 5, 1940: “If anyone asks how you conceive the new 
Europe, we have to reply that we don’t know. Of course we have some ideas about it. But if we were to put 
them into words, it would immediately create more enemies for us … Today we talk about Lebensraum. 
Anybody can interpret it as they wish. When the time comes, we will know very well what we want.” Mark 
Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis ruled Europe (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 121.
32 schmitt’s ideas from different points of view are discussed in: Elvert, Mitteleuropa!, 335-337; Patricia 
Chiantera-stutte, “space, Grossraum and Mitteleuropa in some Debates of the Early Twentieth Century,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 11, no. 2 (2008): 185-201.
33 Elvert interpreted the Nazi “Neuordnung” plans for a federal Europe of 1943-1945 as a resurfacing 
non-racial Mitteleuropa concept, in a form befitting the current situation on the war fronts. Elvert, Mit-
teleuropa!, 379-387.
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Transforming the once envisioned and now gradually acquired Lebensraum into 
a smoothly functioning unit required immense investment in the completion and 
unification of infrastructural networks. The designers of the Grossraumwirtschaft 
were well aware that their success depended largely on the quick development of 
the ties binding the territory.34 Given Czechoslovakia’s former attitudes towards 
the waterways scheme, the unchallenged acceptance of the profitability of water-
ways that were implicitly incorporated in the Czechoslovak-German Protocol of 
19 November 1938 saved the canal promoters a lot of work. The decision to ignore 
the economic aspects of the project clearly illustrates the Nazi fascination with 
the symbolic and, more so, geopolitical qualities of the waterways’ development 
program.35 
Apart from geopolitical matters, the architects of the reich Waterway 
Development Policy were mainly concerned with the economic interests of the 
Third Reich. The waterway network they envisioned would open the markets of 
the Balkans to German industrial goods and simultaneously secure a source of 
cheap agricultural products and raw materials for German industry. Typically, 
such considerations, enhanced by the symbolic power of the large technological 
projects, underlay the Rhein-Main-Donau Gesetz of 16 May 1938. Designed along 
the lines of the 1886 special law issued by the late German Emperor for the con-
struction of the North sea-Baltic sea canal (also known as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Kanal), this act promised to reduce the construction period of the rMD canal 
34 Development of the German autobahn network is typical of such an attitude: James D. shand, “The 
reichsautobahn: symbol for the Third reich” Journal of Contemporary History 19, no. 2 (1984): 189-
200. from the perspective of Nazi geopolitics, the multiple infrastructural utilization of the north-south 
transport corridor through Moravia primarily constituted an axis of Germanization and a tool with which 
to control the ethnically Czech territory. Besides the existing railway, the Wroclaw (Breslau)-Vienna Auto-
bahn (highway), the Oder-Danube canal, and gas and electricity connections would link silesia to Austria 
via Moravia. The corridor between Olomouc and Brno connected Austria to Germany in the narrowest 
part of the protectorate, where the two German populations were divided by not more than 60km and 
transport infrastructures should serve as Landesbrücke (land bridge), especially the extra-territorialized 
Autobahn. In January 1939, a construction of German autobahn connecting Breslau and Vienna across the 
still independent Czechoslovak state started the infrastructural incorporation of the country into the Nazi 
Grossraum. The highway achieved ex-territorial status and formed a materialized bridge that connected 
Germans through Czech Moravia. The reich assumed all construction costs, including interconnections 
with the existing Czechoslovak road network, and agreed to open the highway for local users. Josef Bartoš, 
“Projekty propojení okupovaných území severní Moravy a slezska s jižní Moravou a rakouskem v letech 
1938-1945,” Historie okupovaného pohraničí 1938-1945, vol. 3 (1999): 7-29; Andělín Grobelný, “Projekt 
dálkového plynovodu horní slezsko-Ostravsko-Vídeň v hospodářské politice nacistů v letech 1940-1944,” 
Průmyslové oblasti, vol. 7 (1980): 201-257.
35 The telling example of such an attitude solves the question of the dimension of locks on the DOE agreed 
at the commission of experts’ first meeting. The final decision was to be based on water consumption 
calculations, detached from any economic considerations. report of the commission of experts’ first meet-
ing held in Berlin on December 20 and 21, 1938; Zpráva o I. zasedání komise znalců pro stavbu a provoz 
odersko-dunajskho průplavu konaném v Berlíně ve dnech 20 a 21 prosince 1938 (MZA, h42, b. 275).
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from fifty years to no more than seven. The vice-secretary of state for inland navi-
gation at the German Ministry of Transport, Gustav Königs, noted that the rMD 
canal’s primary goal was to create a united area for inland navigation spanning the 
area between Vienna and the ruhr.36 Besides the connection to the Danube area, 
Königs considered the primary achievement of the project was its contribution to 
the construction of the unified German territory.37 A few years later, however, the 
dimensions of the desired geopolitical entity were enlarged, and Königs moved the 
eastern border of the future unified area from Vienna to the shores of the Black sea 
and the Ussr, and the Grossdeutschen Raum substituted Mitteleuropa.38
36 Gustav Königs (1882-1945), a lawyer who held various posts in the German Ministry of Transport 
between 1931 and 1940, including vice-secretary of state. During the war, Königs administered enemy 
property in Luxembourg. In 1944, he was designated as the vice-secretary of state at the Ministry of Trans-
port in the event of a successful coup, which, as it transpired, failed. Currently, the standard vessel type for 
Class III European Waterways bears his name (Gustav-Königs-Schiff).
37 Gustav Königs, “Das rhein-Main-Donau-Gesetz vom 11. Mai 1938,” Süddeutsche Wasserstrassen 14, no. 
2 (1938): 43-46. In his argumentation, Königs turned to friedrich List and his thesis on the role of infra-
structural unification in national territory formation. The article is accompanied by the German Ministry of 
Transport press release stating the aim of the project in the above-mentioned international trade terms. 
38 Gustav Königs, “Wasserstrassen in Grossdeutschen raum,” Süddeutsche Wasserstrassen 18, no. 3 (1942): 
53-61.
Figure 3.2 – The waterway network envisioned by Nazi experts in 1942 was situated in the 
seemingly borderless territory. The European area, as the map’s title indicates, formed a 
unified entity. Note, what the authors of the map consider the “European area.” By exclud-
ing France, while including Ukraine, the map projects a Europe resembling Mitteleuropa. 
Source: Durchganagwasserstrassen im europäische Raum, map developed by Arbeitskreis für 
Donaufragen der Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft a.V., Süddeutsche Wassestrassen 18, no. 1 (1942): 
12-13.
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In 1938, fritz Markmann, NsDAP member and deputy mayor of the city of 
Magdeburg stated that further advancement of the waterway network was a crucial 
step in forming the Grossraumwirtschaft.39 four years later, following the territo-
rial expansion of Nazi rule, Markmann analyzed the problem on a European scale 
in an updated second edition. he believed that the Grossraum perspective eased 
inland navigation from the confines of national policy and shifted the focus onto a 
higher, European geographical level. Markmann argued that the Mittellandkanal, 
originally planned as a shortcut connecting Berlin markets to the ruhr coalmines 
without a necessary roundtrip via the Netherland rhine ports, the North sea and 
the Elbe, formed an east-west axis binding the north-south-oriented European 
rivers from the french Marne in the west all the way to the russian waterway sys-
tem in the east. Naturally, further extension of the Mittellandkanal was required. 
Connecting the Danube via the Transhelvetic Canal to the rhine and the rhône 
would constitute a southern parallel axis. Connecting the rhine to the Adria might 
establish a north-south axis through switzerland and the rhine-Main-Danube 
and Oder-Danube canals. Markmann called such re-focusing “a tactical turn-away 
from the internal orientation.” 40 
A year later, in 1943, a paper on the European waterway network appeared in 
the leading Nazi journal for spatial research Raumforschung und Raumordnung. 
The author elaborated on Markmann’s visions, concluding that it was time to 
build an international waterway system in Europe, which did not yet have a single 
successful international canal project. German central authorities should secure 
the eastward extension of the regional Mitteleuropean system, in order to attach 
the occupied territories in the east, particularly the General Government, to the 
proposed European network, which would stretch from the Atlantic coast to the 
Caspian sea.41
Indeed, since the outbreak of World War II, Nazi planners had started to ex-
tend their thinking from a Mitteleuropean vision to a continental one.42 By 1942 
39 fritz Markmann, Die deutschen Wasserstraßen (heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1938). fritz-August Wil-
helm Markmann (1899-1949), a lawyer by training, was counsel for the local economic association in 
Magdeburg from 1925; as NsDAP member, he was vice-mayor of Magdeburg between 1933 and 1945. In 
Magdeburg, in the spring of 1938, the German East-West waterway axis was completed with the opening 
of the rothensee ship-lift connecting the Mittelandkanal to the Elbe. Martin Eckoldt, Flüsse und Kanäle: 
Die Geschichte der deutschen Wasserstrassen (hamburg: DsV-Verlag, 1998), 403-415.
40 fritz Markmann and Johann Thies, Die deutschen Flüsse und Kanäle (Leipzig: W. Goldmann, 1942).
41 Gerhard simon, “Die Gestaltung des europäischen Wasserstrasennetze,” Raumforschung und Raumord-
nung 8, no. 3-4 (1943): 117-118.
42 Applying the water metaphor, after the successful invasion of Poland, Goebbels talked about Mit-
teleuropa as a basis for German expansion towards the warm seas of the southeast. Edo friš, “formy a 
metody nacistické okupace v Československu,” in Nacistická okupace Evropy: Sborník referátů z 3. mez-
inárodního kongresu dějin evropského odboje v Karlových Varech v září 1963 (Prague: Naše Vojsko, 1966), 
107-114.
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the Germans controlled most of Europe’s territory, far exceeding geographical 
Mitteleuropa. The Nazi Minister for Economic Affairs, Walther funk, presented 
a scheme for the European Community exemplifying the growing ambitions of 
Nazi Germany. The scheme reflected the actual situation on the continent at the 
height of Nazi domination. funk called for economic and political institution-
alization of the existing unity of European nations against the coalition of the 
British Commonwealth and the soviet Union.43 Königs prepared the program for 
transport unification, part of which focused on inland navigation. he did not pro-
pose a network scheme, rather a regime for operation on waterways, described 
in contrast to the inter-war internationalization. Königs opposed the regime of 
the International river Commissions and instead advocated a German post-1936 
solution that guaranteed freedom of shipping on national waterways to all nations 
“living in peace with Germany.”44
Apart from geopolitical and economic considerations, the waterways, as part 
of the water management system, represented the technological advancement and 
superiority that Nazi politicians and ideologists boasted about. While liberal econ-
omies around the world had difficulties coping with growing pressure on water in 
terms of balancing conflicting interests, the Nazi system of governance allowed 
technocratic solutions. Instead of individual interests and economic cost-effec-
tiveness, Nazism would govern water management with wider and more complex 
considerations. Centralization and “geopolitical water management,” oriented to-
wards productivity and general prosperity, replaced the previously liberal profit-
oriented and un-systematic attitude.
This attitude would probably have found a ready audience among international 
hydraulic engineers, a prime example being stanislav Kratochvíl, a pupil of Antonín 
smrček.45 In his 1939 paper on Nazi Water Policy, agreeing with the pervasive cri-
tique of liberal democracy in Czech society after Munich, Kratochvíl expressed 
admiration for the Nazis’ complex and scientific approach to water management.46 
he hailed the idea of centralizing water management in each larger river basin 
into a single Authority, thus preventing the particular interests of business and 
43 Mazower considered these plans, first articulated by funke in 1940, to be directed mainly towards 
economic cooperation of no-state actors and its political content remained ambigous. Mazower, Hitler’s 
Empire, 123-124.
44 Gustav Königs, “Die Wasserstrassen im Europa-Verkehr,” Süddeutsche Wasserstrassen 19, no. 1-2 
(1943): 2-4. A separate publication of part of Königs’ paper dealt with inland navigation.
45 Dr. stanislav Kratochvil, Dr. sc., born in Brno in 1907, qualified in civil engineering at Brno Czech 
Technical University in 1930, specializing in water management. At the time his paper was published, 
Kratochvil was working at the state Office in Brno. Naďa Urbánková, “Archiv TMB: 100. výročí narození 
profesora stanislava Kratochvila,” Události na VUT v Brně 17, no. 6 (2007): 16-17.
46 stanislav Kratochvil, “Vodní hospodářství a jeho nová organisace v říši,” Zprávy veřejné služby technické 
21, no. 2 (1939): 212-214, 221-222.
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economic groups from suppressing the interests of the national economy. While 
Kratochvíl tried to remain an objective reporter, his writing reveals his enthusiasm 
for the core of the German reform, as reflected in his statement: “also in our areas 
these new arrangements … might in many respects set an example.”47 
Kratochvíl emphasized the interconnection of hydraulic structures with the 
natural environment, especially at the aesthetic and economic levels.48 he did 
so following the Nazi perspective on the German landscape, and with reference 
to German authorities. for instance, he argued that future river channelization 
should not drain the adjacent fields and that flood water should not be disposed 
of without being used; he felt that the banks and the river bed should allow for the 
re-infiltration of water during periods of drought. Kratochvíl said that the regu-
lations must be planned in cooperation with farmers, and riverbanks should be 
reinforced by planting trees or at least be masked by vegetation. The channelized 
river should fit as much as possible into the landscape, on the basis that regulation 
would upgrade the landscape. The same applied to any other hydraulic engineer-
ing undertaking, including canalization and other waterways.49
The specific Nazi form of modernization clearly had considerable support 
among Czech political elites and the technical intelligentsia. Kratochvíl’s paper 
on Nazi water management reform as well as Chalupník’s statement on the water-
way question prove that beyond doubt.50 The fascination with German political 
and technological accomplishments drove the general transformation of the in-
dependent second Czechoslovak republic (1938-1939) into a semi-authoritarian 
state, modeled after the German example. This is just one of many examples of 
such accomplishments. Even after the occupation in March 1939, such a perspec-
tive on the Nazi state as source of inspiration contributed to the Czechs’ relatively 
peaceful reaction to German rule and the politics of Germanization, alongside the 
47 Given the long history of attempts to achieve unification of water management in Czechoslovakia under 
a single central authority, Kratochvíl’s supportive stance towards the German Water Management policy 
was probably more than just an attempt to look good in the eyes of the Nazi and protectorate authorities. 
In 1937, the centralized German Union for Water Management consisted of five sections, largely cor-
responding to hráský’s twenty-year-old proposal for Czechoslovak water management (five groups – water 
supply, agriculture, navigation, hydro-power and waste-water disposal). Ibid.
48 The Nazis developed a specific form of conservationism influenced by their ideology (or, more precise-
ly, a Nazi discourse on ideology). Best articulated by the famous German garden architect and designer of 
the autobahn, Alwin seifert, whose speeches opposing the desertification and degradation (Versteppung) of 
Germany were inspired by the American experience with the “Dustbowl” of the 1930s. David Blackbourn, 
The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (New York: Norton, 2006), 
278-293. frank Uekötter, The Green and the Brown: A History of Conservation in Nazi Germany (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
49 Kratochvíl devoted half of his analysis of the Nazi water administration to this new “natural” paradigm. 
Kratochvil, “Vodní hospodářství.”
50 see the opening quotation of this chapter.
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authoritative and commanding presence representing Nazi power.
When German troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia, the Nazi elite faced the 
dilemma of how to handle the “racially inferior” Czech population and how to 
organize the territory. The ultimate – but unspoken – goal of the Third reich was 
to eradicate Czech nationality through assimilation, deportation, and extermina-
tion.51 The authors of the Master Plan East (Generalplan Ost) assumed that not 
more than half of the Czech people would be fit for Germanization. The rest would 
have to be removed, not just from Czech territories, but from Europe completely.52 
however, the ideological imperative of completely wiping out the slavic popula-
tion stood in sharp contrast to the need to efficiently exploit the Czech industrial 
potential, particularly the ammunition industry. following Bismarck’s maxim that 
politics is the art of the possible, under certain circumstances, plans to strictly ap-
ply the racial policy in Mitteleuropa had to be postponed until the end of World 
War II due to military and economic concerns. While traditional imperial visions 
of foreign policy did not have a great deal of influence among the Nazi elite, this 
traditional power politics gained clear precedence in day-to-day decision-mak-
ing.53 
Two widely-cited documents, dating back to the first years of the Protectorate, 
demonstrate such a struggle between the two aspects of Nazi politics: racial 
Germanization on the one hand, and economic utilization of Bohemia and 
Moravia on the other. The first document was issued on the day of hitler’s declara-
tion of the Protectorate. In his capacity as plenipotentiary for the four-Year Plan 
(Vierjahresplan), an economic program for the revitalization of the German econ-
omy, hermann Göring claimed exclusive authority over the economic integration 
of the Protectorate into the German economic area. his efforts resulted in an en-
forced takeover of Czech Armaments and other large industries. formerly a cru-
cial industrial supplier to DOE construction, the Vítkovice Mining and foundry 
Works became a part of the Nazi industrial group known as Reichswerke Hermann 
Göring.54 The second document was a letter that Karl hermann frank, number 
two in the Protectorate and former MP for the Czechoslovak branch of the Nazi 
51 Boris Celovsky, Germanisierung und Genozid. Hitlers Endlösung der tschechischen Frage: deutsche Doku-
mente 1933-1945 (Dresden; Brno: Neisse-Verag; stilus, 2005).
52 Miroslav Kárný, “Generální plán Východ,” Československý časopis historický 75, no. 3 (1977): 345-382.
53 This applied to the dilemma of German expansion – military or peaceful within the framework of 
the established international order. hildebrand, The Foreign Policy, 14-21; Alice Teichová, Německá 
hospodářská politika v českých zemích v letech 1939-1945 (Prague: fN VŠE, 1998), 25.
54 Other aspects of economic integration included reorienting trade flows in favor of the Altreich, install-
ing a customs union administered from Berlin, transitioning to the war economy, establishing a command 
economy, and increasing the German capital share of direct investments in the Protectorate economy. 
Teichová, Německá hospodářská politika.
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party, wrote to hitler on April 18, 1940. The letter argued that the primary concern 
of Nazi rule in the Protectorate should be the solution to the Czech Question; that 
is, the complete eradication of the Czech Nation. hitler’s response, in the summer 
of 1940, was a compromise: Germanization of the Czechs by gradual assimilation, 
so long as it did not conflict with the vital economic interests of the reich, and 
simultaneous “Germanization” of Czech territory so long as it did not affect the 
ultimate ambition of turning the Protectorate into an integral part of Germany.55 
This compromise resulted in the installation of a dual administration in the 
Protectorate. The Czech government remained formally independent and ad-
ministered its internal affairs, while the Office of the reich Protector represented 
German interests in the country, developing administrative structures to super-
vise the Protectorate government. regarding inland navigation, the German au-
thorities appointed friedrich hirche as plenipotentiary for waterways at the Office 
of the reich Protector before the end of 1939.56 Together with the majority of his 
subordinate officials, hirche moved to Prague from the saxon Government in 
Dresden, where he was responsible for administering the upper stretch of the nav-
igable Elbe.57 This transfer also symbolized the victory of Machtpolitik over ideol-
ogy, as the decision to recruit key officials to the Protectorate from the Altreich 
(pre-1938 territory of Nazi Germany) was directed against the local members of 
the Nazi party, who had extremely radical attitudes towards the Czech popula-
tion.58 
Constructing the Grossraum
from the perspective of the DOE canal, the Nazi occupation of Bohemia and 
Moravia brought about a completely new and quite favorable situation. for the 
first time in the twentieth century, the entire stretch of the envisaged transconti-
nental waterway, from the Baltic and North sea ports to the Danube at Vienna, fell 
under the authority of a single executive power. The new setting promised rapid 
55 Detlef Brandes, Češi pod německým protektorátem: okupační politika, kolaborace a odboj 1939-1945 
(Prague: Prostor, 1999), 158-164.
56 The competences of a plenipotentiary were regulated by the reich Ministry of Traffic (Dienstanweisung 
für Wasserstrassenbevollmachtigte) (NAČr, ÚŘP, b. 1104, August 30, 1933).
57 Letter to under-secretary Liebenow (NAČr, ÚŘP, b. 124, March 18, 1941); report on the meeting at the 
Office of the reich Protector. Niederschrift über die Besprechung beim reichsprotektor, Gruppe Verkehr, 
in Prag, am Montag, dem 27.-28. November 1939 (NAČr, ÚŘP, b. 1104).
58 German historian Brandes interpreted this as a victory for reich Protector Neurath over the secretary 
of state and the second-highest German official at the Protectorate, Karl hermann frank, in this conflict 
representing the Sudetendeutsche, being the former leader of the radical Nazi wing in Czechoslovakia. 
Detlef Brandes, Češi pod německým protektorátem, 38.
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progress, given that infrastructural construction constituted the backbone of Nazi 
Grossraum politics. Driven by Berlin, the canal project enjoyed steady support 
from distinguished individuals among the Nazi elite, including field Marshall 
Göring. The project also had the support of non-state parties, such as the DOECs 
and the public. Everything seemed to be progressing smoothly and even the oc-
cupation and subsequent transformation of the second republic into the German 
Protectorate did not challenge the general optimism of the canal promoters. The 
Protectorate administration managed the new state of affairs relatively smoothly. 
Officials actively aligned its goals with Nazi Germany’s war economy program. 
The canal retained the image of a symbolic national infrastructure through-
out the existence of the second republic. The new state borders were intention-
ally designed to interrupt the main railway lines and transport corridors, thereby 
spoiling the coherent national infrastructural system that had developed over the 
previous twenty years.59 The Czech technical intelligentsia, sensing a moral duty 
to help the nation, reacted by producing plans aiming to create an economically 
sustainable state within the new borders. The vast majority of such documents 
included the DOE, echoing the megalomaniac plans Baťa had presented in 1937. 
Czechoslovakia was facing autonomist tendencies in slovakia and ruthenia and 
the DOE seemed to offer the key to reconsolidating the territory; a symbolic 
tie that would bind it back together. Kjellen’s river metaphor reappeared and 
the Czechoslovak state was depicted as being inherently structurally divided by 
the watershed into three river basins forming ‘natural’ economic units: Poland 
claimed the upper Oder, hungary the Danube, and the Elbe allegedly served as an 
axis for the rising German influence. supporters of the project argued that only 
interconnecting the three networks into a single national system would paralyze 
such centrifugal forces, because the “waterway network would become a backbone 
for other transport networks.”60
furthermore, the rise of technocratic tendencies in the second republic con-
tributed to the general acceptance of the DOE project. The dominating interpreta-
tion of the Munich Agreement as the failure of liberal democracy elevated tech-
nocrats to power. Gradual de-politization of politics culminated in the introduc-
tion of a simplified political system consisting of only two political parties, which 
59 Gebhart and Kuklík, Druhá republika, 165.
60 Memorandum from the capital city of Olomouc for the Ministry of Public Works in Prague. Memoran-
dum rady hlavního města Olomouce (TMB, smrček, b. 136, November 25, 1938); Olomouc was granted 
the title of Moravian capital in the eighteenth century. After the Munich Agreement, the city gained a 
central position within the new state borders and, from the planners’ perspective, supplanted Brno as a 
Moravian centre. Josef Bartoš, “Město Olomouc a projekty kanálu Odra-Labe-Dunaj,” Střední Morava 7, 
no. 12 (2001): 17-26.
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were mutually interconnected in “loyal opposition.”61 Consequently, two members 
of DOECs became members of the new “technocratic” government. Dominik 
Čipera, general director of the Baťa Company, and a member of DOECs since 
its very beginnings, led the Ministry of Public Works between December 1938 
and January 1942. Another member of the society, Vladislav Klumpar, served a 
shorter period in the Ministry of health and social Administration.62 
Within the scope of the second republic government’s economic program, 
which listed the canal among its crucial national infrastructural projects, Bartovský 
prepared a new water-management program for the republic.63 The realization of 
the original plan, sanctioned by the Water Management Act of 1931, had lagged 
behind schedule ever since the program was articulated, and Czech hydraulic en-
gineers saw the situation as an opportunity to accelerate matters. As if answering 
the call of Josef Chalupník, which opened this chapter, Bartovský opened his pres-
entation of the new program to the professional press by boasting, “We are build-
ing new railways, we are building roads and highways, we are making the rivers 
navigable, we are building big hydropower stations, we are preparing the network 
of waterways.” Bartovský summed up the previous twenty years and presented a 
vision for the next two decades. stating that the Czechoslovak republic’s water-
building program was only half completed, Bartovský called for the support of fi-
nancial and business circles to enable “faster and more generous implementation.” 
Bartovský promoted the canal as a milestone of reconsolidation of the nation. he 
foresaw the project being accomplished in six years and emphasized the positive 
social impact of the construction work. It would provide employment for 25,000 
men, and thus a living for more than 60,000 people (compared to a hypothetical 
maximum of 20 to 50,000 covering all the other projects in the water manage-
ment program’s budget). surprisingly, Bartovský interpreted the relocation of the 
canal’s mouth to the Danube from Bratislava to Vienna, enforced by Germany, as 
being advantageous from a national perspective. The relocation of the confluence 
changed the ratio between the part of the route lying on reich territory and the 
part in the Protectorate from 40:223 to 166:157 (in km). Given that both states had 
committed to cover construction costs in their respective territories, such a claim 
61 The authoritarian tendencies led to a combination of legislative and executive powers in the hands of 
the government as of December 15, 1938. Gebhart and Kuklík, Druhá republika, 105-109.
62 Klumpar (1893-1979) was a former Czechoslovak deputy at the International Chamber Commerce 
and, since 1927, director of the Ústřední sociální pojišťovna (central social insurance company). The new 
building of the latter housed the latest navigation department of ŘVC, which was established in 1939 with 
the help of DOECs.
63 “Těsnopisecká zpráva o 156. schůzi poslanecké sněmovny národního shromáždění republiky česko-
slovenské v Praze v úterý dne 13. prosince 1938,” Společná česko-slovenská digitální parlamentní knihovna, 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1935ns/ps/stenprot/156schuz/s156003.htm. Accessed 11 October 2010. 
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was undoubtedly justified from a financial perspective, especially since Bratislava 
had become the capital of the autonomous slovakia.64
Initially, the establishment of the Protectorate induced only rhetorical adjust-
ments and no fundamental technical adaptation of the program, which Bartovský 
only finalized a month before the occupation. Within a few months, the Ministry, 
together with DOECs, had published the updated version in German. The major 
changes were in the general framework, given that the economic development of 
the reich specified in the four-Year Plan substituted the reconsolidation of the 
truncated Czechoslovak state. This Nazi economic program, which Adolf hitler 
had originally written in August 1936 in an attempt to reduce unemployment and 
strengthen the national economy, included a lavishly designed infrastructural de-
velopment program; in addition to the famous highways, waterways featured a 
great deal.65 hermann Göring, who was in charge of the program, had incorpo-
rated the Danube-Oder Canal in the plan at the latest by October 1938, immedi-
ately after the Munich Agreement and even before the signing of the Protocol.66 
Therefore, in the spring of 1939, Bartovský only had to align the national and Nazi 
perspectives on the project.
The so-called Water Management four-Year Plan (Vodohospodářská čtyřletka) 
focused on accelerating the execution of the program that had already been devel-
oped under the Czechoslovak Water Management fund since 1931.67 The entire 
plan was worth 1.6 billion crowns for the period from 1940 to 1943, of which the 
DOE scheme accounted for almost half. Given that the average annual investment 
in water management in the previous two decades had only been slightly more 
than 150 million crowns, it is clear that Bartovský had purposefully presented a 
maximalist alternative and tried to take advantage of the situation. DOECs de-
cided to publish the Čtyřletka plan in both Czech and German, supplemented 
with an introduction by the Protectorate Minister of Public Works, Čipera.68 The 
64 Josef Bartovský, “Labsko-odersko-dunajský průplav a velké vodní stavby ministerstva veřejných prací,” 
Zprávy veřejné služby technické 21 (1939): 112-114.
65 Gerhard L. Weinberg, “hitler’s Memorandum on the four-Year Plan: A Note,” German Studies Review 
11, no. 1 (1988): 133-135.
66 “The sudetenland has to be exploited with all available means. General field Marshall Göring counts 
on complete industrial assimilation of slovakia. Czech and slovakia would become German dominions. 
Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up.” Göring made his 
views on the future of the project clear at the Air Ministry conference on October 14, 1938. Office of Chief 
of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 1 (Washington: 
United states Government Printing Office, 1946), 581.
67 Josef Bartovský, Der Elbe-Donau-Oderkanal im Wasserbauprogramme des Reichsprotektorats Böhmen 
und Mähren: Übersicht und Überprüfung des Investitionsplanes (Prague: společnost dunajsko-oderského 
průplavu, 1939), 4.
68 Bartovský presented the four-Year plan together with the publications to delegates at the Commission 
of Experts’ third meeting in september 1939. Josef Bartovský, Viehrjahrplan für Wassestrassen und Was-
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funds allocated for the DOE within the first four-Year plan were expected to 
cover the preparatory works and the construction of dams providing water for the 
planned waterway. Bartovský expected the project to be completed in the second 
four-Year plan, from 1944-1947, with an additional cost of approximately one bil-
lion crowns.69
serwirtschaftliche Bauten in Böhmen und Mähren. Bau des Donau-Oder-Kanals. Entwurf eines Investition-
sprogrammes. (Prague: Gesellschaft der Donau-Oder-Kanals, 1939).
69 A brief summary of Bartovský’s four-Year plan focused on the DOE. Bartovský later presented on vari-
ous occasions, including in December 1939 at the opening celebration of the Adolf hitler Canal. report 
on the development and state of preparations for the construction of the Danube-Oder canal in Bohemia 
and Moravia. Zpráva o vývoji a stavu příprav pro stavbu odersko-dunajského průplavu na území Čech a 
Moravy (MZA, h42, 275), 9.
Figure 3.3 – Map of the protectorate water structure program developed by Bartovský in 1939. 
By then, Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist. The red territory indicates the Protectorate Bohemia 
and Moravia. Slovakia was an independent state and except for a short stretch of border with 
Poland on the north-east, the Protectorate was surrounded by the German Third Reich. Here 
the DOE is drawn as key to the planned waterway grid in Hitler’s Empire. The Adolf Hitler 
Canal, located in the upper right corner and connecting the Oder port of Kozle (Cosel) to Gliwice 
(Gleiwitz), marked the first step in this direction. It was opened in the autumn of 1939. Source: 
Josef Bartovský, Der Elbe-Donau-Oderkanal im Wasserbauprogramme des Reichsprotektorats 
Böhmen und Mähren: Übersicht und Überprüfung des Investitionsplanes, Prague: Společnost 
dunajsko-oderského průplavu, 1939, 32.
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Paradoxically, the German occupation, in the form of the Protocol and the 
Expert Commission, gave further momentum to the formerly “national” project. 
The unprecedented mobilization of resources and consolidation of the formerly 
fragmented spectra of supporters of the DOE, inspired by escalated nationalism 
in Czechoslovakia during its last years of independence, survived the short-lived 
second republic. At the time of hitler’s stay in Prague in March 1939, the ŘVC 
navigational department commenced operations, supported by DOECs. for the 
first time since the fall of the monarchy, the canal project employed significant 
numbers of engineers. Josef Bartovský, who was simultaneously head of the Water 
Management Department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Public Works, mem-
ber of the Central Committee of DOECs, and editor-in-chief of its journal, man-
aged to retain his extensive powers and his positions after the establishment of the 
Protectorate. hence, from the perspective of the DOE canal, the second republic 
and the first stages of the Protectorate seemed to be a time of growing activity and 
optimistic expectations.
The second meeting of the Commission of Experts on the DOE, originally 
scheduled for March 1939, finally took place two months later, once the situa-
tion had settled down and Nazi rule in the Protectorate had been consolidated. In 
the meantime, however, the commission had lost its international status.70 While 
the informal dominance of the German side characterized the first meeting, the 
representatives of the Protectorate administration realized in the second session 
that they should act more as technical body responsible for the preparation of the 
project on the respective territories. 
During the talks held in Prague in May 1939, the German delegates again 
pushed forward in all aspects of enlarging the canal dimensions. The most visible 
articulation of this perspective came in the re-emphasized preference for “long 
pounds and minimization of the number of locks” in the longitudinal section of 
the canal.71 Apart from the issues settled earlier (particularly the standard type of 
vessel and related measures), other technical dimensions and measures came to 
the foreground, including the type of locks, propulsion on canal pounds, and the 
clearance above water level.72 The last issue clearly illustrated that, from the Nazi 
70 As had the canal. At the first meeting, hoebel spoke of mutual free shipping on the canal “according to 
rules valid for the Danube.” report from the Commission of Experts’ first meeting on the construction and 
operation of the Danube-Oder canal held in Berlin on December 20 and 21, 1938; Zpráva o I. zasedání 
komise znalců pro stavbu a provoz odersko-dunajského průplavu konaném v Berlíně ve dnech 20. a 21 
prosince 1938 (MZA, h42, b. 275), 2.
71 Niederschrift betreffend zweite Tagung der sachverständigen Kommission für den Bau und Betrieb des 
Oder-Donau-Kanals vom 10-13. Mai 1939 (MZA, h42, 121), 4.
72 Niederschrift betreffend zweite Tagung der sachverständigen Kommission für den Bau und Betrieb des 
Oder-Donau-Kanals vom 10-13. Mai 1939 (MZA, h42, 121).
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perspective, the DOE primarily represented an extension of (or a connection to) 
the Danube. The German delegation attempted to align the clearance above water 
level on the DOE with the Danubian standard (6.4 m), which also applied to the 
rMD canal.73 Correspondingly, the question of the standard technical dimensions 
of the envisioned Nazi waterway network was resolved in favor of the Eastern en-
largement. The “natural” differences among waterways, most visibly demonstrated 
by the distinction between man-made canals on the one hand and navigable rivers 
on the other, required a central authority and the introduction of common stand-
ards in order to form a coherent network. These standards clearly reflected the 
push towards the East. In 1939, the hamburg-based Institut für Schiffbau, together 
with the Zentral Verband für Deutsche Binnenschiffahrt in Berlin, developed a clas-
sification of inland navigation vessels mandatory for the reich waterways, and for 
the trans-watershed canals (namely the DOE and rMD).74 They recommended 
the type based on the Danube boats.75 It reflected the ongoing debate on the sug-
gested territorial framework of the Nazi waterway network. 
These general considerations set the scene for discussions regarding the type 
of locks. Based on the report76 presented by Georg franzius of the Wroclaw Oder 
Authority, the commission agreed on 225m-long twin locks that were suitable for 
operating towboats; these were the largest lock dimensions of all the considered 
alternatives. The Wroclaw research institute provided an economic argument for 
such a decision, estimating the future annual traffic on the canal to be 6-8 million 
tons.77 franzius was aware that the enlargement of locks would push the utilization 
of available water resources to the limit and recommended some form of water-
saving mechanism. Apart from the twin sluice option (fifty percent saving), the 
alternative was to install a water-saving basin (sixty-five percent saving). however, 
even when combined with the triple water-saving basin (which would save ap-
proximately sixty-five percent of water in each fill-empty cycle) at each of sixteen 
73 Nazi authorities evidently saw both these trans-watershed canals as equally important for the envi-
sioned Grossraum network.
74 Emil Bendel, “Průběžná doprava ze severního a Baltského moře přes Dunajsko-odersko-labský průplav 
k Černému moři,” Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe 2, no. 5 (1941): 94-95, here 94.
75 Measures 75x2, 5x9m, a bit shorter than the boats for the Mittellandkanal (80m). Ladislav Beneš, “K 
otázce nejvhodnějšího typu člunů pro Dunajsko-oderský průplav,” Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe 2, no. 6 
(1941): 121-124.
76 Berechnung des Leistungsfähigkeit der schleusen für den Oder-Donau-Kanal. Anlage 3 zur Nider-
schrifft betreffend 2. Tagung der Komission für den Bau des Oder-Donau-Kanals am 10. Mai 1939 in Prag. 
(NAČr, ÚŘP, 759).
77 however, the Schlesischen Institut für Wirtschafts- und Konjunkturforschung declared it almost impossi-
ble to estimate the traffic on the canal, which would not be operated before 1945, due to the unpredictable 
political and economic future of the region. schleusen des Oder-Donau-Kanals. Anlage 2 zur Nider-
schrifft betreffend 2. Tagung der Komission für den Bau des Oder-Donau-Kanals am 10. Mai 1939 in Prag 
(NAČr, ÚŘP, 759).
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locks, the entire canal route equipped with twin locks that the commission chose 
would require a flow rate of four m3/s,78 an amount that actually exceeded the low 
flow of the middle Morava during drought.79 While such calculations did not over-
turn the decision in favor of maximal lock dimensions, they did turn the problem 
of water provisioning into the central issue of the project development.
The pressure to reduce the number of locks naturally complemented the push 
to enlarge their capacity. While the old Czechoslovak project proposed eight locks 
on the Protectorate stretch of the lateral canal along the Morava, the German del-
egates would not accept more than six steps, which conflicted with local farmers’ 
interests.80 furthermore, the commission established a special subcommittee to 
investigate the technical solution of connecting the summit reservoir to the Oder 
and Morava valleys. The Germans, following their vision of the canal as a high 
capacity transport route, proposed installing ship lifts at both ends rather than a 
set of chamber locks.81 
After the session in Prague, delegates visited the town of Přerov, considered the 
best location for the start of the construction at the time.82 still optimistic, the del-
egates decided to meet again in the second half of July, at which time they believed 
they would finally solve the complete routing.83
from now on, the DOE scheme was effectively set in motion. Unofficially, 
construction was expected to start before the end of the year. such a tight sched-
ule for preparatory works demanded swift action. Bartovský, who was in charge 
of the project on Protectorate territory, hosted a meeting of the DOECs Central 
Committee at the Ministry shortly after the commission’s session.84 DOECs 
78 Calculations based on the estimated maximum of 16 hours of operation per day. Berechnung des 
wasserverbrauches. Anlage 4 zur Niderschrifft betreffend 2. Tagung der Komission für den Bau des Oder-
Donau-Kanals am 10. Mai 1939 in Prag (NAČr, ÚŘP, 759). 
79 Measured by Kroměříž, a few kilometers downstream, towards the Danube from Přerov, where the 
canal route enters the Morava river valley. In November 1939, the Land Water Management Union or-
ganization of lower Morava valley agricultural producers submitted a position paper on their water needs; 
Dobrozdání o vodohospodářských potřebách při stavbě dunajsko-oderského průplavu (MZA, h42, 275).
80 see the debate on the canalization of the Morava in Chapter 2.
81 ŘVC report on the alterations of the DO canal project, determined at the Expert Commission’s second 
meeting. Zpráva ředitelství vodních cest o změnách na projektu průplavu dunajsko-oderského, určených 
při II. zasedání komise znalců ve dnech 10.-13.května 1939 (MZA, h42, b. 275).
82 Bartovský, “Labsko-odersko-dunajský průplav,” 112. The Expert Commission’s second meeting started 
with sessions in Prague; the delegates then traveled to Morava Valley and Přerov, then by car along the 
proposed route of the summit pound of the canal to Moravská Ostrava; reiseprogram für die schaufahrt 
der sachverständigenkomission für den Bau und Betrieb des Oder-Donau-Kanals vom 11. bis 13. Mai 
1939, in der strecke Prerau – Mährisch Ostrau (NAČr, ÚŘP, 759).
83 Niederschrift betreffend zweite Tagung der sachverständigen Kommission für den Bau und Betrieb des 
Oder-Donau-Kanals vom 10-13. Mai 1939 (MZA, h42, b. 121), 8.
84 secretary General Kačírek participated in the Expert Commission’s field trip. There is no report on the 
meeting in the archives, only the very brief program. however, given the link with the Expert Commis-
sion, and the fact that this was only the central committee’s second meeting and the first since the German 
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subsequently took over part of the work to prepare the project, especially matters 
relating to the Elbe branch, which had been omitted from the official negotia-
tions since the signing of the Protocol.85 DOECs also assumed responsibility for 
studying issues with the operation and economics of the canal, for which both the 
ministry and its technical agency, the ŘVC, lacked the necessary expertise.86 By the 
end of May, Bartovský informed all state institutions involved of the tasks arising 
from the commission meeting and assigned responsibility for their implementa-
tion. The state machinery set in motion and launched geological and pedological 
surveys along the entire Protectorate route. The hydrological Institute in Prague 
began work on the new water provision project as part of the envisioned grand 
scheme of the General Protectorate’s Water Management Plan. The Moravian 
Provincial Office revived and pushed forward the dam projects anticipated by the 
1931 Water Act. Bartovský orchestrated the entire set of Protectorate administra-
tive institutions, research institutes, and NGOs (in addition to DOECs, MŘPs also 
remained active), and simultaneously represented the canal project in negotiations 
with the Nazi authorities. 87
Questions concerning the detailed routing of the canal on Protectorate terri-
tory dominated the discussions at the Expert Commission’s third meeting. This 
took place on the site of the future waterway in Přerov and Zlín in Central Moravia 
from september 21-23, 1939. The vast majority of the 17 items on the agenda con-
cerned specific local solutions for the routing of the canal. Considerable attention 
was paid to re-considering the German suggestion to harmonize the measures 
above water level with the Danubian standard.88
invasion, the main theme of the discussions was probably the status of the project and the DOECs. The 
Nazis nationalized several companies including the steelworks and mines in Vítkovice, main sponsors of 
the organization; Program 2. schůze ÚV konané 16/5/1939 o 10.hod. v zasedací síni MVP (MZA, h42, 
122).
85 Usnesení technického odboru společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu na schůzi konané dne 21. 
června 1939 v ministerstvu veřejných prací (MZA, h42, b. 275, June 21, 1939).
86 Letter from the Ministry to the DOECs requesting an economic study of the most appropriate location 
of ports and their equipment (MZA, h42, b. 275, July 1, 1939).
87 In his efforts, however, he forgot to ask MŘPs for their opinion, which smrček bitterly noted in his let-
ter to DOECs (MZA, h42, b. 275, July 10, 1939).
88 The agenda items illustrate the “technical” character of the commission: (1) financing of the Oder-
Danube canal, particularly the supply of Dutch construction company Amsterdamsche Ballast Maatschap-
pij; (2) The possibility of increasing the pound level above the weir Koblov in order to exclude the need 
for another weir in front of the entrance of the canal in the Oder and continuation of the canal towards 
ratibor; (3) The location of ports in Ostrava; (4) routing between slavíč and Pohl and disposition of the 
ship lift; (5) Change of the routing between radvanice and Lipník; (6) Construction of a navigable aque-
duct to carry the canal over the Bečva river by Přerov and the location of ports; (7) reducing the height of 
the canal pounds between Přerov and Lanžhot for agricultural reasons; (8) Level crossing with the Morava 
by Baťov; (9) The impact of increasing the clearance under the bridge from five to six meters above the 
normal water level on the canal; (10) Construction of dams that provide water supply for the canal; (11) 
Execution of the necessary bore holes in the Přerov-Lanžhot section; (12) routing between Lanžhot and 
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The session, held three months later than originally planned, took place only a 
few weeks after the Nazi invasion of Poland. This prompted a change of German 
opinion on the routing downstream from Ostrava. After the occupation of the 
formerly Polish right bank of the Oder, there was no reason to transfer the canal 
across the Oder, and the issue of the precise routing of the canal stretch in the 
Ostrava region was re-opened. The German delegates urged acceleration of the 
project, and extension of the navigable Oder became a top priority; Ostrava’s in-
dustrial and mining companies should connect to the reich’s waterway network 
via the Upper Oder within four years. 
At the meeting, Bartovský again raised the question of funding. In reaction to 
the enlargement of locks proposed by Germany, the Protectorate administration 
challenged the original agreement based on the territorial distribution of costs. 
Bartovský argued that the German project of a high-capacity waterway would 
generate additional costs of about six hundred million crowns, an increase of more 
than thirty percent on the part of the Protectorate alone.89 In response, Bartovský 
presented the proposal from a group of Dutch investors to participate in the ca-
nal’s construction, which appeared for the first time in January 1939.90 following 
the conclusion of the Protectorate administration, Bartovský suggested turning 
down the offer on the condition that the reich would take responsibility for the 
extra cost on Protectorate territory.91 representatives of the Protectorate Ministry 
of finance supported Bartovský’s position and pledged to provide funding for 
the canal’s construction and related water management structures exactly as in 
Bartovský’s proposal for the four-Year plan. The reaction of the German delegates 
was rather positive, though they did not commit to anything and requested a de-
tailed cost analysis. 
the Danube; (13) Dispositions of the entries and exits of lock chambers; (14) Broadening of the canal in 
curves with a small radius; (15) regulation of the Oder below and above Moravská Ostrava; (16) Consid-
eration of agricultural needs and appropriate use of water resources; (17) Consolidation of the agricultural 
land fragmented by the canal in the Protectorate. Zpráva pro třetí zasedání komise znalců pro stavbu a 
provoz odersko-dunajského průplavu, september 1939 (MZA, h42, b. 275).
89 report on the planned agenda of Commission of Experts’ third meeting. Zpráva k pracovnímu plánu 
třetího zasedání komise znalců pro stavbu a provoz odersko-dunajského průplavu (MZA, h42, b. 275), 1.
90 Dutch investors had investigated participating in financing the canal already in 1935 through Prague 
banker Miroslav Beznoska; Letter from Beznoska to MVP (NAČr, MVP, b. 292, september 10, 1935).
91 report on the meeting held at the Ministry of Public Works on August 25 concerning the financing 
of the Danube-Oder Canal, namely the Dutch developer’s offer. Zápis o poradě konané 25. srpna 1939 
v ministertsvu veřejných prací ve věci financování odersko-dunajského průplavu, zvláště nabídky holan-
dské stavební společnosti (MZA, h42, b. 275). The meeting followed initial negotiations on the Dutch 
offer (Grundlagen der hollandische finanzgruppe für weitere Entwicklung der frage der finanzierung des 
Baues des Donau-Oder-Kanal) as agreed at the personal meeting in Prague on January 11-13, 1939 (MZA, 
h42, 275, November 13, 1939). Among the members of the consortium led by Ballast Maatschappij was 
the mayor of Amsterdam and interestingly a representative from the Baťa Company for the Netherlands, 
Dr. fiksl. It seems Baťa did not lose sight of the canal idea.
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following the meeting, Bartovský summoned representatives of the subordi-
nate offices and other institutions involved in the project. Urging them to imple-
ment the conclusions of the meeting, he pointed out three top-priority areas for the 
coming months: the final solution of the routing in the area of Moravská Ostrava; 
issues related to water provision of the canal, including a set of dams in the upper 
areas of the Morava and Oder river basins; and preparation of the documentation 
for the official audit of the canal routing on Protectorate territory.92
The commission eventually accepted the new longitudinal profile of the canal 
prepared by the Committee for Construction of ship-lifts (consisting of one ŘVC 
representative and one delegate from the German side) in cooperation with the 
ŘVC. While the position of individual structures also changed in the course of 
the preparatory works, the general situation and technical parameters (number 
of locks and lifts and the altitude of the summit reservoir – 279 m.a.s.l) set at this 
session remained stable after the third meeting. 
From Grand Opening to Inauspicious End
Looking at the historical records through the “lens” of the DOE canal, it seems the 
Nazi authorities generally ignored former Mitteleuropean alliances. Neither the 
Mitteleuropäischer Binnenschiffahrtsverband nor the MWT appeared in negotia-
tions, nor was any reference even made to them. While the former never man-
aged to find a stable position, the latter moved its focus and orientation in the 
1930s almost exclusively towards the Balkans.93 In January 1940, Antonín smrček 
closed the MEI bank account in Brno in a final act that forcefully disbanded the 
organization launched by the Nazis immediately after the establishment of the 
Protectorate.94 The Nazis preferred official negotiations at national level.
In October 1939, Julius Krohne invited Czech private interest groups to 
Wroclaw to a meeting of the Verein zur Wahrung der Oderschiffahrttsinteressen 
in order to re-establish informal communication across the border. for this pur-
pose, he revived the canal supporting initiative that had been active until 1937 as 
92 Minutes of a consultation held on October 20 at the Ministry of Public Works. Záznam o poradě ko-
nané 20. října v ministerstvu veřejných prací o postupu prací, uložených ředitelstvím pro stavbu vodních 
cest zemskému úřadu v Brně, plavebnímu ředitelství a hydrologickému ústavu výnosem z 9. října 1939 
(MZA, h42, b. 122, October 20, 1939).
93 Carl freytag, “’Die Tür zwischen Deutschland und Donauraum ist geöffnet’: südosteuropa-Konzepte 
und Positionierung Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftstags nach dem ‘Anschluss’ Österreichs 1938,” in ‘Mit-
teleuropa’ und ‘Südosteuropa’ als Planungsraum, ed. Carola sachse (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2010), 141-166. 
94 Miroslav Jeřábek, Za silnou střední Evropu: Středoevropské hnutí mezi Budapeští, Vídní a Brnem v letech 
1925-1939 (Prague: Dokořán, 2008), 224.
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a German part of the Danube-Oder Committee.95 Expert Commission members 
(Gährs, franzius, and hirche) met with those active in the canal project since the 
inter-war years such as Krieg or Krohne, and also with representatives of local 
authorities such as the mayor of Wroclaw, prominent member of the Nazi party 
hans fridrich, and the president of the occupied area of Upper silesia and head of 
the Wroclaw Chamber of Commerce, Otto fitzner. Kačírek and Bartovský repre-
sented the interested groups in the Protectorate.96 
Despite the outbreak of the war, delegates generally remained optimistic con-
cerning the realization of the canal project. The fact that the budget of three mil-
lion rM, originally reserved in the 1939 German national budget for the project, 
would not be available due to increased war-spending, did not cast a shadow on 
such expectations. Gährs and Bartovský, referring to the current status of the pro-
ject, both agreed that construction should start at the beginning of 1940 and that 
the canal could be operational within six years. Otto fitzner believed that the con-
struction would soon significantly contribute to the consolidation of the occupied 
territories suffering from high rates of unemployment.97 
soon after the Wroclaw conference, DOECs received another invitation, this 
time from the reich Transport Ministry. The German authorities prepared a grand 
ceremony to celebrate the opening of the Adolf hitler canal, a new waterway ex-
tending the navigable Oder from the port of Cosel to the silesian industrial city of 
Gliwice (Gleiwitz). On that occasion, the Nazis decided to launch the construction 
of the DOE – the extension of the navigable part of the river from Cosel to Moravská 
Ostrava – as the first phase of the project. The main speaker, Adolf hitler’s deputy 
in the Nazi Party, rudolf hess, said: “six years ago, we started building a 41km 
long canal … today we are putting it into operation, and simultaneously we start 
constructing another one, 320km long.”98 hess, like Bartovský two months earlier 
in Wroclaw,99 depicted the canal as the first “project of peace” launched in the 
95 Arbeitsauschuss für den bau des Oder-Donau-Kanals, Letter from Krohne to Bartovský (MZA, h42, b. 
275, september 28, 1939).
96 It is worth noting that Georg franzius attended the meeting in his capacity as head of the Wasser-
baudirektion Breslau, recently renamed Wasserdirektion für Oder und Oder-Donau-Kanal. report on the 
meeting organized by Verein zur Wahrung der Oderschiffahrttsinteressen in Breslau on October 11, 1939 in 
the palace of the Chamber of Commerce; Zpráva o pracovní schůzi, kterou pořádal 11. října 1939 Verein 
zur Wahrung der Oderschiffahrtsinteressen in Breslau v paláci obchodní a průmyslové komory (MZA, 
h42, b. 275).
97 fitzner also offered positions for workers skilled in ship building, in reaction to the widely shared view 
that it would be impossible to obtain a sufficiently large fleet within six years; that is, before the planned 
opening of the canal. Ibid., 4.
98 “Odersko-dunajský průplav se začal budovat,” Lidové Noviny, 10 December 1938.
99 Bartovský closed his speech stating, “We are preparing great work that is intended to ensure the peace-
ful economic cooperation of many central European countries.” report on the development and state of 
preparations for the construction of Danube-Oder canal on the territory of Bohemia and Moravia. Zpráva 
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midst of the war. however, the optimistic atmosphere of Wroclaw had evaporated. 
A delegate to the Protectorate Government, Minister of Agriculture Ladislav 
feierabend, noted that a representative of the reich Transport Ministry who kept 
him company on the eve of the celebration in Gleiwitz deplored the fact that “the 
war has suspended any further development of the DOE canal.”100
While hess presented the standard ideological cliché, Minister of Transport 
Julius Dorpmüller drew a broad picture of the future transport network of the 
Grossraum, which Germany would provide to its working people, and emphasized 
the enormous importance of the DOE canal for “silesia, Germany, or even Europe.” 
Dorpmüller envisioned the circular navigable line running through Germany, 
connecting the river basins and waterway systems of the Danube, the rhine, the 
Elbe, the Weser, and the Oder into a single whole, thus linking the Baltic, North, 
and Black seas. furthermore, Dorpmüller saw the possible future extension of the 
Adolf hitler Canal to the east as a tool for expanding German influence along the 
Vistula and further east towards the Dniester. Ultimately, Dorpmüller rather for-
mally assured his audience that it would be possible to continue work on the DOE 
in spite of the war, and that armaments must naturally be the top priority on the 
agenda of the economic four-Year plan.101
In his speech in Gliwice, franzius declared preparatory works on the DOE to 
be virtually complete; however, such claims did not correspond to the situation at 
the turn of the decade. The adaptation of the Czechoslovak project to the demands 
of the Nazi Grossraum policy, signified by the profound change to the standard 
dimensions, required almost complete re-processing of the project. The deputy of 
the ŘVC’s Canal Department, Jozef Karlický, described the real situation. When 
urging the MVP to assign reinforcements to his office, he noted that “some basic 
prerequisites” for the final execution of the general project (namely water provi-
sion) were not yet established, and that this was hampering preparation of the de-
tailed local solutions for on-site examination.102 As of January 30, 1940, the Canal 
o vývoji a stavu příprav pro stavbu odersko-dunajského průplavu na území Čech a Moravy (MZA, h42, b. 
275), 10.
100 feierabend was not a competent authority on the subject; that would have been the Protectorate 
Ministry for Public Works. As he recalled later, feierabend took part in the event because no one in the 
Protectorate government found pleasure in attending Nazi festivities. The members of the Protectorate 
government had devised a secret mechanism for delegations and this was feierabend’s turn. Ladislav Karel 
feierabend, Politické vzpomínky I (Brno: Atlantis, 1994), 245.
101 The official Protectorate delegation consisted of Expert Commission members Topol, Bartovský and 
Zástěra. Their German counterparts at the event were Gährs, franzius, and Krieg. “Otevření průplavu 
Adolfa hitlera a zahájení stavebních prací na Odersko-dunajském průplavu,” Zprávy veřejné služby tech-
nické 21, no. 2 (1939): 245-246.
102 Proposal for the allocation of technical and auxiliary forces. Dunajsko-oderský průplav. Návrh na 
přidělení pomocných a technických sil (NAČr, GŘVC, b. 15, february 19, 1940).
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Department had 59 employees (28 engineers and 31 other professionals, includ-
ing a lawyer). That number included employees originally contracted by DOECs, 
taken over by the Protectorate Administration as of february 1940.103 Karlický de-
manded at least another 30 men in order to quickly produce what franzius had 
announced to be already complete. 
however, instead of focusing on the key unresolved issues identified by Karlický, 
the German delegates presented a brand new set of questions.104 At the Expert 
Commission’s fourth meeting in Prague in mid-March 1940, Georg franzius ta-
bled new designs of canal cross-sections that the reich Transport Ministry had ap-
proved on November 22, 1939 without discussing with Protectorate authorities.105 
103 Letter from MVP (NAČr, GŘVC, b. 15, March 13, 1940).
104 Niederschrift über die vierte Tagung der sachverständigen-Kommission für den Bau und Betrieb des 
Oder-Donu-Kanals vom 15. bis 16. März 1940 in Prag (MZA, h42, b. 275).
105 Erlass vom 22. November 1939 W 7 B 9038-39.
Figure 3.4 – The opening ceremony of the Adolf Hitler canal was accompanied by a DOE canal 
groundbreaking celebration. In their speeches, Nazi politicians hailed the canal as a step towards 
a peaceful future and prosperity. Digging started simultaneously at both ends of the canal. The 
two short stretches built in Vienna and close to Kozle still exist. Source: NAČR, Fotodokumentace 
1897-1975, b. 17, no. 2648.
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Promoting the ecological perspective on waterways derived from the Nazi nature 
conservancy policy, the new design took the aesthetic dimension of the canal into 
consideration, as well as its incorporation into the landscape. The integration of 
waterways into the natural terrain should be secured “by removing overly steep 
slopes and sharp heels and rounding the corners and edges” and also “by planting 
the banks with reeds, shrubs, and trees,” perhaps “even tree-lining can sometimes 
be achieved.”106 Indeed, the proposals that franzius presented did include tree-
lining. Besides such ecologically-motivated changes, as Bartovský bitterly noted, 
the new cross-sections contained yet further widening of the channel. The original 
Czechoslovak design allowed for a width of 34m, the Mittelandkanal standard was 
37m, and the new proposal operated with 41m; this increase required a corre-
sponding increase in water.107
Water provisioning added a new friction line to the debate – besides national 
affinities, river basin affiliation influenced the negotiations. A month before the 
Commission’s fifth session, the special Committee for Water Provision for the ca-
nal met in Prague. While the German representatives had originally agreed to a 
water transfer of 0.27m3/s from the Oder into the Danube watershed, a report 
from the Wroclaw Oder Authority (Breslauer Wasserbaudirektion) presented at the 
meeting did not consider such a possibility. furthermore, and seemingly defying 
common sense, the report required the dams on the tributaries of the Oder to be 
enlarged, including the planned reservoir at Ostravice on Protectorate territory.108 
The Oder Authority gave distinct preference to the water demands of the Oder 
Valley over those of Moravia. The summit reservoir was to be supplied by water 
exclusively from the Morava basin.109 In addition to depriving the southern stretch 
of the DOE of the Oder waters, the new scheme actually provided for a reverse 
direction of water flow. At its second meeting, the commission had proposed uti-
lizing electric water pumping on each lock, in order to cover the increase in water 
consumption related to the canal enlargement. The delegates from Wroclaw pro-
posed employing the same principle on a larger scale to secure the large amounts 
of water necessary for operating the canal by water transfer (pumping) from the 
Danube.110 By turning the entire canal into a kind of pumped storage facility, the 
106 Georg franzius in his Erläuterung to the Querschitte der Oder-Donau-Kanals, dated December 14, 
1939 (NAČr, ÚŘP, 1114), 1-2.
107 report from the Expert Commission’s fifth meeting. Zpráva pro 5 zasedání komise znalců (MZA, 
h42, 122), 2.
108 The special committee report on the DOE canal’s water consumption. Sitzung des Sonderauschusses 
zur Festellung des Speisewasserbedarfes für den Oder-Donau-Kanal (MZA, h42, b. 121, March 14, 1940).
109 report on water provisioning for the DOE. Zur Wasserversorgung des Oder-Donau-Kanals, Breslau, 
den 7. März 1940 (NAČr, UŘP, b. 1114).
110 After another meeting of the special committee held on December 8, 1941 in Prague (MZA, h42, b. 
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canal itself would produce the electricity necessary for pumping. such alteration 
would require the installation of hydropower generators on locks and the adjust-
ment of one of the upper canal pounds into a reservoir basin.111 Excess power 
might be used for further electrification in the country.112 however, the debate on 
water provision remained open.
There was a lack of understanding of the complaints expressed by Karlický 
and that the unresolved technical issues remained open. As well as the water sup-
ply, the standard lock was not prepared either, although Krieg assured Bartovský 
that the reich Ministry was testing the models.113 The exact location of both ship-
lifts, a prerequisite for further development of their design, had not been specified 
due to the unresolved crossings of the canal route with the planned rail tracks. 
The Protectorate representative, on behalf of the Moravian agricultural circles, 
disputed the solution for the southern stretch of the canal between Vienna and 
Lanžhot as proposed by the Viennese Water Authority, because the canal would 
be located below the Morava riverbed and thus threaten to drain adjacent fields. 
On the other hand, franzius rejected the new study of the routing through the city 
of Moravská Ostrava and the coal-mining district, being mindful of the recently 
realized dangers of construction in undermined areas.114 slovakia’s entry into the 
commission made things even more complicated.
During the rest of 1941, the Protectorate Authorities focused on eliminating as 
many remaining bottlenecks as possible. Throughout the year, the MVP pursued 
the standard political procedure necessary to realize the canal project and organ-
ized public consultations, during which the project was exhibited in towns and vil-
lages directly affected by the canal route.115 While Bartovský considered all crucial 
121), the detailed version of the study of water provision for the DOE was finally completed, in time for 
the commission’s sixth meeting. The Erläuterungbericht (explanatory part) alone consisted of 45 pages 
(MZA, h42, b. 122). Protectorate representatives managed to limit the amount of water available for the 
summit pound supply from Bečva basin in order to secure a stable water level, not only for the canal 
stretch in the Morava valley, but also for agricultural needs there. Minutes of the meeting held on septem-
ber 4, 1941 in the MVP on the supply of water to the Oder-Danube canal; záznam o poradě konané dne 4. 
září 1941 v MVP o zásobování odersko-dunajského průplavu vodou (NAČr, MVP, b. 535).
111 ŘVC prepared this study in the summer of 1941: The Oder-Danube canal water provision. Electric-
ity consumption for pumping. Zásobování odersko-dunajského průplavu vodou. spotřeba proudu pro 
přečerpávání (NAČr, MVP, b. 535, June 5, 1941).
112 report of the Commission of Experts’ fifth meeting, Autumn 1940. Bericht für die 5. Tagung der 
sachverständigen-Kommission für den Bau nd Betrieb des Oder-Donau-Kanals (MZA, h42, b. 275), 30. 
113 Testing was undertaken by the Versuchanstalt für Wasserbau und Schiffbau in Berlin. report on the 
Commission of Experts’ fourth meeting. Niederschrift über die vierte Tagung der sachverständigen-
Komission für den bau und betrieb des Oder-Donau-kanals von 15. bis 16. März 1940 in Prag. (MZA, 
h42, b. 121), 4.
114 report of the Commission of Experts’ fourth meeting, february 1940. Zpráva pro 4 zasedání komise 
znalců (MZA, h42, b. 122), 2.
115 Protocol regarding public consultations for the canal routing on Protectorate territory. Protokol o 
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questions to have been solved (including location of ship-lifts, ports, and routing 
through Ostrava), many municipalities and individuals voiced their concerns at 
the public debates. for instance, the representatives at Přerov, otherwise staunch 
supporters of the scheme, expressed their fears regarding the massive 180m wide 
body of the canal elevated almost 15m over the landscape on the outskirts of their 
town.116 some of the complaints could be resolved, but not others. however, the 
public consultations marked a significant step towards realizing the DOE.117
Apart from reports on positive developments in the Protectorate, the 
Commission of Experts’ fifth session saw another round of alignment with reich’s 
standards. The Protectorate office delegate, Dr. Martini, urged greater participa-
tion by the reich Agency for Natural resources’ geologist in the surveys related 
to the canal, and representatives of the reich Transport Ministry presented a 
Directive on fishing, sport and Landscape Planning; in the case of the DOE, this 
mainly concerned wastewater purification.118 
After the session, however, war again interfered with preparatory works. The 
spring of 1941 saw the first significant drop in labor mobilized for canal project. As 
head of ŘVC’s Canal Department, Karlický complained that during the first half 
of the year he had lost 17 out of 79 employees and that under such conditions the 
department would not be able to meet its requirements. While these complaints 
were regular, and by autumn of 1940 the number of employees had dropped (due 
to temporary transfer within the MVP to a “disposal of military constructions”), 
this time it marked the breaking point.119 The reductions signified the war-induced 
change of priorities away from the canal issue. While the invasion of Poland led to 
the suspension of construction work, the attack on russia restricted even prepara-
tory works.120 
přehlídce trasy v trati Lanžhot-Přerov-hranice a st.Ves – Mor. Ostrava-hrušov konané v Brně ve dnech 
12. a 13. července 1940 podle min. nařízení ze dne 23. dubna 1903 ř. z. čís. 90; (MZA, h42, b. 91).
116 Ibid., 39.
117 report on the Commission of Experts’ fifth meeting. Zpráva pro 5 zasedání komise znalců (MZA, 
h42, 122), 26.
118 report on the Commission of Experts’ fourth meeting. Niederschrift über die vierte Tagung der 
sachverständigen-Kommission für den Bau und Betrieb des Oder-Donu-Kanals am 9. und 10. Januar 1941 
(MZA, h42, b. 275).
119 request to complete staff and return transferred work-forces. Žádost o doplnění personálu a vrácení 
oddisponovaných sil (NAČr, GŘVC, b. 15, september 16, 1940); replenishing Canal Department staff. 
Doplnění osobního stavu u průplavní skupiny (NAČr, GŘVC, b. 15, June 20, 1941).
120 In contrast to the situation at ŘVC, the Expert Commission continually grew in number. By its sixth 
session in December 1941, it had no fewer than forty-eight delegates, about ten more than a year earlier at 
the fifth meeting. Compared to the second meeting (the first was rather specific), the number had multi-
plied by a factor of 2.5. This situation was partly due to the different agenda. The focus had switched from 
general questions to local solutions requiring the participation of local experts.
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At the same time, the canal lobby was achieving significant political success. 
In the spring of 1941, the reich authorities issued the Ordinance on the Oder-
Danube Canal to regulate canal-related issues on reich territory.121 This document 
confirmed the Protectorate Administration’s executive powers over the canal pro-
ject on its territory; however, paragraph 25 declared the Oder a reich Waterway 
that included the as-yet unnavigable stretch in the Protectorate, up to the planned 
ship-lift in Jeseník.122 The Ordinance responded to the Protectorate’s political rear-
rangement of its definitive incorporation in the reich as of 16 september 1940, 
and in its subsequent calls for a corresponding update of the 1939 Protocol.123 
As a counterpart to the Ordinance, the Protectorate administration prepared a 
governmental directive on the construction of the DOE focusing on administra-
tive technicalities. The new Protocol between the reich and the Protectorate was 
signed independently on November 12 and December 5, 1941, and was effectively 
an updated copy of the original.124
Both the Ordinance and the Protocol mentioned the Elbe branch of the canal, 
thus giving back the project its “three-seas connection” quality. Whereas the DO 
canal’s progress had become almost indiscernible for outsiders since its celebratory 
launch back in 1939, business circles and municipalities along the Elbe revived the 
idea of the Elbe-Donau connection. The main argument, apart from the stand-
ard talk of prosperity, was based on a comparison with the Danube-Oder con-
nections. from the perspective of hamburg traders, the direct connection to the 
Balkans and Black sea seemed more promising than the diverted connection via 
the Oder or the rMD. By 1940, the saxon Chamber of Commerce had prepared 
a Memorandum arguing in favor of the Danube-Elbe canal. The document com-
pared the predicted traffic on the Oder and Elbe branches of the DOE and clearly 
documented the superiority of the latter. Elaborating on this result, the authors of 
the Memorandum interpreted the Elbe-Danube connection as a necessary part 
of the emerging Grossraum. Instead of the official plan to create the Elbe branch 
only after constructing the DO, they called for both projects to run parallel.125 
121 Letter from the reich Protector’s Office to MVP regarding implementation of the Ordinance. Durch-
führung der Verordnung über den Oder-Donau-Kanal (NAČr, MVP, b. 530, september 3, 1941).
122 ŘVC report for MVP: Allocation of construction costs. rozdělení stavebních nákladů (MZA, h42, b. 
122, November 24, 1939).
123 report on the Commission of Experts’ fifth meeting, autumn 1940. Bericht für die 5. Tagung der 
sachverständigen-Kommission für den Bau nd Betrieb des Oder-Donau-Kanals (MZA, h42, b. 275), 2.
124 The protocol was signed by Protectorate Minister for Public Works Čipera in Prague in November and 
by Gaehrs as representative of GIWE in Berlin on December 5. Protokoll über den bau des Oder Donau 
Kanals festgestellt in Einvernehmen mit dem reichsprotektor in Böhmen und Mähren (NAČr, UŘP, b. 
1114).
125 Dr. Thoelke Nadermann, “Der Verkehrsweg Elbe-Donau. Die Verkehrsbedeutung der Elbe-Donau-
Verbindung Pardubitz-Prerau,” (NAČr, ÚŘP, b. 1114).
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The Protectorate had not forgotten the Elbe question. In addition to occasional 
publications and studies, DOECs delegates supported the activities and visited the 
Convention in hamburg in 1941.126 Eventually, the reich Transport Ministry an-
swered the interested parties’ calls and, for the first time, allocated 50,000 rM in its 
budget for preparatory works on the Elbe branch.127 The Protectorate Government 
was to cooperate on the project with the saxon Ministry of Economy and Labor in 
Dresden who was responsible for conducting work in the sudetenland territory. 
from 1942 onwards, the Protectorate was to cover the works on its territory from 
its own budget.128
Within the context of growing Germanization, as a final goal of the assimilation 
strategy, Protectorate institutions gradually lost importance and independence in 
favor of the parallel German administration. By 1941, the Water Construction 
Department of the reich Protector’s Office, led by hirche, fundamentally ex-
tended its activities. It took over the on-site control and management of those 
water-construction works which had survived the restrictions imposed by the in-
creasing demands of the war economy. By the autumn of 1941, hirche emphasized 
in internal communication within the Protector’s Office regarding the organiza-
tional reshuffle of the Protectorate Government, that the water-related agenda un-
der the proposed Ministry of Transport and Technology should encompass not 
only the respective departments of the Ministry of Public Works, but also those of 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The reshuffle aimed to align the Protectorate adminis-
tration structure with that of the reich, and the main issue was to concentrate the 
transport agenda in one place. Until then, the issue of transport had been divided 
between the Ministry of railways and the Ministry of Public Works, with the lat-
ter in charge of roads and waterways. referring to a recent edict by the führer on 
July 29, 1941, establishing the Inspector-General for Water and Energy, hirche 
claimed that such an arrangement was to follow the example of the Altreich.129 
126 The event was organized by the Verein zur Wahrung des Elbeschiffahrtinteressen. “Výroční zpráva 
společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu za rok 1941,” Plavební cesty Dunaj – Odra – Labe 3, no. 2 
(1942): 31-43, here 34. Most publications on the topic came from the production of DOECs: Spojení 
Labe s průplavem dunajsko-oderským. Díl II, Trať Pardubice-Olomouc (česká větev), Knihovna časopisu 
Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe (Prague: společnost dunajsko-oderského průplavu, 1941); Spojení Labe s 
průplavem dunajsko-oderským. Díl I, Trať Přerov-Olomouc (moravská větev), Knihovna časopisu Plavební 
cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe (Prague: společnost dunajsko-oderského průplavu, 1941). however, DOECs 
was not alone in its interest in the elbe branch. reichs-u-Landesplanung Landsrat Niemayer of Berlin 
demanded and ordered a detailed report: Julius fiedler, františek radouš: Gutachten über die schiffbare 
Verbindung der stromgebiete der Donau und Elbe (MZA, h42, b. 94, february 5, 1940). 
127 Letters from reich Transport Ministry (Gährs) to the subordinate offices: Ministry in saxony and 
relevant department of Protector’s Office, dated July 8, 1941 (NAČr, UŘP, b. 759, July 8, 1941).
128 Undated letter from hirche to the Protectorate Prime Minister (NAČr, ÚŘP, b. 759).
129 re-shuffling of Protectorate ministries. Neugliderung der Ministerien der Protektoratregierung 
(NAČr, ÚŘP, b. 1104, December 1, 1941).
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By virtue of the afore-mentioned edict, hitler established a single new institution 
– the Inspector-General for Water and Energy (Generalinspektor für Wasser und 
Energie) – to handle the water-related planning agenda for four ministries (the 
Prussian and reich Ministries of Transport and Agriculture).130 The jurisdiction 
of this new institution covered reich territory, including the Protectorate.131 The 
establishment of the office aimed to centralize planning on a national level, espe-
cially regarding energy production and construction of the nationwide electricity 
grid. however, the orientation towards energy planning drove the general prefer-
ence for industrializing rivers as a source of energy production over other uses.132 
hirche went beyond such a degree of centralization and managed to concentrate 
the waterways and water management under his auspices at the Protector’s Office 
in the newly created department.133 
The centralization of the water-related administration in the reich (including 
the Protectorate) affected the agenda at the Commission of Experts’ sixth meet-
ing. The application of the reich Waterways standardization program launched 
by recently appointed reich Inspector-General for Water and Energy and former 
highway planner fritz Todt, required further enlargement of the canal cross-sec-
tion. The official reasons for adjustment were purely technical: to avoid accidents 
whilst passing, to avoid abrasion of the banks, and to increase the cruising speed. 
Especially the latter echoed the general emphasis that Nazi planners had placed on 
the maximal transport capacity of the canal.134 
The delegates at the sixth meeting approved the updated version of the 
Wroclaw water provision scheme quite smoothly and accepted several designs, 
plans, and reports. however, this otherwise uneventful event was disturbed by 
the third round of the canal enlargement debate, as well as unexpected objections 
to the accepted canal route through the city of Moravská Ostrava. A lobby group 
of miners operating in the area informed the commission of its opposition to any 
130 The respective ministries remained in charge of operating the waterways or irrigation, but not of their 
development and planning. Erlass des Führers und Reichskanzlers über den Generalinspektor für Wasser 
und Energie vom 29. Juli 1941.
131 “Úprava kompetence říšských úřadů ve věcech hospodaření vodou a energií,” Plavební cesty Dunaj – 
Odra – Labe 2, no. 5 (1941): 108-109.
132 Bernhard stier, “Nationalsozialistische sonderninstanzen in der Energiewirtschaft: Der Generalin-
spektor für Wasser und Energie 1941-1945,” in Hitlers Kommissare: Sondergewalten in der nationalsozialis-
tischen Diktatur, ed. rüdiger hachtmann and Winfried süss (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 138-158.
133 The General Inspector’s office, which initially objected, finally accepted hirche’s plan to concentrate all 
water-related agendas in November 1942 and suggested using the name “Gruppe Wasserwesen.” Organisa-
tion und stellenplan der Wasserwirtschafts-Verwaltung beim reichsprotektor in Böhmen und Mähren 
(NAČr, UŘP, b. 124, November 24, 1942). 
134 Guidelines for the channel cross-section design for operating 1000t vessels. richtlinien für die Ausbil-
dung eines Kanalregelquerschnitts für den Verkehr mit dem 1000t schiff (NAČr, MVP, b. 530, December 
9, 1941).
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routing that would cross the coalmines or deposits, and presented an alternative.135 
however, the proposed detour around the coal basin also meant a detour around 
the city of Moravská Ostrava and the Protectorate stretch of the Oder.136 Together 
with the unsettled solution for the trans-border stretch below hodonín, re-open-
ing of the Oder route issue meant that the commission, after three years of exist-
ence, was unable to finalize the routing at either end of the canal, mostly due to 
long-standing local skirmishes.
Given the sorry state of the planning, it is hardly surprising that the pro-
gress of the construction and preparatory works was even worse. since the first 
directive limiting construction works in the Protectorate to strategic structures 
(Kriegwichtigsbauen), only a few selected engineering bodies continued work-
ing on the canal project. The Ban on New Constructions issued in the spring of 
1941 made it clear that construction would not start before the end of the war.137 
Complaints from the ŘVC geometers setting out the canal polygon illustrate the 
harsh reality: they had to mark the polygon with oak wheels due to the lack of 
stones and give up on the high-fidelity nivelization marking due to an almost total 
scarcity of cement on the market.138 Gährs assured attendees at the Commission’s 
session that both the reich, and the new Inspector-General Todt personally sup-
ported the project and that “construction already commenced would be contin-
ued even during the war, using prisoners of war.”139 The fact that some fieldwork 
continued such as the exploratory works, signified the persisting interest of the 
135 The delegate from the mining company severní dráha ferdinandova (Bergwerksgesellschaft Ferdinand 
Nordbahn) that had opposed the canal project since Austrian times presented these objections. The source 
of surprise was the unexpected opinion change on the part of the company, which had accepted the rout-
ing at public consultations in the summer of 1940 with only minor objections. report on public consul-
tations for the canal routing. Protokol o přehlídce trasy v trati Lanžhot-Přerov-hranice a st.Ves – Mor. 
Ostrava-hrušov konané v Brně ve dnech 12. a 13. července 1940 podle min. nařízení ze dne 23. dubna 
1903 ř. z. čís. 90 (MZA, h42, b. 91), 47.
136 however, even this part of the river had previously been transferred under the governance of the Was-
serbaudirektion Breslau. The new routing suggested the relocation of the canal from Protectorate to reich 
territory. from the summit pound, the channel would not descend directly to the Oder Valley and Ostrava, 
but run parallel to the river on the hillside. Naturally, the interested Protectorate parties did not welcome 
such a sudden twist. The creator of the routing, Professor Berger from the Breslau school of Technology 
(Technische Schule), had previously cooperated on preparing the left-bank alternative, which Germany 
presented at the first commission meeting. Prof. Berger’s routing. Průplav O-D. Trasa profesora Bergera. 
(NAČr, MVP, b. 530, December 16, 1941).
137 This new build ban (Neubauverbot) was issued by the Protectorate government. regierungsverord-
nung vom 7.Mai 1941 über das Neubaugebot (NAČr, UŘP, b. 1109).
138 report on the DO canal survey. Průplav O-D. Měřické práce a průplavní polygon – zpráva (NAČr, 
MVP, b. 530, December 16, 1941).
139 report on the Commission of Experts’ sixth meeting for ŘVC, dated December 20, 1941. Zpráva pro 
ŘVC o 6.zasedání komise znalců pro stavbu a provoz O-D průplavu (MZA, h42, b. 122, December 20, 
1941), 1.
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Protectorate administration and the Nazi establishment in the project.140 
By early 1942, all major technological issues (locks, water provision, channel 
dimensions, and the general route) had been clarified and the only unresolved 
question concerned the projected time at which the end of the war would enable 
the once celebratory-launched construction works to resume. At least such a mes-
sage was leaked from the minutes of the Water Management Committee’s session 
held at the Protectorate Chambers of Commerce in January 1942.141 Bartovský’s 
official duties prevented him from attending in person, but he did submit a con-
tribution. The main message of his report on the state of water management plan-
ning in the Protectorate was clear: there was simply not enough water available to 
meet all the demands, which were often contradictory. The Morava river Basin 
simply could not provide enough water for navigational, industrial, and agri-
cultural purposes. Therefore, Bartovský concluded, “it is no longer possible to 
separate the navigational undertakings from water management and vice versa.” 
Bartovský considered water management planning to be a crucial element in the 
future well-being of the Protectorate. he saw a high degree of centralization as a 
necessary precondition for the successful advancement of the “building program 
and the financial plan for constructing dams and waterways, for water supply, and 
use of water power in the ongoing electrification of Bohemia and Moravia.”142
At a time when any practical execution of large water-management structures 
and waterway schemes was illusory, Bartovský focused on preparing the institu-
tional environment. Aligning the traditional technocratic ideology of Czech hy-
draulic engineers with the political reality of the Nazi occupation, he actually pro-
posed applying the Leadership Principle (Führerprinzip) within the Protectorate 
administration. Bartovský’s vision of a new organization of water management, 
presented in the form of a draft governmental directive, consisted of establish-
ing a central authority – a Directorate for Water Management (Ředitelství vod-
ního hospodářství) within the Ministry of Public Works. The slight change in name 
from the existing ŘVC was symptomatic of the suggested reform. Competencies 
140 Bartovský prepared a long list of constructions he considered vital and requested their exemption 
from the ban. The department of the reich Protector’s office which had final authority on the matter 
granted exemptions for some of these, including a survey of the canal route. These exemptions lasted until 
the end of the war. Einschränkung und feststellung des Bauvolumens für die Zeit vom 1. Oktober 1941 bis 
30. september 1942 (NAČr, UŘP, b. 1109); Monthly reports on the preparatory works document that the 
project was also active in the following years (NAČr, UŘP, b. 1109).
141 Minutes of the Water Management Committee meeting of the Central Chambers of Commerce 
(Ústředna OŽeK), held in Olomouc on January 15, 1942. Zápis o schůzi vodohospodářského výboru 
Ústředny obchodních a živnostenských komor, konané 15. ledna 1942 (NAČr, MVP, b. 531). 
142 Josef Bartovský, “Overview of Water Management and Waterway Planning in Bohemia and Moravia.” 
Přehled vodohospodářského a vodocestného plánování v Čechách a na Moravě (NAČr, MVP, b. 531, 
January 9, 1942), 7.
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that had been in place since Austrian times, pursued outside the administration 
of the Waterway Act and the ŘVC (damming, river canalization and mainte-
nance, flood protection, etc.) were all to be concentrated under the new institute. 
Once the Inspector-General was installed as united authority on waterways in the 
Grossraum, Bartovský attempted to simplify and centralize the political adminis-
tration of waterways.143 
however, Bartovský’s attempt at centralization was victim to the more pro-
found reorganization of the Protectorate administration. As of March 1, 1942, 
hirche de facto substituted for Bartovský as acting head of the Water Management 
Department. Within the context of heydrich’s harsh administrative reform that 
abolished the formal autonomy of the Protectorate government, hirche was given 
the title of Dezernent (department head) and acquired an authority equal to the 
Czech Protectorate Ministers, with a mandate to directly approach the respective 
ministerial referees. 
That same year, 1942, witnessed an important general administrative reform 
(Governmental directive no. 208/1942 dated June 15, 1942), which applied prin-
ciples developed in the Third reich. The Protectorate government abolished the 
Ministry of Public Works and shifted the water management program to the newly 
created Ministry of Transport and Technology. simultaneously, the water-related 
agenda of the Ministry of Agriculture (agricultural water construction, water re-
source management, and water rights) also moved to the same area. however, 
the reform did not affect either the ŘVC as independent technical agency or 
Bartovský’s office, which transferred to the new ministry; there were only minor 
personnel and organizational changes.
The reform reflected the age-old preference of using hydraulic engineers for 
central planning. At this time, discussions on canal routing and dam construction 
were largely impacted by the insufficiency of water resources in the Odra river 
basin, which was the subject of industry representatives’ complaints.144 The discus-
sions, led by the platform of the Commission of Experts, among others, revealed 
the intricacy and complexity of water management in society at the time. farmers, 
industry, municipalities, and states all had specific and often contradictory de-
mands regarding water flows. 
143 reorganization of the water management administration – an outline of the governmental directive. 
reorganizace vodohospodářské služby – osnova vládního nařízení (NAČr, ŘVC, b. 33, November 3, 
1941).
144 for instance, at the above-mentioned meeting, engineer Ludwig hesky stressed the need to properly 
calculate and take fully into account the water demands of the North Moravian industrial area. Minutes 
of the meeting of the Water Management Committee of the Central Chamber of Commerce (Ústředna 
OŽeK), held in Olomouc on January 15, 1942. Zápis o schůzi vodohospodářského výboru Ústředny ob-
chodních a živnostenských komor, konané 15. ledna 1942 (NAČr, MVP, b. 531), 2.
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These sweeping institutional changes characterized the situation in the 
Protectorate, whose incorporation in the Third reich continued to change 
throughout its existence, depending on the war front situation. The terror that fol-
lowed the successful assassination of Deputy-reich Protector reinhardt heydrich 
on May 27, 1942 was the turning point. Until then, the pressure of Germanization 
had grown gradually. When a group of Czechoslovak soldiers sent by the London 
based Czechoslovak government-in-exile succeeded in killing heydrich, the Nazis 
retaliated with a ruthless campaign against the Czech population. While the re-
form itself had been in preparation under heydrich’s leadership and did not reflect 
the terror, from february 1, 1943 onwards, German became the only official lan-
guage of internal communication in the Protectorate administration.145 
The demands of the war economy no longer allowed the commission to reunite. 
By the summer of 1942, the red Army had stopped the advance of the German 
offensive on the Eastern front. The Commission’s seventh meeting, scheduled for 
December 1942, did not take place. In addition to an almost standardized set of 
reoccurring items, the planned agenda included only one new topic: the possibility 
of a towing service on the canal.146 
however, the Protectorate administration had not lost sight of the canal. In 
the spring of 1943, in the wake of Wehrmacht losses in the east, the terror was re-
placed with a period of relative easing.147 This development cleared the way for the 
preparation of a special governmental directive on the construction of the canal 
on Protectorate territory, and following the positive outcome of the public con-
sultation held in the summer of 1940, was nearing completion. Postponed by the 
re-negotiation of the canal routing through the coal-mining region of Moravská 
Ostrava, the final document appeared in August 1943.148
The directive was the swansong of the Nazi DOE project. When the executive 
power in the Protectorate shifted from reich Protector to the newly-established 
state Ministry for Bohemia and Moravia on November 4, 1943, hirche remained 
the head of an inclusive water authority – the section Waterways within the 
Transport and Technology Department.149 regardless of his passive but supportive 
145 Announced in: Věstník ministerstva dopravy a techniky, no. 3 (1943): 1.
146 Commission of Experts – preparation for the seventh meeting. Komise znalců pro přípravu DO 
průplavu. Příprava pro 7. zasedání (MZA, h42, b. 122, October 31, 1942).
147 Brandes, Češi pod německým protektorátem, 333.
148 Instead of taking the form of a government directive, it emerged as a decision by the Ministry of 
Transport and Technology on the routing and the Oder-Danube canal project in general. Entscheidung 
des Ministeriums für Verkehr und Technik (Öffentliche technische Verwaltung) über die Trasse und über 
das generelle Projekt des Oder-Donau-Kanals (G.-Z. 1/279-I/4-1943 vom 18. August 1943) (NAČr, MVP, 
b. 91, August 18, 1943).
149 “Erlass über die Gliederung des deutsches staatsministerium für Böhmen und Mähren,” Verordnungs-
blatt des Deutschen Staatministers für Böhmen und Mähren, no. 27 (1943).
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stance towards the canal scheme, hirche’s activities in the new position followed 
other, more pressing priorities directly connected with the war.150 Bartovský sur-
vived the re-shuffle and retained his position, but failed to keep much of his ef-
fective influence, as the Protectorate Administration gradually lost its formal in-
dependence and sovereignty over available resources. furthermore, the general 
shortage of both manpower and materials restricted all activities related to the ca-
nal: the ŘVC experienced another drop in its workforce and the DOECs journal, 
Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe, published fewer issues in 1944 and none before 
the end of the war in Europe in May 1945. Nonetheless, the preparatory works 
continued virtually without interruption, even during the spring of 1945. 
Conclusion
The canal project played its part in the construction of a Grossraumwirtschaft 
Europe, in transformation of the continent into German large economic area. Nazi 
Germany pushed forward the DOE canal as a geopolitical project aimed at estab-
lishing a closely intertwined economic unit under German rule – Mitteleuropa/
Grossdeutschen Reich – as part of the continental European Community of 
(Aryan) nations. At Gliwicze in the summer of 1939, as representative of the reich 
Transport Ministry, Gustav Königs described the idea thus: “The Oder-Danube 
canal is an expression of the great transport unity that emerged after the collapse 
of political borders between [by then only] silesia and Ostmark … which at some 
point will develop into a [by then only] Mitteleuropean transport route of [the] 
highest significance.”151
The general technical Nazification of the project, seen as an adaptation of the 
technical dimension of the canal to the Nazi geopolitical ideas of the Grossraum 
and related technical standards, drew heavily on German waterway building 
150 hirche’s view on the project remained firmly in line with official Nazi policy. When presenting the 
Protectorate water management program at the Verkehrschau at the Prague Autumn fair in 1940, hirche 
highlighted that “out of a few possibilities to connect [by a waterway] the northern seas to the Danube, 
three lay on Bohemian-Moravian territory.” Then he falsely claimed that, since the autumn of 1938, the 
Grossdeutschen reich had pursued all three of them “with particular emphasis.” however, the other two 
(Danube-Vltava and the Elbe branch of the DOE) recived much less attention than the DOE. Die bestehe-
nden und die zukünftigen Wasserstrassen im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren von Oberregierungsbaurat 
friedrich hirche. Abhandlung für die Verkehrsschau im rahmen der Prager herbstmesse 1940 (NAČr, 
ÚŘP, b. 1114).
151 his address to the Verein zur Wahrung der Oderschiffahrtinteressen was quoted in the meeting report 
published in the Protector Office’s official German language newspaper Der Neue Tag. Quoted by Andělín 
Grobelný, “Místo odersko-dunajského průplavu v nacistických projektech přestavby vnitrozemské vodní 
sítě v letech 1939-1941,” Časopis Slezského muzea 29, no. 1B (1980): 231-241, here 233.
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traditions, as exemplified by Otto franzius’ canonic publication.152 franzius’ trea-
tise, published in 1929, achieved prominence as a standard reference guide for 
engineers involved in waterway planning. Although the publication was often dis-
puted and not blindly applied, it reappeared in discussions on the technical layout 
of the canal throughout the Protectorate’s existence. While it was not unknown to 
Czech engineers before the war, the fact that the ŘVC had to order a copy in 1939 
was evidence of its rise in importance.153 
The canal design produced during the war bore specific marks reflecting the 
values of the period. The engineers on the project and also the Nazi ideologists 
pushed forward their specific visions of the canal and the network it should serve. 
rather than simply listing all the changes distinguishing this particular project 
from its predecessor, it is more beneficial to focus on crucial amendments. 
To celebrate the third anniversary of the Protectorate, all the Ministry of Public 
Works departments provided materials on their activity during that period.154 
Ladislav Vavrouch, a regular visiting member of the Expert Commission, in his 
capacity as head of the Canal Department (of the Water Management and Inland 
Navigation section led by Bartovský) listed five crucial characteristics of the new 
canal project within the Nazi reich Waterways program.155 
The first three points on Vavrouch’s list concerned the construction of the 
planned reich network: its spatial framework, technical standardization, and the 
emphasis on a significantly higher transport capacity. such requirements trans-
lated into the limited number of locks and the significant enlargement of almost 
every dimension of the waterway; this typically took the form of duplication of 
locks and a fundamental gradual broadening of the cross-section. In addition, 
plans for a united European network appeared for the first time, as this became 
an ideological tool of the Nazi war against russia and Britain and simultaneously 
expressed the real territorial delimitation of Nazi rule. The most obvious feature of 
152 Otto franzius, Der Verkehrswasserbau: Ein Wasserbau-Handbuch für Studium und Praxis (Berlin: J. 
springer, 1927). Otto franzius was a member of the German dynasty of hydraulic engineers, professor of 
hydraulic engineering at the Technical University of hanover (1913-1936) and an ardent Nazi supporter 
who served in 1933-1934 as rector. his uncles, Ludwig franzius (1832-1903) and Georg franzius (1842-
1914), were prominent civil engineers. While the former gained world-wide recognition for his correc-
tion of the mouth of the Weser and reconstruction of the port Bremen, the latter achieved the position 
of hafenbaudirektor (director of harbor construction) in Kiel. Otto’s cousin Georg (1880-??) entered the 
DOE canal negotiations in his capacity as head of the Strombau Oder in Wroclaw.
153 see, for instance, its application within the discussions on channel sealing. Průplav O-D, Příčný profil. 
Těsnění (NAČr, MVP, b. 531, April 27, 1942).
154 This formed the background material for such celebratory publications as: Emanuel Moravec, Tři roky 
v Říši: Protektorát Čechy a Morava (Prague: Orbis, 1942).
155 The material consisted of two separate reports: one on canals and a second on inland navigation. The 
list in question is located on page six of the first report. Activities of the department for the last three years. 
Činnost oddělení za poslední tři roky (NAČr, MVP, b. 531, february 25, 1942).
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the high-capacity waterway network serving the Grossraum was the preference for 
ship-lifts. During the debates at the time of the Austrian Empire, Antonín smrček 
had convinced the international committee that ship-lifts did not suit the DOE, 
based on arguments agreed by the PIANC back in 1905.156 since then, all designs 
resolved water level differences through the use of lock chambers. however, the 
inter-war German waterway program revived the idea of ship-lifting on canals. 
The Commission of Experts agreed to the German proposal for the ship- lift so-
lution of the DOE summit reservoir. This proposal involved three lifts – two on 
the southern descent to the Morava Valley, and a single one on the descent to the 
Oder. remarkably, the ship-lift located by slavíč and designed to overcome the 
47m difference, would be the highest ship-lift in the world.157 The vertical water 
level difference did not allow for a hydraulic system or one with floats, and the only 
viable option seemed to be the recent German invention – the counterweight ship-
lift, as executed on the hohenzollern Canal in Niederfinow in 1927-1934, which 
overcame an elevation difference of 36m.158 however, the exact location of slavíč’s 
ship-lift was only determined after the Commission of Experts’ sixth session. 
Despite the special working group on ship-lifts established under the Commission 
at its second session in 1939, the actual designing never took place.
The fourth point on Vavrouch’s list dealt with conflicting water uses. The water 
supply on the reich Waterway “must be in accordance with general water man-
agement planning.” The discussions on water provision led to a resolution of the 
Commission’s fifth meeting, calling for a complex water management plan for the 
DOE canal, which was provided by the engineer Professor Jan Bažant.159 his work 
is generally considered to be the first modern water management plan developed 
in the Czech lands.160 The urge for comprehensive planning ultimately led to in-
stitutional centralization and, from the perspective of the canal, to a significant 
156 Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses, Report of proceedings (Milan: PIANC 
1906), 217.
157 In the comprehensive overview of the navigational facilities on rivers and canals, MVP engineer 
Jaroslav Kratochvíl (not to be confused with stanislav Kratochvíl, also a hydraulic engineer, by that time at 
Brno Technical University) stated that “There will be a ship-lift on the DOE as well, with a vertical gradient 
of 47m. Once constructed, it will be the highest ship-lift in the world.” Jaroslav Kratochvíl, “splavňovací 
stavby na řekách a průplavech,” Plavební cesty Dunaj-Odra-Labe 2, no. 5 (1941): 96-106, here 104.
158 Michael Braun, “Das schiffshebewerk in Niederfinow, 75 Jahre in Betrieb,” Bautechnik 86, no. 12 
(2009): 810-814.
159 The Water Management Plan for Moravia (Moravský vodohospodářský plán) covered the Protectorate 
land of Moravia (a part of former Czechoslovak Moravia-silesia). Professor Bažant communicated with 
Czech members of the Commission (namely Vavrouch). Nonetheless, there are no signs that the plan 
would have been instrumentally altered to serve the Czech engineers’ intentions; Průplav O-D. Zásobování 
vodou – vodohospodářský plán moravský (NAČr, MVP, b. 535).
160 Plán hlavních povodí České republiky, schválený usnesením vlády ČR ze dne 23. května 2007 č. 562, 
(Prague: Ministerstvo zemědělství, 2007), 7.
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shift in its meaning. What had previously been a single-purpose transport route 
became reinstated as part of a wider water management scheme. It was not yet 
an active part, and mostly detached from other water infrastructures, but was set 
within the new perspective on water as a limited natural resource. 
The fifth and the final point concerned the social and economic function of the 
canal, which, according to Nazi planners, should bring prosperity to the areas along 
the canal corridor. following the pattern applied for the Mitellandkanal, the DOE 
was not only intended to connect other waterways in a network, but also the cities 
along the route. The project discussed at the commission included branch canals 
to Brno and Olomouc (as the first part of the canal’s Elbe branch). furthermore, 
in the summer of 1942, when Dr. schumacher of the reich Protector’s Waterways 
Department requested a wall map of the waterways for his office in Prague, he also 
insisted that the considered connection between Prague and the Elbe (a shortcut 
eliminating the lower Vltava) be included.161
Vavrouch evaluated the crucial changes from the perspective of an engineer. 
Apart from the technicalities, however, the canal-designing process also reflected 
social and cultural factors aligned with Nazi ideology. These concerned a perspec-
tive on nature, articulated in both the requirement of “harmonious fitting into the 
landscape” and the ecological consideration of wider interactions related to the 
water cycle within a river basin. Another feature concerns the authoritative system 
within which the project was developed; specifically, the emphasis on centrali-
zation and planning appealed to Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers to the extent 
that they embraced the ideas of the Leadership Principle (Führerprinzip). Indeed, 
the Czech engineers at ŘVC and MVP cooperated enthusiastically on the canal 
project with the Nazi occupants and embraced their ideals in a manner character-
istic of former Czechoslovak society. After the war, when such an attitude became 
a stigma, the Czech engineers tried to distance themselves from Nazi ideology 
and even from cooperation with German engineers on the canal project. In 1946, 
Bartovský noted that he and his colleagues intentionally pursued the canal design 
that “was so fundamentally over-dimensioned and over-priced that in the agreed 
form, it became absolutely unsuitable for rational utilization.” however, as the ar-
chives clearly showed, it was the Nazis who urged for enlargement.162 
finally, the Nazi authorities interpreted the canal as a multipurpose object; 
not in the sense of a multifunctional water infrastructure, but rather as a tool of a 
161 request for the DOE Canal wall map. LOD -nástěnná mapa 1:200.000 (NAČr, MVP, b. 531, June 11, 
1942).
162 Josef Bartovský, Vodní cesty a vodohospodářské plánování v Čechách a na Moravě. Přehled a bilance 
práce dvou generací, další úkoly dvouletka a pětiletka (Prague: společnost Dunajsko-oderského průplavu, 
1946), 50.
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multi-layered process of Germanization. The core value of the canal was the phys-
ical interconnection of the future Grossdeutsches Raum, of Nazi-ruled Europe. 
The canal also represented the conduit of Germanization, in the sense of the 
Landesbrücke (land bridge) concept providing Germanization of the Czech terri-
tory, or the Czechs themselves. This double integration perspective – one follow-
ing traditional Machtpolitik (power politics); the other inspired by racial ideology 
– added to its appeal. 
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Chapter 4  
Linking the soviet Volga; not the rhine!
“Water will stir the blood in the veins of our Industry and Czechoslovakia 
will become a state on a sea shore. Let’s build the port in the heart of Europe. 
Let’s build a new Czechoslovakia”1
Towards the end of the war, the Protectorate and Nazi authorities both paid less 
and less attention to the canal project. The exception was the Wehrmacht, which 
requested a copy of the canal plans in March 1945, when the red Army entered 
silesia and moved along the Oder towards Moravská Ostrava.2 however, informa-
tion included in the canal design did not help the Germans to stop the advancing 
soviet troops. Ironically, the Moravian Gate, described by Baťa and others as the 
Czechoslovak key to (Central) Europe, served as the entrance from the east.
The canal idea re-surfaced soon after the German surrender and re-establish-
ment of Czechoslovakia in the debates on post-war reconstruction and the new 
political organization of Europe. Now eighty-three years of age, smrček met with 
his colleague from the days of the Paris Peace Conference, the diplomat hugo 
Vavrečka, to discuss preparing the Czechoslovak strategy and demands for the up-
coming Peace Conference in Potsdam. recalling how a lack of background mate-
rial had limited the Czechoslovak delegation’s bargaining power back in 1919, they 
pushed for very detailed preparation. In september 1945, the Masaryk Academy 
of Labor initiated a meeting with the minister of transport, at which representa-
tives of the inter-war technocratic movement, often closely linked to DOECs (the 
Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal society) such as smrček or Kačírek, presented their ex-
pert opinion on a wide range of transport issues. Generally, they attempted to repeat 
the post-World War I solutions, such as the internationalization of rivers, or delimi-
tation of borders in a way that secured the viability of border states. This time, the 
main issue was the construction of dams and the production of electricity. 
Moravian business circles led the efforts to pursue construction. Vitkovice’s 
1 Voiceover in the post World War II movie on the canal: Přístav v srdci Evropy by Elmar Klos (1946).
2 The Wehrmacht required a copy of the canal plans (NAČr, MVP, b. 533, March 7, 1945).
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director, františek Kačírek, helped to revive DOECs and its journal (the first post-
war issue was published on October 12, 1945). DOECs activities culminated in the 
spring of 1946, when a Memorandum on the Danube-Oder Canal (Memorandum 
o dunajsko oderském průplavu) was presented to the state authorities, together 
with a proposal for the international funding of the DOE. The document followed 
the earlier initiative, aiming to add the DOE to the peace conference agenda. The 
Memorandum’s authors delimited “necessary gains,” areas to be reclaimed on 
Austrian and German territories as part of post-war reparations, to enable the 
construction of the canal on the territory of a single state. following the fruit-
less international discussions of the inter-war period, such an arrangement was 
widely acknowledged as the best, and most probably the only plausible set-up for 
its completion. More daring minds even considered territorial gains at the expense 
of Poland, and proposed requesting the area along the unnavigable Oder down-
stream from Ostrava to the Polish port of Koźle (formerly German Cosel).
DOECs and other supporters again managed to make the canal a live issue in 
the public discourse.3 Baťa film studios in Zlín had finally completed and pre-
sented to public a short documentary, a kind of a newsreel, describing the advan-
tages of the proposed waterway. The production of the movie had started in 1939, 
but the war delayed its completion. The film, entitled “The Port in the heart of 
Europe” (Přístav v srdci Evopy), depicted Czechoslovakia as uniquely unfortunate, 
because it was a landlocked country – a characteristic it shared with only five other 
“civilized states”: Bolivia, Uruguay, hungary, Austria, and switzerland. The film 
claimed that access to the sea is key to international trade and, therefore, to overall 
economic progress and cultural development. for instance, the dense waterway 
and sea shipping route network made Europe the most developed continent. The 
DOE, connecting three seas in Czechoslovak territory, had the potential to put the 
country symbolically on the coast, which would compensate for its historical im-
perfection. simultaneously, the canal, with its cheap water-borne transport, would 
make Czechoslovakia a European crossroads, as it would become an important 
node on the pan-European waterway network, connecting Czechoslovakia to the 
Ussr and Western Europe.4
3 This was the main goal of the society’s postwar program, as expressed by its chairman Ivan Petr at the 
DOECs Central Committee meeting on April 2, 1946. “Zpráva pro valnou hromadu společnosti dunajsko-
oderského průplavu v Praze, konanou dne 29.ledna 1946,” Plavební cesty D-O-L 8, no. 5-6 (1946): 92-96, 
96-98.
4 Přístav v srdci Evropy, (1946). In 1966, one of the directors of the movie, Elmar Klos, received an Acad-
emy Award for Best foreign Language film for The Shop on Main Street, which he co-directed with Ján 
Kadár.
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smrček, Bartovský, and Zimmler – all former leaders of the community sup-
porting the DOE project – published their views in quick succession on the im-
portance of the project and its role in the new political setting. Above all, they each 
stressed the great economic potential of the canal project.5 None showed a deeper 
understanding of the situation or aligned the canal debate with the most pressing 
issue of the time. While the DOECs organized the Waterway Convention in 1947 
in Přerov, modeled after those of the 1920s, Communist leaders were preparing for 
the sovietization of the country. 
On Sovietization
During the Cold War, the direct influence of the Ussr transformed East European 
states and societies profoundly and in a seemingly uniform fashion. That is the 
indisputable core of the notion sovietization. however, the use of the term 
“sovietization” in literature is neither clear nor straightforward and includes 
5 smrček and Bartovský on the pages of the journal Plavební cesty DOL, Zimmler in an introduction to the 
book on waterways by Cvrk.
Figure 4.1 – The war negatively affected the state of waterways in Europe. Necessary repairs 
required enormous efforts, but simultaneously opened the door to bold reconstruction schemes. 
The picture shows a ship-wreck on the Danube, which remained in this position long after the war 
ended, well into 1946. Source: NAČR, CPU, b. 96. 
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innumerable temporal, spatial, and thematic variations and subtleties. After al-
most a century of service in political and later also in historical debates, the notion 
is loaded with divergent meanings, and sometimes carries a value judgment. 
Generally, it is possible to derive two dominant meanings of sovietization from 
the literature: primarily political and primarily cultural. The former focuses on 
the process of establishing the soviet type of communist regimes in new terri-
tories and incorporating them into the soviet power-sphere (creation of a bloc). 
The latter draws attention to the specificity of the soviet modernization concept. 
Application of the soviet model did not stop at the political level, but also involved 
deeper social and cultural transformations. While these were certainly inspired 
by a specific soviet version of modernization, the Ussr controlled them only to a 
limited extent (if at all).
Unfortunately, the literature on the topic is hard to systemize with differing 
time frames, and aspects of the process make it extremely difficult to impose any 
kind of order on the situation.6 Instead of trying to classify such a chaotic collection 
of material, it might be more fruitful to look at the use of the term “sovietization” 
as employed by the historiography of Eastern Europe; at that level, at least some 
nuances disappear.
A comparison of three studies on the sovietization of Eastern Europe pub-
lished between 1959 and 2009 provides an illustrative “genealogy” of the notion. 
starting from the simple recognition of the construction of the Eastern Bloc by 
its contemporaries, the three volumes (all published under the exact same title 
within a period of more than fifty years), reveal how historiography deepened its 
understanding of a term that now covers the sophisticated, albeit rather chaotic 
clutter of analyses of incentives, agents, and aspects of the transformative process.
When, in the midst of the Cold War, German scholars Neumann and Birke 
published an account of the sweeping transformations taking place in Eastern 
Europe, their main concern was to show how institutional, cultural, and intel-
lectual soviet-like unification was being driven. They saw a process in motion that 
could lead to a reality of the dissolution of formerly independent states within 
the soviet realm. What they witnessed and described was the relatively rapid and 
smooth homogenization of formerly specific national cultures and nationally spe-
cific organizational patterns into the image of the Ussr. The development of a 
planned economy’s international system added to the growing entanglement of 
6 In his analysis of the uses of the concept, Jiri Vykoukal showed how different historical experiences shaped 
the interpretation of the process in local historiographies. for instance, the connotation of russification 
is quite strong in Poland and the Baltic states, while almost completely lacking in the case of hungary or 
Czechoslovakia. Jiří Vykoukal, “sovětizace jako výkladový problém,” Moderní dějiny 15, no. 1 (2007): 287-
301, 289.
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Eastern Europe into a single entity that worked according to soviet rules and un-
der soviet leadership. It is important to note that, in accordance with the overall 
aim of the publication, the volume covered the period from 1945 to 1957.7
Generally speaking, the Cold War atmosphere on the western side of the 
Iron Curtain in the 1950s produced a negative and essentialist picture of the 
sovietization process. In the writings of contemporary German Ostforschung and 
American sovietology, which were limited to Eastern Europe in the final decade 
of stalin’s rule, the concept of sovietization stood for the enforced establishment 
of soviet rule over Eastern Europe. 8 The volume by Birke and Neumann is con-
sidered to be among the few balanced scholarly contributions to the problem pro-
duced in the 1950s and 1960s.9
After 1989, the domestic historiographies of Eastern Europe adopted the theme 
of sovietization and developed a specific political conception of it. The crucial 
question behind inquiries into the problem was whether there was an alternative 
to sovietization after 1945. What role did local politicians play in the adoption/
imposition of soviet/communist rule? To what extent could they influence its final 
shape? Where was the point of no return on the time axis? Given this framework 
for research, it is hardly surprising that virtually every text on the topic published 
in Czech historical literature since then operates within the rather narrow tem-
poral range of 1944-1953. In order to understand the installation of communist 
7 Eugen Lemberg Ernst Birke, and rudolf Neumann, , Die Sowjetisierung Ost-Mitteleuropas. Untersuchun-
gen zu Ihrem Ablauf in den Einzelnen Ländern, vol. 1 (frankfurt/Main: A. Metzner Verlag, 1959). Although 
the title includes East Central Europe, it also has a chapter on the Balkan Peninsula. see the introduction for 
the basis of their understanding of the sovietization process.
8 These two parallel scholarly disciplines are oriented on the analysis of the soviet sphere, both suffer-
ing from scarcity of information and largely dependent on second-hand sources, official publications and 
influenced by emigrées, who by definition, are hesitant to create anything other than negative images of 
the Ussr. As American historian Alexander J. Motyl stated in the late 1980s, “Contemporary sovietology 
represents an awkward amalgam of data collection, policy analysis, and journalism that is as divorced from 
scholarship as sense impressions are from theory.” Alexander J. Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: 
Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 1.
9 Tejchman singles out this quality of the edited volume in his brief bibliographical account of the literature 
on the political version of sovietization. however, even Neumann and Birke, otherwise scholarly correct, 
completely ignored the role of the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe. It has been argued elsewhere that this 
first-hand experience with Western totalitarianism paved the way for the sovietization of Eastern Europe. 
Miroslav Tejchman, “Geopolitika a revoluce,” in Sovětizace Východní Evropy: Země střední a jihovýchodní 
Evropy v letech 1944-1948, ed. Miroslav Tejchman (Prague: historický ústav, 1995), 261-283, here 282. It 
is important to note that Western Cold War historiography tends to interpret sovietization as inherently 
evil, while the American stance in the conflict is defended as ideologically correct, firm, and democratic. A 
recent example of such attitude is the concept of New Cold War history developed by American historian 
John Lewis Gaddis, in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1997). Naturally, a number of East European historians have ob-
jected to this view and tend to see the UsA and the Ussr as both practicing their specific form of Realpolitik. 
see, for instance, László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945-1956: Between the United States and the Soviet 
Union (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 322-323.
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regimes and soviet rule in the region, it is only natural to focus on the immediate 
postwar period, or the last years of stalin’s rule.10 The Sovětizace Východní Evropy 
collection, published in 1995, represents a solid example of such an attitude. Its 
authors saw sovietization as a “full integration of East European countries into 
the soviet sphere, leading to their actual loss of sovereignty.”11 following this logic, 
1948 marks the end of the process. By the end of that year, all respective coun-
tries were fully governed by communists and set firmly within the soviet Bloc; 
that is, outside the Marshall Plan and on the brink of the Comecon.12 The au-
thors constructed the process as an interaction between the inner transformation 
(formation of the communist regimes and society on a domestic level) and the 
outward expansion (formation of the soviet Bloc driven from Moscow). Based on 
a detailed comparative analysis of the pro-soviet communist regimes and their 
roads to power in East European countries between 1944 and 1948, the authors 
concluded that endogenous sources were, ultimately, clearly inferior to the pres-
sures from Moscow.13 This “political” conception of sovietization narrows down 
the notion’s explanatory potential almost exclusively to the Ussr’s subjugation of 
East European countries. 
however, important objections could be raised against the narrow political 
perspective. such a conception of sovietization, strictly oriented on the political 
10 for instance, Jiří Vykoukal dated the sovietization of East European countries to 1944-1948. Others 
who discussed the issue in the specific contexts of cultural politics (Knapík), military (volume edited by 
Danielová), aircraft industry (roeser) or press (Bystrov), also keep to this delimitation. Polish author An-
drzej Koryn and German historian Michael Lemke took similar stances. Vykoukal, “sovětizace”; Jiří Vy-
koukal, Bohuslav Litera, and Miroslav Tejchman, Východ: vznik, vývoj a rozpad sovětského bloku, 1944-1989 
(Prague: Libri, 2000), 95-102; Jiří Vykoukal, “sovětizace, lidová demokracie a komunismus,” in Sovětizace 
Východní Evropy: země střední a jihovýchodní Evropy v letech 1944-1948, ed. Miroslav Tejchman (Praha: his-
torický ústav, 1995), 7-38; Libuše Danielová, ed. Sovětizace armád střední a jihovýchodní Evropy po 2. světové 
válce: sborník příspěvků z konference (Brno: Vojenská akademie v Brně, 2004);Vladimír Bystrov, Svobodná 
nesvoboda: některé příklady postupující komunizace a sovětizace mediální krajiny v Československu a snah 
komunistů umlčet český nekomunistický a církevní tisk v letech 1945-1948 (Prague: Vyšší odborná škola pub-
licistiky, 2006); Jiří Knapík, Únor a kultura: Sovětizace české kultury 1948-1950 (Prague: Libri, 2004); Mat-
thias roeser, “sovětizace a militarizace Československého leteckého průmyslu v letech 1949-1953,” Soudobé 
Dějiny 3, no. 1 (1996): 60-71; Andrzej Koryn, “International Aspects of the sovietisation of Central-Eastern 
Europe, 1944-1947,” Acta Poloniae Historica, vol. 92 (2005): 99-116.; Michael Lemke, ed. Sowjetisierung und 
Eigenständigkeit in der SBZ/DDR (1945-1953) (Weimar; Köln; Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1999).
11 Tejchman, “Geopolitika a revoluce,” 261. The literal translation is “sovietization of Eastern Europe.” Mi-
roslav Tejchman, ed. Sovětizace východní Evropy: země střední a jihovýchodní Evropy v letech 1944-1948 
(Prague: historický ústav, 1995). In a way, this volume builds on the work of Neumann and Birke, who actu-
ally intended to devote the second volume of their analysis to the comparative and more theoretical evalua-
tion of changes in Eastern Europe, unbound from the confines of the national perspective. see introduction 
in: Ernst Birke, Die Sowjetisierung, 1.
12 Vykoukal, “sovětizace,” 299.
13 Confusingly, the presence of soviet military forces is seen as a hindrance to sovietization (understood as 
a communist road to power). The installation of the soviet party-state model was much smoother in Albania 
and Yugoslavia, where local communist partisans led the liberation process without direct involvement of 
red Army troops. Tejchman, “Geopolitika a revoluce,” 262, 266.
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anatomy of the take-overs, does not actually need to employ the term. The stand-
ard “establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe” seems appropriate.14 
furthermore, considering the history of the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal, even the 
institutional and organizational (political) changes took longer than just those few 
years of stalinism. Also, the corresponding changes in technical lay-out (such as re-
orientation towards the east) were incorporated even later than that, but not before 
1958 and, in its fully-elaborated form, not before 1964. 
The phenomenon of sovietization clearly extended the narrow political field. 
Apart from ongoing pressure from the Ussr and Moscow-trained local party lead-
ers, independent sovietizing efforts were also in operation. Many areas of life were 
sovietized (adapted to the soviet model) by domestic players with various moti-
vations or through the operation of international institutions standing outside the 
effective political control of the Kremlin.15 It seems it was precisely the formation 
of a new “sovietized” political elite and the strong presence of the soviet element 
(either symbolic or through the physical presence of the red Army and the soviet 
secret Police NKVD) that secured a favorable environment for the gradual applica-
tion of the soviet Model in all spheres of society, including technical standards. It 
was only after 1948 that East European nations began to experience sovietization on 
a deeper level. This continued, to a varying degree, up to 1989.16 The first generation 
of graduates of “sovietized” universities replaced the technical cadres educated in 
the inter-war period. By the mid-1960s, young people occupied most of the leading 
positions in the programs involving hydraulic engineering and the canal scheme; 
specifically, in the scientific (institutes), political (ministries), and administrative 
(regional water administration) fields. Therefore, sovietization should also be seen 
as a cultural phenomenon that was, to a certain extent, parallel to the nineteenth 
century Central European experience with Germanization or the simultaneous 
process of the Americanization of Western Europe. While Americanization is often 
14 Norman M. Naimark and L.I.A. Gibianskii, The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 
1944-1949 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
15 soviet control over Comecon activities was certainly limited and changed over time. see Metcalf ’s discus-
sion on the changing ability of soviet leaders to achieve their objectives. Lee Kendall Metcalf, The Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance: The Failure of Reform (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1997).
16 Again, the definition of the term is crucial. for some romanian historians, the sovietization of the coun-
try ended in early 1960, when the direct influence of the Ussr in romania weakened. These historians 
simply refer to the further development of central economy and the party state as Communization. Catalin 
Turliuc, “romania’s sovietization. sociocultural Aspects,” in Sovietization in Romania and Czechoslovakia: 
History, Analogies, Consequences, ed. Alexandru Zub and flavius solomon (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003), 57-66, here 
57. however, given that the soviet model shaped the formation of communist regimes in all European 
countries, even the post-1960 transformations in romania principally followed the soviet institutional sys-
tem. E.A. rees, “Introduction. The sovietization of Eastern Europe,” in The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: 
New Perspectives on the Postwar Period, ed. Balázs Apor, Péter Apor, and E.A. rees (Washington, DC: New 
Academia Pub., 2008), 1-28, here 4-9.
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characterized as “Empire by Invitation,” the creation of the soviet Bloc might be 
characterized as “Empire by Coercion.”17
The third volume, Sovietization of Eastern Europe (2008), builds on exactly this 
argumentation and employs the notion in the broadest possible sense, defining it 
simply as a “transplantation of the soviet Model.”18 Accordingly, contributions to 
the book cover the entire period of the Ussr’s existence, a country where the soviet 
model was not only developed, but also applied for the first time. A wide range of 
historical sub-disciplines addresses the theme and releases it from the domain of 
exclusively political histories.19 
furthermore, the notion of sovietization was originally used by actors to describe 
a transformation to a pre-defined civilizing project based on messianic aspects of 
communist ideology (class struggle) and russian imperial traditions (russification).20 
It was exclusively an invention of post-war Ostforschung/sovietology scholars such 
as Neumann, Birke or Gaddis; they only exploited its analytical potential. The archi-
tects of the process, the soviet leaders, had coined the term as a normative category 
during the first years of the soviet regime to describe the specific soviet socialist 
strategy of modernization. 
Precisely this modernization layer comes to the fore when approached from a 
cultural point of view. As a specific vision of progress, or more exactly a non-capi-
talist version of modernity, the soviet model (when not seen as inherently imperial 
and russian) became acceptable and perhaps even desirable among various circles 
of Czechoslovak society, even before the Communist coup of 1948.21 however, this 
is not to say that the takeover would have been possible without the presence of 
soviet power. Even in Czechoslovakia, whose population was the most prone to 
Communist ideals among the East European countries (at least according to the 
1946 elections), the situation would hardly have developed into such a far-reaching 
application of the soviet model of Communism.22 
17 Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United states and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” Journal 
of Peace Research 23, no. 3 (1986): 263-277; László Borhi, “Empire by Coercion: The soviet Union and 
hungary in the 1950s,” Cold War History 1, no. 2 (2001): 47-72.
18 Balázs Apor, Péter Apor, and E.A. rees, The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Post-
war Period (Washington, DC: New Academia Pub., 2008).
19 Cultural approaches dominate the volume. Of the fifteen contributions, three are devoted to the sovieti-
zation of historiography, one to the evolution of the concept itself, two to economic issues (from a cultural 
viewpoint), two to religion, and the remaining seven to either leisure or rituals of soviet communism.
20 for a detailed discussion on this notion and its historical development, see Tarik Cyril Amar, “sovietization 
as a Civilizing Mission in the West,” in The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar 
Period, ed. Balázs Apor, Péter Apor, and E.A. rees (Washington, DC: New Academia Pub., 2008), 29-46.
21 Tejchman, among others, summed up the pro-soviet moods. Tejchman, “Geopolitika a revoluce,” 278.
22 for the Czechoslovak elections of 1946 see Vykoukal, Litera, and Tejchman, Východ, 144-147. Czecho-
slovakia’s national model of socialism, which did not include collectivization, was abandoned in favor of 
the stalinist concept in 1948, immediately after the Communist Party came to power. The process was also 
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Apor and reese’s volume stresses the dual dimension of sovietization; besides 
the unification of political and economic structures and organizational forms di-
rected from Moscow, the newly-established soviet democracies also attempted to 
import the soviet way of life on a broader scale.23 In a way, this second “cultural” 
aspect bears a strong resemblance to the endogenous political forces that formed 
political sovietization, as described by Tajchman et al. In this way, Apor and rees 
paraphrased the above-mentioned duality of the process: the imposition of the 
soviet system (incorporating the state into the soviet Bloc) and appropriation of 
the soviet way of life by domestic players (governments, etc.). however, such ap-
propriation of soviet models in their stalinist form into the very different environ-
ments of Eastern Europe, inevitably collided with local traditions and settings, 
which did not leave the scene without a fight. In the end, “indigenous” forces, 
through resistance or appropriation, took part in the final shaping of the local/
national/sectoral versions of sovietization.24
A shift from political to cultural interpretation of the process inspired a re-
evaluation of its major driving forces. The standard image of soviet party com-
missars operating in the shadows, assisted by the NKVD and local communists as 
their collaborators, is clearly incomplete. There were at least two other important 
groups of sovietizers. Operating on the receiving end were partly non-communist 
supporters or carriers of the modernization program, such as scientists, engineers, 
and professionals active in the voluntary adoption of the soviet model in their spe-
cific area of expertise. At the other end, soviet advisors were sent to supervise or 
directly manage the transformation in economic, political, and military spheres. 
It would be highly unjust to state that sovietization was imposed on Czecho-
slovak society completely against its will, although recent mainstream Czechoslovak 
historiography tends to underplay such events. In fact, it initially received a warm 
affected by the stalin-Tito split and ensuing attacks on “nationalism excesses.”Václav Průcha, Hospodářské a 
sociální dějiny Československa 1918-1992. 2. díl, období 1945-1992, vol. 2 (Brno: Doplněk, 2009), 262. John 
Connelly, Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech and Polish Higher Education, 1945-
1956 (Chapel hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 55. 
23 such attempts ranged from the adoption of Lysenkism in Biology to the suggested import of soviet corn-
flakes and the subsequent sovietization of the Czechoslovak diet. Anna Matalová and Jiří sekerák, Genetics 
Behind the Iron Curtain: Its Repudiation and Reinstitualisation in Czechoslovakia (Brno: Moravian Museum, 
2004); Martin franc, Řasy, nebo knedlíky? Postoje odborníků na výživu k inovacím a tradicím v české stravě v 
50. a 60. letech 20. století (Prague: scriptorium, 2003), 198.
24 The existence of national versions of sovietization is one of the main claims of Connelly’s study of edu-
cational systems in Central Europe. Connelly, Captive University. Jakub rákosník builds his story about 
the sovietization of the welfare state in Czechoslovakia around the interaction of historically determined 
structural factors and the impact of contingency factors. i.e. installation of a soviet-style communist re-
gime. Jakub rákosník, Sovětizace sociálního státu: lidově demokratický režim a sociální práva občanů v 
Československu 1945-1960 (Prague: filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy, 2010).
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welcome from a significant part of society as a remedy for the failure of the lib-
eral democratic model and its main representatives, namely the West European 
countries that had betrayed Czechoslovakia before the war by signing the Munich 
Agreement.25 Also, some non-communist political representatives admitted being 
attracted to the soviet model, and the literature has described their actions in vari-
ous fields of social activity.26 Naturally, hydraulic engineers, so famously fascinated 
with planning, were no exception to the rule. 
The concept of “self-sovietization” was adopted for the activities of people and 
organizations independent of the regime, who seemed to have an obsessive in-
terest in introducing soviet methods and practices. John Connelly has fruitfully 
exploited the notion (originally coined in the context of standard “political” dis-
cussion over sovietization in the GDr) in his study on the sovietization of univer-
sities in communist countries of Central Europe.27 however, he used the term in a 
relatively narrow sense to describe the efforts of “compulsive sovietizers” among 
communist functionaries. In the case of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal project, this 
role was also adopted by some non-communist hydraulic engineers who were fas-
cinated by communist values and technology and their emphasis on “planning,” 
similar to the experiences of the (then) recent period of Nazi occupation. As 
soon as life went back to normal, some Czechoslovak water/hydraulic engineers 
began promoting the qualities of the soviet model of water management in the 
Czechoslovak trade press.28 
25 Published under the subtitle “Dobrovolná sovětizace – Voluntarily sovietization,” sviták’s interpretation 
of the process challenges the popular image of Czechoslovakia as a helpless victim left exposed to the Ussr 
once it was betrayed by the West at the Yalta Conference, much in the same way as happened a few years 
earlier in Munich. such interpretation forms a dominant discourse in Czechoslovak context and is generally 
referred to as the “Munich complex”. sviták argued that Czechoslovak diplomats during the war viewed the 
Ussr as a viable alternative to the West and that this stance, known at least to the British delegation, affected 
the negotiations at Tehran and Yalta. such a view has attracted greater support in recent Czech historiog-
raphy; see the seminal volume on the last years of World War II by hrbek. Jaroslav hrbek, Draze zaplacená 
svoboda: osvobození Československa 1944-1945 (Prague: Paseka, 2009); Ivan sviták, Veliký skluz: dobrovolná 
sovětizace 1938-1948 (Prague: Orbis, 1990). for more on the “Munich complex,” see: Jan Tesař, Mnichovský 
komplex: jeho příčiny a důsledky (Prague: Prostor, 2000).
26 In the case of natural sciences, the scientists themselves (not communist party members or supporters) 
initiated sovietization in their specific fields. Jiří Jindra described this group as “young progressive scien-
tists lacking sufficient experience” and prone to “parroting of soviet results”; he also characterized them as 
“opportunistic”. Jiří Jindra, “The sovietization of Natural sciences in Czechoslovakia (1945-1960),” in Sovi-
etization in Romania and Czechoslovakia: History, Analogies, Consequences, ed. Alexandru Zub and flavius 
solomon (Iaşi: Polirom, 2003), 44-56, here 45.
27 It is important to note that, in the standard political debate on sovietization as the establishment of com-
munist regimes, this notion has been strongly opposed for implying that the Ussr’s role was not vital for the 
result. It was, of course, and “self-sovietization” must be understood as just one, and definitely not the most 
important, mode of the sovietization process. Connelly, Captive University, 45-46.
28 Alois Bratránek, Organizace hydrologické služby v SSSR ve srovnání se službou v ČSR (Prague: sÚh, 1946). 
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After 1948, self-sovietization became a prominent tool with which to gain or 
maintain influential positions within the system. furthermore, in the context of 
political trials, it also became a matter of life and death and insufficiently zeal-
ous sovietizing activity could be considered as betrayal.29 Local Communists did 
their best to sovietize the country, closely following stalin’s famous quote that “a 
revolutionary is he who, without arguments, unconditionally, openly and honestly 
… is ready to defend and strengthen the Ussr …”30 however, these individuals 
were limited in their endeavors by a lack of soviet guidance. They often had to 
improvise and work out how the sovietization of a given branch or sector should 
develop and to what end. To a certain extent, experts in the given fields were al-
lowed, or even invited, to shape and control the process, as politicians logically 
lacked the necessary expertise.31 In the case of the DOE, this resulted in disputes 
on the meaning of sovietization, based on the functional versatility of the project 
among specialists from all sectors of the national economy involved: transport, 
agriculture, water-management, construction, power engineering, and ideology.32
however, in the crucial power sectors such as military and heavy industry, 
the course of action was determined and controlled by advisors appointed by the 
Ussr.33 Throughout the 1950s, the Czechoslovak government often asked for 
their presence and counsel in other spheres of the national economy and for spe-
cific branches of state administration, such as culture or education.34 In the most 
important arenas, and where advice was available, the whole consulting process 
worked on the basis of virtually undisputed adoption of soviet advisors’ opinions, 
such as during preparations to reorganize a sector of the Czechoslovak economy.35 
Over time, and with changing international relations within the bloc, the system 
of advisors, ambassadors of sovietization, left in favor of the multilateral discus-
sions within Comecon.36 Although the soviet advisors kept their position of final 
29 Connelly, Captive University, 55. Czech communist rudolf slánský, one of the fourteen leading party 
officials sentenced to death in 1952, was accused of treason for slowing down the economic development 
of the country by “delaying the invitation of soviet advisors in the economic sector.” Karel Kaplan, Sovětští 
poradci v Československu 1949-1956 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV Čr, 1993), 10.
30 Quoted in English by Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Challenge of Change in the soviet Bloc,” Foreign Affairs 
39, no. 3 (1961): 430-443, here 430.
31 Jindra, “The sovietization of Natural sciences,” 45.
32 see the discussion below of the “extra-official party committee” on the canal in 1951.
33 These critical areas were: uranium mines and military education (1945-1949); national security, army, 
economic planning (since 1950); Kaplan, Sovětští poradci, 10.
34 Generally up to 1957; later only on exceptional occasions. Ibid., 96-98.
35 In 1951, soviet experts provided 46 documents, analysis and recommendations that were “perceived and 
treated as binding guidelines” by the Czechoslovak authorities. Ibid., 48-60.
36 following the shift from stalin’s concept of general laws of transition to socialism (that is, the one and 
only proper way was the soviet one), to Khrushchev’s less rigid stance, which allowed for some national 
peculiarities. 
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authority until the early 1960s, they did not interfere automatically and had to be 
asked for assistance, as in the case of the Czechoslovak railway reforms in 1962.37
The international system of the soviet Bloc, first labeled as “socialist camp,” 
and later “socialist world system” or “socialist commonwealth,” formed another 
important arena for articulating the sovietization process. 38 As Valentina fava and 
Matthias Uhl illustrated in the cases of Comecon and the Warsaw Treaty, respec-
tively, these bodies represented a platform for negotiating the actual configuration 
and content of the process. At the outset, East European countries tried to comply 
with soviet demands and implement soviet experiences and models as much as 
possible. however, it soon became clear that the literal transplantation of soviet 
production methods into different environments of Eastern Europe would not be 
smooth and unchallenged.39 Likewise, debates on the nuclear-missilization of the 
Warsaw Treaty showed that, notwithstanding its dominant position, the Ussr 
never fully relied on its eastern allies in military terms; the sovietization of their 
respective armed forces in the sense of subjugation to common command was 
partly a by-product of the Warsaw Pact.40 In this way, sovietization efforts were 
largely left to the local communist authorities and experts, who had to find a way 
to implement the measures agreed on at an international level in the given policy 
37 Although the soviet advisors were generally called back to the Ussr by 1957, they were also sent abroad 
on direct request later on. for instance, when Czechoslovak railways faced a capacity crisis in the early 
1960s, the authorities asked for more soviet advisors. According to Minister of Transport Bruno Kohler, 
“comrade Osincev, advisor at the Ministry of Transport, can’t manage it all by himself.” New advisors arrived 
and prepared the re-organization of the railways administration, and later cooperated on the Czechoslovak 
transport policy, especially on the preparation of the railway connection to the Ussr and construction of 
the wide-gauge (russian) railway to Košice steel works. Board Meeting of the CzCP Central Committee 
(NAČr, KsČ-ÚV-02/1, sv. 6, aj. 5-14, January 22, 1963).
38 On the so-called Zhdanov doctrine, which defined post-war Europe as basically consisting of two an-
tagonistic “camps,” see Zhdanov’s speech at the first meeting of Cominform in 1947. Andrej Aleksandrovič 
Ždanov, O mezinárodní situaci: referát na informační poradě představitelů několika komunistických stran, 
konané v Polsku koncem září 1947 (Prague: redakce světových rozhledů, 1947). for details on Khrushchev’s 
vision of the “socialist Commonwealth,” see the respective chapter in his edited memoirs: Nikita sergeevich 
Khrushchev and sergei Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3 (University Park, PA: Pennsyl-
vania state University, 2004), 386-397. In accordance with general soviet policy, Czechoslovak delegates at 
the UNECE ICT referred to the other socialist countries as ZsT (země zocialistického tábora – countries of 
the socialist camp; sometimes abbreviated as “socialist camp” or “peace camp”) or LD (lidové demokracie 
– people’s democracies) till 1956-1957. After Khrushchev’s critical speech at the twentieth CPsU congress, 
Czechoslovak transport experts adopted the new doctrine and referred to their bloc partners as socialist 
system countries (státy socialistické soustavy) or simply “socialist states.” Even then, however, abbreviations 
like ZsT appeared from time to time (AMZV, archival groups of the Department International organization 
1945-1975).
39 Valentina fava, “Between American fordism and ‘soviet fordism’: Czechoslovak Way Towards Mass 
Production,” in The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period, ed. Balázs Apor, 
Péter Apor, and E.A. rees (Washington, DC: New Academia Pub., 2008), 47-64.
40 Matthias Uhl, “sovietization and Missile-ization of the Warsaw Pact, 1958-1965,” in The Sovietization of 
Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period, ed. Balázs Apor, Péter Apor, and E.A. rees (Wash-
ington, DC: New Academia Pub., 2008), 65-76.
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sector. In return, such localized sovietization affected negotiations on an interna-
tional level. 
The soviet system of rule combined hard and soft controls, even before its ex-
pansion into Eastern Europe.41 Together with previously mentioned factors, this 
creates a somewhat “entangled whole” picture of sovietization. The multiple forces 
operating on various geographical and societal hierarchical levels shaped the final 
results. structural factors interacted with decisions made by individuals and were 
influenced by older traditions or technological dependencies. 
however, as the available literature suggests, and as sources confirm, stalin’s 
death marked a significant shift in the general modus operandi of sovietization. 
During the rather fierce imposition of pro-soviet regimes, accompanied by un-
conditional acceptance of soviet leadership, the new communist elite came into 
power in all East European countries. The year 1953 marked another turning point 
in this respect, this time in favor of the soft controls of the de-stalinization period. 
The already sovietized elite secured future loyalty to the Kremlin by integrating 
nations deeply in the soviet system using cultural attractions, ideology, and in-
ternational institutions. The best example was the growing activity of the bloc’s 
international organizations, in a way supplanting direct soviet control. An illustra-
tive case was the revival of the Danube Commission. sovietized in 1948 already, 
it only became fully operational in 1955 after the Bratislava Agreements finally 
regulated the conditions for international navigation on the river. similarly, only 
in 1955 did all East European countries (except the GDr) finally join the United 
Nations. furthermore, Comecon had entered a period of multilateral economic 
coordination a year earlier, when its secretariat was established to slowly take over 
the administrative agenda of the council from soviet state institutions.42 Last but 
not least, the Warsaw Treaty, signed in 1955, also based the bloc’s military coop-
eration on an international foundation. The rapidly developing transnational or-
ganizational structure of the bloc signified a new form of sovietization. however, 
as in the case of Comecon, it took a few more years before these bodies became 
fully independent in their areas of expertise and replaced the soviet planning of-
fice (GOsPLAN) as main coordinating body. furthermore, although Comecon 
membership was limited to individual European communist countries, it also 
41 for the interwar period, see the description of soft and hard-line tools employed in the Ussr’s ethnic 
policy explicitly analyzed in: Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the 
Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 21-22. Postwar developments are 
similarly described in standard histories of the Cold War and Eastern Bloc such as Jeffries and Bideleux or 
Pearson, as well as in the analysis of the bloc integration, which always stresses the military dominance of 
the Ussr, for example in the standard text by Brzezinski. 
42 Michael Charles Kaser, Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies (London; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), 65.
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cooperated with various international organizations outside the bloc.43
Thus the process of sovietization can be divided into several periods: the po-
litical sovietization of 1944-1948; stalin’s hard sovietization of 1948-1953, dur-
ing which the reality of the Iron Curtain was finally drawn; and a softer vari-
ant based on international cooperation when the direct influence of the soviet 
Union was substituted by international cooperation, more precisely in the form 
of the Khrushchev doctrine of “two systems.” In the wake of de-stalinization, 
Khrushchev rearticulated the Cold War conflict in peaceful terms as a contest be-
tween socialism and capitalism. In order to fully exploit the perceived comparative 
advantage of the socialist system – namely, the lack of irrational market competi-
tion – Khrushchev strived to employ economic planning on an international scale 
through Comecon.
The origins and functioning of Comecon in the context of sovietization remain 
largely mysterious. The literature on the topic is divided into two streams. The 
first describes Comecon as a deliberate attempt to bind socialist countries by eco-
nomic links under the rule of the Ussr (a tool of soviet hegemony, and political 
incentive). The other views its establishment as a natural reaction to the closure of 
Western markets and the subsequent urgent need to coordinate flows of interna-
tional trade within the bloc; this was later revived and upgraded in reaction to the 
integration processes in the West and the rome Treaties (economic incentive).44 
The combination of these approaches seems to create a third option, in which 
Comecon constitutes a platform for discussing sovietization, created and led by 
the soviets in response to calls from local “self-sovietizing” politicians and experts. 
They not only required economic cooperation after the loss of Western markets 
and products, but also an exchange of opinions in order to reduce uncertainties 
concerning sovietization.45 
Nonetheless, the decisions made by the respective bodies of Comecon un-
doubtedly contributed to the process and affected the shaping of the region; in 
43 similarly, after World War II, Czechoslovak representatives only started attending conferences organized 
by the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC) in 1957 – no East European 
delegates attended the 1947 and 1953 congresses. see reports on the proceedings of these 17th-19th Con-
gresses (1947-1957).
44 such a distinction is clearly demonstrated in available descriptions of the very first days of the organiza-
tion: Comecon was established in January 1949, allegedly as a response (or substitute) to the Marshall Plan 
and OEEC; it was either imposed or extorted by East European countries. Discussed in: robert Bideleux, 
“The Comecon Experiment,” in European Integration and Disintegration: East and West, ed. robert Bideleux 
and richard Taylor (London; New York: routledge, 1996), 174-204, here 175-176.
45 Kaplan’s account of the process whereby GOsPLAN and Comecon substituted the direct presence of 
soviet advisors in the late 1950s seems to support such an interpretation. Local sovietizers were not happy 
with the soviet decision to withdraw advisors, which they saw as possibly endangering the “proper” devel-
opment of their country. Kaplan, Sovětští poradci, 95-97.
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other words, they contributed to the convergence of local sovietization processes. 
As Valentina fava argued in her analysis of the automobile industry in the 1950s, 
decision-making at Comecon level was hampered by nationalistic tensions, com-
bined with soviet hegemonic ambitions. This situation could be seen as a re-ne-
gotiation of nationally specific methods of sovietization, with the authoritative 
visions of the Ussr, which were represented not only by regular delegates, but also 
by special advisors, whose position within Comecon was extremely influential, at 
least in the 1950s.46 
A simple analysis of the titles (let alone the content) in the major periodical for 
Czechoslovak water engineering Vodní Hospodářství, illustrates the first phase of 
the sovietization process.47 It is immediately apparent that the impact of stalinism 
was extremely strong – almost one-quarter of the ninety full-length articles pub-
lished in 1952 can be labeled “sovietized;” that is, they either introduce methods 
developed in the Ussr or directly discuss the soviet model (ten articles in 1951, 
twenty-one in 1952, and only two in 1953). This period ended when stalin died 
(followed by the first Czechoslovak Communist President, Klement Gottwald, 
who died only a week later). The following year formed a kind of break; perhaps 
because after the hard stalinist period, there was a huge backlog of articles for 
publication that did not deal with the Ussr. 
Projecting a Soviet Canal
In the first years after World War II, the idea of the Canal gained wide public and 
political support. The revival of the pre-war image of the Danube-Oder-Elbe con-
nection as a national display of technology made it almost impossible to openly 
oppose the idea; at least that is what the idea’s opponents complained of later.48 
DOECs led the camp of canal supporters, although many initiatives such as those 
promoted by the Baťa company were organized without its direct participation. 
DOECs, established in 1937 by industrialists from the Ostrava coal basin, sur-
vived the war and maintained a relatively stable membership; only the names of 
companies changed, having been “Nazified” during the war. from the late 1940s 
onwards, all large industries were renamed after a soviet or Communist hero or a 
46 for a discussion of the role of soviet advisors within Comecon, see: ibid., 44-49.
47 Established in 1951 and based on the authors, tradition, and readers of the DOECs Journal Plavební 
Cesty DOL.
48 fuxa’s report on DOE, discussed at the third meeting of the extra-official committee. A copy of fuxa’s 
1949 report in: Zápisy ze schůzí mimoúřední stranické komise pro vypracování zprávy o D-O průplavu – 
Záznam o třetí schůzi (MZA, h42, b. 280, November 30, 1930), annex.
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famous red Army battlefield. The number of institutional DOECs members grew 
to over 50 in 1941. After the Communist coup of 1948, four ministries joined 
the society: the Ministries of finance, Industry, Domestic Trade, and Agriculture, 
which showed the communist regime’s strong interest in the canal.
shortly after the Communist takeover in february 1948, DOECs attempted 
to blend in with the new regime. The organization proposed transforming itself 
into part of the envisioned “national company,” assigned with developing the ca-
nal project. such an attempt reflected the wave of “nationalization” of strategic 
industry after World War II. Under the new circumstances, whereby most of the 
biggest members and investors had become state-owned, the society’s leaders saw 
a national company, established by a special act, as being best suited to coordinate 
the preparatory works, fundraising, and overall management of the DOE pro-
ject. The most striking feature of the proposal was its emphasis on the “national” 
management of the water route. In sharp contrast to its own recommendation of 
April 1946 (Memorandum), DOECs suggested avoiding international financing 
or loan arrangements.49 Overall, after World War II, the “national” aspect of the 
canal again took precedence over the “European” or “international” dimension in 
its Czechoslovak promoters’ rhetoric.
however, even sacred national interests were already under noticeable pres-
sure of sovietization, at least in terms of their articulation. Clearly influenced by 
young soviet volunteers on the Byelomor canal construction , the Youth commit-
tee of the bottle factories in Ústí nad Labem in 1947 passed the following resolu-
tion: “The Czechoslovak Youth do not want to lag behind and therefore suggest 
entrusting our youth with the construction of the long planned Elbe-Oder and 
Danube-Oder canals.”50 here the sovietization of methods did not affect the ideas; 
above all, young workers saw the importance of the canal in its capacity to place 
Czechoslovakia at a “European crossroad.” 51
The inherent international aspect of the canal project resurfaced after 
Czechoslovak efforts to re-draw national borders failed. While cooperation with 
Austria was not necessary, because there was an opportunity to build the lateral ca-
nal to the Danube on the left (Czechoslovak) bank of the Morava, the situation on 
49 Proposal to establish National Enterprise DOE, dated April 1948. Návrh na zřízení “Národního podniku 
DOL” (NAČr, MD I., b. 814).
50 “Urychlit přípravné práce pro stavbu dunajsko-oderského průplavu,” Rudé právo moravskoslezské, 6 feb-
ruary 1947.
51 The soviet model was later applied in the form of the so-called “stavby Mládeže” (Youth Constructions). 
Byelomor canal volunteers were known in Czechoslovakia from the propagandistic soviet journal SSSR 
na Stroike. Jan Lomíček, “Časopis “sssr na strojke“ jako pramen ke studiu témat sovětské meziválečné 
propagandy,” Člověk, no. 13 (2008), http://clovek.ff.cuni.cz/pdf/lomicek_studie_13.pdf. 13-19. Accessed 16 
July 2009. 
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the Upper Oder was different. In March 1947, Czechoslovakia and Poland signed 
an Agreement on Friendship and Mutual Help, mediated by the soviet Union.52 
The Ussr advanced the agreement as a key to stabilizing relations between the 
two states, which had been problematic since World War I due to the unclear and 
often disputed delimitation of borders. Under this agreement, a body for transport 
study was established in the summer of 1947.53 The construction of the DOE ca-
nal received prominent attention and a special subcommittee for its construction 
(study Committee for Preparation of the DOE) soon began work.54 Although this 
expert committee and its working groups met 18 times between March 1948 and 
April 1950, the Czechoslovak authorities viewed its activity with suspicion from 
the very start – especially due to its enforced formation as a part of the Polish-
Czechoslovak reconciliation.
A member of the Czechoslovak-Polish committee, Josef fuxa, had been a 
prominent critic of the canal project. As clerk at the inter-war Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, fuxa joined DOECs in 1938. After the War, when he became head 
of the Transport Department of the national economic planning institute (the 
Economic Council), he entered the debate on the DOE. In his new capacity, fuxa 
organized and chaired the National Evaluation Committee on the Danube-Oder-
Elbe Canal.55 he launched a survey among industrial groups and business cham-
bers on the potential cost-effectiveness of the canal in the new circumstances of 
postwar Europe. Eventually, a group of experts was invited to take part in evalu-
ating the procedures. On June 14, 1948 delegates of several ministries, shipping 
companies, the Masaryk Academy of Labor, and of course DOECs, attended the 
final evaluation meeting, hosted by fuxa. however, the most important outcome 
was a report, prepared by fuxa alone, for the Communist Party. Although writ-
ten for the purposes of the new establishment, the text was surprisingly devoid 
of standard ideological ballast. Openly articulated as a defense of railways as the 
most important means of transport from the national point of view, fuxa’s report 
presented a negative standpoint towards the construction of the canal.56 his key 
52 Karel Kaplan, Československo v poválečné Evropě (Prague: Karolinum, 2004), 91-95.
53 Čs.-polská dopravní komise (NAČr, MD I. 1945-1953, Prague; b. 53-54).
54 Čs.-polský studijní komitét pro věci vodní cesty Odra – Dunaj (NAČr, MD I.; b. 808, 814); Ibid. (MZA, 
h42, b. 186).
55 Governmental institute established by presidential decree in 1945 to coordinate economic development 
and prepare a national economic plan. 
56 In the contemporary situation, a railway line parallel to the trajectory of the planned canal still had free 
capacity. Given the state of the Austrian economy under postwar reconstruction, it is hardly surprising 
(and definitely a strange thing to be omitted from the text) that such a situation would most probably have 
changed in the future. A copy of fuxa’s 1949 report in: Zápisy ze schůzí mimoúřední stranické komise pro 
vypracování zprávy o D-O průplavu – Záznam o třetí schůzi (MZA, h42, b. 280, November 30, 1930), an-
nex, 30.
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objections could be summed up under the heading of “economic nationalism.”57
The evaluation meeting took place a few months after the Czechoslovak com-
munist coup d’etat. Under the new conditions, fuxa’s report was soon seen as out-
dated in both its premises and methods; as a Communist Party member named 
Šťastný, who oversaw the re-evaluation of the project, noted, on the road to com-
munism and in the heated up Cold War, “political reasons cannot be numbered 
in crowns.” he continued, “It is necessary to take into account the international 
importance of the canal and the development of the economy and transportation 
in neighboring peoples’ democracies… Our economy turns more and more east-
wards. And as for the construction costs, we should also consider the employment 
of brigády mládeže (youth construction groups).”58
The image of the canal was significantly altered along with the symbolic sig-
nificance assigned to its construction. The basic claim remained unchanged; that 
is, that the canal was not only a matter of economic viability, but also one of na-
tional pride and cultural maturity of the nation. however, instead of paying a debt 
to Europe, the task was now to promote the sovietization of the nation and its 
territory.59 Besides economic and political criteria, ideological qualities also be-
came important when assessing the viability of the project. The canal had to fit 
the soviet Modernization model, or at least the perceived image of it held by the 
Czechoslovak Communist decision makers. 
In an introduction to a popular article on the DOE published in Technická 
Práca, Dr. Tille (a leading member of DOECs and, in this capacity, a member of 
the Extra-Official Party Committee) articulated the idea of the canal as a possible 
57 Basically, fuxa presented the canal as a potential threat to the national economy. Most of his objections 
concerned the economic viability of the project from the perspective of the command economy. firstly, con-
struction costs should be based on individual states’ interests and profits; according to fuxa, Poland should 
get more than fifty percent of the profits and therefore pay for construction. secondly, construction would 
negatively affect the viability of nationalized railways (current freight on the line along the planned canal 
route was significantly lower than the projected capacity of the canal). Thirdly, construction works would 
draw human forces, financial capital, and construction material away from the national economy, which 
needed to employ them in other places and projects. Ibid.
58 Záznam ze třetí schůze mimoúřední stranické komise pro vypracování zprávy o Dunajsko-oderském 
průplavu (MZA, h42, b. 280, November 30, 1950), 3.
59 A significant amount of the materials produced by DOECs in the 1950s reflected this re-articulation 
of the meaning of the canal. Its monthly bulletin (1954-1959) was filled with material on the Ussr and its 
waterway building scheme. Moravian Land Archive (MZA, h42, b. 288, Zprávy společnosti D-O průplavu). 
The first lines of a speech by Jan Šeba, Czechoslovak consul general in hamburg, at the Waterway Confer-
ence on March 7, 1923 in Brno illustrated the former, European image of the canal: “Due to our geographical 
location, we owe the construction of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal to Europe. The fact that we will build it 
only confirms the prestige of our country and will prove our maturity, about which we like to boast, but have 
not proven by any impressive feat so far …”; Quoted from the speech proposal approved by the Ministry of 
foreign Affairs. Archives of the Ministry of foreign Affairs (AMZV): “Projev generálního konzula Jana Šeby 
na schůzi Moravského říčního a průplavního spolku” (AMZV, IV, b. 169).
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tool of sovietization. In Tille’s view, the large-scale hydraulic technologies of com-
munism, which promised to change the entire region into an image of a soviet 
utopia, were characterized by three dominant aspects. firstly, the technologies 
constituted an extension of the electrification plan, and therefore marked an im-
portant step on the path to industrialization. secondly, they formed a vital part of 
a plan to transform the natural environment by solving the problem of irrigation 
as well as producing electricity. The third aspect was the transport function, spe-
cifically the connection to the world by the river and sea ports. In Tille’s opinion, 
these constructions would make an immense contribution to the material base of 
communism and, from this angle, the DOE should be seen as a future great struc-
ture of socialism.60 Corresponding with the sovietization of the “meaning” of the 
canal, the same thing was happening to its promised outcomes, although not only 
on purely rhetorical grounds. The European Crossroads and the Canal of the Three 
Seas were suddenly transformed into the Gate to the USSR (via the Danube).61
60 Jan Tille, “funkce dunajsko-oderského průplavu v systému evropských vodních cest,” Technická práca 5, 
no. 10 (1953): 624-628, here 624.
61 Kliment Velkoborský, manuscript Central European Waterways and the possibility of the transport rela-
tions with the USSR. Vodní cesty střední Evropy ve vztahu k možnostem dopravních styků se sssr a lidově 
demokratickými státy; around 1950 (MZA, h42, b. 282).
Figure 4.2 – Screenshot from the movie Přístav v srdci Evropy [The Port in the Heart of Europe], 
presenting an optimistic image of future cooperation among European nations, in which the canal 
would play a central role. The arrows represent the flows of goods. The DOE and adjacent water-
way network promised a smooth circulation of goods and new markets for Czechoslovak produc-
ers. Source: Elmar Klos, Přístav v srdci Evropy, 1946.
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The claim of sovietness might appear to be little more than a feeble attempt to 
argue in favor of the DOE, in the hope of gaining wider support, and to make the 
idea of the DOE more attractive and appealing for the ruling Communist regime. 
In the overall context of stalinism, however, the entire situation can be seen in a dif-
ferent light. Czechoslovak society, and especially Czechoslovak Communist lead-
ers, expected the Ussr to lead them gradually on the way to socialism; they were 
surprised that, in many respects, the road plan for sovietization was not available. 
such uncertainty, combined with an atmosphere in which virtually anybody could 
be arrested and even executed for treason or sabotage of the socialist order, gave 
reasonable force to the argument for “proper soviet” technology.62 Where there 
was no direct instruction from Moscow or no soviet advisor available, the real 
“soviet” point of view had to be negotiated locally.63 Given the soviet regime’s well-
known fascination with large water technologies such as Dneprostroi or the Volga-
Don canal,64 the efforts of the DOECs to present the DOE as its Czechoslovak 
counterpart seemed relatively promising. furthermore, Czechoslovak engineers 
were far from immune to the promises of soviet technology. As early as the 1930s, 
articles in the trade press written by such prominent engineers as Jan Bažant and 
Antonín smrček, celebrated soviet achievements in the field, along with those of 
the Germans and Americans.65
however, the response of the state authorities was not in favor of such interpre-
tation. The first document on the canal, the above-mentioned 1949 fuxa report, 
provided full information for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (CC CzCP). It included marginal but explicit refutation of the 
canal’s putative “soviet quality.”66 In 1952, in an evaluation of the findings of the 
62 In the Czechoslovak case, this includes such prominent figures as the general secretary of the Communist 
Party (1946-1951) rudolf stránský, who was arrested in 1951 and executed in 1952. Karel Kaplan, Report on 
the Murder of the General Secretary (Columbus: Ohio state University Press, 1990).
63 There are well documented cases from the first half of the 1950s showing how soviet advisors (sovetnik) 
were originally assigned to help the head of an institution make important decisions. In some cases, the ad-
visor took over the office – even at relatively high hierarchical level. for instance, Kaplan quoted Minister of 
Defense Karol Bacílek who admitted that he simply “trusted the soviet advisors and did not scrutinize their 
advice and recommendations at all.” Kaplan, Sovětští poradci, 9.
64 Paul r. Josephson, “‘Projects of the Century’ in soviet history: Large-scale Technologies from Lenin to 
Gorbachev,” Technology and Culture 36, no. 3 (1995): 519-559, here 534-536.
65 In the 1930s Jan Bažant regularly published short reports on soviet hydraulic structures in the Czecho-
slovak engineering journal Technický obzor and after the war he summed up his writings on Dneprostroi 
and russian waterways for the new water management journal: Jan Bažant, “Vodní stavby v sssr,” Vodní 
Hospodářství 1, no. 1 (1951): 8-11. Jan Bažant (1881-??), professor of water construction at the Brno Techni-
cal University, author of the first water management plan for Moravia (1940) and of several variants of the 
DO (E); a disciple of professor smrček. stanislav Kratochvíl, stanislav Kratochvíl, “Prof. inž. Jan Bažant 
osmdesátníkem,” Vodní Hospodářství 11, no. 10 (1961): 484.
66 As, for example, in the report prepared by Josef fuxa, head of the transport department of the Economic 
Council (hospodářská rada, a governmental central economic planning board, 1945-1948); A copy of fuxa’s 
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Extra-Official Committee, the Ministry of state Control, stressed that it was im-
possible to compare the potential effect of the DOE on the Czechoslovak economy 
with the role of soviet canals in the Ussr. The ministry’s reasoning was that “their 
usefulness lies not only in transport, but above all in their capacity to provide wa-
ter for irrigation and subsequent fertilization of large areas of steppe and also in 
the utilization of hydro power.”67 
The crucial site for negotiating the “sovietness” of the canal was the special 
“Extra-Official Party Committee,” set up in the autumn of 1950 by representatives 
of several ministries to re-examine the original fuxa report.68 The situation since 
1948-1949 had changed profoundly in that a constellation of international rela-
tions and the main directions of international trade were being rapidly reoriented 
in an Easterly direction. Under the new circumstances, the Communist Party ex-
erted a newly-acquired interest in the canal issue. furthermore, a clear and final 
decision on the project was required in order to prepare the first National General 
Water Management Plan, issued in 1953. some voices even argued that the non-
existence of the final word on the canal blocked the socialist industrialization of 
Moravia (that is, sovietization of its production capacity for constructing heavy 
industry).69 
On October 26, 1952, the Czechoslovak Government passed resolution no. 
206 on the Danube-Oder canal. The resolution again put a halt to the project, 
which had previously been heralded as an “iconic national enterprise.”70 While the 
first governmental program of 1945, the Two-Year plan of 1946, and even the first 
five-Year plan of 1949 included indistinct remarks on the future realization of the 
canal, by 1952 the Communist Government had set its main concerns differently 
and the project was abandoned.71 
The resolution formed an integral part of the general sovietization of 
Czechoslovak economic planning.72 During 1951, a significant change occurred in 
1949 report in: Zápisy ze schůzí mimoúřední stranické komise pro vypracování zprávy o D-O průplavu – 
Záznam o třetí schůzi (MZA, h42, b. 280, November 30, 1930), annex.
67 statement by the Ministry of state Control regarding the report on the state of the preparatory works 
for the D-O canal, prepared for the government by the Ministry of Construction (NAČr, ÚPV-B, b. 1363, 
June 17, 1952), 3-4.
68 A typical example of the emerging party state, in which the structures of official political administration 
are paralleled by analogous party structures.
69 An opinion expressed by Jan Šťastný during discussions on the canal at the unofficial party committee’s 
second meeting. Zápisy ze schůzí mimoúřední stranické komise pro vypracování zprávy o D-O průplavu – 
Záznam ze druhé schůze (MZA, h42, b. 280, November 16, 1950).
70 Ironically, they did this on the 34th anniversary of Czechoslovak independence.
71 Ministry of Building Industry: Danube-Oder Canal. Draft report for the government on the state 
of study, research and design work (NAČr, ÚPV-B, b. 1363, september 5, 1952), 1.
72 An important factor was the general militarization of the Eastern bloc economies driven by stalin and 
soviet advisors. In the Czechoslovak case, the “soviet model” of industrialization consumed 28 percent of 
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the government’s economic policy, which definitively abandoned the promised 
national path to communism. Instead, the government uncritically adopted the 
soviet modernization model, based on the introduction of heavy industry. This 
started the “industrialization of an already industrialized country.”73 Accordingly, 
the standpoint of the state Planning Office (sPK – the Czechoslovak version of 
GOsPLAN) on the canal, which was crucial for the Government’s decision, pri-
oritized investments more in accordance with such demands.74 In addition, the 
first five-Year plan of 1948-1953 (already approved) had other priorities regarding 
infrastructure investments, most notably the electrification of railways, the con-
struction of a second east-west transnational railway magistrála (Plzeň-havlíčkův 
Brod-Brno and Zvolen-Košice), and the reconstruction of the road network. 
Concerning water management, the main share of investments was directed into 
electrification; this complied with Lenin’s famous definition of communism as the 
“sum of electrification and soviet power.” 
Despite the fact that the canal promoters eventually lost their battle with the 
first sovietizing wave, the war was not over. An instruction accompanying the reso-
lution ordered the institutions involved in the project to store all relevant technical 
materials completed by that time in one place for possible future use.75 Therefore, 
the decision to stop the canal project, and thus reject more than half a century 
of detailed planning as incorrect and unsuitable under the new circumstances, 
was not an unambiguous and definitive statement. Indeed, it would have been an 
immense waste of resources given the existence of an updated canal design pro-
duced by a group of experts of the international Polish-Czechoslovak Committee 
on Transport (1948-1950).76 At the first meeting of DOECs after the negative gov-
ernmental decision, the secretary noted: “by accomplishing the Volga-Don canal, 
new evidence was produced that all the ideas connected with canal construction 
in our country are not fictitious. It will be up to us to learn our lessons properly. 
… Although pressing investments in certain industrial sectors required temporary 
GDP in 1952, which led to a financial crisis and the currency reform of 1953. Zdeněk Jirásek, “Čtyři roviny 
měnové reformy 1953,” in Fenomén Stalin: náhoda, nebo nevyhnutelnost? Padesát let od měnové reformy, ed. 
Marek Loužek (Prague: Centrum pro ekonomiku a politiku, 2003), 107-111.
73 Karel Půlpán, Nástin českých a československých hospodářských dějin do roku 1990. 1. díl (Prague: Karoli-
num, 1993), see the Introduction.
74 The decision to prefer industry to infrastructure investments seems paradoxical, given the general belief 
in the close dependency between the two, usually seen as two sides of the same coin. In this case, inter-
modal competition between railways and waterways had a profound effect on the development of the canal 
negotiations. from the very beginning, railways were the preferred mode of transport within the context of 
sovietization. 
75 Government resolution no. 232/1952. Information on a draft government resolution. Informace k návrhu 
vládního usnesení (NAČr, ÚPV-B, b. 1363, October 25, 1952).
76 Čs.-polská dopravní komise (NAČr, MDI; b. 53-54). Čs.-polský studijní komitét pro věci vodní cesty 
Odra – Dunaj (NAČr, MDI, b. 808, 814).
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postponement of the DOE … it is our duty to continue showing to respective 
authorities and the people … the versatile usefulness of the canal.”77 Indeed, the 
defeat did not halt the canal promoters’ activities; they simply worked harder on 
presenting their dear canal from a soviet perspective: as a source of power and 
electrification, a source of water for industry and irrigation, and also as a water 
source for socialist workers, whose numbers were expected to multiply at unim-
aginable speed.
however, there was more to soviet water politics than a discourse on water. 
The theory was accompanied by daily practice, which strongly affected the insti-
tutional environment surrounding the DOE. The first significant corresponding 
change occurred in the early 1950s and marked the start of almost twenty years of 
constant change in water management governance, during which the half-century-
old national institutional landscape of canal negotiations underwent turbulent 
times. At the start of 1949, the Directorate for Waterways (Ředitelství vodních cest, 
ŘVC) was disbanded and its administrative agenda was distributed among the re-
spective regional authorities.78 The canal department of ŘVC survived for a while 
under the Ministry of Technology, and in 1950, during another reorganization of 
the state administration, its agenda and employees were dispersed among various 
ministries. The most active core, built around the engineer Ladislav Vavrouch, 
who by 1945 had substituted Bartovský, formed the Water-management Office of 
the Ministry of Constructions (VKMsP: Vodohospodářská kancelář Ministerstva 
stavebního průmyslu).79 Private efforts and activities were suppressed and regional 
associations supporting the canal were either disassembled or transformed into 
branches of the only organization acknowledged by the state – DOECs.80 
Administrative bodies dealing with water-related issues, which had been scat-
tered among various ministries, were united under the Central Administration 
of Water Management (Ústřední Správa Vodního Hospodářství, ÚsVh) in 1953. 
The brand new central institution linked three crucial administrative bodies: 
the Water research Institute (VUV), the Water Management Center (Vrs), and 
Water Constructions (hydroprojekt). The latter was actually a sovietized (in title 
77 report Zápis o schůzi ústředního výboru společnosti, dunajsko-oderského průplavu v Praze, konané dne 
10. listopadu 1952 v Olomouci (MZA, h42. b. 279).
78 As of January 29, 1949, the Ministry of Technology disbanded the Directorate for Construction of Water-
ways in Prague without any substitution. Ministerial decree no. 4/66.
79 Ladislav Vavrouch had been active in propagating and designing the canal since the 1930s and a member 
of DOECs throughout its existence. In addition to engineering work, Vavrouch contributed on a regular 
basis to all the major technical journals in Czechoslovakia on canal issues (including the DOECs publishing 
activity in PCDOL, Vh, ZsPDO).
80 Including the oldest DOE-promoting organization, Moravský říční Spolek in Přerov (established in 1904) 
and Spolek pro stavbu Labsko-oderského průplavu v Pardubicích.
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and agenda) successor of the stavoprojekt, an organization created in 1948 as spe-
cialized engineering body for water constructions. It was established by the engi-
neer Čestmír Štoll, who during the 1950s and 1960s became the director of the 
VKMsP, UsVh, and other water-management bodies.81 All across Eastern Europe 
appeared analogous “images” of the original soviet Gidroproekt Institute.82 
While the water-related agenda was centralized, the waterway agenda was 
split among two bodies replacing the former ŘVC. The Central Administration 
of Water Management (ÚsVh) was, logically, the central organ of water manage-
ment investments. As such, it was also responsible for the development and main-
tenance of the navigation infrastructure, while the actual use of the infrastructure 
– waterborne transport – remained with the Ministry of Transport. While this 
could be seen as a rather standard division of competences, in the case of the DOE 
it met with rather fierce criticism from the DOECs.83 This was easily understand-
able: a special governmental Institute for Development of Water Transport (ŘVC) 
that had been active for half a century was not just replaced, but disbanded.84
81 Čestmír Štoll (1908-1983) was a pre-war communist, a graduate of the Czechoslovak Technical Univer-
sity (ČVUT) in Prague (1930), a research assistant at the same institution (1930-1940), an employee and 
from 1945 leading actor in the nationalization of Ústřední elektrárny (a partly state-owned corporation for 
constructing power plants established in 1920). Štoll also cooperated on the articulation of the first five-
Year Pan (1948). In 1948, he established the center that designed large water structures (stavoprojekt), later 
fully sovietized into the Czechoslovak version of hydroprojekt (1952). from 1951, he was director of the 
VKMsP and deputy minister there from 1953, responsible for creating the ÚsVh (government decree of 
November 11, 1953). he then became its chairman until its abolition in 1958. from 1959-1960, Štoll was 
the deputy minister of energy and technology and from 1960 professor at Prague Technical University. j.j., 
“Padesát let Ing. dr. Č. Štolla,” Vodní Hospodářství 6, no. 7 (1961): 190.
82 The institute was established by hydrologist sergei Yakovlevich Zhuk and acted as the central organ 
for complex solutions of hydraulic structures in the Ussr emerging from the soviet electrification plan 
and canal projects in the 1930s. “80th Anniversary of the Birth of Academician sergei Yakovlevich Zhuk,” 
Power Technology and Engineering 6, no. 9 (1972): 893-893, 36-37; Paul r. Josephson, Industrialized Na-
ture: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World (Washington DC: Island Press/
shearwater Books, 2002).
83 see the DOECs perspective on the reorganization of water management published in its bulletin: Ladis-
lav Vavrouch, “Zákon o vodním hospodářství,” Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu 2, no. 11 
(1955): 3-6, here 6; “Diskusní příspěvek sDOP k dopisu UV KsČ,”  Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-oderského 
průplavu 5, no. 2 (1958): 1-2, here 2.
84 however, in a wake of the “new wave” of sovietization and subsequent new economic policy of “decen-
tralization” of state administration (see Průcha, quoted below), the ÚsVh was disbanded in 1958. Its agenda 
was transferred to the new Ministry of Energy and Water Management, within which the Directorate for 
Water Management Works (Ředitelství vodních děl, ŘVD) was created as the central authority over water 
constructions, and municipalities and district administrations gained considerable powers in this respect. 
Even this turn of events soon saw a reverse move. After the Danube flood of 1965, when many levees and 
flood banks kept by local authorities could not sustain the pressure and broke down, the state took over the 
maintenance of the river banks and the central authority was re-established as an independent organ. In ad-
dition to the revived ÚsVh, the Directorate of Water resources (Ředitelství vodních toků, ŘVT) was created, 
organized according to the six main river basins – three of which (the Morava, the Elbe, and the Oder) were 
directly involved in the DOE project). Václav Průcha, “hospodářský vývoj v letech 1945-1992,” in Studie o 
technice v českých zemích 1945-1992, ed. Jaroslav folta (Prague: Encyklopedický dům, 2003), 13-60, here 39.
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The institutional and ideological sovietization of water management affected 
the further development of the DOE. The first state Water Management Plan of 
1953 not only acknowledged the idea of the canal, but specified principles of the 
complex utilization of water resources, and thus the future design of the water-
way.85 Instead of the former fascination with the canal as a connection to seas and 
world markets, socialist engineers saw it as a threat to national water balance (or 
a tool to secure it, depending on the general position on the canal). An important 
factor in the development of the Water Management Plan was the extreme drought 
of 1947, which resulted in a twenty-two percent drop in the harvest. The most fer-
tile lowlands were the worst affected, including the Morava valley. furthermore, 
the Upper Oder Basin, with its industrial areas around Ostrava, suffered from a 
“negative water balance,” because consumption threatened to exceed the available 
supply; the Nazis had already noted this in their development plans for the region.
“social needs” replaced economic profit as a crucial category in calculating the 
cost-effectiveness of the canal. As Kornai famously postulated, needs are always 
higher than planned and not calculated on the basis of demand, but rather on 
the redistribution of available products.86 It was precisely along this line of argu-
85 Václav Plecháč, Vodní hospodářství na území České republiky, jeho vývoj a možné perspektivy (Prague: 
EVAN, 1999), 162. In official English translantions the plan was called the State Aquacultural Plan. “English 
resume,” Vodní Hospodářství 10, no. 5 (1960): 35.
86 János Kornai, Economics of Shortage (stockholm: Institute for International Economic studies, University 
of stockholm, 1979).
Figure 4.3 – Early 1950s representation of the DOE (on the right), was clearly modeled after the famous Soviet 
propaganda image of the Volga-Don Canal. The Soviet image shows how complex utilization of the Volga would 
contribute to the Sovietization of adjacent areas. Rectangular irrigation systems, hydro-power plants, and rivers as 
a transport routes would turn a backward and peripheral area into a modern part of the USSR and leading indus-
trial region. By mimicking the visual representation, the DOE is presented as a parallel to the Grand Soviet scheme. 
Source: Jindřich Kumpošt, “Dunajsko-oderský průplav z hlediska brněnského kraje,” in Dunajsko-Oderský průplav 
edited by Společnost dunajsko-oderského průplavu (Prague: SNTL, 1953), 64. The Soviet image is from a reprint in 
the Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu, vol. 2, no. 4.
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mentation that the authors of the sVP argued it would be necessary “to make al-
lowances for a 162 percent increase in drinking water requirements; of industrial 
water by more than 50 percent; of irrigation water by 32.1 percent; attending to the 
harmless drainage of waste water increased by 72 percent”; and they were happy 
to conclude that it was possible “to amplify the utilization of hydropower by 495 
percent.”87 
The geographical allocation of sources of hydropower also acted against the 
canal project. Czechoslovakia consisted of four historic lands, which geographi-
cally corresponded approximately to the five main watersheds. While the Elbe 
river basin (Bohemia) accounted for 36 percent of the hydropower potential of 
the whole country, and the hilly landscapes of slovakia in the basins of the Danube 
and Vistula for 54 percent, the Moravian and silesian flatlands, drained by the 
Morava and the Oder, respectively, comprised a mere 10 percent.88 Given the fact 
that the five-Year plans were calculated on a sectoral basis, any investments in the 
hydropower utilization of the Morava or Oder were deemed virtually impossi-
ble. The Vltava Cascade and hydro-energy utilization of the Váh in slovakia, both 
built between 1951 and 1966, depleted the financial resources allocated to water 
management. By the end of the second five-Year plan in 1960, the capacity of the 
hydraulic power plants had risen by 420 percent compared to 1945.89
Indeed, the planned “economic” and “balanced” water management, which 
the sVP had promised and delivered, was quickly replaced by a preference for 
hydropower structures.90 Large-scale water structures (hydropower and dams) 
consumed more than half of the sector’s budget within these ten years; the wa-
ter supply network received considerable attention as well, but river regulations 
and amelioration almost disappeared from the agenda.91 The continuity of the ca-
nal idea, in the rapidly changing institutional environment, was secured by the 
87 Jan rosík, “státní vodohospodářský plán a zásady pro další plánovité řízení vodního hospodářství,” Vodní 
Hospodářství 4, no. 4 (1954): 99-103. Jan rosík was a former employee of ŘVC.
88 E. Polák was a hydropower specialist at the Ministry of Energy (in 1960). Emil Polák, “hydroenergetika,” 
Vodní Hospodářství 10, no. 5 (1960): 186-189, here 187.
89 Ibid., 189.
90 The plan had four main targets: (1) mapping of all possible water resources; (2) securing conditions for 
efficient and economical water management; (3) determining measures necessary to accomplish targets 1 
and 2; and (4) reaching maximal efficiency in construction and implementation of suggested measures. Jan 
Košler, “Význam státního vodohospodářského plánu pro vodní hospodářství,” Vodní Hospodářství 10, no. 5 
(1960): 223-225, here 223.
91 The government’s share of spending on water management in 1945-1960 was as follows: hydropower 
(37.6 percent), other dams (12.6 percent), water supply network (21.3 percent), sewer system (12.4 percent), 
river regulations (9.5 percent), amelioration (2.3 percent), other investments (4.3 percent). Based on the 
report of fifteen years of Czechoslovak water management published by the Deputy Minister of Energy and 
Water Management, J. Málek, “15 let našeho vodního hospodářství,” Vodní Hospodářství 10, no. 5 (1960): 
177-183, here 179.
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DOECs. Although much more modest in its goals and appearance, the society 
managed to keep the canal idea alive and circulating, through occasional publica-
tions in popular journals and newspapers, and by keeping the interested com-
munity of hydraulic engineers, municipal authorities, and industrial enterprises 
informed and active. An important part of this effort was the revival in 1954 of 
its own journal in the form of mimeographed copies. The bimonthly publication 
provided interesting information on just about anything connected to the canal 
issue. for instance, it regularly informed readers about both domestic and foreign 
publications (books, journals, newspapers) that related to the DOE canal topic in 
some way.92
The other uninterrupted line was the activity of former ŘVC employees and 
individuals with a person interest in the project, most notably hydraulic engi-
neers. While smrček, Bartovský, and Zimmler had left the scene, their younger 
colleagues, some of whom had been involved in the project since the early 1920s, 
worked elsewhere within the water management governance system and had ac-
cess to materials assembled for potential future use according to the governmental 
resolution of 1952.93 The most prolific among this new generation was Kliment 
Velkoborský, a former ŘVC employee and life-long active DOECs member who 
led the Waterway Department at the Ministry of Transport.94 Velkoborský led 
the negotiations on the canal in 1957-1958 in Poland and Germany on behalf 
of Czechoslovakia and also informed DOECs members about the latest devel-
opments by publishing articles in the bulletin.95 Equally important was Ladislav 
Vavrouch at the Ministry of Construction. Other engineers found new positions 
at the Transport research Institute and the Academy of sciences.
The exclusion of the public from decision-making processes usually tops the 
list of “trademarks” of the soviet model. Only a relatively closed group of selected 
experts could join the debates and gained access to relevant data, because the state 
had a monopoly on information and international relations. Therefore, private ini-
tiatives, although led by the very same experts and supported by state firms and 
local state administrations, were not able to pursue their goals efficiently, and had 
problems accessing information. finding itself in such a situation, and facing the 
92 from both sides of the Iron Curtain (see Chapter 4), and only very rarely from outside Europe. 
93 Antonín smrček passed away in 1951, followed by Bartovský in 1955.
94 After his graduation, Velkoborský worked at the Czechoslovak Navigation Office (Československý 
plavební úřad) until 1942, when he was transferred to Prague ŘVC. from 1949, he led the Inland Naviga-
tion Department at the Ministry of Transport. J.M. Jiroušek, “Za inž. Klimentem Velkoborským,” Vodní 
Hospodářství 11, no. 10 (1961): 456.
95 for instance, he published the official report from these meetings with only minor changes – Kliment 
Velkoborský, “Informace o námětu spojení Dunaje s Odrou, Vislou a průplavy NDr,” Zprávy Společnosti 
dunajsko-oderského průplavu 6, no. 4-5 (1958): 1-10, (MZA, h42, b. 288). 
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threat of forced termination because of the illegality of private societies, DOECs 
“voluntarily” disbanded itself in 1959.96 At a meeting of the Central Committee 
of DOECs in 1957, delegates debated the possibility of merging with one of the 
sector’s scientific-Technical societies (vědecko-technické společnosti; VTs).97 The 
heated discussion between proponents of water management issues and the trans-
port sector reached a stalemate, which resulted in unsuccessful negotiations with 
VTs for Water Management in Ostrava. hence DOECs remained, strictly speak-
ing, an illegal society, and as such, fell easy victim to the final sovietization of public 
space, which was ironic after it had survived the period of stalinist sovietization.
An important aspect of this decision was Comecon, which had started to show 
interest in the DOE at that time. such developments reassured members of the 
society that the case was not altogether lost.98 The disbanding of DOECs marked 
the final act of the gradual sovietization of the canal project’s institutional back-
ground. 
Sovietization “Beyond the State” 
While domestic sovietization almost killed the canal project, sovietization at 
transnational level helped it survive. The impact of sovietization, together with 
generational change, weakened the “institutional memory,” which until then had 
helped maintain the idea of the canal. The 1952 governmental resolution post-
poning the canal project, together with the wide-sweeping institutional and soci-
etal transformation of the early 1950s, resulted in de-mobilization of the political 
and social capital gathered during the previous fifty years’ support of the DOE. 
however, when sovietization took the form of infrastructural integration of the 
bloc, it also worked in favor of the canal. The Czechoslovak government based its 
decision to stop the project on the DOE reports, developed from the perspective 
96 This was despite the fact that they had the option to join the Czechoslovak scientific-Technological so-
ciety (ČsVTs), a professional association of Czechoslovak engineers. however, negotiations failed. Zápis o 
schůzi společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu, konané dne 9. července 1957 v Praze (MZA, h42, b. 288). 
97 The soviet model of trade organizations was based on a sector principle (as opposed to “capitalist” en-
gineering societies based on the status of engineers), established in Czechoslovakia in 1955 by the Govern-
ment resolution 594 of March 16. Instead of the former Association of Engineers and Architects (Spolek 
inženýrů a architektů (sIA), 1866-1951), the new communist associations were open to anyone active in a 
given technical field and willing to cooperate in its development. Minutes of the DOECs central committee 
meeting held in Přerov on March 8, 1957. Zápis o schůzi ústředního výboru společnosti dunajsko-oder-
ského průplavu konané dne 8. Března 1957 v Přerově; private archive of Jaroslav Kubec.
98 Letter from DOECs central committee to all members on the disbandment of the society, circulated 
as the final issue of the company’s bulletin. “Oznámení členům společnosti,” Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-
oderského průplavu 6, no. 10 (1959): 1-2, (MZA, h42, b. 288).
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of the national economy. however, the authors of these reports often explicitly 
stated that their evaluation of the canal would have been different once the project 
became in the “common interest of people democracies.”99 
The revival and re-organization of Comecon soon fulfilled this condition. The 
bulk of the literature, whether of Eastern or Western origin, speaks of Comecon, 
with some exaggeration, as a fig leaf that concealed soviet domination.100 The 
Western literature frequently dismisses Comecon (and its program for the socialist 
Economic Integration) as an unsuccessful project. While the former statement is 
disputable, the latter is undoubtedly true as far as measures of economic integra-
tion are concerned.101 however, some authors argue that the primary aim of the 
99 Ministry of Building Industry: Danube-Oder Canal. Draft report for the government on the state 
of study, research, and design work (NAČr, ÚPV-B, b. 1363, september 5, 1952), 9.
100 Which is indeed disputable, especially when analyzed “from below” rather than as an instance of soviet 
hegemony. As Valentina fava argues in her analysis of the automobile industry in the 1950s, decision mak-
ing at Comecon level was hampered by nationalistic tensions combined with soviet hegemonic ambitions. 
Valentina fava, “COMECON Integration and the Automobile Industry: The Czechoslovak Case,” EUI Work-
ing Papers 2008, no. MWP 18 (2008), http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/8710. Accessed 15 October 2010.
101 Jozef M. van Brabant, Socialist Economic Integration: Aspects of Contemporary Economic Problems in 
Figure 4.4 – “Let us Learn Russian. Let us Learn from the Soviet People to Work, Think and 
Live in a New Way.” The1951 picture visualized the confluence of waterway constructions and 
Sovietization. Source: James Aulich and Marta Sylvestrova, Political Posters of Central and 
Eastern Europe, 1945-1995 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 140.
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organization was to build up a protected environment within which the socialist 
camp would prosper and ultimately win the “contest of two systems.”102 In January 
1949, the third paragraph of the minutes of the founding session of Comecon 
acknowledged the importance of transport for the constitution of the autarkic 
economic bloc. The proposal for a common transport policy stated that “plans to 
enlarge transport and transit facilities were to be worked out jointly in order to 
keep pace with the growth of other economic relations.”103 similar proclamations 
appeared regularly in all Comecon proclamatory documents.
Despite such proclamations, the initiative failed, because at that time the soviet 
leaders preferred bilateralism in economic relations within the bloc and prior-
itized military investments. During Comecon’s rather formal and shadowy exist-
ence, the infrastructural integration of the socialist Bloc followed other paths. 
regarding waterways, the Danube Commission and the meetings of directors of 
the Danube shipping companies formed central platforms for negotiations in the 
early 1950s. After World War II, when the soviets revived the international regime 
on the Danube in 1948, the convention of the new Danube Commission prohib-
ited riparian member states from reviving bilateral negotiations and projects (re-
garding police, constructions, standards, etc.) operating in the inter-war period. 
This measure was not directed against “capitalist” countries (none had joined 
the commission by then), but was supposed to prevent any international coop-
eration outside the control of the commission, and thus the Ussr.104 While such 
“sovietization” of the Danube Commission was organized prior to the establish-
ment of Comecon, the 1956 Bratislava Agreement marked the final incorporation 
of the river into the Comecon intergovernmental economy.105 This was a restrictive 
cabotage agreement between the riparian national shipping companies (usually 
one state-owned company per country) that allowed vessels to trade only to or 
from their home countries. 
The national development programs of the Danube riparian socialist states, 
such as the first Czechoslovak five-Year Plan 1948-1953, included utilization of 
the Danube. following the soviet example, utilization of available water resources 
Eastern Europe, soviet and East European studies (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), 245-250.
102 Vladimir sobell, The Red Market: Industrial Co-operation and Specialisation in Comecon (Aldershot, 
hants, England: Gower Pub. Co., 1984), 3.
103 Brabant, Socialist Economic Integration, 42.
104 David T. Cattell, “The Politics of the Danube Commission under soviet Control,” American Slavic and 
East European Review 19, no. 3 (1960): 380-394, here 382-383.
105 The soviet Union dictated that a new Danube Commission covering the length of the Danube was to be 
composed only of riparian states; therefore, Britain and france were omitted. Austria became a full member 
in 1960 while Germany did not until 1989. Josef Šír, Mezinárodní vztahy v dopravě (Prague: Nakladatelství 
dopravy a spojů, 1985), 71-72.
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Figure 4.5 – The history of water management governance reforms in Czechoslovakia after the 
World War II – the impact of Sovietization resulted in two turbulent decades, when the admin-
istration experienced various, and at times contradictory reforms often modeled after what was 
considered the Soviet example. The water research institute (VUV est. 1919) and the centralized 
hydraulic engineering agency (Hydroprojekt est. 1948) operated throughout the Soviet period. The 
turbulent developments were not limited to water engineering. Other organizations in electricity 
production and research faced similarly complicated institutional development. Sources: Ladislav 
Votruba, “Vodohospodářské poměry, legislativa, organizace,” in Studie o technice v českých 
zemích 1945-1992. 3, ed. Jaroslav Folta (Prague: Encyklopedický dům, 2003), 1987-1991, here 
1989; Libor Záruba, “Hydroprojekt,” in Plavební příručka, ed. Vratislav Teklý (Prague: Nadas, 
1962), 195-196; Marcela Efmertová, “K institucionálnímu vývoji výzkumně-vývojové základny 
slaboproudé elektrotechniky v Československu v letech 1945-1965,” Studie z dějin techniky, no. 1 
(1988): 291-446, here 296.
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was to play a crucial part in sovietization; that is, the electrification of the country. 
Initially, bilateral commissions on border waters ensured a certain amount of co-
ordination, as did the direct presence of soviet experts.106 Czechoslovakia pursued 
negotiations over joint projects to develop border stretches of the Danube as a 
potential source of hydroelectric power with hungary and Austria.107 
106 Their role was absolutely crucial. for instance, in the case of the plan to utilize the Czechoslovak 
stretch of the Danube, the government wanted to consult the plan with soviet experts in 1952. however, 
the Ministry of Construction that prepared the project, had difficulties securing such expertise (NAČr, 
UPV-B, b. 1363, April 7, 1953).
107 report on the meeting. Dunajská Plavba: využití Dunaje 1956 (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 128). Czechoslo-
vakia withdrew from negotiations with Austria over the Wofstahl Dam project in 1960, the same year that 
Austria joined the Danube Commission. The decision was based on calculations showing that national 
hydropower stations on the Vltava and Váh were economically more efficient. furthermore, the third 
five-Year plan was generally marked by a shift away from investments to large water management projects. 
resolution of the political bureau of the CC CzCP no. 105 (NAČr, KsČ-ÚV-AN II, b. 169, June 28, 1960).
Figure 4.6 – The utilization scheme for the Danube developed by Comecon was fragmented 
through bilateral negotiations. Throughout the 1950s, Czechoslovakia negotiated utilizing the 
river with Hungary. Simultaneously, the country also negotiated the damming of the Danube with 
Austria. The DOE played a role in the Czechoslovak plans for Danube, as the planned entry of the 
canal to the Danube would be affected by dams. Source: “Postavíme s Rakouskem společné vodní 
dílo na Dunaji,” Svobodné slovo, May 13, 1957.
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At the March 1956 Moscow meeting of hydraulic and electrical engineering 
experts on the Danube, which Czechoslovak representatives called “the training at 
the Moscow Gidroprojekt,” delegates of the two members of the bloc that did not 
have access to the Danube appealed to their Czechoslovak colleagues to summon a 
special expert group on the DOE canal.108 Czechoslovakia was eventually assigned 
to investigate the possible navigation connection of the GDr, and Poland to the 
future transport axis of the bloc. 
following this meeting, Comecon adopted the Danube scheme. The new soviet 
leadership encouraged the organization to be more active, which led to a rapidly 
expanding administrative structure, most notably to the establishment of the per-
manent secretariat (1954) and the first twelve standing Commissions (1956) at the 
7th session in Berlin in 1956. The program for complex utilization of the Danube 
was launched at the same meeting, based on the recommendations of the above-
mentioned expert meeting.109 To this end, the Commission for the Exchange of 
Electric Power among Members of the Comecon and for the Use of the hydro-
resources of the Danube was created.110 Under its auspices, the Czechoslovak 
hydroprojekt produced A Study on the Navigation Connection of the Danube with 
the Oder, Vistula and the Canals of GDR in the summer of 1958.111 
The study was the first official document related to the DOE canal in almost six 
years. The resolution of 1952 was the start of the longest break in the state-funded 
preparatory works on the canal since the Austrian Waterways Act of 1901. The 
change in institutional policy and considerable weakening of personal continu-
ity, together with the significant influence of the soviet Model, set the scene for 
a fundamental alteration of the canal’s design. In the form of a brief and general 
draft, the authors of the study compared three basic routing alternatives. They 
eventually selected the riverine one as superior to both the lateral canal along the 
Morava and the rather obscure connection of the Oder to the Danube via the Váh 
river on slovak territory.
108 report on the meeting of the Comecon group of experts on Danube Utilization in Moscow June 26-29, 
1956 (AMZV, MO-OMO 1955-1965, b. 128).
109 Czechoslovak report on the VII session of Comecon held in Berlin, May 18-25, 1956. Protokol o VII. 
zasedání rVhP konaném od 18.-25. Května 1956 v Berlíně (NAČr, KsČ-ÚV-AN II, b. 31), 177-185.
110 Typically, the available files on this commission in Czechoslovak archives are dispersed among sev-
eral institutions: reports on the first meetings in Berlin and Warsaw in January 1958 (AMZV, MO-OMO 
1955-1965, b. 128); report on the second and final meeting, held in July 1958 in Prague (MZA, h42, b. 280, 
Protokol z jednání pracovní skupiny rVhP pro plavební spojení Dunaje s Odrou, Vislou a průplavy NDr, 
uskutečněného June 25-July 3, 1958).
111 studie plavebního spojení Dunaje s Odrou, Vislou a průplavy NDr – discussed in Kliment Velkoborský, 
“Informace o jednání pracovní skupiny expertů o spojení Dunaje s Odrou , Vislou a průplavy NDr,” Zprávy 
Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu 5, no. 8 (1958): 1-4, (MZA, h42, b. 288).
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In 1958, however, the special Comecon Commission on the Danube fell vic-
tim to a relapse in soviet-Yugoslav relations.112 subsequently, the talks continued 
on a bilateral basis for each stretch of the Danube, coordinated only through the 
standing Commission on Electric Power.113 The waterway agenda transferred to 
the standing Commission on Transport. 
Because the bloc suffered from significant transport problems in the late 1950s, 
the standing Commission on Transport (sCT) was established at the 7th session 
of Comecon. The insufficient capacity of railways, which accounted for more than 
two-thirds of intra-bloc transport in the early 1950s, required immediate atten-
tion.114 from 1953 onwards, traffic volumes between the individual Comecon 
countries and the Ussr grew significantly. The most rapidly increasing goods 
were oil, corn, and iron ore; therefore, the capacity of inland waterborne transport, 
which was underutilized at the time, seemed to offer a solution to the problem.115 
Comecon standing Commissions were established in order to overcome the 
economic nationalism of “state socialisms” operating within the organization and 
to create a technocratic apparatus devoted to the idea of socialist internationalism 
as expressed in the concept of international socialist division of labor. As Kaser 
pointed out, the delegates were not foreign service officials, but experts, and thus 
“the consideration of specific problems could be competently dealt with at this 
level. It was these working parties of experts in Moscow which … made the recom-
mendations on bilateral specialization … Although the decisions were not binding, 
a certain national commitment was thereby made, because decisions could only 
be taken at delegates’ meetings if the chief delegates were present in person.”116 In 
a similar manner, Brabant argued that the existence of the Conference of shipping 
Directors (later a permanent part of the Comecon, but outside the competence of 
the standing Commission) was opposed to delegating duties to formal Comecon 
bodies, because that would have implied “the transfer of power from the national 
to the regional level, whereas the relatively loose framework of a conference can 
meet the need for consultation and exchange of useful information.”117
The first item on the agenda of the first Meeting of the Comecon Working 
Group on Transport was to coordinate plans of all types of transport between the 
Comecon member states (a point justified by increasing transport costs), transport 
112 Kaser, Comecon, 68.
113 romania and Yugoslavia eventually decided to pursue the scheme under the Danube Commission.
114 Józef Wilczynski, Technology in Comecon: Acceleration of Technological Progress through Economic Plan-
ning and the Market (New York: Praeger, 1974), 228.
115 Czechoslovak position on the 8th session of Comecon. Československé stanovisko k VIII. zasedání 
rVhP (NAČr, KsČ-ÚV-AN II, b. 31), appendix 3 – report on the session, 14.
116 Kaser, Comecon, 65.
117 Brabant, Socialist Economic Integration, 192.
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volumes, and the need to plan the use of available capacities in advance, in order 
to maximize outcomes. At this first session held in Warsaw in August 1957, the 
DOE appeared on the agenda. During discussions over the possible use of in-
land navigation, which would relieve overloaded railways by transferring a part 
of the soviet exports of heavy substrates to the waterways, the Polish and GDr 
delegates suggested examining the link between the Oder and the Danube.118 They 
also referred to the five-year-old results of the Polish-Czechoslovak Committee 
on the canal. Pushing forward the improvements of the Oder and Danube navi-
gation, considered necessary to mobilize available capacities, Poland asked the 
Czechoslovak representatives about the state of the Danube-Oder connection.119 
Generally speaking, inland navigation topics were relatively well represented. 
Out of twenty-six items, two were purely administrative, three were on coordina-
tion of planning, eight on railways, seven on maritime navigation, and five on in-
land waterways.120 hence, waterways were given rather undeserved priority, con-
sidering that with the exception of the Danube, the Elbe, and the Oder, there were 
no other truly international navigable rivers on the territory of Comecon member 
states (apart from GDr canals). 
In January 1958, at the second meeting of the Comecon Working Group on 
Transport, the participants compiled a list of permanent national representatives. 
significantly, all Comecon countries delegated employees of their respective trans-
port ministries, with the exception of the Ussr, which was represented by an of-
ficial from the state Planning Institution GOsPLAN.121 The leading role of Moscow 
was further confirmed at the meeting of Czech and East German engineers over 
the DOE project, held at the same time, at the Commission on the Danube. Both 
sides agreed that once all necessary documentation had been prepared, it would be 
passed to Gidroproekt Moscow with a request to pursue the DOE project through 
Comecon.122 The pleas of engineer františek Krýsl, one of the co-authors of the 
118 report from the first Meeting of the Comecon Working Group on Transport, Warsaw August 13-21, 
1957 (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 4).
119 The personal change following the 1948 communist coup was so profound that Czechoslovak repre-
sentatives were rather surprised to hear that there was a special committee on the DOE within the Polish-
Czechoslovak Transport Committee; at least, a substantive question mark on the side of the protocol sug-
gests this. Ibid.
120 The last issue was the complicated task of finding a way to transport Albanian fruit to Czechoslovakia 
and Poland via Yugoslavia. 
121 Minutes of the second Meeting of the Comecon Working Group on Transport. Zasedání pracovní 
skupiny pro dopravu čelnských zemí rVhP, Warsaw January 20-29, 1958 (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, 
b. 4), annex 13.
122 reports on the first committee meetings to examine the navigation connection of the Danube with the 
Oder, the Vistula, and the Canals of GDr held in Berlin and Warsaw in January 1958. Zpráva o poradách 
zástupců Čsr, LrP a NDr, konaných v Berlíně a ve Varšavě v lednu 1958 o předběžném projektu spojení 
Dunaje s Odrou, Vislou a průplavy NDr (AMZV, MO-OMO 1955-1965, b. 128). 
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final report, confirm that the study was indeed sent to Moscow. At one of the last 
events organized by DOECs, Krýsl noted, “we sent the final project to Moscow 
GOsPLAN, and since then, after half a year, we have still received no information 
at all.”123 furthermore, such a complaint suggests that the communication between 
the hydraulic engineers at the Czechoslovak hydroprojekt, and their colleagues 
representing the country in Comecon, was rather limited.
At the next meeting held in Warsaw in October 1958, the working group became 
the standing Comission for Economic and scientific-Technical Cooperation in 
the field of Transport (sCT), equipped with its own subcommittees for waterways 
and airways.124 By this time, the sTC had addressed and assessed the development 
of the waterway systems of Comecon member states from the viewpoint of inter-
national transport.125 The final scheme included three main routes: the DOE (the 
north-south Danube-Oder-Vistula connection), the northeast-northwest Neman-
Vistula-Oder-GDr waterways link, and the southeast-southwest Dnieper-Bug-
Vistula link.126 This sketched out the basic measures for the proposed Comecon 
network. The aim to establish a complementary east-west transport link led to 
experiments with existing infrastructures on the route from Kaliningrad (Ussr) 
to Magdeburg (GDr), making use of the ruined Augustow canal. A trilateral com-
mittee was established under Comecon to analyze the promises and pitfalls of the 
route. It took about four years (1956-1960) and two trial cruises before the project 
was called off.127
The Permanent Working Group on Waterways met for the first time before the 
end of 1958. Its general agenda consisted of standardizing vessels and port equip-
ment; developing a network (both inland and maritime); coordinating planning in 
production and use of vessels (originally for the period to 1965, and then to 1975 
“in perspective”; in cooperation with the standing Commission on Machinery); 
123 The study completely disappeared from the Czechoslovak archives. Kliment Velkoborský, “Přednáška o 
dnešním stavu studijních prací na DO průplavu,” Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu 6, no. 5-7 
(1959): 1-11, (MZA, h42, b. 288).
124 several subcommittees called “sections” were established within sTC: the original two permanent 
working groups established at the first meeting on air (5) and water transport (3) were gradually comple-
mented with sections on coordination (1), railways (2) and road transport (4) working group. finally, a 
special body on containerization (section 6) was established. sTC shared the Comecon/socialist transport 
integration agenda with the OsJD (or OsZhD), which was established in 1957 exclusively for railway and 
road transport.
125 At this point, almost all Comecon’s activities and plans were framed as being those of “Comecon mem-
ber states” – not socialist camp, not people democracies, not communist, etc., always strictly formal – see 
Minutes of Comecon sCT (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 4-14).
126 see point 6 of the work plan of the sTC. Protocols of the Comecon sCT – I/58 (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, 
odd. 20, b. 5), annex 5. The latter two connections had actually been in operation in the nineteenth century 
– Augustow Canal (built 1839) and Dnieper-Bug Canal (built 1775, reconstructed 1848).
127 Comecon sCT Protocols (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 4-5).
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and finally, managing waterways (again, both inland and maritime). Given the 
generally poor situation of the transport sector throughout the bloc, debates on 
the measures to achieve an increase in transport utilization of the Danube, such as 
the stimulation of tariff policy, gained prominent attention. 
however, the main item at the first session was the soviet delegation’s proposal. 
A few months earlier, the soviets had presented a plan to the Committee on Inland 
Navigation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
regarding the construction of the pan-continental waterway network. The UNECE 
was virtually the only organization in the 1950s that facilitated regular cooperation 
between both parts of the continent divided by the Iron Curtain. The UNECE ac-
cepted the proposal and the soviets then pursued the idea in Comecon. The sCT, 
together with the Danube Commission, was to prepare background materials that 
would reflect the interests of Comecon member states. Under the soviet proposal, 
the waterway projects considered by Comecon had a wider economic context, and 
connecting the Danube and GDr canals to the West would provide a vital route 
for the cheap transportation of raw materials, agricultural products, coal, and oil 
across the Iron Curtain. Among the suggested topics for inquiry by the sCT were 
the determination of individual projects on Comecon territory, preparation of 
general classification of waterways (a necessary precondition for interconnection 
of different waterway systems), and articulation of the international status of the 
European network.128
The soviet involvement in and support for the plan clearly came from their 
own experience with waterway construction. Completion of the Volga-Don Canal 
in 1952 connected the Caspian and Black seas. Czechoslovak engineers greatly 
appreciated this symbolic achievement, so they started reconstructing the Baltic-
Volga waterway. This established what later became known as the United Deep 
Inland Waterway system of European russia.129 Improving the Danube, as well 
as its connection via the Danube-Main canal towards Western Europe, and via 
the DOE to Poland and the GDr, would provide a significant extension of the 
soviet system. In addition, due to the different railway gauge in the Ussr, trans-
port by rail within Comecon required trans-shipment, which made the mixed 
water-railway solution competitive. Of course, other Comecon countries would 
profit from their position on the network. furthermore, Poland often complained 
at sTC meetings about Czechoslovakia’s insufficient utilization of the Oder. Most 
of the southeast European countries expressed similar feelings about the Danube 
128 Protokoll der 1. Tagung der ständigen Arbeitsgruppe für schiffahrt in Berlin, 16.-20. Dezember 1958 – 
Anlage 2, Vorschläge der Udssr (BA, Archiv DDr, DM 5195).
129 A.A. Belyakov, “Water Network of russia,” Power Technology and Engineering 27, no. 5 (1993): 287-294. 
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and complained that Czechoslovakia profited excessively from the railway transit 
to the West.
While the soviet proposal envisaged the establishment of an Expert group un-
der the sCT, realization of cooperation on the waterway network under Comecon 
ultimately took a different form. Instead of preparing joint standpoints for talks at 
the UNECE, the sCT Working Group on Waterways decided to develop a sepa-
rate plan for an interconnected waterway network of the soviet Bloc (edinaia set’ 
vnutrennikh vodnykh putei stran-chlenov SEV). The DOE was a crucial part of this 
plan; it was designated to “link Poland and Germany to the Danube” and, in so 
doing, connect the only two European Comecon countries that stood outside the 
system of the Black sea.130 
Work on the plan was delegated to respective national authorities; in the case 
of the DOE, Czechoslovakia was put in charge of gathering all materials and pro-
ducing the final report. All the individual plans were then to be sent to the soviet 
GOsPLAN, which was to devise the general report on the waterways. The task was 
more precisely outlined at the fifth Meeting of the sCT in 1960, when the report 
on the work of the standing Working Group on Water Transport (sWGWT) was 
discussed.131 The sCT agreed that: 
regardless of the increasing traffic volume … these transport routes [in-
land waterways] are insufficiently exploited. The reason is the unfavora-
ble distribution of inland waterways, which does not correspond with 
the development of waterborne transport. In order to overcome such a 
drawback, it is necessary to establish a set of links connecting individual 
rivers, mainly the Danube and the Oder and the Pripyat to the Bug and 
the Vistula. 
The Czechoslovak representation was asked to prepare a report on the standardi-
zation of inland navigation vessels, the GDr worked on the classification, and the 
Ussr was entrusted with preparing a list of problems related to the establishment 
of the unified network. finally, in 1962, the Eighth sTC meeting in Warsaw ac-
cepted the finalized scheme, which included more than fifteen individual water-
ways (rivers as well as canals or canal projects). for the first time since World 
130 Wilczynski, Technology in Comecon, 236.
131 Important meetings were held in the summer of 1960. The first was a special conference in Prague (July 
8-13) devoted to discussing two reports: “On the establishment of the unified system of inland waterways” 
and “On the necessary measures for the development of inland water transport between Comecon mem-
ber states.” At the end of the month, at the Third Meeting of the sWGWT in Berlin, the soviet delegation 
presented their general report on the development of waterways. Unfortunately, neither of these documents 
was available to the author.
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War II, the plan also included the Elbe branch of the DOE.132 In the autumn 
of the same year, another session agreed on the classification and standards of 
planned waterways and on the methodology for calculating the viability of the 
waterway projects.133 however, the real core of the scheme formed only three main 
routes: two from the original proposal of 1958 (DO (E) and Dnieper-Pripyat-Bug-
Vistula) completed to full circle by a lateral sea canal connecting the Dnieper to 
the Danube along the Black sea.134
132 Protocols of the 8th session of the Comecon sCT (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 5).
133 Protocols of the 9th session of the Comecon sCT (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 5).
134 Intermediary report on the problem: Creation of the united inland waterway network of the Comecon 
member states. Promezhutochnyjj doklad po probleme: sozdanie edinojj seti vnutrennickh vodnykh putei 
stran-chlenov sEV, Protocols of the 21st session of the Comecon sCT (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 5), 
annex 12:5.
Figure 4.7 – For its scheme of a unified waterway network (here in 1964), Comecon remark-
ably did not use the term Europe. While interwar canal promoters were building “Mitteleuropa,” 
and Nazis their “European Economic Area,” Comecon called its waterway network plan simply 
“Waterways of Comecon Member States.” The alliance with the USSR was central. The lateral 
canal along the Black Sea coast secured the link to the USSR by connecting the Danube River 
with the Don, which in its turn was connected to the Volga. Source: General Study of the Water 
Transfer from the Danube to Moravia. Rámcová studie přečerpávání vod Dunaje na území 
Moravy NAČR, KSČ-ÚV-02/1, sv. 48, aj. 51-10, 1964.
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however, the initial idea of building connections between the Danubian sys-
tem and the Polish waterways on the one side and the soviet waterway systems 
on the other, as effectuated in the Comecon studies of the Vistula-Pripet-Dnieper 
waterway and of the coastal canal Danube-Dnieper, proved overly optimistic. The 
navigation conditions on the Volga and Danube were too different to be man-
aged efficiently. Closer examination of these links revealed the principal obstacle 
facing any attempt to integrate the two systems; namely, the difference between 
soviet and European standard dimensions. standard IV-class vessels, fully suit-
able for navigation on all main European waterways, would only be able to reach 
the Dnieper; the Lenin Volga-Baltic system required vessels that were capable of 
short sea-navigation and constructed to withstand a wave regime of large artificial 
reservoirs. Merely by linking the hitherto separated networks, it was still not pos-
sible to link the soviet waterway system to the rest of the continental waterways.135 
Negotiations over the planned scheme became even more complicated after 1964, 
when the Executive Committee of Comecon listed the waterway unification pro-
ject among the most important “scientific-technical inquiries” that required a 
higher degree of coordination.136 The program became less focused on transport 
issues (the basic technical-economic calculations had already been done) and was 
spread among different organs of Comecon (standing commissions on water man-
agement, electricity, agriculture, scientific-technical cooperation, etc.). The water-
way network scheme was renamed TrA-1 in the Comecon transport research task 
of 1965 and also appeared several times over the next few years in sTC negotia-
tions, but disappeared from its agenda completely around 1968.137 During the late 
1960s, waterways gave way to other means of transport, at least in the planned 
construction of the unified network, and Comecon concentrated on the develop-
ment of inter-modal transport on the Danube.138 
In addition, the political tensions within the socialist Bloc had a significant 
influence on the fate of the plan. romania and Yugoslavia decided to fulfill their 
common project on damming the Danube Gorge at Iron Gates through the 
135 Jaroslav Kubec, “hlavní směry výstavby vodních cest v Evropě a jejich souvislost s budoucím rozvojem 
lodní dopravy “ in Vliv plánované výstavby evropských vodních cest na rozvoj československé lodní dopravy po 
roce 1970, ed. Jaromír Kozák (Prague: ČsVTs, 1968), 7-29, here 20.
136 Intermediary report on the problem: Creation of the united inland waterway network of the Comecon 
member states. Promezhutochnyjj doklad po probleme: sozdanie edinojj seti vnutrennikh vodnikh putei 
stran-chlenov sEV Protocols of the 21st session of the Comecon sCT (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 5), 
annex 12:2.
137 Protocols of the 16th session of the Comecon sCT (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 5), annex 5.
138 see, for instance, the Agreement on International Direct Mixed Rail-water Transport (MZhVS), which 
aimed at “more rational utilization of rail and water transport,” especially on the Danube and was signed by 
the European six and the Ussr in Warsaw on December 19, 1961. Protocols of Comecon sCT 4/60 (NAČr, 
MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 5).
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Danube Commission rather than through Comecon. furthermore, the change in 
the soviet technology policy also played an important role. following the fascina-
tion with hydro-power stations during the stalin era, Khrushchev’s administration 
initially emphasized other aspects of large hydraulic structures, most notably soil 
reclamation and irrigation. Consequently, water-related issues generally received 
wide support from the Kremlin in the Khrushchev period. Vladimír Chmelár, a 
slovak water engineer who had worked on the Gabčíkovo dam since the emer-
gence of the idea to dam the Danube on the Austrian/Czechoslovak border in 
1952, and who lived to see it finally raised in 1992, noted: “in 1960, we lost one 
dam on the Danube, Bratislava/Wolfstahl, due to the incompetence of President 
Novotný’s advisors; then, in 1964, Khrushchev lost interest in the Danube and we 
almost lost Gabčíkovo as well.”139
The Final Plan
After the first version of the canal design produced in 1958 by hydroprojekt, the 
Comecon network scheme initiated another round of studies of the problem. This 
time, however, a brief analysis of options was insufficient, and hydroprojekt had 
to cooperate with other institutions, most notably national research institutes.140 
The National Territorial Planning Office (Státní ústav územního plánování, sÚÚP) 
was put in charge of the project. Unlike the 1958 study, the fully-fledged project 
could clearly embrace the new approach towards waterway planning based on the 
soviet concept of “complex utilization.” Indeed, in some ways the sovietization of 
the canal project became just that: “complex”. All of the past designs were accused 
of being single-purpose transport routes and, as such, dismissed as partial and 
sector solutions. The word “complex” entered the Czechoslovak hydraulic engi-
neering vocabulary with the analysis of soviet waterways.141 Although there was 
139 Vladimír Chmelár, Gabčíkovo do prevádzky! Uvedenie vodného diela Gabčíkovo do prevádzky dočasným 
riešením (Žilina: Electa, 1991), 6.
140 Most notably the Water Management research institute (VÚV) and the Transport research Institute 
(VÚD- represented by Jaroslav Kubec). Komplexní technicko-ekonomická studie spojení řek Dunaje, 
Odry a Labe 1965 (NAČr, MD III), 7. The archival group is not yet fully organized and the boxes contain-
ing the study are not numbered. I would like to thank archivist Miroslav Kunt for making the document 
accessible.
141 Instructive in this sense were first translations, printed as authored texts, of the selection of articles from 
soviet journals on the large hydraulic technology projects. Oldřich Vitha, a new graduate from the CVUT, 
published them in two versions in 1950 and 1951. A proper translation of the soviet original appeared in 
1953. Vitha later became one of the leading figures in Czechoslovak water management. Oldřich Vitha, O 
velikých stavbách komunismu v Sovětském svazu (Prague: sČsP, 1950); Oldřich Vitha, “sovětský svaz – vzor 
pro naše vodohospodáře,” Vodní Hospodářství 1, no. 9 (1951): 274-277; Oldřich Vitha, Veliký boj sovětského 
lidu – stavby komunismu (Prague: svět sovětů, 1952); Oldřich Vitha, Vodní bohatství SSSR a jeho využití 
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some American inspiration, the saint Lawrence and TVA projects appeared in 
Czechoslovak literature as “pioneers,” rather than fully covering the “complex” na-
ture of river basin water management.142 
The new “complex” design reflected the 1950s discursive sovietization of the 
canal, which emphasized its triple functions. In the early 1960s, the “Needs” cal-
culated by economic planners started to overlap with the suggested capacities of 
the waterway. The third five-year plan, designed in the late 1950s and declared in 
1960, marked a significant shift in national water politics from the rapid develop-
ment of hydraulic power plants towards other forms of water use.
The water balance of the North Moravian region became an issue due to the 
rapid growth of metallurgical and mining industries in the region, which were 
supposed to make it the “steel heart” of the republic. Oldřich Vitha, the young 
director of the National Directorate for Water Management Development 
(Ředitelství vodohospodářského rozvoje, ŘVr), led studies on the possibility of wa-
ter transfer from the Danube, either across the watershed with the Vltava – follow-
ing the old Austrian Danube-Vltava-Elbe project – or up the Morava.143 Arguing 
in favor of the latter, Vitha stressed that the planned off-take from the Danube to 
Czechoslovakia had already been incorporated in the Comecon Danube scheme.144 
If such a scheme was to solve the water balance problem of Northern Moravia, it 
would have required construction of the canal connecting the Morava and Oder 
river basins – the Danube-Oder connection. Vitha pointed out the soviet exam-
ple of the water transfer scheme (the recently accepted Irtysh-Karaganda project 
aimed to solve Kazakhstan’s water balance problems), which, according to Vitha, 
“appears to be efficient solely as a water management measure, without power or 
(Prague: Osvěta, 1952). Velké stavby komunismu. Sborník článků sovětských autorů, hospodářsko-politický 
atlas světa Velká řada (Prague: sNPL, 1953).
142 The inherent inability of capitalism to deal with water issues in their complexity, and thus ensure the 
common good and not serve particular interests of various sectors and lobby groups, was strongly pro-
nounced, not only in connection with the re-organization of water management, but also directly in discus-
sions about the canal (as compared to American or colonial projects, but never German, french, or any 
other European projects). Instructive in this sense are articles published by the then-chairman Oto Dub and 
secretary Jan Tille of the DOECs in the first year of the Vodní Hospodářství journal: Jan Tille, “Případ řeky 
sv. Vavřince,” Vodní Hospodářství 1, no. 4 (1951): 110-111; Oto Dub, “Vodní hospodářství za kapitalizmu a 
socializmu,” Vodní Hospodářství 1, no. 2 (1951): 33-37.
143 Oldřich Vitha (1924-2008), was a graduate of the Technical University of Prague. his initial fascina-
tion with communist ideology resulted in the publication in 1951-1952 of leaflets on the soviet achieve-
ments in the field of hydraulic engineering. After graduation, Vitha finished his PhD in 1965 with a dis-
sertation on “Economic Efficiency of hydraulic structures.” In 1958-1960, Vitha worked as a consultant in 
China. In 1961, he became a director of the Ředitelství vodohospodářského rozvoje. Milan Doležal, Zdeněk 
Švec, and Václav Bečvář, “In Memoriam ing. Oldřich Vitha, Drsc,” Vodní Hospodáství 58, no. 1 (2009): 16.
144 Minutes of the plenary session of the Commission for Water Managemnet, held on Thursday October 
17, 1963. Záznam o plenárním zasedání komise pro vodní hospodářství ČsAV konaném ve čtvrtek dne 17. 
Října 1963 (AAVČr, KVh, b. 15, October 17, 1963).
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navigation utilization, while having to overcome greater length and greater altitude 
differences.”145 such a project actually fulfilled the three demands of sovietization: 
1) taming nature, which it achieved by pumping water from the Danube up the 
Morava Valley to the regions with (“in perspective”) negative water balance; 2) the 
canalization of the Morava for the purposes of flood protection; and 3) reclama-
tion of a relatively significant acreage of arable land.146
The railway crisis of 1962, during which a shortage of wagons significantly af-
fected the country’s economy, contributed to the revival of the canal as a viable 
alternative in national transport infrastructure. The brand new National Transport 
Policy (Dopravní koncepce) of 1963 aimed to “restore the balance between trans-
port capacities and industrial production.” Apart from reviving the idea of high-
ways, which had been put to one side in 1950, the document emphasized the pos-
sibilities of waterways, especially the Elbe branch of the DOE. The argument for 
its implementation was purely national: the east-west direction was much more 
important for the Czechoslovak economy than the north-south link, which mainly 
interested other countries.147 
On a regional level, however, the re-evaluation of the canal as transport cor-
ridor was already underway, thanks to the individual initiative of another young 
engineer, Jaroslav Kubec, who stood behind the revival of the canal idea in 1960 at 
the KVrIs Ostrava. Kubec challenged the 1952 variant of the routing through the 
undermined area of the silesian coal basin.148 
The 1963 report on the “transfer of water from the Danube,” which preceded 
the study on the canal, combined all three anticipated shortages (needs) to support 
construction of the proposed waterway. here, the third function, electrification, 
also appeared. According to its authors, the entire Morava river Basin was go-
ing to suffer from insufficient water resources by 1980 (as the Oder Basin already 
did).149 similarly, the main east-west railway connecting the Northwestern coal 
145 Vitha’s proposal for the utilization of the DOE canal to transfer water from the Danube to Moravia. 
Ibid., 3.
146 “In perspective” was a socialist newspeak term used for long-term planning (for a period of several 
five Year Plans).
147 such evaluation of the project is repeated in virtually every official complex report on the project.
148 Zdeněk Kreuz, “studijní činnost v oboru úprav toků, vodohospodářských asanací v poddolovaném 
území a vodních cest,” in Vodní hospodářství v povodí Odry 1945-1970, ed. Pavel Ženatý (Ostrava: Profil, 
1972), 75-85, here 78.
149 During the discussion of this material at the presidium of the CC CzCP, Czechoslovak President An-
tonín Novotný noted that “the soviet Union goes on the Baltic-Black sea canal next year!” however, mis-
trust within Comecon was stronger than the power of the soviet example: all other members agreed that 
a better solution than building future dependence on Polish coal (by constructing the canal) would be to 
build a nuclear power plant (in effect strengthening dependence on the Ussr). General study of the Water 
Transfer from the Danube to Moravia. rámcová studie přečerpávání vod Dunaje na území Moravy (NAČr, 
KsČ-ÚV-02/1, sv. 48, aj. 51-10), 5.
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basins with electric plants on the middle Elbe, by far the most used transportation 
link in Czechoslovakia, would become inadequate by 1970.150 The Elbe branch of 
the canal follows the route of this railway. The last problem that the canal had to 
solve was the electricity supply of the Morava Basin; flatlands did not allow for ef-
ficient hydropower utilization. The construction of the canal would enable cheap 
transportation of Polish coal for thermal power plants, and dams supplying water 
for the waterway could provide cooling for nuclear power stations. In connection 
with the projected drop in coal production in Czechoslovakia and the rise of im-
ports after 1980, the planned plants were also expected to heat the water, thereby 
ensuring navigability on the canal for 330 days a year.151
A detailed new study appeared in 1964, and in updated form a year later, un-
der the heading “Complex economic-technical study on interconnection of the 
rivers Danube, Oder, and Elbe.”152 The Czechoslovak government accepted the 
study, which led to further examination of the canal project. finally, in 1968, 
hydroprojekt presented a new canal design: the General solution. As one of the 
engineers argued later, “another extreme of the contemporary notion of the water-
way functions originated in megalomaniac ideas of volumes of water transfer, in 
uncritical extrapolation of constantly increasing water demands, as well as in the 
belief in the ‘limitless possibilities’ of the socialist economy.”153 In a way, such an 
evaluation seems fair: the project calculated traffic of forty million tons per year on 
the Danube-Oder connection, while the highest estimate to date had been fifteen 
million tons. The canal was expected to provide water for irrigating four hundred 
and twenty thousand hectares of agricultural land, and the water amounts trans-
ferred from the Danube expected to reach fifty m3/s. The system of transfer resem-
bled the one envisioned in rough contours during the Nazi period; each lock was 
to have a hydropower plant. however, there was no reference to the Nazi proposal 
either in the Complex study or in the General solution. Unlike the Nazi proposal, 
however, the new design preferred smaller locks that would enable piecemeal nav-
igation of push-convoys, which had been introduced on European rivers after 
World War II. The introduction of the tolkatch (boat designed for pushing barges) 
had been discussed at sTC meetings from the early 1960s. Otherwise, the stand-
ards applied followed Class IV of the common UNECE/Comecon classification.
furthermore, the canal route exploited the current riverbeds to the greatest 
possible extent, which was somewhat contradictory to the earlier “canal” solution. 
150 Ibid., 14.
151 Ibid., 9.
152 Komplexní technicko-ekonomická studie spojení řek Dunaje, Odry a Labe (NAČr, MD III).
153 Jaroslav Kubec, Josef Podzimek, and františek Nepil, Křižovatka tří moří: vodní koridor Dunaj-Odra-
Labe (Prague: Your ArTillery, 2007), 62.
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Without exception, all the older versions until the first hydroprojekt study of 1958 
preferred lateral canals. The canal sections were proposed for high sections only 
and wherever routing through the riverbed was not efficient. The gigantomania 
reflected in the water transfer measures, and the “taming of nature” symbolized 
by channelization of the whole stream of the river, are both typical characteristics 
of the so-called soviet technological style.154 The straightening of the streams of 
Moravia respected nothing except purely technical objectives; namely, the three 
functions mentioned above.155
Nonetheless, the traditional fascination with German canals (which was ac-
tually part of the still-preferred notion of a Central European Network substan-
tially distinct from the soviet russian Volga-Baltic system) continued uninter-
rupted. The general solution of 1968 was accompanied by a set of photographs 
of German canals, taken on a study tour in 1969 during the final evaluation pe-
riod of the General solution. The West was not the only source of experience and 
Czechoslovak experts also paid a visit to soviet experts in the same year.156
The final round of evaluations took quite a long time (from 1966 to 1971), 
partly due to the turbulent political situation in Czechoslovakia during and af-
ter the Prague spring of 1968. Václav Plecháč, another young hydraulic engineer 
who, by then, was already head of the International Department of the Water 
Management section of the Ministry of forestry and Water Management, chaired 
the special Governmental Committee (koordinační meziresortní komise) on the 
DOE. Ultimately, the chosen form of viability calculation decided the fate of the 
project. While the rather shadowy developmental function of the project was re-
jected immediately, including its possible utilization for electricity production, the 
other two functions did not compare with the more economical alternatives. The 
enlarged capacity of the existing railway (which would allow it to handle growing 
traffic), as well as separate construction of a water transfer system without naviga-
tion structures, would both have been cheaper than the DOE canal. According to 
Plecháč, the DOE would not be economically viable without direct financial par-
ticipation from Comecon member states.157 following Plecháč’s recommendation, 
154 Josephson, “Projects of the Century.”
155 Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal: General solution Průplavní spojení Dunaj-Odra-Labe: Generální řešení, 
souhrnné provedení, 1968 (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 66).
156 Zpráva ze služební cesty do sssr/report from the business trip to the Ussr, July 1969 (NAČr, MZO-
fMZO, odd. 20, b. 67). In 2010, Plecháč recalled that when the experts arrived in Moscow, nobody had a 
clue why they had come. he considered the trip largely useless and recalls that the state of soviet waterways 
was strikingly bad. Interview with Plecháč, conducted by the author in autumn 2010.
157 report on the results of the evaluation of the General solution of the Danube-Oder-Elbe waterway 
developed by the Ministry of forestry and Water Management (MLVh). Zpráva o výsledcích posouzení 
generálního řešení průplavního spojení Dunaj – Odra – Labe (AVÚV, January 29, 1971).
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the government passed Decree no. 169/1971, which postponed the final decision 
on the DOE construction to 1990 and imposed a moratorium on constructing the 
planned route of the canal until that time.
What seemed to be a purely technical matter was, in the eyes of some of the 
involved hydraulic engineers, a rather personal affair. In the mid-1960s, the canal 
project was backed by the rehabilitated Communist politician Josef smrkovský. A 
member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 
1946-1951, smrkovský had been imprisoned from 1951-1955 and returned to the 
highest levels of Czechoslovak politics in 1965 as director of the ÚsVh. from this 
position, he supported the canal project and cooperated with Vitha, Kubec, and 
other supporters of the project.158 however, after the Prague spring, during which 
158 smrkovský participated at several canal-promotion events, mostly in the “debates with workers.”
Figure 4.8 – In 1968, Czechoslovak engineers made a series of study trips to West Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the USSR. The experience in Germany influenced them most. This pic-
ture, taken during the trip to the RMD construction site, shows the water saving basins of the 
RMD lock at Erlangen. Source: Zpráva ze studijní cesty do NSR a Holandska k ekonomickým 
problémům vnitrozemské plavby (AVUV) [Year 1968].
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he again joined the CC CzCP (1966-1969), smrkovský’s political career was defi-
nitely over. support for such a hypothesis could be found in the difference in cal-
culations of the construction costs of the DOE. In his final report in 1971, Plecháč 
compared the cost of the DOE, at twenty-two billion CZK, with the alternative 
solutions, eleven billion CZK. A few years earlier, however, in 1967, the officially 
estimated canal costs had not reached ten billion CZK.159 
Conclusion
Ironically, the negative governmental resolution of 1952 actually also marked a 
new beginning. It was the first step in the gradual process of sovietization of the 
canal project, which was later revived in the context of far-reaching Communist 
societal transformations. What had failed was only an attempt to promote the idea 
of a national canal as a Communist project. The reason behind the failure was 
that the quality of the current design had been seen as not being comparable to 
those “great structures of Communism,” the usefulness of which lay not only in 
a transport function, but more importantly in modernization of the affected ter-
ritory: electrification enabled by hydropower, reclamation through irrigation or 
drainage, etc.
The transportation role was not sufficiently appealing for the new sovietized 
technocracy. Although the first five-Year Plan (1948-1953) included “preparatory 
works” on the DOE canal, priority was subsequently given to the sovietization 
of the national industrial structure and to the legal and institutional transforma-
tion of strategic branches of the national economy (including water management). 
Priority was given to the development of railways and hydro-energy production, 
respectively.
however, the question of the DOE was raised again, this time in a properly 
sovietized manner. Under Khrushchev’s leadership (1953-1964), the concept of 
sovietization had changed. Apart from soviet-like industrialization, there were 
issues of soil reclamation and irrigation, which meant that water management in 
general received wide support from the Kremlin. Combined with the general need 
to upgrade the inadequate capacity of transport routes within the Eastern Bloc, the 
revival of the canal idea emerged as a logical outcome.
159 It should be noted that the 1971 estimate was calculated at 1968 prices. rozbor připomínkového řízení 
komplexního posouzení výstavby průplavního spojení DOL ve srovnání s dunajskými vodními díly ve 
smyslu vládního usnesení č.232/1966, TErPLAN, March 1967 (AVUV).
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however, the International Organization of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance played the main role in the project’s revival. In the context of the pro-
gram for complex utilization of the Danube, Comecon sought to connect the de-
tached waterway systems of northern socialist countries of Poland and the GDr 
to the Danube. The utilization scheme, which had originally been designed to pro-
mote soviet industrialization through harnessing of the river, fell short of initial 
expectations due to the political tensions between Tito’s Yugoslavia and the Ussr 
that arose after Khrushchev’s denouncement of stalin.
Once revived, the canal remained on the Comecon agenda. The reorientation 
of Eastern European economies towards the Ussr led to considerable transport 
problems, and waterways seemed to promise a relatively cheap alternative to over-
loaded railways. Comecon developed a plan for a regional waterway network 
that was designed to serve the most intensively utilized east-west transport di-
rection. In 1960, after a few years of initial discussions, the Comecon standing 
Commission for Transport launched a plan to build the unified waterway network 
of Comecon member states. In 1963, after setting the basic parameters for the 
network, work on the individual canal projects started and a brand new design of 
the DOE appeared in 1965.
The new “sovietized” design was not a direct import from Moscow, but the re-
sult of Czechoslovak interpretation of soviet influences. While some uncertainties 
occurred in the initial period regarding the form of sovietization, the situation set-
tled down over time. In January 1958, during the first Comecon project developed 
in the context of the Danube Utilization scheme, the Czechoslovak engineers used 
the meetings with their counterparts in Warsaw and East Berlin to oppose the 
literal application of the soviet model. Consequently, the standards of lock dimen-
sions proposed earlier by Moscow Gidrorpoekt were changed to fit the existing 
technological support network. These were mainly the standards applied on other 
stretches of the Central European waterway system; in this case, the lower Oder. 
The standards were later negotiated at Comecon.160
The final design, produced in 1968 as a result of the almost exclusively national 
debate over the 1965 general design of DOE, showed clear signs of sovietization. 
This so-called “general solution” marked the most important discontinuity in 
project’s history to date in terms of technical, institutional, and personal aspects. 
from a technical point of view, the general solution marked a shift from trans-
port to water management, from lateral canal to river, from motor boats to push 
convoys, from ship-lifts to locks. The former leaders, who had been active since 
160 Jiří Janáč, “resistance to sovietization in Technology,” in Crossing frontiers, resisting identities, ed. Luďa 
Klusáková, et al. (Pisa: Edizioni Plus – Pisa University Press, 2010), 217-221.
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Austrian times, were replaced for a short period in the 1950s by a new generation 
of graduates from sovietized universities: Vitha, Kubec, and Plecháč. The con-
stant re-shuffling of the institutional landscape surrounding the canal project fur-
ther contributed to the significant changes of the project. The decisions made by 
Comecon’s respective bodies contributed to the process and affected the shaping of 
the canal. however, this was not done according to some pre-defined soviet impe-
rial plan in the form of a direct “export” of the soviet model.
The unfortunate fate of the Comecon scheme, which gave way to develop-
ment of roads and railways, heralded the negative resolution of the Czechoslovak 
government on the DOE. Probably not by accident, the last report on DOE for 
Comecon was developed in 1967, in the same year as the first voices were heard to 
doubt the project. In 1972, there was an important turning point, when the gov-
ernment officially put a stop to the project, which was no longer supported by the 
international organization.
furthermore, the Comecon scheme failed in one more aspect. In the spatial 
imagination of the Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers, Comecon (or socialist/
soviet Bloc) did not represent a territorial unit, and the engineers operated with 
Figure 4.9 – While restarted as a Comecon effort in the 1960s, by the end of the 1970s, the DOE 
was presented in Czechoslovak documents as a European project. Remarkably, the map accom-
panying 1970 Czechoslovak project documentation entirely ignores the existence of the Iron 
Curtain. The map actually strongly resembles those produced by Mitteleuropeanists before World 
War II. However, this time the area is called Europe. Source: Průplavní spojení Dunaj Odra Labe. 
Ekonomické podmínky a možnosti. Shrnutí k 30.11.1970 Hydroprojekt. NAČR, FMZO odd. 20, 
b. 67.
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notions of Europe and Central Europe throughout the period. The working docu-
ments on the canal developed by experts, often opened with a declaration of the 
canal’s role in a future European network, not an East European network.161 
161 see, for instance, the debate on the installation of a ship-lift on the Orlík dam. (AAVČr, KVh, b. 15, 
May 11, 1961).
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Chapter 5 Mastering Three seas
The DOE water management system will either constitute a part of, or be 
connected to both the Comecon and West European waterway networks, 
and thus become an important component of European Waterways.1
Despite the victorious march of sovietization and ensuing division of the conti-
nent into two halves, as epitomized by the Comecon waterway integration scheme, 
Czechoslovak engineers on the DOE project never abandoned the ideal scenario of 
a pan-continental waterways network. They tended to ignore the political barrier 
of the Iron Curtain that was threatening to detach their dream project from one of 
the three seas it once boasted to connect. The opening quotation comes from dis-
cussions on the DOE canal held in the early 1960s and shows, in condensed form, 
how the Comecon scheme was accompanied and enlarged by the broader picture 
of continent-wide integration. The situation was no different in the mid-1950s or 
1970s. The bold visions sketched by Czechoslovak engineers depicted Europe as a 
unified whole, as if there was no Cold War.
In the 1950s, DOECs members clearly expressed their ideas on the spatial de-
limitations of the future waterway network containing the DOE. Advocating the 
necessity of the interconnection between the separated river basins of the Danube, 
the Oder, and the Elbe, articles published in the mid-1950s in DOECs bulletins 
positioned the DOE in the “European” inland water transport system or, following 
the then dominant force of Moscow and the Ussr, the Eurasian network. Papers 
by engineer Karel raba illustrate the latter.
In 1955, raba published an article dealing with the development of Czechoslovak 
inland water transport and infrastructures. raba, a lifelong crew officer on Danube 
vessels, turned scientist after World War II and was a member of the Czechoslovak 
1 “soustava DOL bude přímou částí a nebo bude navazovat na vodní cesty ve státech rVhP i v západní 
Evropě a tak se stane významným článkem evropských vodních cest.” Opening words of the debate on the 
proposed utilization of the canal to transfer water from the Danube to Moravia held at the Czechoslovak 
Academy of sciences, Commission for Water Management. Interestingly, the formulation in the final eval-
uation report had changed significantly: instead of West European waterways, only the rMD connection 
was named. Minutes of the plenary session of the Commission for Water Management held on October 
17, 1963. Záznam o plenárním zasedání Komise pro vodní hospodářství ČsAV konaném ve čtvrtek dne 
17. října 1963. (AAVČr, KVh, b. 15), 3.
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Academy of sciences, established in 1953 based on a soviet model. his paper ad-
dressed the DOE’s position in the construction of the transnational waterways 
network. raba, ignoring the Cold War, proposed developing four continen-
tal diagonal waterway axes: a northeast-southwest connection from Moscow to 
Marseille; a north-south corridor from szczecin to Trieste; an east-west link from 
the port of rotterdam to sulina through the rMD canal; and, finally, a northwest-
southeast passage starting on the North sea coast in hamburg and terminating on 
the Aegean in Thessaloniki. Apart from the east-west connection consisting of the 
realization of the rhine-Main-Danube canal, the other three routes would exploit 
a part of the DOE system. Emanating from the traditional DOECs interpretation, 
and from raba’s perspective, Czechoslovak territory would be the central cross-
roads of the “trans-European water links.” The crucial novelty of his proposal lay in 
the incorporation of Moscow, which had not appeared in earlier proposals. raba 
envisioned the “port of five seas,” as he named the soviet capital, connected to the 
DOE by a complicated system of trans-watershed canals and rivers instead of the 
Volga and the Danube.2
Jan smetana, director of the Water Management research Institute (VUV) in 
Prague, proposed an even more radical eastward extension of the envisioned net-
work. he did so in the same year (1955) as raba, in his address to the third plenary 
session at the Czechoslovak Academy of sciences.3 from smetana’s perspective, 
the future European network would consist of two east-west “navigational author-
ities.” The Danube, as the southern axis, would serve the eastern part of Europe; 
the northern and significantly longer parallel would involve an extension of the 
existing Mitteland canal all the way to the Pacific Ocean. such a Eurasian water-
way artery would start in the rhine basin and reach the Caspian and Aral seas 
through German, Polish, and soviet rivers and canals. In the context of Davidov’s 
infamous siberian Water Diversion Project, smetana envisioned a connection 
reaching further east from there to the Baykal, and then through the river Amur 
along the soviet-Chinese border to the Okhotsk sea.
2 These rivers included the Moscow, Dnieper, Pripet, Bug, Vistula, Noteć, Warta, and Oder. Karel raba, 
“Vodní cesty v Československu a úvahy o jejich rozšíření,” Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu 
3, no. 1 (1956): 1-7, (MZA, h42, k. 288). The metaphorical name for Moscow was originally coined for 
rostov on the Don after the Volga-Don shipping canal was built in 1952, and later passed onto various 
cities along the Volga-Baltic waterway system connecting the Black sea, the sea of Azov, the Caspian sea, 
the White sea, and the Baltic sea. The Volga-Don canal was also hailed as “Master of the five seas” in the 
bulletin, “Magistrála pěti moří,” Zprávy Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu 2, no. 7-8 (1955): 12-13, 
(MZA, h42, k. 288).
3 smetana touched on the issue of waterways in his lecture “Arrangement of the waters in the people’s 
democratic Czechoslovakia and its internal and international significance”, reviewed by Kliment Velko-
borský in the bulletin. Kliment Velkoborský, “Zahraniční tisk o projektu průplavu Dunaj-Odra,” Zprávy 
Společnosti dunajsko-oderského průplavu 2, no. 2 (1955): 1-4, here 2-4, (MZA, h42, k. 288).
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Both raba and smetana proposed closely associated plans for the DOE canal 
with the idea of an interconnected East and West, a concept that, in the mid-1950s, 
seemed more distant and illusionary than ever before. In the wake of World War 
II and the subsequent formation of a bipolar Europe, the former integrative con-
cepts of Mitteleuropa, or variously formulated ideas of the Centre, ceased to con-
stitute a viable spatial frame for waterway integration. Instead, the Czechoslovak 
hydraulic engineers’ spatial imagination ignored the reality of a divided continent, 
remaining faithful to the idea of Europe or, more precisely, an eastwardly elon-
gated European Waterway from the rhine to the Volga and beyond. furthermore, 
they were not the only ones dreaming of transnational waterway integration on a 
pan-continental scale. Nor were they ignorant of their foreign colleagues’ visions 
and the DOECs bulletin at that time reported various plans for waterway network 
development. The french rhone-rhine canal project, several swiss plans to turn 
the roof of Europe into its central waterway hub, the West German north-south 
canal, and multiple Comecon plans for the GDr-Ussr waterway link, all emerged 
in the context of post-war reconstruction of the continent.4
Various waterway projects, including the DOE, fit squarely into the program 
of the peaceful reconstruction of the continent. Despite the Iron Curtain, which 
rapidly split Europe in two, efforts to construct a single network did not disappear. 
New international organizations emerged after World War II that sought to inte-
grate Europe. They attempted to overcome the great divide and unite representa-
tives and experts from east and west. such initiatives resembled the visions of the 
Czechoslovak engineers and their counterparts in other parts of the continent. 
What raba and smetana foresaw, began to materialize in the very same year. In 
1955, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) organized 
the first meeting of experts on inland navigation and specialists from both sides of 
the curtain attended.
UNECE originated from post-war reconstruction efforts and built on expe-
rience gained from the interwar League of Nations. To supplant Allied military 
assistance, British and American initiatives inspired the establishment of three 
intergovernmental organizations to handle the restoration of European produc-
tion and trade once the war ended. All European countries except spain and 
the defeated powers were invited to join. Given the pan-European character of 
these bodies, they became known as “E-organizations.” In addition to a coal and 
4 All these projects featured in DOECs bulletins Zprávy společnosti DO průplavu. The papers were mostly 
lengthy excerpts of German, french, and russian publications provided by members of the society. 
Among the most diligent contributors were Ladislav Vavrouch, who had access to foreign literature in 
his capacity as department head at the Ministry of Construction and, since 1956, Jaroslav Kubec, a fresh 
graduate in hydraulic engineering (MZA, h42, b. 288).
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   183 11/5/2012   1:34:02 PM
184 European Coasts of Bohemia
a general emergency organization, the third entity focused on European infra-
structures (ECITO). In 1946, the United Nations Economic and social Council 
turned its attention toward the reconstruction of devastated areas in Europe and 
established UNECE, a regional commission for the continent that supplanted the 
E-organizations. Despite the general distrust between the West and East which di-
minished in E-organizations from 1945 to 1947 and was non-existent in UNECE’s 
Figure 5.1 – Raba’s 1956 vision of the European waterway network. Unlike the Comecon plan, 
the Raba design did not lose the European perspective. He proposed an eastern extension of the 
network instead of a self-contained and isolated Comecon network of socialist countries, showing 
how the idea of Europe as a natural framework for the waterways was firmly rooted in the minds 
of Czechoslovak experts. The DOE was a central part of his scheme, which also revived an earlier 
plan to connect Prague to Regensburg (Danube) via the city of Plzeň and the Berounka River, 
perhaps inspired by Kračmer’s “de-Austrianizing plan” that had older roots. Source: Karel Raba, 
“Vodní cesty v Československu a úvahy o jejich rozšíření + Náčrt možných mezinárodních vod-
ních spojů,” Zprávy Společnosti D-O průplavu 3, no. 1 (1956): (MZA, H42, k. 288), 6.
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initial years, by 1955 UNECE had become virtually the only existing platform for 
discussion in a divided Europe. The UNECE Inland Transport Committee (ITC) 
took on ECITO’s agenda and, in addition to reconstructing the existing transport 
network, prepared plans for its development on the continent, thus answering the 
call of people like raba and smetana. 
While the Comecon scheme helped to revive the idea of the DOE in the late 
1950s, its further development during the 1960s and especially after the negative 
government resolution of 1972, was much more closely linked to the processes of 
pan-European infrastructural integration led by UNECE. As the opening quota-
tion suggests, after World War II, the DOE had been developed simultaneously 
within two different transnational frameworks, sovietized East European and 
European Continental. UNECE’s work gave the Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers 
the chance to develop and design the DOE according to emerging pan-European 
standards. When Communism collapsed, they had the “Europeanized” canal de-
sign ready to present to international and national authorities.
Indeed, the processes of sovietization, discussed in chapter three, and Euro-
peanization, to which this chapter is devoted, ran parallel throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century. As popular belief suggests, sovietization equated 
to de-Europeanization. The prominent Czech/french novelist Milan Kundera re-
ferred to the mutual opposition of Europeanization and sovietization in his 1984 
essay, The Tragedy of Central Europe.5 he described the post-war history of the 
region as the endless struggle of the Czechs, Poles, and hungarians to maintain 
their European identity against the forced imposition of the “new world” of soviet 
Communism. To some extent, the DOE canal records support his perspective. 
however, they equally imply that the situation was far more complicated and that 
the two processes did not stand in strict opposition.
On Europeanization
Unlike sovietization, which social science abandoned long ago and has since 
become exclusively an object of historical inquiries, Europeanization only re-
cently achieved the status of commonplace term in the social sciences.6 however, 
5 The french title of the essay, which translates as A Kidnapped West, expressed Kundera’s message more 
explicitly. The same title was chosen for publication in Czech. Milan Kundera, “Únos Západu,” in Západní, 
východní a střední Evropa jako kulturní a politické pojmy, ed. Miloš havelka and Ladislav Cabada (Plzeň: 
Západočeská univerzita, 2000), 102-115.
6 Kevin featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’,” in The Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin 
featherstone and Claudio M. radaelli (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-26, here 3.
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historians remain rather skeptical toward such concepts. In 2000, Geiger noted 
that they have long avoided defining or even using the term, approaching it with 
suspicion due to its obvious link to recent political developments and dissatisfac-
tion with its ambiguity.7 The history of the notion left imprints not only on its 
diminished potential as a clearly defined analytical category but, in a way not dis-
similar to sovietization, equipped the notion with implicit normative meanings 
and connotations. In contemporary literature, Europeanization typically presents 
not only a process of policy adjustments but also the optimal trajectory of change.8
The notion of Europeanization was originally a product of semantic conflation 
of “Europe” and “European Union,” derived from the self-definition of the latter. 
Over the past two decades, it has enjoyed increasing popularity in European in-
tegration studies. facing the need to conceptualize a top-down process of adapt-
ing EU (and its predecessors’) organizational dynamics in the member states at a 
domestic, institutional, and organizational level, scholars active in the field coined 
the term as a fitting designation.9 A definition supplied by radealli also aptly sums 
up its meaning. When defining Europeanization, he refers to processes of con-
struction, diffusion, and institutionalization of “formal and informal rules, pro-
cedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and 
norms,” which are first defined and developed at EU level and then incorporated 
in national discourses and political structures.10
such a definition serves scholars examining the development of the EU’s struc-
tures and governance system.11 however, it also leads to a paradoxical situation by 
7 In his contribution to the very first special issues on Europeanization (in a European studies Year-
book), Geiger studied the reaction of Irish foreign policy to various European integration plans, from the 
rejection of the Briand Plan through prioritization of newly acquired sovereignty, to acceptance of 1950s 
integration projects as a means of modernizing the country. Geiger defined Europeanization as an effect of 
a political integration project.Till Geiger, “Europeanization on the periphery: Irish elite responses to Euro-
pean Integration, 1929-63,” in Europeanization: institution, identities and citizenship, ed. robert harmsen 
and Thomas M. Wilson, Yearbook of European studies = Annuaire d’études européennes (Amsterdam; 
Atlanta, GA: rodopi, 2000), 105-134, here 106.
8 Břetislav Dančák, Petr fiala, and Vít hloušek, “Evropeizace – pojem a jeho konceptualizace,” in Ev-
ropeizace: nové téma politologického výzkumu, ed. Břetislav Dančák, Petr fiala, and Vít hloušek (Brno: 
Masarykova univerzita, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, 2005), 11-26, here 18.
9 According to James Caporaso, the appearance of the notion was related to the observed gradual reversion 
of the causal flow from (1) the original “bottom-up” direction, to (2) the regional “horizontal” organization 
stage, into (3) the recent “top-down” process. James Caporaso, “The Three Worlds of regional Integration 
Theory,” in Europeanization: New Research Agendas, ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten Peter Vink (hound-
mills, Basingstoke, hampshire England ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 23-45, here 25.
10 Claudio radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive Change,” European 
Integration Online Papers 4, no. 8 (2000), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm. Accessed 20 Decem-
ber 2007. 
11 As Dirk Lemkuhl stated in his defense of EU-ization as the true scope for Europeanization, “broaden-
ing of the perspective would aggravate the problem of attributing unambiguous causality to a European 
impact.” Dirk Lemkuhl, “some Promises and Pitfalls of Europeanization research,” in Europeanization: 
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challenging the “common sense” meaning of the notion and its analytical content: 
providing the response of domestic authorities to EU decisions is indeed negative, 
Europeanization in this narrow meaning could “potentially undermine European 
integration efforts.”12 however, as British economics historian Alan s. Milward 
noted, this process could not be described in terms of uni-directional diffusion 
or even imposition of standards and norms developed by the EU. Milward used 
the notion in his 1992 interpretation of the evolution of the EU as an aspect of the 
national reassertion of European nation states which created Europe to save their 
goals. he explicitly used the term Europeanization when discussing the establish-
ment of a regime of protection and subsidization of agricultural production at 
international level in Western Europe. Unlike his contemporaries, he employed it 
also for the bottom-up process. Milward concluded, that by creating a common 
market for agricultural products, nation states managed to protect their interests 
against growing globalization pressures. In his perspective, Europeanization re-
mains limited to the processes within the EU and covers both parts of the political 
integration process: the push for creating a European regime and its reverse ap-
plication in domestic policy.13 
As the adjective suggests, “European” transformations were hardly limited to 
the EU and its member states in both territorial as well as institutional terms. In its 
narrow meaning, Europeanization as “monopolized by scholars of the unification 
process between the member states of the EU and concentrating on adaptations to 
Brussels,” hardly stands for more than mere EU-ization.14 |Criticized for the EU-
ization label, EU-centrism tends to overlook other cross-border relations managed 
through a variety of transnational regimes and institutions operating alongside the 
EU and having an impact on territories outside the EU.15 A good example was the 
New Research Agendas, ed. Paolo Graziano and Maarten Peter Vink (houndmills, Basingstoke, hampshire; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 337-353, here 349.
12 Julian Clark and Alun Jones, “The spatialities of Europeanisation: Territory, Government and Power in 
‘EUrope’,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 33, no. 3 (2008): 300-318, here 306.
13 Chapter 5 of Milward’s book has this word in its title: The Europeanization of Agricultural Protection. 
Alan s. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London; New York: routledge, 2000), 197.
14 While many authors go beyond radeaelli’s exclusive focus on domestic adaptation and question 
European-level decision making processes, the EU remains the main research site. Caporaso, “The Three 
Worlds.”
15 Critics of EU-centrism of the narrow Europeanization concept came from European integration studies 
(for instance, schimmelfennig and sedelmeier) and other disciplines (flockhart). for a history of technol-
ogy, Johan schot formulated and empirically proved the criticality of the role of other (in his case expert) 
networks for integration on the continent. frank schimmelfennig and Ulrich sedelmeier, The Europeani-
zation of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Trine flockhart, “Euro-
peanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms across Time and space,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 48, no. 4 (2010): 787-810. Johan schot, “Transnational Infrastructures and the Origins of 
European Integration,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. 
Alexander Badenoch and Andreas fickers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 82-112.
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UNECE. It had been pan-European in character since its establishment in 1947, 
and failed to pay attention to the political division of the continent.
In opposition to the narrow perspective of EU-ization stands the extremely 
broad concept of Europeanization framed within the narratives of European civili-
zation. for instance, when Czech historian Josef Pekař formulated his master plan 
for Czech national history’ at the very beginning of the twentieth century, he was 
placing the history of the Czechs in the context of Europeanization understood as 
the formation of European civilization. “We participated in the common endeavor, 
from the tenth to the twentieth century; in the Gothic epoch we had Europeanized 
ourselves to the point that we would indicate directives to Europe, our teacher and 
governess, that we wanted to get hold of the steering wheel.”16 Even recently, a sim-
ilar approach appeared in the literature. According to flockhart, Europeanization 
is an historical process dating back to the Middle Ages that consists of “cultural 
encounters” that mediate the transfer of norms and behavioral practices making 
up the identity of the community of self-aware Europeans.17
The all too apparent flaw of such a concept lies in the at least questionable level 
of Europeans’ self-awareness in history. Additionally, it remains a question that ac-
tually constitutes the Europeanizing quality of a given process. In a volume Klaus 
Kiran Patel edited in 2010, probably the first attempt at an historical analysis of 
the process of Europeanization, he defined it as “a variety of political, social, eco-
nomic and cultural processes that promote (or modify) a sustainable strengthen-
ing of intra-European connections and similarities through acts of emulation and 
entanglement experienced and labeled as ‘European’ in the course of history.”18 
In his perspective, the notion of Europeanization roughly corresponds with the 
formation of European identity, and encompasses transnational transfers, flows, 
and patterns that occur in Europe or which historical actors defined or labeled as 
“European.”19 
In all these suggested meanings and with all due respect to the differences 
16 “… i my účastnili se práce společné od 10. do 20. století; v době gotické zevropeisovali jsme se do té 
míry, že že jsme chtěli udávat směrnice Evropě, své učitelce a vychovatelka, sami se uchopiti kormidla.” 
Josef Pekař, “smysl českých dějin,” in O smyslu českých dějin, ed. Josef Pekař (Prague: rozmluvy, 1990 
[1929]), 383-405, here 389. 
17 however, from a historian’s point of view, these considerations seem too bold, especially regarding the 
retrospective projection of the process. flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization?” 791.
18 Kiran Klaus Patel and Ulrike von hirschhausen, “Europeanization in history: An Introduction,” in Eu-
ropeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel,  
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1-18, here 4.
19 see the paper by John Davis on the British Beat “conquering” Europe. John Davis, “‘Die Briten kom-
men.’ British Beat Music and the Conquest of Europe in the 1960s,” in Europeanization in the Twentieth 
Century: Historical Approaches, ed. Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 229-252.
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between flockhart and Patel, Europeanization serves as a corrective to the nar-
row notion of political European integration. In this chapter the term is used in 
a less ambitious and more specific way, though also formulated as an alternative 
to the notion of European integration. somewhere between the western-centered 
EU-ization and the rather elusive concepts of European (identity) formation and 
European civilization, Europeanization as applied here stands for the processes of 
alignment to standards that their authors define as European, and for all manner 
of related activities aimed at constructing and applying such European standards. 
spatially, such processes were not limited to the EU or to any geographical defini-
tion of Europe. The principal players were seldom recruited from diplomats and 
governments but rather as individual experts. This definition draws on the concept 
of the Hidden Integration of Europe discussed in the Introduction. The fact that this 
chapter studies the Europeanization process through the perspective of a single case 
study, the DOE, makes it possible to settle for this rather straightforward definition. 
The literature on European integration tends to reproduce the Cold War image 
of a continent divided by political systems into two antagonistic parts, each develop-
ing its own independent integration model. scholars of post-war European integra-
tion have generally neglected UNECE and organizations that are primarily technical 
and expert in nature and operate on a continental scale. Nonetheless, among other 
projects, UNECE aimed to construct the European waterway network, thus actively 
promoting the Europeanization of the national networks beyond the territorial 
limits of Western political integration. The organization was not only operating on 
European territory but also deliberately working on its integration and the construc-
tion of at least a technically united Europe. here the label “European” seems for 
once absolutely justified.
The available literature on the organizations promoting infrastructural inte-
gration on a continental scale in twentieth century Europe sheds light on their 
role in the history of Europe. however, this literature focuses predominantly on 
the western part of the continent, although the Communist countries participated 
and cooperated in the work of such organizations and their projects. Among the 
many regional organizations operating in Europe, Comecon (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance) most often attended UNECE meetings. 
Transnational and intergovernmental organizations transgressing the Iron 
Curtain represented crucial platforms of Europeanization. Czechoslovak engineers 
involved with the planning of the DOE project and representatives of professional 
Czechoslovak institutions assigned with cooperation on an international level, 
that is, in the organizations focused on construction of an (at least infrastructural) 
integrated continent, thus represented crucial carriers of the Europeanization of 
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the DOE project.
UNECE took the leading role among organizations facilitating cooperation 
among experts from both sides of the Curtain. UNECE leaders deliberately pur-
sued a non-political technical working style to ensure that its operation (not only 
agenda and resolutions) was acceptable to both socialist and capitalist countries.20 
such a specific organizational set-up meant that the development and final adap-
tation of any given decision into local or national policy often depended vitally 
on the abilities and initiative of the experts involved. hence, individual engineers 
became instrumental in pushing forward the idea of the canal at all levels of au-
thority at a national as well as transnational European level.21
The cooperation between Comecon and UNECE played an important role in 
the Europeanization of the canal design. On technical issues and especially stand-
ards, Comecon often agreed with UNECE. furthermore, it converted sessions of 
its own subsidiary bodies into a sort of regional platform within UNECE. The joint 
operation of Comecon states at UNECE sessions enabled more balanced harmo-
nization of the standards valid on both parts of the continent, and allowed repre-
sentatives of the Eastern Bloc to actively influence final decisions. Thus, contrary 
to the general image of the Cold War, the trans-border cooperation and formation 
of Europeanization could not be described in terms of a one-way transfer from the 
technologically developed West to the backward East.22 
The alignment of Comecon and UNECE standards thanks to cooperation be-
tween the two entities, led to the establishment of a single set of recommended di-
mensions and regulations valid for the entire continent. While the Comecon rec-
ommendations were also “voluntary” – making the standards not absolutely bind-
ing for engineers working on the canal – because no alternative set of recommen-
dations existed, simply led to the recommendations being adopted as European. 
In addition, the existence of the UNECEas virtually the only transnational or 
international organization pursuing the DOE project after the Czechoslovak gov-
ernment’s negative resolution of 1972, made sticking to the UNECE the only alter-
native for tireless supporters of the canal. The 1972 failure to construct the canal 
as a national project induced growing orientation toward “higher” international 
structures, such as UNECE and later the EU, to secure the sheer survival of the 
project and to keep the idea alive. Indeed, the hydraulic engineers promoting the 
20 schot, “Transnational Infrastructures,” 85.
21 Importantly, in the socialist system (or planned economy), all international relations remained to a 
certain extent controlled by the state.
22 for instance in 1964, french delegates asked soviet colleagues about their experience with incline 
planes on inland waterways. The Ussr provided them with translations of papers by soviet expert B.s. 
Malevantchik published in the journal Transportnoie Stroitelstvo a year earlier (UNOG, GIX 15-1 35-9).
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   190 11/5/2012   1:34:03 PM
 Mastering Three seas 191
DOE idea attempted to utilize the transnational relations achieved by and through 
the international organizations, and these relations kept the canal on the UNECE 
agenda.
Technocratic internationalism, traditionally an ideology of experts, played a 
crucial role in the Europeanization process. After the World War II, as smetana 
and raba’s cases demonstrated, Czech hydraulic engineers substituted the 
Mitteleuropean spatial frame with Europe. Jaroslav Kubec, the leading figure in 
Europeanization and long-time member of UNECE working groups on inland 
navigation and shipping, was similar to the self-sovietizers of the early 1950s. his 
extensive list of publications advocating a European waterway network and the 
DOE, together with his personal connections, accounted for the relatively undis-
puted acceptance of the European dimension of the canal project in the 1960s, 
although not even a decade earlier the same waterway symbolized sovietization. 
furthermore, the experience of adapting the soviet model to the Czechoslovak 
environment in the 1950s led to considerable disappointment among the public 
and the community of hydraulic experts. Though not openly discussed, the grow-
ing neglect by soviet management is implied in the minutes of Academy of science 
meetings. In 1955, during a discussion of waterway construction and irrigation 
plans for southern slovakia, Alfred Dutka openly declared that there was nothing 
in the soviet experience that might be adopted in Czechoslovak conditions, and 
recommended turning to the rhine for inspiration.23 In the very same year the 
UNECE started to exchange experiences with the West as advocated by Dutka.
The available periodization of Europeanization generally does not divide the 
post-1945 period into sub-periods, especially those using a broader definition 
of the term.24 In contrast, Cold War literature divides post-war political history 
into four distinctive periods, which was important for the processes transgress-
ing the Iron Curtain. The changing East-West political relations had a definite 
profound influence on the construction of the European waterways network, i.e., 
the Europeanization of the Czechoslovak waterway projects. The Bloc formation 
period of the high Cold War (1945-1953) saw the formation and stabilization of 
the two blocs, and the delimitation of their borders in Europe. Gradually, the for-
mer allies ceased to communicate even at the most basic technical level. With 
23 report on the fifth meeting of the Commission for Water Management 1955 (AAVČr, KVh, b. 15, 
November 25, 1955). Alfréd Dutka was an interwar diplomat who was dismissed from the Ministry of 
foreign Affairs after 1948. The secret Police kept him under surveillance as a suspicious person and prob-
ably an “Imperialist agent” throughout the 1950s and 1960s (ABsČr, MV, 707969). for the next meeting, 
joined by soviet UsVh expert Kubarev, Dutka even prepared a comparison of Dutch and soviet inland 
navigation.
24 flockhart, “Europeanization or EU-ization?” Ute frevert, “Europeanizing Germany’s Twentieth Cen-
tury,” History & Memory 17, no. 1 (2005): 87-116.
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Khruschev’s rise to power in the Ussr, dialogue between the blocs emerged, which 
became a distinctive feature of the Peaceful Coexistence period (1953-1962). 
Technical organizations such as UNECE represented an important platform for 
the otherwise limited dialogue between the two antagonistic sides. The 1960s then 
marked a transition toward the period known as the Détente, which dominated the 
1970s and 1980s. The steadily growing level of cooperation, although hampered by 
general distrust between the political elites of East and West, led to the helsinki 
Conference on security and Cooperation in Europe (1973-1975), also important 
for the level of its negotiations with experts. however, these two decades also wit-
nessed the acceleration of separate developments in integration on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. With the collapse of communism in 1989, the Europeanization 
introduced into Central Europe during the period of Peaceful Coexistence took on 
the form of EU-ization. 
Czechoslovak participation in the international organizations geared to con-
structing the European waterway network, most notably the relevant subsidiary 
body of UNECE, followed a similar pattern. While renowned for their favor of 
international organizations during the interwar period, Czechoslovak diplomats 
and experts largely withdrew from these after World War II.25 Between 1948 and 
1953, few delegates from Prague attended any international organization meet-
ings with a Western membership, whether intergovernmental or transnational 
technical bodies. The situation changed in the mid-1950s, but the delegates re-
mained under strong political control. A decade later, around 1964, the situation 
eased further as traveling abroad became more commonplace and tolerated, even 
across the Curtain. Nonetheless, for the next decade, virtually all delegates trave-
ling to the West, where most UNECE or PIANC meetings took place, had to sign 
a Cooperation Agreement with the Czechoslovak secret Police, státní bezpečnost 
(stB). The Europeanization of the canal designs reflected the intensity of the con-
tact among the pan-European organizations. Initially, the Comecon project was 
developed according to Comecon standards, but since the early 1960s the designs 
gradually adopted dimensions and regulations developed and recommended by 
UNECE for the European network. After 1972, the Comecon network project 
virtually disappeared and the only available technological dimension for interna-
tional waterways the designers followed for the DOE was the European one.
25 As organizers of the Berlin workshop, How did Eastern and Western Europe meet in International 
Organizations (1945-1973)? A ’Post-Cold War’ Perspective (June 24, 2011) noted, it is surprising how little 
attention Czechoslovak historians have paid to post-war international organizations despite the important 
role Czechoslovak representatives played in them in the interwar period. General research is lacking. The 
assumptions presented here are based on the examples of people like Vojtěch Krbec.
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Across the Curtain
In the immediate post-war months, transport experts complained that inland wa-
terways are in most cases obstructed in the navigation channels by destroyed rail 
and road bridges, by blockships and in some cases by destroyed locks.”26 however, 
any attempt at reconstruction complicated the even more fragmented political 
map of post-World War II Europe. The situation required the continuing efforts 
exerted by the League of Nations and its aligned organizations iin the interwar 
period. Nonetheless, the results of the LoN transport conferences of the 1920s, 
most notably the Barcelona statute, remained a memento of interrupted integra-
tion; often, as in the case of the canal, this did not mean a complete stop but rather 
a continuation of the project by other means. As expressed by Königs in 1942, the 
Nazi vision of the international regime actually represented a continual struggle 
for a generally acceptable form of river and canal administration on a continental 
scale.27 The idea of an integrated waterway network, carried out by the institutional 
memory of several transnational organizations operating in post-war Europe, re-
tained the appeal of a unified Europe that the Nazis had attributed to the project.
To create a consistent network out of various national waterway systems and ex-
tremely diverse inland navigation standards, which historically developed within 
different river basins, establishing a universal (European) régime of operation on 
waterways was necessary. however, whereas the basic network already existed for 
railways or roads and its Europeanization required the introduction of a transna-
tional European régime of operation, inland waterways remained fragmented into 
isolated islands of navigation by the mid-twentieth century. 
By August 1945, after his return from the Potsdam Peace Conference, U.s. 
President Truman publicly announced that, “one of the persistent causes for wars 
in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways of 
Europe … The United states at Berlin proposed that there be free and unrestricted 
navigation of these inland waterways. We think this is important to the future 
peace and security of the world. We proposed that regulations for such naviga-
tion be provided by international authorities. The function of the agencies would 
be to develop the use of the waterways and assure equal treatment of them for 
all nations …”28 Although stalin immediately rejected the proposal, the vision of 
26 E.r. hondelink, “Transport Problems in Europe,” International Affairs 21, no. 4 (1945): 512-521, here 
517.
27 Gustav Königs, “Die Wasserstrassen im Europa-Verkehr,” Süddeutsche Wasserstrassen 19, no. 1-2 
(1943): 2-4.
28 Louis B. Wehle, “International Administration of European Inland Waterways,” The American Journal of 
International Law 40, no. 1 (1946): 100-120.
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transnational governance survived and resurfaced later through the efforts of vari-
ous organizations, predominantly the United Nations and PIANC.29
The U.s. representatives presented free navigation on international waterways, 
in terms of an interwar state of affairs, as key to a peaceful future for the continent. 
Even without actual archival evidence, assuming such plans also had a similar 
background seems correct and justifiable, namely that the principles of interna-
tionalization of the Danube after 1918 enabled the British to obtain economic in-
fluence in the area and American intervention could hardly be free of analogous 
intentions.30
In addition to diplomats, experts on inland navigation also made efforts to 
rapidly improve and reconstruct European waterways. The first post-war meeting 
of the restricted PIANC executive committee took place in Brussels in December 
1946, eleven years after the last congress at the very same location. American, 
British, Dutch, and french delegates participated.31 The committee decided to 
postpone the first post-war congress until 1949 to achieve “suitable and judicious 
organization, which has always been a characteristic of the congress.”32 however, 
such a decision had a negative effect on attendance. With the soviet bloc with-
drawing from the international stage, only a few papers were from beyond the 
Curtain.33
At the opening session of the congress in Lisbon, Major General Phillip 
B. flemming, chairman of PIANC’s American section, called for opening a 
broader perspective than the traditional focus on strictly engineering problems. 
Emphasizing the need to plan the development of inland water transport infra-
structure as part and parcel of the integrated inland transport system, he called 
for international cooperation on the re-construction of the navigable network 
and, in a rather straightforward manner, advertised the activities and measures 
undertaken by the freshly established UNECE in this respect. stating “the canal 
29 A fact often depicted in U.s. literature as an insult from stalin, though given soviet control over the 
Danube and Truman’s proposal to organize the international river commissions based on the big three, 
france and the riparian states, the soviet position seems understandable; for the debate in Potsdam from 
an American perspective, see robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1964), 277-279. for an example of the American “insult” interpretation, see Gregor Dallas, 1945: The War 
that Never Ended (New haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 574.
30 Alice Teichova and Penelope ratcliffe, “British Interests in Danube Navigation after 1918,” Business 
History 27 (1985): 283-300.
31 Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses, Account of the XVIIth Congress, Lisbon, 
1949 (Brussels: General secretariat of the Association, 1950), 5.
32 Ibid. Letter to heads of national PIANC committees from secretary-General Joseph Millecam in 1946, 
reprinted in the Preface. Despite the post-war situation and general decline in membership, the number 
of papers submitted to the congress was higher than the previous two congresses in 1931 and 1935 (alto-
gether 110 papers and 12 reports), proving that, organizationally, its goal was achieved.
33 four of them were from Czechoslovakia. Ibid.
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systems must be so planned as to give the communities – regional and national – 
the best and most efficient service,” he actually meant that they must be built to 
serve Europe.34
While universalistic in its aims, PIANC remained a mostly European enter-
prise well into the second half of the twentieth century. Although it boasted of cov-
ering the whole world, in membership and focus it was mainly a European agency, 
at least until the 1960s. In 1953, Joseph Millecam, PIANC secretary-General, 
touched on the issue of European dominance in his foreword to the report of the 
work of the 18th Congress. Attempting to justify why rome and not Brasilia was 
chosen as location, he pointed out that “10 out of 11 congresses since 1905 were 
held in Europe, 1136 out of 1866 members reside in Europe (61%), 20 out of 39 
governments supporting PIANC are situated in Europe (50%), 76% of subsidies 
and subscriptions come from European countries.” In fact, except for the United 
states which hosted the event in 1912 and 1961 and a trip to British Egypt and 
suez in 1926, the first Congress held outside Europe took place in Osaka in 1990, 
followed by sydney in 2002.
Under the heading acceleration of transport on inland waterways, the Lisbon 
Congress covered issues on the establishment of a regional network at both a ma-
terial and operational level. After all, in the eyes of some delegates, national, in-
stitutional and administrative regulations were the crucial factors slowing down 
waterborne traffic and limiting its competitiveness. Among the measures dis-
cussed was the international cooperation required, especially regarding the stand-
ardization of waterway and vessel measures. reporters on the issue approached 
the problem from various angles, though several important points can be derived 
from the gathered data. Most of the contributors (virtually exclusively Europeans 
except for the U.s.) described the existing national waterway classifications. 
Classification into categories representing vessel types was seen as most useful, 
namely for constructing new and reconstructing older waterways and naviga-
tion structures.35 Again, the American delegates were most vocal on this point, 
insisting, “the broader the territorial extent of this uniformity, the greater the re-
sulting benefits.”36 however, the picture emerging from the national reports only 
documented the fragmentation of the continent’s inland waterways. The french 
34 Ibid., 69.
35 rené Graff, “General report,” in XVIIth International Navigation Congress Lisbon 1949, Section 1 – 
Question 1. Acceleration of Transport on Inland Navigable Waterways, ed. Permanent International Associa-
tion of Navigation Congresses (Brussels: General secretariat of the Association, 1950), 1-9, here 8.
36 frederick M. rademacher, Adolphus J. McCorkle, and John B. Newsom, “Paper,” in XVIIth Internation-
al Navigation Congress Lisbon 1949, Section 1 – Question 1. Acceleration of Transport on Inland Navigable 
Waterways, ed. Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (Brussels: General secre-
tariat of the Association, 1950), 57-80, here 77.
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classification developed for the reconstruction and improvement of the national 
network heavily damaged during the war recognized four categories of canals by 
dividing the 600t carrying capacity in two. since 1879, two standards had been op-
erating, one for principal waterways (fitting the french self-propelled vessel type 
Peniche 5x38, 5x1.8 m), the other for smaller local canals. By 1931, the Dutch had 
developed a classification of five classes and the rhine 2000t vessel. Nonetheless, 
regardless of the southern and Northern Peninsulas’ isolated systems or absenting 
Eastern Europe, the documents showed a tendency in Western Europe to adopt 
three main standards derived from the following vessel types: the rhine barge 
over 2000t, the 1200-1350t rhine-herne canal barge, and the traditional 300-350t 
lighters, with intermediate types such as the 1000t Dortmund-Ems canal barge or 
600t Belgian Campine barges.37
The Congress opened with a debate on the basic standards for a future regional 
network, foreseen by certain delegates as a natural outcome of reconstructing the 
destroyed or damaged ports and waterways. however, ultimately PIANC only as-
sisted international organizations in implementing the plans. The results of the 
discussion launched at the Lisbon Congress were taken up by other international 
organizations.
The support for UNECE expressed by General flemming, the American rep-
resentative at the Congress, aptly characterized general U.s. foreign policy on 
the post-war reconstruction of Europe. American policy makers identified na-
tionalism in its various forms (economic, ethnic, etc.) as the crucial cause of the 
War; thus, they intended to curtail the powers of European nation states and di-
rect them towards cooperation. The economic superiority of the U.s. allowed it 
to enforce the establishment of some form of supra-national governance on the 
continent, which it exercised through the Marshall Plan. The program’s architects 
deliberately designed it in a way that required some degree of integration. At first, 
they considered entrusting UNECE with running the program, but decided to 
create a brand new organization to meet the task, the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), in response to the Cold War. OEEC membership 
was restricted to non-communist countries.
Although the Americans remained present at UNECE, they pushed for inte-
gration focusing on the western part of the continent, and it was here that the ideas 
expressed by flemming in Lisbon first came to life. Within the parameters of the 
OEEC, a special body was created for transport in 1953, The European Conference 
of Ministers of Transport. By its first meeting, the participants had declared interest 
37 see other Lisbon Congress reports.
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in developing and improving the state of the inland waterway network and laid the 
foundation for developing the unified West European waterway network.38 
Unlike the OEEC, UNECE’s goal was to facilitate interaction between both 
parts of the continent. from the very beginning, UNECE’s chief executive, Gunnar 
Myrdal, strongly pushed for preserving it as continent-wide organization and was 
prepared to put considerable effort into gaining the confidence and cooperation 
of socialist countries.39 Initially, however, the envisaged East-West collaboration 
yielded minimal results. from about 1950, East European countries gradually 
withdrew from all subsidiary bodies. Apart from continued Polish membership on 
the Coal Committee, the OEEC had virtually become a West European agency and 
thus lost part of its justification for existence.40 Until 1953, the subsidiary bodies 
consisted of exclusively West European experts and delegates carried out almost 
all the work.41 furthermore, the position of the East European countries within 
UNECE has been much debated by contemporary critics of Myrdal’s politics. he 
was often accused, especially by the Americans, of being overly active and obliging 
in his attitude towards the Eastern bloc.42 The fact that hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
and Poland had left the scene (except the vital Coal Committee), together with the 
Ussr, clearly suggests that political mechanisms were in operation.
The organizational structure of UNECE and its mode of operation corre-
sponded with the intentions of its designers. The annual plenary sessions of the 
Commission, mostly attended by diplomats and permanent delegates of member 
countries, often staged rhetorical battles between representatives of the competing 
social systems, similar to many international Cold War organizations. UNECE’s 
smooth operation secured the secretariat, whereas its technical committees con-
ducted the core of the work. Both the plenary and subsidiary bodies refrained 
from majority voting, and projects without consensual support were withdrawn 
from the agenda. such measures protected the committee sessions from splitting 
along political lines. Issues of standardization and subsequent integration of the 
transport systems came under the authority of the Inland Transport Committee 
(ITC). UNECE also actively cooperated with other transnational organizations, 
especially technical ones. regarding inland navigation, international commissions 
38 Erich seiler, “Die Klasseeintelung der europäischen Wasserstrassen und ihre Bedeutung für die Bin-
nenschiffahrt,” Die Wasserwirtschaft 45, no. 10 (1954-1955): 245-258.
39 Václav Kostelecký, The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe: The Beginning of a History 
(Göteborg: Graphic systems AB, 1989), 56.
40 David Wightman, “East-West Cooperation and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,” 
International Organization 11, no. 1 (1957): 1-12, here 4.
41 Jean soitis, ECE in the Emerging European System (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1967), 45.
42 Wightman, “East-West Cooperation,” 5.
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for both the rhine and the Danube existed (those for the Oder and the Elbe were 
not revived after the war) in addition to PIANC. however, in the organization’s 
initial years, developments on the Danube remained unknown as communist 
countries neither invited UNECE to the negotiations nor informed it.43 
Transport, and especially waterways, is a prominent item quoted in the lit-
erature to illustrate UNECE’s successful mediation in East-West cooperation.44 At 
the very first ITC session, waterways appeared on the agenda within the broader 
discussion of post-war reconstruction and future operation of European transport 
networks. The interruption of the committees’ work attributable to the withdrawal 
of Eastern Europe did disrupt the attempts to reconstruct the existing waterway 
network in Europe.
Only in 1953 did the isolationism on the east side of the Iron Curtain begin to 
thaw. Czechoslovak representatives identified the 1953 talks held at the UNECE 
Council in Geneva between Comecon member states and capitalist representatives 
on the resurrection of international trade as a turning point in the commercial/
technological sphere.45 The soviet bloc representatives saw UNECE as an opportu-
nity to cooperate with the West and benefit particularly in the field of technology. 
The Ussr promoted wider cooperation in the transport sector and saw UNECE’s 
ITC as a bridge to facilitate interaction between the newly established socialist 
transnational railways and the West European system.46 The UNECE founding 
members from people’s democracies such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the 
Ussr, resumed full participation before 1955, and the other East European com-
munist countries Albania, Bulgaria, hungary, and romania entered UNECE for 
the first time that year.
Otakar Šimůnek, then head of the permanent Czechoslovak delegation at 
Comecon, clearly stated the Czechoslovak standpoint toward the UNECE in 
his speech at the Council’s seventh session. In the wake of the 20th congress of 
the soviet Union’s Communist Party, he openly criticized the shortcomings of 
43 Note by the secretariat on relations with international organizations for inland waterway transport. 
Prepared for the third session of the UNECE Inland Transport Committee. UNECE document TrANs/34, 
28 september 1948.
44 Wightman, “East-West Cooperation”; Gunnar Myrdal, “Twenty Years of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe,” International Organization 22, no. 3 (1968): 617-628.
45 from the conference paper based on Czechoslovak sources. Wightman offers the standpoint of the UN-
ECE as mediator that achieved its goal to bring the East back to Geneva through these informal trade 
consultations in April 1953. Ludovit hallon and Miroslav Londák, “facilities, forms and Areas of Economic 
Activities of firms in Neutral and in socialist Countries During the Cold War: The slovak Case,” XIV Inter-
national Economic History Congress (2006), http://www.helsinki.fi/iehc2006/papers3/Londak.pdf. Accessed 
12 June 2008. see also, Wightman, “East-West Cooperation,” 4.
46 The Ussr, unlike Czechoslovakia, was not a member of the UNECE: report on the utilization 
of Czechoslovak membership for the Inland Transport Committee. EhK: Zpráva o využití čs. členství ve 
výboru pro vnitrozemskou dopravu (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 68, April 5, 1965).
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Comecon member states’ cooperation. he identified a certain isolationism on the 
part of the organization, arguing in favor of establishing broader cooperation with 
capitalist countries based on the “peaceful co-existence policy.”
Among capitalist international organizations, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe is the most important one for European 
socialist countries … however, it is necessary for Comecon countries to 
consult on the means of proceeding in UNECE in order to secure further 
development of mutually benefiting relations between East and West … 
Joint action and active participation of experts from socialist countries in 
UNECE working groups would enable us to exploit and actively influence 
the UNECE organs dealing with tasks that are extremely important for 
our countries (he also lists “some modes of transport”).47
The year 1955 marking the restoration of the UNECE pan-European integrative 
approach, was also significant for the first ad hoc meeting of experts on inland wa-
terway problems held under the auspices of UNECE at Geneva in May. The debate 
aimed to solve practical problems such as the unification of police regulations, 
signs and signals, boatmen’s papers, and ships’ certificates. Political tension with 
the socialist Danube Commission caused a slight delay in waterborne transport 
compared to other means of transport that had fully established their own perma-
nent working groups by 1955.48 
47 Among the benefits of mutually exchanging experiences with capitalist states, Šimůnek listed the grow-
ing purchasing potential, removal of discriminatory economic barriers, and enhancement of knowledge 
on progressive technology. he also mentioned the opportunity to obtain statistics on the development of 
European economies. he warned: “despite the expected improvements, materials provided by the UNECE 
could not solve all the economic issues in socialist countries. That would be the task of the Council and its 
bodies to help member states solve specific problems arising from economic planning.” Otakar Šimůnek 
(1908-1972) was a Czechoslovak communist politician, chemical engineer, and minister for the chemical 
industry (December 1951 – June 1954); minister and head of the Czechoslovak state Planning Office/state 
Planning Commission from June 1954 to July 1962 (Czechoslovak GOsPLAN, until 1960 Státní úřad pláno-
vací, later on Státní plánovací komise; this change reflected the common East European pattern, with one 
powerful central planning office subdivided into departments replacing industrial ministries); at the same 
time Deputy Prime Minister from 1959, Czechoslovak Permanent Comecon representative responsible for 
Czechoslovak affairs within Comecon from 1962, and responsible for developing economic relations with 
other countries in his capacity as head of the state Commission for Economic and scientific-Technical Co-
operation since 1965; long-term member of the CzCP central committee and member of parliament; after 
1968, he gradually lost his positions.
48 Tension arose concerning the international status of the Danube and the sovietized version of the Dan-
ube Commission established in Belgrade in 1848. At the first ad hoc Meeting on Inland Waterway Problems 
organized by UNECE, representatives from Great Britain opposed the participation of the Danube Com-
mission delegate, stating that the only proper Danube Commission was established in 1921 by the Treaty 
of Versailles. The delegate’s affiliation to the Commission was deleted from the minutes. Meeting of the Ad 
hoc Working Group of the Economic Commission for Inland Waterway Transport in Geneva, May 31-June 
3, 1955. Zasedání pracovní skupiny Evropské hospodářské komise pro vnitrozemskou vodní dopravu v 
Ženevě 31.5.-3.6. 1955 (AMZV, MO-OMO, k. 65, July 4, 1955).
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   199 11/5/2012   1:34:04 PM
200 European Coasts of Bohemia
In exact accordance with Šimůnek’s proposal, Comecon member states coor-
dinated their participation in UNECE meetings right from the start, by coordi-
nating the course of action and the attendance (who goes where; where the com-
mon standpoint needs support from a permanent delegate or an otherwise non 
interested party; the expert groups on the agenda of a particular country, etc.).49 
Delegations of experts in Geneva unavoidably defrayed in western currencies and 
heavily burdened the sending institutions’ budgets. As a result, the insufficient 
numbers of delegated experts due to financial constraints and limited manpower 
led to the Czechoslovak participation at UNECE being highly criticized from the 
outset. One of the first inland waterways reports, namely on the post-session meet-
ing of socialist countries at the permanent soviet delegate’s residence, emphasized 
that insufficient attendance by experts from the “peace camp” at meetings limited 
their ability to be properly informed and prepared.50
The East-West divide affected negotiations within the working group. Although 
Karel hoblík, a Czechoslovak representative at its first meeting in 1955, stated in 
his report to the government that the situation could “by no means be character-
ized as a dispute between delegates from peace camp countries and others. Quite 
to the contrary – on many occasions the views of the soviet delegation or any 
peace camp country were supported by capitalist countries and vice versa.”51 for 
example, during the discussion on standardizing signaling and marking water-
ways, Austria rather illogically voted against the adoption of the Danube standard 
in favor of the rhine.52 
The integration of European waterways in UNECE started with the soviet ini-
tiative. The motivation for the soviet proposal to establish a unified European wa-
terway network at UNECE’s 23rd session in 1958 was probably to gain free access 
to the not yet internationalized waterways in the western part of the continent.53 
At least the Czechoslovak officials decided to support the opportunity to “use not 
only the existing waterways and Elbe-frG canals, but also the future Danube-
rhine connection.”54 for the Ussr and its allies, the idea of a network provided 
49 for instance, the plan for Czech participation at UNECE meetings in 1955 was coordinated with the 
Polish plan then forwarded to the permanent soviet UNECE delegate. UNECE – participation at meetings. 
EhK – účast na zasedáních 1955 (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 65).
50 report on the meeting of the UNECE Working Group for Inland Water Transport in May 1956. Zasedání 
Ps EhK pro otázky vnitrozemské vodní dopravy od 22. do 25. 5. 1956 v Ženevě – zpráva o výsledcích pro 
PV (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 66).
51 report on the meeting of the UNECE Working Group on Inland Water Transport in June 1955. EhK: 
Pracovní skupina pro vnitrozemskou vodní dopravu – zpráva o průběhu a výsledcích (AMZV MO OMO 
1955-65 b. 65, June 8, 1955), 7.
52 UNECE document Trans/WP 31/sG 1/2, 1956.
53 UNECE document W/TrANs/256, 1958.
54 A draft of guidelines for the Czechoslovak representative at the 13th session of the ITC UNECE, Geneva, 
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the potential exploitation of cheap transport on international rivers — trans-
port fully operated by socialist vessels not requiring to be hired and paid in hard 
currency. This idea led to the establishment of the special Group of Experts on 
Problems involved in Establishing a Unified system of Waterways of International 
Concern in Europe, as a subordinate body of the ITC sub-committee for Inland 
Water Transport.55
Going back to the materialization of Cold War sentiments in the UNECE, it is 
important to mention that the Ussr separately pushed forward the construction 
of an integrated waterway network within Comecon objectives. The first draft for 
the network, the Program for the further study of issues related to the establishment 
of the unified inland waterway network of the Comecon member states, issued in 
1960, mentioned UNECE; the second article of the “opening remarks” stated that 
the Program included all issues necessary for the economic and technical evalua-
tion of the purposefulness of establishing the Comecon network, and “simultane-
ously it takes account of problems establishing the unified European network of 
inland waterways of international importance as set out in the UNECE Group of 
Experts’ action program.”56 
A crucial point in the development of a unified system was establishing a com-
prehensive classification of European inland waterways, which imposed order on 
the rather incoherent array of artificial canals and navigable rivers. The techni-
cal aspects of existing infrastructures varied immensely because of the differing 
natural conditions and applied national or regional standards. When starting to 
develop a universal standard, the Group adopted a classification developed by 
Professor seiler in 1954 for the rhine Basin and the Coal and steel Community, 
based primarily on vessels’ carrying capacity.57
By 1960, at the onset of negotiations on which classification to adopt, the Group 
of Experts agreed that the links connecting the main basins should be Class IV and 
higher (enabling vessels of 1,000-1,500t carrying capacity to navigate) and that the 
capacity of these waterway links (at locks, for example) should allow pushed barge 
convoy traffic.58 Both sides also agreed that the lowest two classes of seiler’s clas-
sifications were too variable for any standardization. The debate centered on class 
III, some of which were the most important waterways of international concern, 
December 15-19, 1958 (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 68).
55 By 1966 (at its sixth session), the group was renamed Working Party for the Development of Waterways.
56 Program for further studying issues related to establishing the unified inland waterway network of Com-
econ member states. Comecon Protocols sCT TP/8/62 (NAČr, MZO-fMZO , odd. 20, b. 5), annex 10.
57 seiler, “Die Klasseeintelung.”
58 report on the Group of Experts’ fourth session. UNECE document TrANs/WP34/3, 15-8-1960). The 
same specification was the core of the Comecon unification scheme (with pushed-barge convoys – tolkatch 
– as technical novelty).
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such as the German Mittellandkanal. The West German delegate announced that 
the canal could not be upgraded to Class IV, but at the same time was reluctant to 
include class III in the internationalized European network.59
Indeed, the issue created tension, so much so that at the 23rd session of UNECE 
ITC (January 20-25, 1964, Geneva), West European countries declared the idea 
of a unified European waterway system an “East European interest.” however, 
Austria showed interest and so it remained on the agenda. Czechoslovak delegates 
reported with some regret that the much-expected deeper analysis by the subcom-
mittee on inland water transport and its work on a unified waterway network did 
not happen.60
Establishing a unified European waterway network also required high ca-
pacity links to be constructed, thus forming a continent-wide waterway system 
out of the, up till now separated networks of soviet russia, the rhine, and the 
Danube. To this end, economic studies were carried out for the rhine-Main-
Danube, Danube-Oder, and Dnieper-Vistula-Oder water connections.61 for each 
of the three projects, a special Group of Rapporteurs composed of interested parties 
started operations in 1964, led respectively by representatives of the frG (rMD), 
Czechoslovakia (DO), and Poland (DVO).62 
The struggle between the two worlds escalated again in 1966 at the sixth meet-
ing of the experts on integration, at which the classification battle resumed with 
new vehemence. The West European delegates met twice before the meeting to 
prepare arguments for the dispute over classification (within the framework of 
the European Conference of Ministers of Transport), which was finally helped by 
the independent stance held by romania who was not at the meeting but had sub-
mitted its own proposal. Nor did Poland and Ukraine attend the meeting. Given 
that Bulgaria had not taken part in the working group, the Czechoslovak dele-
gates, together with the Ussr and hungary, were heavily outweighed by Austria, 
Belgium, france, the frG, the Netherlands, switzerland, the UsA, and Yugoslavia. 
Eventually, class III was also protected from standardization (and internationaliza-
tion) by western countries.63
59 report on the Group of Experts’ third session on Problems involved in Establishing a Unified system of 
Waterways of International Concern in Europe. Zpráva o 3. Zasedání expertů pro stadium otázky sjedno-
cení evropských vodních cest (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 68, November 16, 1962).
60 report on the 23rd meeting of the UNECE ITC. Zpráva o průběhu 23. zasedání 20-25.1.64 Ženeva 
(AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 68).
61 report on the Group of Experts’ second session, UNECE document TrANs/WP34/6, June 1, 1961. 
62 report on the Group of Experts’ fourth session, UNECE document TrANs/WP34/12963.
63 report on the Group of Experts’ sixth session on Problems involved in Establishing a Unified system of 
Waterways of International Concern in Europe. Zpráva o 6. zasedání expertů pro stadium otázky sjednocení 
evropských vodních cest (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 68, October 15, 1965).
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In a way, this situation ushered in the ensuing developments. The Group of 
rapporteurs (Gor) on the DOE experienced severe difficulties coping with the 
hostile attitude of western and allegedly neutral countries towards the GDr. In 
1967, the Elbe branch was included in the DOE project, thus directly involving 
the GDr in the scheme. however, the Austrian delegation, faithful to the western 
position, argued that the GDr could only be invited to the group as occupied terri-
tory, based on article 10 of the UNECE Charter, which was an unacceptable condi-
tion. In 1968, the Ussr and hungary joined the Gor, holding observer status and 
Yugoslavia and romania were invited to cooperate. In addition, the International 
rhine and Danube Commissions (CCNr, DC) were allowed to join the group. 
The Gor met only five times on the DOE, and the last meeting was at Vienna in 
December 1968. The next session, originally planned for November 1969 in Děčín 
(Czechoslovakia), was cancelled by the Gor chairman, who failed to find a way 
to ensure the GDr experts could participate and followed the general Comecon 
line.64 On the same grounds as at the 25th session of the UNECE Working Party on 
the Development of Inland Waterways, the Polish delegate stated that the Gor on 
the Dnieper-Oder did not intend to start work because the GDr, a riparian state 
on the Oder, was not allowed to participate due to its unclear position outside 
UNO structures.65
With the report on the rhine-Danube canal delivered and others postponed, 
the Group of Experts on unification ceased to meet regularly after 1967. This some-
what contradicted the 1967 claim by Jean soitis that “bipolarity has been replaced 
by … a power subsystem” in which “the hegemony of superpowers is withering 
away … With very few exceptions, the only problems whereby the Ussr can still 
rely on the support of other East European countries seem to be the Vietnam War 
and the threat of German militarism.”66 To that, it seems we should add solidarity 
with the GDr. 
By aligning European and soviet standards, UNECE activities naturally af-
fected the technical layout of the DOE canal, and perhaps even more profoundly, 
its economic implications, as free shipping on West European rivers under-
pinned the idea of the Comecon and European waterway network. The process 
of applying the waterway standards developed by UNECE, as well as utilizing the 
64 As occupation zones, both Germanies could send their representatives to ECE meetings, although the 
GDr did not take part before the mentioned trade consultations of 1953 (soitis, ECE in the Emerging Eu-
ropean System, 49). After the Paris Treaty, the UN (ECOsOC) accepted the frG but not the GDr based on 
U.s. policy that considered communist Germany still an occupation zone due to the non-existence of free 
elections; the GDr only became a member of UNO in 1973 despite regular attempts by East Europeans to 
open the issue in the 1960s.
65 UNECE document E/ECE/TrANs/544, 20-1-1966, 65-67.
66 soitis, ECE in the Emerging European System, 8.
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experience gained by cooperating with colleagues on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain, depended largely on the experts and delegates attending the meetings 
on behalf of Czechoslovakia. As mentioned above, UNECE presented itself as an 
apolitical, purely technical organization because the resolutions made in Geneva 
had to be implemented and adapted in a national context by local experts on a 
voluntary basis. Thus, the entire Europeanization process – that is, the application 
of “European” standards developed at UNECE – fell on the shoulders of individu-
als whose position within state ranks allowed them to influence crucial decisions. 
These experts did often attend UNECE meetings and took part in the standard 
setting process.
Thus, we should focus attention on the experts involved in the actual creation 
of the standards applied to the canal designs – the Czechoslovak representatives 
at UNECE. A striking feature in the first years of the European Network plan was 
the difference between the experts attending Comecon meetings and those go-
ing to Geneva because both inland waterway sections of the Comecon standing 
Commission on Transport and the UNECE Inland Transport Committee shared a 
similar agenda. Experts delegated to UNECE meetings were politically more relia-
ble and linguistically well-equipped state officials. Experts sent abroad had several 
levels of reliability. some engineers were simply not allowed to leave the country 
on any official mission, others were restricted to socialist countries (Comecon), 
third-world countries or other countries in-between, and finally only the most 
reliable represented Czechoslovakia in capitalist states.67 To some extent, such a 
distinction recreated the Iron Curtain even within the group of Czechoslovak hy-
draulic engineers, as those working on the Danube-Oder project at UNECE were 
in a way separated from the engineers attending Comecon meetings on water-
ways. however, the need to coordinate Czechoslovak representation at interna-
tional organizations dealing with transit led to the decision to make institutions 
representing Czechoslovakia at Comecon sTC also responsible for other interna-
tional organizations.68
The Czechoslovak representatives who attended meetings of the UNECE ICT 
Working Party on Inland Water Transport were carefully selected from appropriate 
67 Profiles of engineers nominated for promotion always included a note indicating their degree of reli-
ability, such as “delegated to countries of the socialist camp,” etc.; for Oldřich Vitha’s profile, see Zásady 
organizační přestavby odvětví vodního hospodářství, 1966 (NAČr, KsČ-ÚV-02/1, sv.129, aj.137-3). After 
1964, this policy softened, as the case of Czcehoslovak scientists show: soňa Štrbáňová and Antonín Ko-
stlán, Sto českých vědců v exilu: encyklopedie významných vědců z řad pracovníků Československé akademie 
věd v emigraci (Prague: Academia, 2011), 5.
68 The organization coordinating international relations, letter from the Ministry of Transport to the 
Ministry of foreign Affairs. Organizace koordinačních pracích v oboru mezinárodních vztahů (AMZV, 
MO-OMO 1955-1965, b. 68, January 9, 1963).
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institutions. since 1955, Karel hoblík, an ardent communist lawyer of working 
class origin and high ranking state official at the Ústřední správa plavby (Central 
Office for Navigation) had represented Czechoslovakia. he was accompanied by 
hydraulic engineer svatopluk hlava, who did not have such a glossy political pro-
file but had mastered several languages. This was clearly a politically motivated 
choice. The appropriate candidate would have been engineer Kliment Velkoborský, 
head of the Prospective Planning Department’s navigation section at the Ministry 
of Transport, who had led the negotiations over the DOE Comecon project in 
1957 and 1958.69 When Velkoborský retired, his successor rudolf Vachuda was 
suddenly delegated to UNECE as well as Comecon.
rudolf Vachuda (1925-??) was originally a joiner by trade, but in 1949 the 
Youth Union (Svaz mládeže) at the factory where he worked sent him to study 
at University of Political science and Economics, a freshly established institu-
tion focused on training the new communist technocracy.70 After graduating in 
1953, he joined the Ministry of Transport. from the summer of 1958 he was sen-
ior engineer in the Prospective Planning Department as specialist in inland water 
transport. Vachuda proved his loyalty to the communist regime by also spying on 
his colleague Velkoborský, who was suspected of espionage. however, only after 
Vekoborský’s retirement did Vachuda, a member of the communist party since 
1949, become a secret Police informer (until 1970).71 he also chaired the Gor on 
the DOE on behalf of Czechoslovakia. since the early 1960s, at the meetings re-
lated to the DOE, Vachuda was usually joined by Václav Plecháč, who, as shown in 
the preceding chapter, fundamentally influenced the history of the canal. 
Western literature often depicts UNECE as an apolitical institution governed 
and run by experts; however, for Czechoslovak delegates in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
situation was not that simple. Before going to Geneva, they usually received meet-
ing guidelines from the Ministry of foreign Affairs, and before the actual UNECE 
session started, they met with representatives from other socialist countries at the 
Permanent soviet Delegate’s residence to prepare joint action. While UNECE was 
by definition a technocratic organization established to bridge the gap between 
the eastern and western part of the continent on technical grounds, Comecon is 
often seen as a fig leaf covering soviet imperialism. Paradoxically, as seen from 
the eastern perspective, the situation was reversed. While engineers within the 
Comecon structures were able to act independently (as in the case of changed lock 
69 Oddělení perspektivního plánu.
70 Markéta Devátá, “Vysoká škola politických a hospodářských věd jako nástroj indoktrinace marxisticko-
leninského vědeckého světového názoru,” in Proměny diskursu české marxistické historiografie, ed. Bohumil 
Jiroušek (České Budějovice: Jihočeská univerzita, 2008), 193-204.
71 he “signed” on January 15, 1959 (ABsČr, MV, 642778).
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dimensions at the previously mentioned Berlin negotiations of 1958), nothing like 
that ever happened at UNECE, where Czechoslovak representatives were barely 
more than soviet puppets. They were the only ones to support the soviet proposal 
of 1958 by a special letter (demanded by the Ussr), acting always in accordance 
with the Ussr, unlike romania, Yugoslavia or even hungary and Poland.72
This Czechoslovak loyalty sometimes created amusing situations. for in-
stance, in his report on the second Meeting of Experts on the Unification of 
Waterways, Vachuda bitterly complained that, in reaction to the soviet proposal, 
the Czechoslovak delegation committed to summarizing the methodology of the 
complex justification of waterways as practiced in socialist countries, “despite ask-
ing the soviet delegation to take up the task.”73 
Europeanization of the Canal Design
remarkably, the debate over the construction of the transnational network en-
compassing the DOE in the Czechoslovak trade press focused almost exclusively 
on the UNECE initiative; in other words, the European aspect. The Comecon 
alternative, though in a way politically less problematic, surprisingly did not 
find its way into public discourse. With the exception of the journal Plánované 
Hospodářství (Planned Economy), which had published some Comecon sCT 
activities and materials, the plans for the Comecon waterway network passed 
generally unnoticed. The central transport journal Doprava, as well as the main 
water management monthly, Vodní Hospodářství, followed only the progress of 
the UNECE plan ever since rudolf Vachuda had published an account of the pre-
pared UNECE classification in 1961.74 similarly, when Czechoslovak shipping 
companies organized a national conference on inland water transport in the au-
tumn of 1967, the title emphasized the continental rather than the “Eastern Bloc” 
72 EhK – ITC: sovětský návrh jednotné vodní sítě / UNECE ITC: soviet proposal for a unified waterway 
network, preparation of Czechoslovak standpoint, March 23, 1959 (AMZV, MO-OMO, k. 68). however, 
even Czechoslovak delegates sometimes expressed an independent (i.e. not soviet ordered) opinion at 
UNECE for instance, during negotiations on the interwar convention regarding responsibility for naviga-
tion damage . Czechoslovakia did not support the soviet attempt to change the convention because, unlike 
in the Ussr, the Czechoslovak law did not contradict its principles. however, even such a rational deci-
sion was only accomplished because of a soviet note saying, “holding a common stance is not necessary in 
this point.” report on the meeting of the UNECE Working Group for Inland Water Transport (May 22-25, 
1956). Zasedání Ps EhK pro otázky vnitrozemské vodní dopravy (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 66).
73 report on the second meeting of experts to study the unification of European Waterways. Zpráva z 
II. jednání expertů pro studium sjednocení evropských vodních cest (AMZV, MO-OMO, b. 68, June 26, 
1961), 5.
74 rudolf Vachuda, “Připravuje se nová klasifikace evropských vodních cest,” Doprava 3, no. 1 (1961): 
13-16.
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dimension of the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal project. The event went under the title, 
“Impact of Planned Construction of European Waterways on Czechoslovak Water 
Transport.”75 furthermore, when the Czechoslovak authorities published a spe-
cial informatory leaflet on the project, they decided to devote it to the twentieth 
anniversary of UNECE rather than celebrate Comecon sCT’s tenth year. While 
the publication hailed UNECE and its efforts to create a unified Europe, it was 
printed in russian as well as in English, french, and German and distributed 
within Comecon.76 That was perhaps why Plecháč, one of the authors, concluded 
that the publication was not presented as “background material” for negotiations 
as originally intended, but only as a promotional leaflet.77 Thus, despite all the 
sovietization efforts, the canal remained a European affair from the perspective 
of Czechoslovak society throughout the 1960s, similar to raba and smetana’s pro-
motion in the 1950s.
however, from a technical point of view, the situation was not so straightfor-
ward. Until the mid-1960s, engineers working on preparations for the Danube-
Oder canal project launched by both Comecon and the Czechoslovak govern-
ment in 1958, hardly applied any of the knowledge and experience derived from 
UNECE, although the problem of the waterway network had been debated con-
currently in both organizations. Usually, all problems raised at UNECE were first 
debated within Comecon, such as the socialist cost-efficiency calculation method-
ology of 1962, the classification of waterways in 1962, determining crucial “miss-
ing links” in the planned network, and classes of trans-watershed connections, 
among others. 
The first direct “European” influence came in 1964, when Czechoslovak water-
way experts visited france, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the frG. The trip fos-
tered among them the belief that the technical concept of the DOE was correct and 
feasible and that the winter traffic regime, similar to the one planned for the DOE, 
was not at odds with the efficiency of inland navigation, and worked “under con-
ditions similar to ours” (in a blunt link to the incomparable soviet experience).78 
UNECE’s role in organizing the visit remains veiled in mystery, as no official docu-
ments on the trip exist; however, the IWT subcommittee discussed the possibility 
of mutual study trips across the Curtain between 1961 and 1963.79 
75 Vliv plánované výstavby Evropských vodních cest na rozvoj čs. vodní dopravy.
76 Jaroslav Čábelka, Navigation-Canal System Dunaj-Odra-Labe (Prague 1968).
77 Vyšný’s note on talks with Plecháč (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 66, April 30, 1968). 
78 The DOE system: Technical Economic study. soustava Dunaj-Odra-Labe, technickoekonomická studie, 
Ředitelství vodohospodářského rozvoje Praha, pracoviště Brno, December 1965 (AVUV), 133.
79 see the UNECE ITC subcommittee reports on IWT meetings V-VII.
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Given the circumstances of the evolution of European standards, their appli-
cation in the DOE design is difficult to determine. The Comecon classification 
presented at the ninth session of the sCT in 1962, generally complied with the 
updated seiler version debated at UNECE. Unlike its predecessors, the Complex 
study of 1964 was based on operating push units consisting of a push boat and 
1,560t barges, coinciding with vessels of the UNECE/Comecon Class IV fitting 
the 85 x 12 (x 3.5)m lock chamber. Class IV was chosen on Comecon’s recommen-
dation and positive experience with the standard on West-European waterways. 
furthermore, it accommodated vessels operating on the Elbe, the German canals, 
and the Oder, as well as most of the Danube ships.80
The 1965 Technical-Economic study, developed to supplement the Complex 
study and as basis for its revision, applied the dimension recommended for in-
ternational waterways, although its authors noted that such measurements were 
larger than necessary for the planned transit volumes.81 however, some param-
eters were based on national Class B standards: 28-32m width of the waterway at 
2.5m below water level and 50m at water level, depth of 2.8m at riverine stretches 
and between 3.5m (dredged) or 4.5m (embankment) in the canal stretch, and a 
curve diameter of 800m or 400m in riverine parts.82 
The discrepancy between national norms and the parameters of the DOE wa-
terway did not go unnoticed during the thorough reviews of the study following 
its presentation to the government in 1966. several pages of critical remarks and 
comments dealt with this problem.83 Ordinance no. 27 of January 31, 1964 of the 
Ministry of Transport was taken from older Czechoslovak legislation and thus did 
not fully comply with the Class IV standard.84 however, the differences were mar-
ginal and the Czechoslovak standards often required larger dimensions. A typical 
and most often highlighted example was bridge clearance, which should be 6.5m 
80 A comprehensive assessment of the canal construction linking the Danube, the Oder, and the Elbe, in-
cluding the joint Czechoslovak-Austrian dam project on the Danube near Bratislava, in terms of economic 
efficiency and comparison with the joint Czechoslovak-hungarian Danube water works in chronological 
order of construction phases, December 15, 1966. Komplexní posouzení výstavby průplavního spojení 
Dunaje, Odry a Labe včetně dunajského díla rakousko-českosovenského u bratislavy z hlediska ekonom-
ické efektivnosti a porovnání s československo-maďarskými vodními díly na Dunaji z hlediska časového 
pořadí etap výstavby (AVUV), 53.
81 Ibid., 58.
82 Ibid., 101. 
83 Analysis of the consultation process to comprehensively assess the construction of the DOE ca-
nal compared to the Danube water works related to government resolution no. 232 (1966). rozbor 
připomínkového řízení komplexního posouzení výstavby průplavního spojení DOL ve srovnání s duna-
jskými vodními díly ve smyslu vládního usnesení č.232 (1966), TErPLAN, March 1967 (AVUV).
84 Developed by the Transport research Institute with a science grant I-0-15-10/1 in the first half of the 
1960s. (Unfortunately, materials on the history of the norm are not available, as parts of the VUD archives 
have been lost or destroyed.)
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according to the Czechoslovak ordinance and only 5.25m according to the Class 
IV standard.85 
European inspiration went far further than simply applying Class IV. The 
Czechoslovak experts’ visit in 1964, as well as renewed interest in PIANC and 
UNECE, enabled Czechoslovak engineers to study the latest navigation structures 
erected in the West. This was also the case before the 1950s, but in much more 
modest terms.86 To calculate the capacity of lock chambers, the coefficients were 
verified using the frG’s statistical surveys.87 Naturally, studies concerning the 
DOE often operated with the data and experience derived from the rMD. The 
suggested usage of inclined planes on the Elbe branch was based on the Belgian 
experimental ship-lift built in ronquiéres that had almost the same parameters. 
Czechoslovak engineers boasted that during the design process, the Belgians 
made use of former DOE projects.88 Unlike during the 1950s, when any document 
on the DOE started with the Volga-Don project, now the introduction of offi-
cial documents hailed developments in Western Europe. for instance, the three-
page-long introduction of the study submitted to the government in 1966 only 
once mentioned the Ussr. The account of “the Development of the inland wa-
terways in Europe after World War II” only briefly touched on its plan to increase 
inland navigation’s share of the general transport volume. On the contrary, the text 
highlighted West European projects such as the french lower seine, the Belgian 
Charleroi-Brussels (with ronquieres), or the West German rhine-Main-Danube 
and Elbe-seitenkanal connecting hamburg to the Mitellandkanal. Most notably, 
even the notion of “complexity” suddenly seemed a “western” invention and, of 
course, there was none of the soviet rhetoric “taming of nature.” In this sense, the 
notion was much less ambitious, as proven by the chosen model on the increase 
in industrial productivity in the rMD corridor, even before its full completion.89 
remarkably, in the context of an otherwise openly “European” discourse on the 
canal, the technical studies prepared by experts often ignored the existence and 
work of UNECE. The 1965 ŘVr study recognized only two classifications, that of 
Comecon and that of “Western-Europe” (seiler’s).90 Even in 1967, the classification 
85 rozbor připomínkového řízení komplexního posouzení výstavby průplavního spojení DOL ve srovnání 
s dunajskými vodními díly ve smyslu vládního usnesení č.232 (1966), TErPLAN, March 1967 (AVUV).
86 Although proving such an assertion with any hard numbers would be difficult.
87 Ibid., 13.
88 Ibid., 13.
89 In a way, Czechoslovak engineers embraced the narrative of backwardness and accepted the role of the 
“East”; Czechoslovak materials quote a Munich-based IfO-Institute study, which claims that industrial 
productivity in the rMD area is 3.4 times higher than elsewhere in the frG, attributing this to the exist-
ence of the waterways. Ibid., 6. 
90 The DOE system: Technical Economic study. soustava Dunaj-Odra-Labe, technickoekonomická studie, 
Ředitelství vodohospodářského rozvoje Praha, pracoviště Brno, December 1965 (AVUV), 62.
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applied in the DOE design was considered to be a Comecon product merely “ac-
cepted in the West,” without ever mentioning UNECE.
It is indeed interesting how Cold War patterns and an East-West perspective, 
dominated Czechoslovak engineers’ thinking, as far as official documents can 
prove. The reviews of the Technical-Economic study offer an illustrative example 
of this point, and simultaneously capture a rare appearance of UNECE in the de-
bate. One of the reviews recommends using the study in question as background 
for further negotiation at UNECE level, only “after making the amendments nec-
essary from a political point of view.” Indeed, UNECE remained viewed as “the 
other” not only by the Czechoslovak state but also by the experts, and was to be ap-
proached with caution by experts as well as the state.91 The Cold War, as presented 
in the study in the form of the two classifications, resurfaced once again in the 
résumé, which foresaw the DOE becoming an “efficient transport route of interna-
tional significance, fully connected to both Comecon and West European water-
way systems.”92 however, the calculated transport volumes only considered intra-
Comecon trade and, more precisely, traffic between the Ussr, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, and the GDr without the Ussr-GDr transit, which was impossible to 
determine.93 
Ultimately, 1967 brought about significant Europeanization of the debate thanks 
to UNECE Gor’s economic analysis of the Danube-Oder canal.94 The prelimi-
nary results report of the technical part of the socialist 1968 canal project (up to 
December 31, 1967), which unveiled the reasons behind the significant increase 
in planned costs, stressed the “change of parameters for the waterway according 
to the demands of the Ministry of Transport (still based on Class IV, but altered 
to encompass experience from new European waterways).”95 The text also stated 
there were several points more prone to change than others, and thus needed to be 
updated: routing and weirs/steps; transport and port capacities; amounts of water 
transferred from the Danube; the volume of required works; and investment costs.
To gain even more experience operating Class IV canals, the Ministry (MZLVh) 
organized other trips to Germany in the summer of 1968. In July, Czechoslovak 
DOE experts visited rhine-Main-Donau AG and the IfO Institute in Munich 
and discussed the justification and economic efficiency of waterways. Then they 
91 reviewers report on the technical economic study of the DOE system by Professor Vilibald Bezdíček 
dated January 27, 1966. Ibid., 137.
92 Ibid., 130.
93 Ibid., 131.
94 Economic study of the Danube-Oder connection – report on the Gor’s second session. UNECE docu-
ment W/TrANs/WP34/49, March 21, 67. 
95 The canal – preliminary results. Průplavní spojení DOL, předběžné výsledky (NAČr, NAČr, fMZO, 
odd. 20, b. 66, January 18, 1966).
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went to the Netherlands to study Dutch waterways with the help of the Transport 
research Institute in rotterdam.96 Only two months and one soviet invasion later, 
Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers made another study trip to the frG, this time 
focusing exclusively on the rMD.97 Indeed, evaluating the contribution and effect 
of these trips on the further development of the DOE is difficult, except to confirm 
the technical feasibility of the DOE and its design.
Another European aspect of the General solution was financing. several docu-
ments proposed sharing the cost based on calculated profits or another more or 
less illusory and hard-to-prove ranking. Talks with Poland proved a fiasco, while 
Austria, hungary, and the GDr were never approached. Besides such bilateral 
solutions, more ambitious propositions appeared. The Czechoslovak Permanent 
Mission in Geneva submitted a proposal to establish a joint stock company in 
which Czechoslovakia would hold 60 percent of the shares with a foreign investor 
holding the remainder. UNECE should guarantee the investment and prepare the 
general agreement on the company and the canal’s operations. The intergovern-
mental committee on the DOE did not consider the proposal a viable option.98 A 
not dissimilar idea, to apply for funding from the UN Development Program, was 
dismissed as both discreditable and useless given its preferences.99
In the context of preparing the General solution, the question of interna-
tional cooperation on the canal was raised and the economic part of the General 
solution should have included a chapter on an evaluation of the canal from the in-
ternational division of labor and foreign trade perspective.100 however, in the end, 
the document fell short of expectations due to the limited participation of foreign 
96 report on the trip to the frG and the Netherlands to study the economic problems of inland naviga-
tion, July 2-10, 1968. The trip was specifically organized to help Czechoslovak experts evaluate and develop 
the economic potential of the DOE. The delegation consisted of rudolf Vachuda, Václav Plecháč, one engi-
neer from hydroprojekt, and one engineer from Terplan, the regional planning institute in Prague. Zpráva 
ze studijní cesty do Nsr a holandska k ekonomickým problémům vnitrozemské plavby (AVUV).
97 Also organized by MZLVh, this time by water management experts at hydroprojekt and ŘVT, and 
Plecháč’s deputy at the Ministry, engineer Kabele. report on the study trip to the GDr concerning prepa-
ration, construction, and operation of the rhine-Main-Danube Canal and other West German Waterways, 
september 8-15, 1968. Zpráva ze studijní cesty do Německé spolkové republiky k problematice přípravy, 
výstavby a provozu průplavu rýn-Mohan-Dunaj a některých dalších západoněmeckých vodních cest 
(AVUV).
98 This was due to international legal issues concerning the construction of the Danube-Oder-Elbe canal. 
K některým mezinárodně-právním otázkám výstavby kanálu Dunaj-Odra-Labe, November 1967 (NAČr, 
MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 65).
99 UNECE-DOE: Minutes of a meeting at Comrade Bušniak. EhK-DOL: Záznam o poradě u soudruha 
Bušniaka 1967 (AMZV, OMEO, b. 42, July 5, 1967).
100 required by Governmental resolution no. 232 (1966) on further study of the canal. Draft outline of 
the economic section of the General solution. Návrh osnovy ekonomické části generálního řešení soustavy 
DOL: podklad pro jednání meziresortní řídící komise (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 66, february 2, 
1968).
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institutes and lack of Czechoslovak initiative. regarding financing, the only op-
tion discussed was the national budget, more precisely the water management and 
transport sectors.101
The final episode of evaluating the General solution, led by Plecháč, heavily 
underplayed the European aspects of the project. Indeed, with Comecon turn-
ing away from inland navigation and the UNECE Gor facing stalemate over 
the GDr, the possibility of finding financial sources and general support out-
side Czechoslovakia seemed unlikely. Plecháč stated as much in his final report 
for the government, concluding that the DOE is indeed “an extremely costly 
scheme, which has to be considered a European project, the realization of which 
depends on the extent of participation by other interested countries.” however, 
Czechoslovakia only entered into negotiations with Poland, and its position was 
rather negative. With reference to the not-yet completed studies on the DOE de-
veloped by UNECE and Comecon, he suggested consultations with other neigh-
boring states in the coming years and preparing the DOE project for realization 
after 1990.102
Although the work on the DOE within UNECE was suspended and the Comecon 
network proposal put aside, the European waterway network remained an issue of 
debate. The opening of the port of Nuremberg and the rapidly progressing work on 
the rMD canal in West Germany interested East European planners. The opening, 
planned for 1981 according to the Gor report presented at the UNECE in 1967 and 
then postponed to 1985, was close enough to influence socialist countries’ mid-term 
economic planning. hence, the European waterway network did not disappear 
from the discourse; only the rhine-Main-Danube substituted the DOE as crucial 
East-West waterway connection even in Czechoslovakia.
By 1970, the Czechoslovak Danube shipping Company (Československá plavba 
dunajská) launched a research program on its potential role in future traffic on the 
rhine-Main-Danube canal. At one of its meetings, Vachuda spoke as guest expert 
about ECE activities and shed light on the standard dimensions, the most pressing 
technological issue of the rMD. As with the DOE, the rMD was designed accord-
ing to Class IV, and Vachuda claimed that all vessels and structures on the Danube 
should adapt to that standard because “No one will adapt to standards valid on 
the Danube, as its traffic volume will never reach the quantities which are and will 
be transported on the rhine.”103 In addition, he mentioned the poor state of the 
101 Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal: General solution Průplavní spojení Dunaj-Odra-Labe: Generální řešení, 
souhrnné provedení, 1968 (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 66).
102 report on the General solution evaluation of the Danube-Oder-Elbe waterway. Zpráva o výsledcích 
posouzení generálního řešení průplavního spojení Dunaj – Odra – Labe (AVÚV, January 29, 1971).
103 Minutes of ongoing external examination of the research project “Inquiry into traffic flows on the 
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Danube, which did not comply with Class IV, attributable to different standards 
set by the Danube Commission (longer, wider, and flatter vessels) and the inability 
of Danubian countries to improve the waterway. furthermore, Vachuda saw the 
danger of navigating on the rMD while developing the Danube. In the foreseeable 
future, the lower parts of the river might accommodate four 5,000t vessels, while 
the Austrian stretch and the rMD were built according to Class IV standard for 
1,500t ships. The required transshipment would negatively affect the rMD and 
might divide the traffic into two branches: from Austria toward the rhine and 
from Czechoslovakia towards the Black sea. 
Also on a personal level, the notion of European cooperation did not easily 
fade. since 1967, Czechoslovak hydraulic engineers (interested in inland naviga-
tion) had organized their own annual meetings. following the interwar tradition 
of waterway conventions and taking inspiration from Germany, they called the 
event Plavební dny (Inland Navigation Days, derived from the double meaning 
of the German word Tag – both a convention and a day). Jaroslav Kubec, as head 
of the navigation department at the Transport research Institute, became a cru-
cial agent for these activities and in 1973 invited colleagues from West Germany. 
While not a groundbreaking achievement, and in the context of the détente initi-
ated largely by West Germany, such cooperation was not extraordinary; nonethe-
less, the stB were suspicious of Kubec’s activities. They had already interrogated 
him about his contact with German experts and his “suspicious appearance” at 
the official opening of the new port Nurnberg in 1972. The official Czechoslovak 
delegates reported to the police their surprise at meeting him there, as Kubec had 
received an invitation from his UNECE Gor colleagues. Nonetheless, when the 
stB asked him to use his contacts for their purposes, he declared that in the past 
he had communicated mostly with delegates from socialist countries at interna-
tional congresses primarily because of the different background of “westerners” 
who usually represented business circles.104
When Vachuda decided to suspend Gor meetings, he noted that restoration of 
its activities required the fulfillment of one of three conditions: a Europe-wide con-
ference on security; a summoned meeting of the Working Group on Waterways 
rMD system and ČsPD’s role.” Záznam z priebežného oponentského konania výzkumné úlohy “Priezkum 
tovarových prúdov na sústave rMD a podiel ČsPD na preprave” (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, b. 65, february 24, 
1971), 3.
104 Interview dated April 21, 1972. The Czechoslovak secret Police (stB) intended to use Kubec’s knowl-
edge and contacts to obtain information on the development of inland navigation in West Germany, 
especially regarding the current state of the Main-rhine-Danube canal (ABsČr, ZsGŠ, 00108007). Kubec 
came to the stB’s attention after the celebratory reception thrown by Bavarian Prime Minister Alfons Gop-
pel for the opening of the new port of Nurnberg and completion of its connection to the Main-Danube 
Canal, (ABsČr, MV, 707969).
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Unification as a superior body; or pressure from Austria.105 Although the GDr 
entered the UNO in 1973 — an option Vachuda did not really think of — the 
Gor did not resume its activities and the UNECE Working Group on Unification, 
which celebrated its elevation from a mere expert group at its last session, did not 
meet.
however, when the pan-European Conference on security and Co-operation 
in Europe in helsinki actually fulfilled the first of Vachuda’s conditions, initially he 
did not revive the Gor. The helsinki final Act, signed in 1975, included a chapter 
on transport noting that “the speed of technical progress in the various fields of 
transport makes desirable a development of co-operation … and information ex-
change.” The document called for the elimination of disparities applying to traffic 
on inland waterways and urged the participating member states of the CCNr and 
the DC to further develop the work and studies carried out “in particular within 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.” While this proclamation 
responded to concerns expressed by Vachuda, the conference meant little or noth-
ing from the perspective of the DOE project as a part of the European network. 
The DOE Gor resumed its activities in 1976. however, the motives for its re-
vival had more to do with bilateral Czechoslovak-Polish initiatives. During an 
evaluation of the General solution in 1967, a bilateral Czechoslovak-Polish com-
mittee was established to plan the trans-border section of the DOE and the neces-
sary Polish participation on the upper Oder. The outcome of the committee’s nego-
tiations was not positive, and its final report was one of the first official documents 
to openly doubt the economic feasibility of the project.106 Nonetheless these ne-
gotiations gave birth to a renewed interest in the extension of the Oder. Once the 
DOE project was conclusively halted in 1972, the Czechoslovak government had 
to face pressure from north Moravian industries requiring direct access to inland 
water transport. rudolf Peška, director of the steelworks in Vítkovice (by then 
Vítkovické železárny Klementa Gotwalda), was most instrumental and he rose to 
the position of relatively unchallenged leader of the entire region, even becoming 
a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at national level.107 
105 UNECE – further actions by the Gor chairman. EhK – další postup předsedy zpravodajů (AMZV, 
OMEO, b. 68, November 28, 1969).
106 A committee of Czech and Polish experts developed two studies between 1967 and 1969. They proved 
the technical feasibility and utility of the project, but admitted that economically speaking, it was not cost 
effective, at least if only Poland and Czechoslovakia were sharing the costs. souhrnná zpráva o výsledcích 
generálního řešení soustavy Dunaj-Odra-Labe, Vodohospodářský rozvoj a výstavba závod Brno, July 1970 
(AVUV), 54-55.
107 rudolf Peška (April 25, 1924-January 14, 1996), director of the steelworks (1970-1979) and then 
Director General of the “economic production unit” VHJ koncern Vítkovice, a socialist concern he helped 
to form (1979-1989). As World War II hero and successful manager, he became a member of the Central 
Committee of CzCP in 1971 and held the position until 1989.
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In 1975, to persuade the national authorities of the feasibility of navigation on the 
Oder and to prove the usefulness of inland navigation for the steel works, he or-
ganized experimental shipping on the Oder from the improvised port of Bohumín 
on the Czechoslovak-Polish border.108
108 Trial transportation on the Oder from Bohumín, information for the minister. Zkušební přeprava 
z Bohumína po Odře, informace pro ministra (NAČr, fMZO, odd.20, b. 64, April 23, 1975).
Figure 5.2 – Vessels setting sail for the Baltic from the improvised port on the Oder in 
Czechoslovakia. Unlike their predecessors, experts in Socialist Czechoslovakia considered the 
Oder navigable. In 1975 Vítkovice Steelworks tried to prove the point by dispatching a small load 
of pipes via a vessel from Bohumín. The trip was meant as a gesture supporting the plans to make 
the Oder navigable into Czechoslovak territory. Source: Jiří Matějček and Jiří Výtiska, Vítkovice: 
Železárny a strojírny Klementa Gottwalda (Prague: Práce 1978), 84.
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While the experimental shipping hardly proved anything as the state of the 
river did not allow the transportation of a sufficient volume of steel to make the 
event a proper test, the Czechoslovak government responded positively, even be-
fore the event took place. The Czechoslovak-Polish committee of experts on navi-
gation was created under the heading Permanent Czechoslovak-Polish Transport 
Commission, at its 22nd meeting in March 1975, and a new study on the DOE 
appeared before the end of the next year.109 The four Czechoslovak delegates at the 
first meeting of the Czechoslovak-Polish committee in ratborz from May 12-16, 
1975 included Plecháč and his two colleagues from the Ministry, together with a 
Vítkovice steelworks representative.110
Although developed by two socialist countries, thus not the best example of 
East-West cooperation, the study built on the helsinki atmosphere, depicting the 
DOE as a contribution to “the development of European economic cooperation 
between states with different social and political regimes” that would “create op-
portunities for such cooperation even during the construction period.”111 Unlike 
previous studies, this time the calculated expected transport volumes on the canal 
also included Austrian transit and shipping to and from West European countries. 
Led by Plecháč, the protagonists on the Czech side also considered financial issues. 
At this point, they came up with the idea of a joint application by Czechoslovakia 
and Poland to the Comecon International Investment Bank.112 The study also in-
troduced a slightly altered technical layout of the navigation structures as the push 
unit principle became more prominent.
As is often the case, instead of straightforward solutions, the expert negotiations 
gave rise to a rather long list of new technical issues. The Committee subsequently 
turned into a quasi-permanent body and inefficiently met almost every year until 
1989.113 The Vikovice steelworks crucial role was confirmed by the presence of 
109 report by the Czechoslovak-Polish working group on integration of waterways and inland navigation 
works executed in 1975-1976 for the joint study of canal links on the Danube-Oder for the Czechoslovak-
Polish Permanent Commission on transport. Zpráva československo-polské pracovní skupiny pro otázky 
integrace vodních cest a plavby pro stálou československo-polskou dopravní komisi o pracech, prove-
dených v letech 1975-76 na společné studii průplavního spojení Dunaj-Odra (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 
20, b. 265, January 21, 1977).
110 Business trip report of the Czechoslovak-Polish committee’s first session. Cestovní zpráva ze služební 
cesty do Polské ldivé republiky na I. zasedání československo-polské pracovní skupiny (NAČr, MZO-
fMZO, odd. 20, b. 64). 
111 Zpráva československo-polské pracovní skupiny pro otázky integrace vodních cest a plavby pro stálou 
československo-polskou dopravní komisi o pracech, provedených v letech 1975-1976 na společné studii 
průplavního spojení Dunaj-Odra (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 265, January 21, 1977), 18.
112 r. stone David, “CMEA’s International Investment Bank and the Crisis of Developed socialism,” 
Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 3 (2008): 48-77.
113 There were three different Czechoslovak-Polish expert working groups, each holding an annual ses-
sion: Pracovní skupina pro vodohospodářské plánování v hraničních vodách (water management planning 
in border waters), Pracovní skupina pro integraci vodních cest a plavby (integration of waterways and ship-
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its representatives in the Czechoslovak delegation alongside Plecháč and his col-
leagues from the Ministry. While the study concerned the DOE as such, the com-
mittee focused on the extension of the navigable Oder into Czechoslovak terri-
tory. By 1977, only the lowest part of the river downstream from Kostrzin allowed 
1,500t Class IV vessels, and the middle navigable part up to Kozli was scaled for 
Class II 400t vessels. Kozli was about 40km downstream from the Czechoslovak 
border and even more distant from the steelworks. Nonetheless, for extra-large 
factory products such as machinery components for the chemical industry and 
nuclear power plants, the waterway would be by far the most efficient mode of 
transport.114
Ultimately, at the third committee meeting in the autumn of 1975, the delegates 
agreed to revive the UNECE Gor on the DOE.115 They hoped to obtain the data 
necessary for their own, above-mentioned study. The first revived meeting (actu-
ally the sixth meeting of the Group) took place in Poland; Vachuda remained the 
chair. furthermore, to interest as many cooperating (and co-financing) states as 
possible, the organizers invited delegates from other socialist Danubian states, be-
sides the former three member countries Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria. The 
GDr and the Ussr became full members of the Gor, while Bulgaria, romania, 
Yugoslavia, and hungary gained observer status. Over the next five years, before 
the final report was completed and submitted to the IWT Working Party, more 
than 130 experts had participated in Gor work, including some from other coun-
tries such as Greece, who intended to gain experience for their Danube-Aegean 
canal project.116 The economic viability of the project was evaluated based on the 
standard comparison of costs and profits instead of a comparison with alterna-
tives, as was the case in the General solution; Austria objected to applying the 
socialist evaluation methodology. Naturally, the report found the DOE economi-
cally efficient and advocated its construction. however, the study did not provide 
as complex an evaluation as the authors would have liked due to the limited co-
operation of the countries involved. In particular, not all participants were ready 
to share all required data, as several tables in the final report clearly show.117 The 
ping), and Skupina projektantů k problematice splavnění Odry (Group of designers for navigation of the 
Oder). All these groups held more than 13 sessions before 1987 (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 70).
114 To this end, in July 1966 hydroprojekt in cooperation with MZLVh developed Technical and Econom-
ic Study of Making the River Oder Navigable to Ostrava as background document. Technicko Ekonomická 
studie splavnění Odry do Ostravy (NAČr, MZO-fMZO, odd. 20, b. 265).
115 Minutes of the third meeting of the Polish-Czechoslovak Working Group on the integration of 
waterways and inland navigation, November 10-14, 1975. Zápis ze třetí zasedání polsko-československé 
Pracovní skupiny pro otázky integrace vodních cest a plavby (NAČr, fMZO, odd. 20, b. 64).
116 Jaroslav Kabele, “Průplavní spojení Dunaj-Odra-Labe ve studii pro Evropskou hospodářskou komisi 
OsN,” Vodní Hospodářství, no. 12a (1981): 317-325.
117 Kabele, a member of the group in his capacity as Plecháč’s deputy at the Ministry, mentioned this fact 
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UNECE Working Group for Inland Water transport finally accepted the Gor re-
port on the DOE at its 42nd session in 1981.
While Vachuda presided over the Gor, top expert and hydraulic engineer 
Jaroslav Kubec took the lead in its work. A long-time supporter of the DOE scheme 
and one of the last active members of DOECs in his capacity as head of inland 
navigation at the Czechoslovak Transport research Institute, Kubec led the practi-
cal development of the UNECE study. he was also responsible for Czechoslovak 
data and background materials. from a technical point of view, the report drew 
on the General solution and the Czechoslovak-Polish study of 1977 and did not 
introduce anything new, as it focused mainly on the transport-economic evalua-
tion of the project. While the 1970 Plecháč report, which decided the fate of the 
General solution, doubted the expected transport volume of 42 million t per year, 
the UNECE study almost doubled the estimate to 79.5. 
Nonetheless, one technical feature of the project was re-evaluated. By 1960, 
Kubec had opposed ship-lifts on the DOE, anticipating the future rise of pushing 
units to the detriment of motorboats.118 While the General solution substituted 
lifts on the Danube-Oder connection with a set of locks, on the Elbe branch two 
inclined planes were positioned to overcome the highest altitude differences. To 
accommodate higher transport volumes, the UNECE study proposed a set of locks 
even on the Elbe branch. The lift could only take one barge while others would 
have to wait, thus significantly delaying the transport of a push convoy consisting 
of several barges. In contrast, a set of twin 190 x 12m locks could move several 
barges up or down at once. furthermore, new experiences with push convoys led 
to a general enlargement of navigation structures fitting Class IV; for safety rea-
sons, the recommended lock dimensions were 190 x 12m instead of the former 
170 x 12m and a waterway width of 38m instead of 32m in the canal stretches.119 
Kubec expressed his point clearly in an article published in 1974. he noted 
that the existing seiler/Comecon classification merely “reflects the historical evo-
lution of vessel dimensions” and thus provided a precise and useful characteriza-
tion of existing waterways. however, it did not serve well as guideline for future 
developments. Kubec concluded that a modern classification system should be 
based on the module principle instead of the historically developed standard ves-
sels. A module would consist of a single type of standardized barge and a push 
boat. Classification would then reflect the size of the push unit; more precisely, the 
in his account of the Gor’s work. Ibid., 323.
118 Jaroslav Kubec, “Ke kategorizaci vodních cest v Čssr,” Doprava 3, no. 7 (1961): 237-238; Jaroslav Kubec, 
“Vývoj studijních prací na vodní cestě Dunaj-Odra-Labe a jejich dnešní stav,” Doprava, no. 1 (1964): 34-42.
119 Economic study of the Danube-Oder (-Elbe) connection, UNECE document TrANs/sC.3/105 
(1981).
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number of barges and the type of push boat.120 Indeed, the early 1970s finally saw a 
breakthrough of push convoys on European rivers, especially on the rhine and the 
Danube, and a massive introduction on both rivers was often seen as a precondi-
tion, or at least favorable factor for their integration and operation of the rMD.121 
Until then the standards had been diverse. The ECMT standard barge Europa II 
was half a meter wider than barges used on the Danube (11m). 
In cooperation with other experts on inland navigation at the Czechoslovak 
Academy of science, in the second half of the 1970s Kubec worked on an up-
dated national classification of waterways.122 During the preparation of the 
Czechoslovak-Polish study of 1977, their results were ignored on the basis that the 
“DOE as an international waterway must meet Class IV standards.” Working on 
the report prepared under UNECE allowed Kubec and his colleagues to adjust the 
dimensions, despite the fact that the new classification proposal submitted in 1979 
had not been implemented.123 
While Kubec’s initiative could be seen as a departure from the European, 
though undeclared, standard, his intentions were precisely the opposite. he saw 
the Czechoslovak waterways as an integral part of the future European network 
and, while working on the new national classification, he studied the European 
waterways in detail. Thus, the national classification was actually a derivative of 
the European one. While submitting one proposal to the Ministry of Transport, 
he submitted the other simultaneously to the Czechoslovak Transport research 
Institute’s bulletin, formulated as a draft of the new European classification of wa-
terways, both based on the same principles.124 
The trend away from inland water transport toward roads was reversed in the 
late 1970s in the wake of the oil crisis. The 16th Congress of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party (CzCP) declared for the years 1981-1985 (7th five-Year Plan) 
to return to the transport investments policy favoring “energetically economical” 
water transport and railways, “knowing that by that we are cutting the investments 
120 Jaroslav Kubec, “rozvojové tendence plavby a vodních cest,” Vodní Hospodářství 23, no. 5 (1974): 122-
130, here 125.
121 Erich seiler, “Die schubschiffahrt als Integrationsfaktor zwischen rhein und Donau,” Zeitschrift für 
Binnenschiffahrt und Wassestrassen, no. 8 (1972): 300-312.
122 The Ministry of Transport ordered the study by the Transport Commission of the Academy in 1977 to 
secure a coordinated and efficient introduction of push convoys into the national transport system. Jaro-
slav Čábelka, “Činnost komise pro dopravu ČsAV a její příspěvek k rozvoji vodních cest a plavby,” Vodní 
Hospodářství, no. 6a (1978): 160-161. 
123 The proposal was turned down due to its authors’ emphasis on the “future.” The main objection of the 
ministries, transport, and MZLVh, was the document’s overly theoretical tone and insufficient attention to 
the existing inland navigation infrastructure. Proposal for new classification of Czechoslovak waterways. 
Návrh nové klasifikace československých vodní cest (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 72, July 6, 1979).
124 JaroslaV Kubec, “studie k návrhu nové klasifikace evropských vodních cest,” Zborník prác Výskumného 
ústavu dopravného 17 (1978): 13-42.
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originally designated to roads and highways.”125 Thus, the final UNECE report on 
the DOE came at a favorable moment.
In reaction to this report, the Czechoslovak government urged incorporat-
ing the waterway scheme in the Czechoslovak investment plans for 1990-2000. 
furthermore, the government appealed to experts, members of the Czechoslovak-
Polish committee, to develop guidelines for launching diplomatic negotiations 
with Poland regarding the extension of the navigable Oder. Tellingly, the resolu-
tion boasted dealing with “the development of waterways and their connection to 
the system of waterways in Europe.” In fact it only considered connections to the 
Eastern bloc and hamburg, at least until the opening of the rMD or signing of 
the agreement on mutual free shipping on national waterways with the frG. The 
specifications of the Czechoslovak waterway program, as envisioned by the 16th 
Party congress, finally appeared in 1984. however, the main investment was for 
modernizing ports and vessels, and only a minor part for possible extension of the 
navigable Oder across the border and of the Elbe to Pardubice. The work on the 
DOE was mostly limited to negotiations with Poland and other interested states, 
namely Austria.126
To maintain momentum, Vachuda submitted a proposal to the Council for 
International Economic and scientific-Technical Cooperation (Rada pro mez-
inárodní hospodářskou a vědecko technickou spolupráci) to further progress the 
DOE project. This institute emerged in the wake of the socialist integration move-
ment launched under Comecon in the 1970s to coordinate Czechoslovak partici-
pation in the international division of labor, especially within Comecon. The pro-
posal emphasized the extension of the navigable Oder to Czechoslovakia as a most 
needed and achievable goal.127
In connection with the unrelenting efforts of Vítkovice steelworks manage-
ment to secure waterway access, the Czechoslovak government finally addressed 
the question of the Oder. however, the impulse came directly from the Ussr, 
which considered inland navigation the optimal mode of transport for nuclear 
power station components.128 According to the 1974 agreement between the 
Ussr and Czechoslovakia, Vítkovice was assigned to produce parts for nuclear 
125 Quoted according to Václav Plecháč, “rozvoj vodní dopravy a vodních cest v Čssr,” Vodní 
Hospodářství, no. 7A (1982): 173-179, here 178.
126 Czechoslovak Government resolution no. 54/1982.
127 Draft guidelines for initiating concrete negotiations with Poland on making the Oder navigable to 
Ostrava. Návrh směrnic pro zahájení konkrétních jednání s Polskem o splavnění Odry do Ostravy (NAČr, 
fMD, b. V2 71, December 23, 1988).
128 Paul r. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today (New York: W.h. 
freeman, 2000), 95.
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systems, and by the early 1980s, the plan finally approached realization.129 The 
waterways seemed an obvious choice, but their current state in Czechoslovak ter-
ritory, including the technical equipment at the ports, did not allow their utiliza-
tion. Although the Explanatory Memorandum on the topic, prepared for a gov-
ernment session in 1984, pleaded for investment in waterways, the resolution only 
addressed road and railway transport.130 A few months later, at the insistence of 
Vítkovice, the Czechoslovak government passed another resolution directly ad-
dressing the Czechoslovak Oder. Despite expressing a general will to make the 
Oder navigable, the resolution was actually negative as it included a rather long list 
of yet unresolved issues requiring attention before work could commence. Mostly, 
these open issues related to the Polish ratborz reservoir project, which would raise 
the water level on the Oder to make it navigable and simultaneously block drain-
age of the Ostrava coal basin.131
129 The heaviest item, the steam generator for the VVEr 1000 reactor type weighing 368t, was to be pro-
duced in Vítkovice. Czechoslovak Government resolution no. 49/1974.
130 Explanatory Memorandum, appendix to Czechoslovak Government resolution no. 54/1982. 
Důvodová zpráva (NAČr, ÚPV-f, March 4, 1982), 2.
131 Czechoslovak Government resolution no. 104/1984 (NAČr, fMD, b.V2 71).
Figure 5.3 – Although Comecon had decided to discontinue its waterway construction program 
in 1970, the idea soon resurfaced in the wake of an oil crisis. Strong support came from another 
Comecon plan: the development of nuclear power plants. Due to their size, some of plants’ parts 
could only be transported by water. The map shows waterways connecting Vítkovice Steelworks 
to the USSR and main European ports. The red lines indicate the routes (among them the Oder) 
for transport to and from the USSR; the green lines suggest links to European ports. Remarkably, 
RMD substitutes the DOE as a crucial part of the “red circle” representing the main waterway 
infrastructure network. Source: Part of the documentation on the issue of transport of over-sized 
parts for nuclear plants. Appendix to Czechoslovak Government resolution no. 155/1978.
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The reserved attitude of the Czechoslovak authorities towards the Oder re-
flected their occupation with the other, southern end of the DOE. Throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, the impact of the forthcoming opening of the rMD received 
growing attention among central European politicians and transport experts. The 
most debated topic was managing operations on the new waterway connecting the 
West with the East, and the Czechoslovak representatives often tried to link the 
DOE question to the rMD debate.132
While the rMD would physically integrate two main European river basins 
dominated by two adversary political systems, it actually fueled antagonism 
between the two. The atmosphere of cooperation epitomized by the helsinki 
Conference evaporated from European waterways in the late 1970s. 
The antagonism began even before helsinki. since 1973, the Ussr and hungary 
had discussed establishing an international navigation regime on the new water-
way with the frG. however, Germany preferred a bilateral to a multilateral agree-
ment and the Ussr considered this decision a political strategy aimed at gaining 
political influence in the Danubian basin, thus targeted against the Ussr.133 To 
avert this threat, in 1974 the Ussr called a meeting of the remaining four co-
operating Eastern Bloc Danubian countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ussr, 
and hungary (a.k.a. “Čtyřka”, or “the four”), at which they agreed on coordinated 
action.134 since the 1960s, romania and Yugoslavia have stood aside.
Thus, the European waterway network became a highly political issue, once 
again drawing the attention of governments, and not only experts. such re-po-
liticization of the waterway issue escalated in 1979, when West European coun-
tries signed the strasbourg revised Convention on rhine Navigation, limiting 
free shipping on the rhine to riparian countries and members of the European 
Economic Community.135 Naturally, socialist countries considered this new ar-
rangement an attack on the Eastern Bloc. furthermore, neither the expert-driven 
UNECE nor the similarly limited Danube Commission (confined to technical and 
administrative, but not economic issues) offered a firm basis for negotiation with 
the CCNr. In 1980, at another meeting of the “four,” Czechoslovak delegates pur-
sued the idea of establishing a special body to negotiate terms for the rMD on 
132 Experts from the Ussr, hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia met in sofia in february 1985. Jed-
nání expertů sssr, MLr, BLr a Čssr v sofii (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 71).
133 report on the consultative meeting on the future status of the rhine-Main-Danube, November 25-27, 
1974. Zpráva o kozultativní poradě o budoucím statutu kanálu rýn-Mohan-Dunaj (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 
71), 5.
134 Ibid.
135 The protocol was signed in strasbourg on October 17, 1979 and came into force on february 1, 1985. 
Additional Protocol no. 2 to the revised Convention for rhine Navigation, (1979), http://www.ccr-zkr.org/
files/conventions/ProtAdd2_en.pdf. Accessed 6 August 2011.
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behalf of socialist states, possibly within Comecon structures. however, not even 
this small group of four states was able to reach an agreement. While the Ussr 
and, as always, Czechoslovakia, pushed the multilateral solution, Bulgaria and 
hungary preferred bilateralism. In the wake of the meeting, the “four” prepared 
a statement on the strasbourg Additional Protocol, accusing it of a protectionist 
character that preferred the CCNr and EEC member states.136
By the early 1980s, only two rivers (rhine and Danube) in Europe provided free 
navigation to all countries, though the actuality of such “freeness” was as diverse as 
capitalist and socialist legal thinking and language can be. To reach a consensus, 
the Ussr proposed dealing with free navigation at UNECE. The navigation law 
experts of European Comecon member states (except romania) met in Moscow 
to discuss the soviet proposal before its presentation at Geneva in November 1984. 
Before discussing the drafted Principles, they noted with bitterness that Comecon 
had tried for a long time to put the unification of legal regulations of inland navi-
gation on the European network on UNECE’s agenda, but without success.137 The 
Principles were set in the tone of the helsinki Conference, and the strasbourg 
revision was interpreted as a “slap in its face.”
When the CCNr strasbourg Addendum came into force in January 1985, at 
another meeting of the “four” in sofia, Czechoslovakia proposed an Addendum to 
the original Belgrade Agreement, allowing the Danube Commission to retaliate.138 
While intended to be submitted at the latest to the Commission’s 46th session in 
1987, ultimately the document never appeared on the agenda due to lack of con-
sensus among its socialist members states.139
136 statement on the Additional Protocol to the Act of Mannheim on rhine Navigation, february 1981. 
Prohlášení k dodatkovému protokolu k Mannheuimské akte o plavbě na rýně (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 71).
137 report of the Comecon member states meeting on basic legal principles governing international navi-
gation on the unified network of European inland waterways of international importance, Moscow, August 
22-24, 1984. Zpráva o zasedání členských států rVhP o základních právních principech upravujících 
mezinárodní plavbu na sjednocené síti evropských vnitrozemských vodních cest mezinárodního významu 
(NAČr, fMD, b.V2 71).
138 The “Additional Protocol to the Convention on Navigation on the Danube signed in Belgrade on 
August 18, 1948, concerning the functions of the Danube Commission in the area of transport-political 
and economic issues” would entitle the Danube Commission to influence tariff policy and develop a policy 
regulating non-member countries shipping on the river. The meeting of experts from Czechoslovakia, 
the Ussr, hungary, and Bulgaria on the issue of inland waterway transport in Europe was held in Prague 
on November 17-21, 1986. Jednání expertů Čssr, sssr, MLr a BLr o problematice vnitrozemské vodní 
dopravy v Evropě (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 71).
139 The need to consult other members of the Danube Commission significantly slowed the negotiation 
process and the generally acceptable version of the document was not completed until 1989. furthermore, 
some experts voiced their fears that the Addendum meant a revision of the Belgrade Treaty as such, thus 
creating the possibility for the frG to become a full member of the Commission. That was seen as poten-
tially beneficial, as it would force the frG to accept the general terms of free shipping on the Danube for 
the currently non-free parts between regensburg and Kelheim on the future rMD. In addition, according 
to the statutes, the four could hardly hope to enforce the Addendum without help from at least two other 
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The political and technical aspects of inland navigation were mixed up in 
the second half of the 1980s, a period viewed as the last phase of the political 
Cold War. however, soviet and Czechoslovak efforts aimed at strengthening the 
political and economic antagonism of the two blocs failed, as the Eastern bloc 
proved unable to achieve common action. Indeed, by 1988, bilateral agreement 
negotiations on shipping on inland waterways between the frG and individual 
socialist Danubian countries were almost complete.140 simultaneously the Danube 
Commission started preparations for opening the rMD by discussing the adop-
tion of many UNECE standards, such as the European Agreement Concerning 
the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (AND) and 
others. A special meeting of DC experts on this point was held in Budapest in 
December 1987 and others were to follow.141 While diplomats took part in esca-
lating the conflict, among them occasionally rudolf Vachuda in relation to his 
position in the UNECE Gor, the hydraulic experts acted in concert.142 When the 
Czechoslovak-Polish Working Group on Integration  of Waterways  and Inland 
Navigation finally produced a report in 1988 on the extension of the navigable 
Oder to Ostrava, it referred to the UNECE report on the DOE as a “grand design” 
that the parameters of the future waterway should meet.143 however, these were 
far too large for the transport volumes considered for this stretch of the river, as 
well as for the current state of the Oder. furthermore, in the second half of the 
1980s, when Kubec at the Transport research Institute developed a project on 
“Technological Integration of Inland Navigation of Comecon Member states” in 
response to the growing importance of push convoys, standards-wise he put the 
problem in the context of his 1970s research. however, this time it was set within 
the revived 1960s Comecon network scheme without really addressing the links 
Commission members. While the Ussr, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and hungary could easily outvote ro-
mania, Yugoslavia, and Austria, the ratification procedure for such a significant amendment required the 
support of at least six member states. Consultation with Ministries of Transport in Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, hungary, and the Ussr, and representatives of Ministries of foreign Affairs, ruse June 10-13, 1987. 
Konzultace náměstků ministrů dopravních resortů BLr, Čssr, MLr a sssr s účastí představitelů MZV 
těchto států v ruse, June 10-13, 1987 (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 71), 1-3.
140 Bilateral agreements with hungary and Czechoslovakia were prepared for ratification in 1987, and 
negotiations with Bulgaria were close to finalization. The Ussr required the frG to first join the Danube 
Commission, thereby making the rMD fully international. Ibid., 4-6.
141 Guidelines for the meeting of Transport Ministry experts from Czechoslovakia, the Ussr, hungary, 
and Bulgaria held in Moscow, January 19-21, 1988. směrnice pro jednání: zasedání expertů ministerstev 
dopravy Čssr, sssr, MLr a BLr v Moskvě (NAČr, fMD, b. V2 71, December 23, 1987), 6.
142 Internal letter no. 183/81-22 urging Vachuda’s participation at the meeting in his capacity as leader of 
the Gor on DOE (NAČr, fMD, b. 71, May 5, 1982).
143 Československo-polská studie splavnění Odry v úseku Ostrava-Kozlí, část technická / Czechoslovak-
Polish study on making the Oder navigable in the section between Kozlí and the Ostrava-technical part, 
1988 (AVUV Brno), 36.
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beyond the curtain.144
Canalizing Europe
The last year of the Cold War witnessed a revival of DOE debates across various ge-
ographical levels, and all these activities intersected in the small Moravian village 
of slušovice. In a fashion not dissimilar to the story of Vítkovice director rudolf 
Peška, the director of the local agricultural cooperative Agrokombinát slušovice, 
františek Čuba, became an important figure in the region and at national level. he 
144 Jaroslav Kubec, “Integrace plavební sítě členských zemí rVhP z hlediska zavádění progresivnich tech-
nologií ve vodní dopravě,” Zborník prác Výskumného ústavu dopravného 50 (1987): 72-88.
Figure 5.4 – In the late 1980s Jaroslav Kubec proposed to create a circular “Magistrala” in the 
Comecon area, thus reviving the Comecon scheme that faded away rather than officially termi-
nated. In this map, he acknowledged official national foreign policy, trying to make it work in 
favor of the DOE project. Source: Jaroslav Kubec,” Integrace plavební sítě členských zemí RVHP z 
hlediska zavádění progresivnich technologií ve vodní deprave, “Zborník prác Výskumného ústavu 
dopravného 50 (1987): 72-88.
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was a big industrialist in the socialist system and developed unique business trust. 
The Agrokombinát slušovice activities ranged from farming, crop cultivation and 
breeding to production and development of electronic equipment. furthermore, 
Čuba pictured himself as heir to the interwar industrialist Baťa who resided in the 
nearby city of Zlín, and naturally became interested in the project once pursued 
by Baťa.145
In september 1987, the slušovice local congress center hosted a conference 
with Czechoslovak inland water transport experts who studied the possibility of 
utilizing the Morava.146 At national level, the rMD scheme and expected increase 
in Danube traffic contributed to the idea of extending the Danube waterway net-
work into Czechoslovak territory by making the lowest part of the Morava up to 
Zlín navigable.147 simultaneously, rudolf Vachuda decided to revive the UNECE 
group of experts on the DOE by summoning a meeting in slušovice for february 
1988.148 While little is known of the background of the reunion, that it took place 
in slušovice indicates Čuba’s involvement. The official reason Vachuda presented 
to the Working Party on Waterways was the need to update the study.
A year later, Jaroslav Kubec and his colleague approached františek Čuba with 
a plan to revive the DOE idea. The meeting went well and, to this end, in less than 
half a year the first joint-stock company in socialist Czechoslovakia was estab-
lished. Čuba used his political and economic influence, and companies situated 
along the proposed (and since 1972 protected) canal corridor swiftly collected 
significant funds to allow the launch of preparatory works on the updated DOE 
design. The name chosen for the new company reflected the recent upheaval of the 
green movement and alluded to an image of inland water transport as the “green-
est” mode of transport, Ekotrans Moravia.149 
The DOE project faced opposition from environmentalists, who represented 
probably the strongest public movement tolerated in communist Czechoslovakia.150 
145 Elsewhere in his 1988 book called The Road to Prosperity, he compares his achievements and meth-
ods to those of Baťa. františek Čuba and Emil Divila, JZD Agrokombinát Slušovice – cesty k prosperitě 
(slušovice: Agropublik, 1988).
146 Konference o dopravním využití řeky Moravy: sborník přednášek (slušovice: 1987).
147 Miroslav Cihlář, “rozvoj přeprav čs. vodní dopravy v 9. a 10. pětiletce s výhledem do roku 2010,” 
Doprava 30, no. 2 (1988): 113-126, here 120. The navigability of the Morava was of course discussed while 
preparing the report for UNECE, but since then the priority was the extension of the Oder. At the 10th 
Waterway Convention (Plavební dny) in 1980, several participants addressed the possibility of making 
the Morava navigable: 10. plavební dny 1980. Vyšší využití vodní dopravy (Ostrava Dům techniky ČsVTs, 
1980).
148 UNECE document TrANs/sC.3/r.129, Information on the 1st Meeting of Experts on the Economic 
Study of the Danube-Oder (Elbe) Connection, October 6, 1988.
149 registered on August 26, 1989, accepted by Ministry of Transport decree 64/88-KM, June 28, 1989.
150 Miroslav Vaněk, Nedalo se tady dýchat: ekologie v českých zemích v letech 1968 až 1989, historia nova 
(Prague: Maxdorf, 1996).
TEHS9_janac_proefschrift.indd   226 11/5/2012   1:34:06 PM
 Mastering Three seas 227
In an attempt to make the canal project more environmentally friendly, Kubec 
proposed its combination with the planned fast railway along the canal route and 
a set of adjustments responding to “ecological demands.”151 The engineers invited 
ecologists to cooperate in developing such a “sustainable” (they called it “antro-
poecological”) design, though without much success. The final drafted design 
was based on a compromise between the riverine and canal alternative. Instead of 
maximal utilization of existing rivers, as was the case with the General solution 
and DOE study of 1981, the new design employed only those parts of the riverbed 
already adapted for navigation. Thus, the much appreciated natural environment 
of meandering stretches of both the Morava and the Oder and natural habitats in 
environmentally protected areas along the canal route would survive untouched 
during the construction and operation of the waterway. The southernmost part of 
the canal returned to the old routing proposed as national alternative after World 
War I by smrček. furthermore, the new design limited water consumption (the 
pumping system on locks on the Morava) and, following the example of the almost 
completed rMD canal, reinforcing embankments with vegetation was proposed. 
In the political turmoil following the collapse of Communism in Czechoslovakia 
in the autumn of 1989, Ekotrans leaders slowly accepted that the “atmosphere” in 
society was against the project, portrayed in the media as a bequest of commu-
nist megalomania and a fatal threat to the environment. Instead of investing in 
the canal, Ekotrans invested the funds gathered from stakeholders into a broad 
range of potentially profitable business activities. The final goal to realize the DOE 
remained along with projects started by Ekotrans directly related to the devel-
opment of inland navigation; most significant was perhaps the cooperation with 
hamburg shipping company Eurokai on the Elbe.152 
In addition to its “communist” and “anti-ecological” character, the new “post-
communist” national transport and water policy also played against the DOE. 
The second 1990 issue of Ekotrans’ eponymous journal reprinted the cartoon 
joke that became famous in Czechoslovakia during the days of the so-called 
“Velvet revolution” in the autumn of 1989. The cartoon depicted two groups of 
people holding signs, one saying Back to Europe and the other saying Back to 
151 “Aktualizovaný generel integrace vodních cest v Československu,” Ekotrans Moravia 1, no. 3 (1990): 
8-35.
152 Ekotrans’ activities were numerous. The company was involved in the World Business Centre project 
in Prague, developed a freightliner terminal close to the border with Germany (Transmotel by sokolov), a 
trans-shipment station on the Elbe by Mělník, a Euroro transport system in Mělník-hamburg, established 
a travel agency, bought a botel (boat hotel) in Prague and a castle close to the German border at Bor u 
Tachova, developed a Yacht hotel project in Prague, started a program on the production of bottled water 
(at the time non-existent in the Czechoslovak market), participated in plans for gas and peat extraction in 
Czechoslovakia, opened a car rental in Zlín, and others. 
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Asia. The symbolic power of the metaphorical “return to Europe,” from which 
Czechoslovakia and East Central Europe had allegedly been “stolen” by the Ussr 
with the silent agreement of the West, left virtually no space for an alternative 
integration framework. The cartoon posed the question either Europe or Asia. An 
essay on the future of the European integration process and the position of water-
ways in the new Europe accompanied the picture. The essay foresaw a process of 
regionalization dividing the periphery of the European Economic Community. 
It depicted Czechoslovakia as standing at the crossroads of various integration 
models, most notably the post-socialist revival of Central Europe (together with 
hungary and Poland) and the Alpine region integration led by Austria and Italy. 
While Czechoslovakia had indeed joined several such organizations by the early 
1990s, the Italian-led Central European Initiative (CEI), as well as the Visegrad 
Group or CEfTA, served mainly as preparation for full European Union member-
ship — the unchallenged goal of economic and political transformation.153 The 
coalescence of Europe with European institutions was clear, and the EU overshad-
owed all others. Accordingly, investments in transport were oriented towards the 
reconstruction and speedy completion of the neglected highway system. rather 
than large construction projects, the new regime focused on economic transition 
and general reorientation toward the West, and restricted infrastructural invest-
ments to improve the existing network and its alignment and interconnection 
with West European networks. 
After 1989, Czechoslovakia, together with its neighboring former socialist 
countries, entered European institutes linked to post-war integration processes in 
the western part of the continent.154 In the field of transport, a prominent organi-
zation was ECMT, which expanded from its original 19 member countries in 1953 
(the same as in 1989) to 44 in 2007.155 The crucial, if mostly symbolic, event in 
the development of a pan-continental waterway network occurred in Budapest on 
september 11, 1991. At the Ministerial Conference on the Most Timely Issues of 
European Inland Waterway Transportation, 25 European Ministers of Transport 
from both sides of the former Iron Curtain met to celebrate the opening of the 
153 By joining the EU, countries automatically left CEfTA. Martin Dangerfield, “CEfTA: Between the 
CMEA and the European Union,” Journal of European Integration 26, no. 3 (2004): 309-338.
154 Accordingly, these countries developed transport policies aimed at integrating their national networks 
with those in Western Europe. The Czechoslovak transport policy of 1993 is a typical example, as it reads 
as the journey to harmonize the Czech transport sector with standards developed in European Communi-
ties, in both the material and institutional sense. Transport Policy of the Czech republic for the 1990s. 
Dopravní politika české republiky pro devadesátá léta. Czech Transport Ministry, August 2, 1993.
155 frank schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: 
Aksant, 2008), 282.
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rMD and discuss further development of the network in Europe.156
The institutional and material interconnection of the waterways on the conti-
nent, marked by the “eastern enlargement” of the ECMT and the opening of the 
link between the rhine and the Danube, was complemented by technical unifica-
tion. The problem of standardizing the European network, largely abandoned in 
the late 1960s, reopened in 1985 at the 26th PIANC Congress in Brussels. The 
Dutch delegate suggested a revision of seiler’s classification dating from 1954, as 
it did not consider pushed units of two, four, and six barges, thereby criticizing 
the standards on the same grounds as Kubec in the 1970s. Czechoslovakia was the 
only socialist country to participate in the special PIANC working group estab-
lished to develop a new classification. The recommendation corresponded with 
Kubec’s ideas, based on the push unit module principle.157 ECMT had discussed 
the new classification proposal in cooperation with UNECE and accepted it in 
1992.158 
156 The Declaration signed by all participating delegates called for unification of the fragmentary water-
way network on the continent, namely for constructing a pan-European inland navigation system based 
on market principles. UNECE document TrANs/sC.3/138: White Paper on Trends in and Development 
of Inland Navigation and its Infrastructure, (1996), http://live.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/final-
docs/sc3/TrANs-sC3-138e.pdf. 87. Accessed 23 August 2011.
157 Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses, Standardization of Inland Waterways’ 
Dimensions. Report of Working Group No 9 of the Permanent Technical Committee I (Brussels,1990).
158 resolution no. 92/2 on New Classification of Inland Waterways. Document ECMT CM (92)6/fINAL, 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/IntOrg/acquis/wat19922e.pdf. Accessed 24 March 2010.
Figure 5.5 –Cartoon from the Ekotrans journal. The group on the left is holding a sign say-
ing, “Back to Europe,” while the other sign reads, “Back to Asia.” The collapse of the USSR and 
Comecon is presented as an escape from Asiatic Soviet influence. Czechoslovak society embraced 
the European idea. In reaction, canal promoters start to present the DOE as a European, and 
Europeanizing, project. Previous cooperation in the UNECE made this discursive reorientation 
rather easy. Source: Ekotrans Moravia 1, no.2 (1990): 6.
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In 1993, for the last time, Ekotrans intervened in favor of the canal. A reviewed 
version of the General solution produced by Ekotrans appeared, implementing 
various ecological measures and following the new ECMT/UNECE classification 
of 1992.159 Ekotrans also organized a trip to the rMD for journalists and public 
servants to get them interested in the project.160 furthermore, the company pre-
sented the study of the Czech republic’s waterway network in an attempt to influ-
ence the new state’s transport policy.161 On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia split 
into two separate states and the DOE lay almost exclusively on Czech territory. 
The authors’ most important concern was the continuing subordination of water-
ways to the Water Management Authorities, which tended to oppose any naviga-
tional structures. Thus, the document called for reinstallation of the Directorate 
for Construction of Waterways (Ředitelství vodních cest – ŘVC), the traditional 
central bureau from the pre-communist period. 
simultaneously, Czech navigation experts were active at UNECE. In 1992, 
the group of experts revived by Vachuda back in 1988, who survived the institu-
tional and personnel changes, presented its final report.162 Its quality did not meet 
the standards, as Kubec later admitted.163 however, by that time, he and his col-
leagues at UNECE were geared to another priority. since the Budapest Conference 
of 1991, they had been developing European agreement on international coop-
eration in promoting and planning inland waterway development. following the 
experts’ old dream, systematic construction of the European waterway network, 
the group prepared a complement to the three already existing UNECE plans for 
European infrastructural networks, those for road (AGr 1975), rail (AGC 1985), 
and combined transport (AGTC 1991). The European Agreement on Main Inland 
Waterways of International Importance (AGN) was accompanied by the Inventory 
of Main standards and Parameters of the E-waterway network (Blue Book) con-
taining the technical characteristics of all waterways identified in AGN and main 
ports. Once again, Kubec was instrumental in this initiative. When the group of 
experts faced difficulties finalizing a generally acceptable map of the desired final 
shape for the network, he provided the draft, which was accepted with only minor 
changes.164 The AGN text was finalized in January 1996 and representatives of the 
159 General solution for the DOE, November 1993. Generální řešení plavebního spojení Dunaj-Odra-
Labe, (MZA, h42, b. 340).
160 Thematic trip to the rMD canal May 17-18, 1993. Tématický zájezd rMD (MZA, h42, b. 471N).
161 Vodní cesty České republiky, february 1993. Part 4 was devoted to the DOE and the entire scheme 
was entitled “Technical-Ecological study.” Technicko-ekologická studie (MZA, h42, b. 341).
162 UNECE document TrANs/sC.3/r.160, 7-9-1993.
163 Interview with Jaroslav Kubec conducted by the author in 2010.
164 Ibid.
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Czech republic signed the document in the summer of 1997.165 The DOE was 
included in its full length, but divided into two E-waterways: E-30 (Oder-Danube 
connection) and E-20 (Elbe branch). 
Despite the successful technical and political Europeanization of the DOE pro-
ject, the new political and economic circumstances of the 1990s did not prove 
favorable to such a huge investment project. The 1996 Czech waterway develop-
ment program, as well as the general national transport policy for 1996-2005, 
considered the DOE a matter for the distant future, which did not require more 
than prolonging the protection of the route.166 Even the charter of the revived 
Directorate for the Construction of Waterways (ŘVC) in 1998 did not mention 
165 June 23, 1997 in helsinki. 
166 Program podpory rozvoje vodní dopravy v České republice do roku 2005 – accepted by Government 
resolution no. 635/1996.
Figure 5.6 – The map accompanying the European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of 
International Importance (AGN) shows the DOE in a dashed line in the center. The UNECE 
provided the background for this treaty. In this scheme, Russian waterways become part of the 
European system. Similar to the Comecon project, it overlooked vastly different areas of the 
Danube, Black Sea and Volga. The unity, therefore, remained to a great extent only imagined. 
Source: European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance (AGN). 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/9/5/2638.pdf. Accessed May 29, 2007.
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the canal. Nonetheless, by being part of AGN, the DOE route was also incorpo-
rated in the Accession Treaty, on the basis of which the Czech republic entered 
the EU. Echoing the words of his interwar predecessor, a Czech navigation expert 
and canal promoter concluded in 2002 that “it is  important to realize that once 
the European Union considers it necessary to link the Oder with the Danube, the 
Union  will also participate financially and the connection will be achieved. 
Nowhere, however, is it stated that this connection must go through the territory 
of the Czech republic.”167
Conclusion
The literature often depicts post-war Europe in terms of the Cold War as a whole 
divided into two antagonistic halves. furthermore, international organizations of 
this period are often seen as arenas for ideological debates, in which the Ussr and 
other members of the Eastern bloc in particular set out to demonstrate the supe-
riority of the socialist system. The historical record of the Europeanization of the 
DOE contradicts such an overly simplified picture. Obviously, political tensions 
between East and West did not necessarily result in separate developments on 
both sides of the Iron Curtain. At a technical level, experts often managed to over-
come ideological discrepancies. however, such cooperation was rather fragile and 
greatly dependent on the general political atmosphere on the continent. Episodes 
of relatively close and problem-free cooperation were disturbed by the conflict 
over the position of the GDr in the late 1960s. The aligned Danube and rhine 
regulations clearly document such developments. These peaked in the 1960s and 
early 1970s and were revived by the late 1980s after the opening of the rMD canal, 
the waterway that physically connected the two separated river basins on the con-
tinent and finally created a coherent European network. 
Indeed, politics played a major role in Europeanization across the curtain. In 
the mid-1950s, some communist politicians welcomed the opportunity of tech-
nical cooperation with the West as a potential source of superior technology. 
simultaneously, the UNECE was seen as an arena fit for “peaceful competition” 
of the two systems, as declared by Khrushchev in the late 1950s. regional (conti-
nental) geographical delimitation, emphasized in the UNECE charter, formed the 
basis for trans-curtain cooperation directed toward maximization of contacts and 
167 Jaroslav Gallina, “Vývoj přípravy propojení Dunaj – Odra – Labe. Závěry zpracovaných dokumentů 
a jejich plnění,” in Porta Moravica 2002: Evropská vodní cesta Dunaj-Odra-Labe (Přerov: sdružení Dunaj-
Odra-Labe, 2002), CD-rOM.
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(technical) compatibility, that is to say maintaining the sense and practice of unity.
seen through the lens of the canal design, the post-war period marked a shift 
toward European technical standards. The onslaught of 1950s sovietization inter-
rupted the continual development of the canal project and its reorientation toward 
the soviet technological style. however, since the early 1960s, Comecon gradually 
left the position of leading transnational organization in favor of the pan-conti-
nental UNECE. similarly, national standards deriving from local traditions and 
set within older national legislation, had been substituted not with a soviet model, 
but by UNECE recommendations. 
remarkably, visions of Europe competing over the shape of the DOE and the 
waterway network on the continent in the second half of the twentieth century 
generally acquired a pan-continental character. The shift from Mitteleuropeanism 
toward Europeanism in the spatial imagination of Czechoslovak navigation ex-
perts and hydraulic engineers represented both the rejection of the Mitteleuropean 
framework defiled by Nazi Grossraum visions and resistance to the adoption of the 
socialist part of Europe as a territorial unit. from raba to Kubec, Europe remained 
the dominant frame of the network surrounding the DOE, though extended to-
wards the East to incorporate the Ussr. The push for Comecon to cooperate with 
UNECE can be interpreted as a reaction to such visions; Šimůnek’s statement of 
1956 suggests as much. however, the limited sources make it difficult to clearly trace 
a link between the two. 
standards for the network set by UNECE and developed in cooperation between 
East and West were accepted on both sides of the Curtain. Links can be found in the 
literature to the UNECE 1960 waterway classification.168 Even Viatcheslav Novikov, 
long-time secretary of the UNECE Working Party on Inland Water Transport, 
asserted in his account of UNECE efforts aimed at constructing the integrated 
European waterway network that the 1960 proposal for European classification 
derived from seiler’s work had been accepted.169 It seems the UNECE secretariat 
adopted his classification to structure information on waterways in the late 1950s, 
and inland navigation experts accepted such a decision.
The role of individual experts was crucial in the process of aligning national, 
Comecon, and European (UNECE) standards in the DOE designs. Unlike career 
bureaucrats such as Plecháč, Jaroslav Kubec was a waterway enthusiast, as even the 
secret Police noted. his activities to develop a proposal for the new Czechoslovak 
168 Marko Pršić, Dalibor Carević, and Davor Brčić, “Determining Inland Waterway Parameters with Ap-
plication to the sava river,” Promet 23, no. 2 (2011): 147-154.
169 Viatcheslav Novikov, “Building a Coherent and Modern Pan-European Inland Waterway Network,” in 
Porta Moravica 2002: Evropská vodní cesta Dunaj-Odra-Labe (Přerov: sdružení Dunaj-Odra-Labe, 2002), 
CD-rOM.
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classification in the 1970s and in the UNECE Group of rapporteurs a few years later, 
and his role in finalizing the E-waterways plan in the 1990s were instrumental for 
the articulation of European standards and their adoption in Czechoslovakia.170 his 
late 1970s proposal for the new Czechoslovak classification rightly identified the 
introduction of the module principle as a basis for the European network, later 
reflected in the new UNECE/ECMT classification of 1992. The simultaneous in-
troduction of push convoys and containerization on the East and West sides of the 
Curtain provided an opportunity for setting common standards.
since the 1970s, Comecon gradually abandoned the waterway issue as far as 
network planning was concerned. Despite the considerable focus on inland navi-
gation since the oil crisis, minimal efforts were made to interconnect and integrate 
navigable rivers and canals while Comecon was mainly oriented to implementing 
new technologies on existing waterways, especially the Danube. In this context, 
Kubec formulated his vision of the Comecon waterway Magistrala in 1987, but 
envisioned the adoption of UNECE and rhine standards. 
This atmosphere naturally weakened the DOE’s position and its promoters had 
to look elsewhere for support, which further reinforced the Europeanization pro-
cess. The collapse of Communism and the rapid disbandment of Comecon left space 
for other integration concepts. strong Europeanism on the part of Czechoslovakia 
and the positive attitude of the ECE (and EU) towards post-communist countries 
resulted in the former West European model of “European integration” becoming 
the only considered option. By being incorporated in the Accession Treaty, the 
canal became part of the EU-ization of central European territory. Those on the 
Czech side responsible for negotiating transport issues with the EU claimed that 
the EU had initiated the implementation of the DOE in the Treaty. however, some 
journalists have suggested it just indicated yet again the success of the Czech canal 
lobby, which had managed to keep the idea alive for more than a century.171 
170 In the early 1960s, when Plecháč substituted Mudruňka as head of the ministry department, the retir-
ing man told him, “most probably the canal will never be constructed, but it provides an opportunity for 
extensive travel.” Interview with Plecháč conducted by the author in the autumn of 2010.
171 radek svítil and Vendula Maráková, “D-O-L: průplav zahalený tajemstvím,” Ekolist (2003), http://
ekolist.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/zpravy/d-o-l-pruplav-zahaleny-tajemstvim. Accessed 16 June 2011.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
This book has studied twentieth-century European history and the dynamics of 
“Europe” as an imagined community, in particular through the lens of the DOE 
project. This study revealed two distinctive aspects. The first was the continuity 
of European waterway integration in spite of various political ruptures, namely 
the break-up of the Austrian-hungarian Empire, Nazification, sovietization, 
and Europeanization. The second aspect was the important role of experts in the 
alignment of national and transnational interests and infrastructure development 
plans. These experts were responsible for continuity in the hidden integration 
of Europe, as they were able to propose the DOE as a solution in very different 
political paradigms in the twentieth century, linked to very different visions and 
images of Europe. At first glance, the historical record of the Danube-Oder-Elbe 
canal reads as a row of successive false starts and stops. It builds up to a story of 
the typical infrastructural “white elephant,”1 destined to fail. The current situa-
tion confirms this picture: the Oder, Elbe, and Danube are still not connected and 
none of the governments involved (Czech, slovak, Polish, or Austrian) currently 
sees the construction of the canal as a priority. however, the question remains as 
to whether this is the most interesting way to look at the DOE history. I would 
argue that it is more significant to note that it proved incredibly hard to kill the 
desire to build the canal. Notwithstanding the recurring negative resolutions of 
national governments, the canal never disappeared from public debate through-
out the twentieth century. The striking ability to survive two world wars, numer-
ous political struggles, competition from other transport modes and perspectives, 
and, last but not least, fundamental changes in the perception of water as part 
of the natural environment, represents the most tantalizing aspect of the canal 
project. This remarkable capacity to remain on the agenda puts the history of the 
canal in a different light. The question is not why the DOE has never been built, 
but how it survived. Instead of investigating the reasons for its failure, we should 
seek the reasons and mechanisms of its continued existence. There are plenty of 
1 Dirk van Laak devoted one of his books to white elephants. he defined them as large-scale technologi-
cal projects which “combine ambitious technology with politics and alleged massive economic gain.” Dirk 
van Laak, Weisse Elefanten. Anspruch und Scheitern technischer Grossprojekte im 20. Jahrhundert (stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), 10.
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factors explaining the failure, but what could account for its almost uninterrupted 
presence in infrastructural planning throughout the century?
The key to this question lies in the role of the experts. They were the ones who 
provided continuity through all the political troubles. In times of political turmoil, 
the experts’ mandate to work on their own diminished; they had to wait for a new 
window of opportunity in order to put the canal back on the agenda and start the 
process of transnational synchronization of interests and ideas all over again. This 
dynamic could serve as entry point to a periodization for the long twentieth-cen-
tury history of waterways’ hidden integration process in Europe – hidden because 
it was driven by experts who preferred to work behind the scenes.2 
When the DOE project was launched by the Austrian Imperial Waterway Act 
in 1901, the continent was divided into many isolated navigation “islands” with 
different regulations, ships, port-equipment, standards and marking. These is-
lands had historically been developed in the individual river basins of every main 
river on the continent, the rhine, the Danube, or the Elbe. from 1870 onwards, 
the rivers had become part of national networks promoted by the newly estab-
lished German Empire. The development of such national systems required the 
construction of canals to overcome the watersheds dividing national territories. 
The DOE, at the early stage of its development, represented a typical example of 
such a project, driven by the Austrian-habsburg Empire. Experts did anticipate 
problems, however, due to this nationalization process. They wanted to build 
transnational connections as well and create a European network. In the early 
1880s, businesspeople and experts interested in inland navigation established the 
Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (PIANC). In this 
forum, the transnational history of the DOE was born. While smrček did not at-
tend the first PIANC meetings, he studied the results of earlier sessions. When 
the technical differences between the existing french and German networks cre-
ated a conflict, Czech experts, together with the rest of the Monarchy, naturally 
joined (and even co-inspired) independent integration efforts in Central Europe. 
These were implicitly linked with the German Mitteleuropa concept and designed 
to enable practical cooperation on the ethnic German population scattered in the 
politically divided area to the west of the rhine and to the north of the Danube. 
however, once the Austrian authorities drafted the rudiments of the imperial 
network that bound the territory of the habsburg Empire, they had to choose 
between their Pan-German allegiances and natural and historical constraints. By 
that time, the historically developed standards on the Danube, the rhine, and the 
2 Thomas Misa and Johan schot, “Inventing Europe: Technology and the hidden Integration of Europe,” 
History & Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-19.
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Elbe differed significantly. Naturally, the Austrian authorities chose the Danube 
as the axis of the future network and also pursued Danubian standards for its 
other parts, including the planned DOE link that would connect the Danube to 
the Vistula. Thus, the Mitteleuropean efforts failed. The un-linking of the German 
Oder to the Austrian Canal, originally planned to connect Danube to Oder, sym-
bolized this failure. 
Not until the late1920s did the Mitteleuropean group of experts meet again. The 
DOE routing was slightly adjusted in such a way as to serve Czechoslovak rather than 
Austrian interests. The slovak capital of Bratislava replaced Vienna as main port on 
the Danube end of the canal. The DOE was represented by the Czech smrček and 
the German Gothein. Also present at one of the meetings in Budapest was Kliment 
Velkoborský, who would become head of the Inland Navigation Department at the 
Ministry of Transport in communist Czechoslovakia. The official introduction of 
the Mitteleuropean standard 1000t vessel in the Czechoslovak Waterway Act of 1931 
was one of the successes of these meetings. however, the Czechoslovak national gov-
ernment persisted in its negative attitude towards the DOE project until 1938, when 
it was forced to become more positive under pressure from Nazi Germany. This new 
effort after 1938, led by Nazi Germany, was able to build on earlier inter-war agree-
ments. Compared to the relative success of Mitteleuropean efforts, the respective at-
tempts to develop a pan-European network, promoted by the League of Nations, 
achieved limited immediate results. however, various proposed regulations did 
lay the basis for post-war waterway integration attempts stimulated by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
starting with the Nazi ascent to power, the construction of the Grossraum wa-
terway network, including the DOE canal, achieved momentum. The Nazis did not 
have to rely on rather complicated transnational negotiations, as they were in a posi-
tion to push their ideas through. The coercive nature of this phase was unique in 
the twentieth-century history of the DOE and its results were equally exceptional 
– for a short while, construction work commenced. In both personal and technical 
aspects, this can be seen as a transition period. Building on many of the ideas and 
structures developed in the previous fifty years, a new technological style emerged, 
epitomized by the boldly drafted ship-lifts and water management measures. 
While the older generation remained active, the generous DOECs endowment 
and Nazi government support produced a whole new generation of hydraulic en-
gineers working on the canal, which affected the canal’s future. Due to the ongo-
ing war and the fall of the Nazi Empire, success was short-lived. Czechoslovakia 
became part of the Eastern bloc and fell under soviet influence in the post-war 
settlement. 
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The soviet waterway models and standards were more difficult to implement in 
Central Europe than the Nazi versions. After the communist takeover of Central 
Europe, structures supporting the canal project, both at national and transnational 
levels, fell victim to the initial phase of the Cold War. Also, the old masters of cen-
tral European waterway building left the scene. It took a decade to set up a com-
pletely new institutional landscape, during which time people like Velkoborský 
retired. In the mid-1960s, a new generation of engineers educated in the soviet 
style took the lead. While they had read the DOECs papers and cooperated with 
some of the still active engineers from the war generation such as rosík, they had 
a different perspective on the canal and the network. Basically, instead of a transport 
route, these new engineers envisioned a water management scheme. Instead of a 
Central European network, they preferred a pan-European network. They found 
a home for their efforts in UNECE activities. In the case of the waterways, this or-
ganization was able to overcome Cold War separation from the mid-1950s onwards. 
They provided a link between Comecon and UNECE efforts, also on a personal level. 
Yet, it is also clear that the 1950s, the period of at least partly enforced adaptation to 
methods and standards developed in the Ussr, marked the most visible discontinu-
ity in the DOE canal’s history. The differences between the 1952 design (actually an 
update of the project started by the DOECs before the war then further developed 
by the Nazis) and the General solution of 1968 or even the hydroprojekt study of 
1958, far exceeded the differences between any other two designs or general layout 
placed next to each other on the chronological axis. While the utilization of the riv-
erbed had been debated since the mid-1920s and the water management perspective 
and potential for water transfer had been introduced by the Nazis, it was only the 
soviet-style “complex” perspective, supported by the power (albeit mostly symbolic 
and imagined) of the communist party and soviet technological superiority, that al-
lowed the corresponding changes to be applied in the canal design.
from the perspective of this generation of experts, the DOE canal development 
can be divided into two periods. The first period is linked with smrček and his 
Central European ideals (1890s-1940), and the second is best represented by Kubec 
(who preferred a pan-European network). They both operated across at least two 
transnational integration frameworks. In between, the massive political and techno-
logical changes of World War II and its aftermath altered the scene. from a techno-
logical point of view, a similar situation arose – the canal was developed mainly as 
a transport route for pull boats (not ship-lifts) between 1908 and 1938, while in the 
1970s, after the turbulent conflicts of World War II and initial years of the Cold War, 
the canal again became relatively stabilized as a complex water management system 
for transporting push convoys.
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Indeed, the DOE’s survival should be interpreted less as a result of fitting 
into various (geopolitical) agendas, and more as a technological love affair of a 
group of hydraulic and inland navigation experts who relentlessly promoted this 
project.3 In his analysis of the European dimension of waterway construction in 
Western Europe in the twentieth century, Nil Disco concluded that the trans-ba-
sin waterway projects owe their existence to mundane national interests, rather 
than to grand conceptions and visions of common European interests.4 Indeed, 
the engineers promoting the DOE canal often voiced local and national ambi-
tions, although they could easily switch arguments if required. Their main priority 
was building the canal. The same experts often working on the national as well 
as transnational levels played a vital role in helping to (re-)create the demand for 
the canal on both levels and in keeping the idea alive. Despite witnessing pro-
found differences in the political situation and state organization in the twenti-
eth century, experts managed to work on the canal. When the DOE canal was 
perceived as a form of Mitteleuropeanization in the inter-war years, the atmos-
phere of mutual distrust among central European nations made official diplomatic 
cooperation aimed at creating a transnational network impossible. At first, offi-
cial cooperation remained limited at the expert level as well, and the pre-World 
War I Mitteleuropean Verein (DOUV) was only revived in the late 1920s. By that 
time, however, Czechoslovak waterway plans had been adapted to the standards 
developed by German engineer Leo sympher. Without actual transnational nego-
tiations, Czechoslovak experts applied the dimensions proposed for the German 
network. They held high enough positions within the state ranks to do this with-
out any significant interference from other national authorities. These positions 
helped them keep the canal on the agenda, even though the project was accused of 
benefiting Germany and its imperial plans. Using the authority and power of high 
officials and revered experts, the group of canal proponents managed to counter 
proposals to change the route, which would have made the canal more national. In 
their eyes, this change would render the project inefficient. 
The fate of the Mitteleuropean Verband (MVB), which disappeared in the early 
1930s, suggests that the experts were not initially prepared to accept aggressive 
Nazi rhetoric. Nonetheless, once Czechoslovakia signed the Protocol for con-
structing the canal after the Munich Treaty in the autumn of 1938, leading Czech 
experts like smrček welcomed the agreement. By the mid-1930s, smrček had made 
3 This builds upon the argument of Bruno Latour in Bruno Latour, Aramis, or the Love of Technology 
(Cambridge, Mass.: harvard University Press, 1996).
4 Cornelis Disco, “from sea to shining sea: Making Ends Meet on the rhine and the rhone,” in Material-
izing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas 
fickers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 353-397.
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it clear that his allegiances lay with the canal and the transnational network rather 
than the state he once helped create. In the ensuing negotiations, which continued 
after the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, Czech experts acted more or less as 
a local branch of the reich authorities and had to accept and adopt standards and 
demands developed at Nazi headquarters, although some room for negotiation 
remained. Consequently, the canal was transformed into a transnational transport 
route, paying little respect to the needs of the local population. Also, people like 
Bartovský, head of the Czechoslovak Ministry’s water management department 
since the mid-1930s and throughout the war, proved susceptible to the Nazi style 
of planning and ideology.
Post-war Czechoslovakia found itself on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain 
and exposed to the influence of sovietization. Again, Czech experts were quick 
to adapt the general idea of the canal to the new dominant ideology and cop-
ied the soviet narrative of a “complex” water management project. however, it 
was only after the establishment of the Comecon that they managed to again get 
the canal on the agenda of national authorities. Comecon created a platform for 
technocratic planning of the East European network. Although individual experts 
played their role within Comecon, they had less power to align the national and 
transnational perspective. Unlike the inter-war non-governmental organizations 
that had pushed for Mitteleuropeanization, Comecon was fully controlled by of-
ficial delegates of the nation-states. It was an intergovernmental organization that 
delegated less power to individual experts, who had to adhere to the state’s official 
foreign policy. 
While UNECE officially operated in a similar fashion as Comecon, it gave in-
dividual experts more scope. Its expert committees for waterway network plan-
ning provided the platform for expert negotiations. Unlike the Comecon setting, 
the Czechoslovak state foreign office representatives did not coordinate a national 
position. This meant that experts could work on the adoption of UNECE stand-
ards and recommendations on their own. They used this scope and managed to 
Europeanize the technical lay-out of the canal and create a bypass across the po-
litically impenetrable East-West divide. At one point in the late 1980s, Kubec was 
working simultaneously on soviet and European versions of the design, which 
differed significantly in their spatial scope. 
Experts followed the specific ideology for which schot and Lagendijk coined 
the term “technocratic internationalism.” This was a political strategy of technifi-
cation (or de-politicization) and delivered a remarkable flexibility in the face of 
turbulent political circumstances. schot and Lagendijk promoted the idea that the 
construction of the canal should be left to those experts who were best placed to 
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design the canal based on technical parameters. They considered the construc-
tion of the DOE canal (which they felt was a clear missing link in the European 
waterway network system) to be unavoidable from a long-term perspective. The 
question of whether and how it should be built should not be determined by what 
they perceived as short-term and often misguided, official national foreign policy 
objectives. Their motivation to promote the canal ultimately corresponded with 
their expectations that building a canal would not only help overcome tensions 
between national and transnational interests, but also encourage national and in-
ternational prosperity. 
Antonín smrček and Jaroslav Kubec illustrated this best. Both men were ut-
terly devoted to their professions as hydraulic and waterway engineers and, as 
such, were both members of the PIANC, the oldest transnational network special-
izing in navigation matters. smrček took part in various transnational events that 
aimed to establish the waterway network and create the DOE canal. In his posi-
tion of generally respected authority, he influenced both governmental (at first 
Austrian and then Czechoslovak) policy and transnational network schemes in 
the first half of the century. Operating at the transnational level, he relentlessly 
stimulated interest in the DOE canal among local industries in Moravia, while 
representing them at meetings on the various Mitteleuropean initiatives. smrček 
was instrumental in setting common standards for the Mitteleuropean waterway 
network in Central Europe and their adoption by Czechoslovak national institu-
tions developing the DOE canal. The same could be said of Jaroslav Kubec, who 
joined the PIANC as Czechoslovak representative. he tried, albeit unsuccessfully, 
to update the national waterway dimension standardization to fit new standards 
emerging in Europe in the 1970s and then successfully implemented these visions 
in the 1981 DOE canal design developed for the EEC. After the collapse of com-
munism, Kubec participated in the negotiations for the new classification of the 
European network in the UNECE after 1990 and was instrumental in creating 
the plan to construct the European waterway network accepted by the UNECE in 
1996, which of course included the DOE canal. 
The expert ideology factor explains the persistent motivation behind the hy-
draulic engineers and transport experts’ efforts to promote the canal, which were 
the reason the matter remained on the agenda. The question is why they failed to 
make it happen. This failure can be explained by the fact that the engineers needed 
the consent of the Czechoslovak foreign office and political establishment. They 
could have won this support if they had had more time, which was not granted due 
to the turbulent times. The story could have been different if the Central Powers 
had won World War I or the Nazis World War II. Under certain circumstances, 
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even the separate Comecon network might have come to fruition, even in its ex-
tended version reaching the Pacific. The lead time experts needed was also a con-
sequence of their strategy. Winning the necessary support involved several steps. 
firstly, experts had to find their own way, both at the national and translation 
level, in updating the project to fit new political and ideological demands and in 
developing the appropriate technology and institutional environment which could 
perform the desired functions. secondly, once successful, they had then to go back 
to the national authorities and present a completed design, and request their sup-
port, using acquired “transnational and international” support as an argument in 
favor of the project. however, this second step could not be realized. The turbulent 
history of Czechoslovakia in the 1900s did not provide the promoters of the canal 
project with a long enough period of political stability for undisturbed prepara-
tion or execution of all the necessary measures. Every time the political regime 
changed abruptly (1918, 1938, 1948, 1968, and 1989), they virtually had to start 
all over again. While the experts were strong enough to keep the canal alive, they 
were too weak to get it built. 
Although the history of the DOE canal seems quite specific, it does correspond 
to developments elsewhere in Europe. In the Netherlands,5 for instance, the first 
practical applications of the synthetics approach to water, as exemplified in the 
National Water Management Plans, appeared around 1940; that is, at virtually the 
same time as the first Bažant Water Management Plan for Moravia. In addition, 
the period during which the expert-driven exploitation of water as natural source 
dominated Dutch national water policy corresponds roughly to the develop-
ments in Czechoslovakia. While the Dutch Rijkswaterstaat adopted the concept of 
Integrated Water Management in 1989, allowing non-expert groups such as ecolo-
gists and municipalities to enter the design process, the collapse of communism 
in the same year in Czechoslovakia resulted in the swift assumption of the same 
model. My research suggests that strong transnational links between experts could 
be responsible for this shared history. 
The DOE is now a European matter. The UNECE experts involved in water-
way planning have produced several studies on the development of a continental 
waterway network since the plan for E-waterways came into force.6 The problem 
was revisited in 2010 by the Platina platform within the EU’s NAIADEs Action 
5 Cornelis Disco and Erik van der Vleuten, “The Politics of Wet system Building: Balancing Interests in 
Dutch Water Management from the Middle Ages to the Present,” Knowledge, Technology & Policy 14, no. 4 
(2002): 21-40, here 39.
6 see regularly updated UNECE Blue Book: Economic Commission for Europe, Inventory of Main stand-
ards and Parameters of the E Waterway Network, (2011), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/
doc/finaldocs/sc3/ECE-TrANs-sC3-144r1e.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2007.
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Program. The documents identified eleven missing links in the European network 
and attempted to determine the level of commitment of the countries involved 
to deal with the problem. The DOE represented a unique case on this list. Unlike 
all the other projects which were strictly national regarding construction site, the 
DOE appeared four times. While slovakia, the Czech republic, and Poland all 
declared their support and incorporated the DOE project in their national devel-
opment programs, Austria did not see it as a priority and concentrated on other 
improvements on the Danube. The future of the project, as the Platina paper sug-
gested, depends on the success of the Czech initiative to include the DOE in the 
new TEN-T list of Priority Projects and thus obtain funds from the TEN-T budget 
for the 2014-2020 period.7 The networks of experts has continued to promote the 
DOE idea persistently and passionately. The future will tell whether conditions 
could be created for its final realization.8
7 Platina, Inventory of Bottlenecks and Missing Links on the European Waterway Network, (2011), http://
www.naiades.info/file_get.php?file=41304ce4aeb4f1690cfb771ee486329ecf8. Accessed 3 May 2011.
8 These conditions do not seem to exist at the current time (spring 2012). The pool of organizations and 
individuals supporting inland navigation in the region is relatively limited. Their attempts to create larger, 
and thus more efficient, lobbying groups and to constitute a permanent platform for expert negotiations 
have so far failed. 
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Annex 1 List of Barge Types
Barge types in operation on European waterways in the 1970s according to Jaroslav 
Čábelka: Čábelka, Jaroslav. Vodní cesty a plavba (Prague: sNTL, 1976): 64-65 and 
78.








Area of Use Seiler/ECE
classification
Groß-finow 250 41,50 5,10 1,60 GDr
Central Europe


















































Kempenaar 620 50,00 6,60 2,50 Netherlands, Belgium Class II
Weser 650 60,50 8,80 1,90 frG
Plauen 650 65,00 8,00 1,75 Poland, GDr, Oder
Danube 675 675 63,00 8,20 1,90 Danube
Gross-Plauen 760 67,00 8,20 1,80-2,00 GDr, Elbe
Elbe 900 76,00 10,00 1,80 Elbe
Amanda 1000 76,27 10,32 1,80 Elbe
Dortmund-Ems 1000 67,00 8,20 2,50 rhine Class III
Danube 1000 70,00 9,40 2,20 Danube
Elbe-canal type 1000 80,00 9,20 2,00 Elbe
Widende Canal 
type
1000 75,00 10,60 1,60 Elbe






































Volga-Baltic systém, Ussr Class IV
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Gustav Koenigs 67,00 8,20 2,50 930 500 rhine frG
Express 44 88,00 8,20 – 1130 900 rhine switzerland




































National Archive, Prague (NAČR)
Československý plavební úřad 1921-1950 / Czechoslovak Navigation Office (ČPU).
Commission for Canalization of rivers Vltava and Elbe / Komise pro kanalizování řek Vltavy a 
Labe 1896-1937 (KKVL).
Czechoslovak Communist Party – Central Committee 1945-1989 / KsČ – Ústřední výbor 
1945-1989 .
Presidium of the CC CzCP / KsČ – Ústřední výbor 1945-1989. Předsednictvo ÚV KsČ 
(KsČ-ÚV-02/1).
Office of the first secretary of the CC CzCP Antonín Novotný / Kancelář 1. tajemníka ÚV 
KsČ Antonína Novotného – II. část 1951-1967 (KsČ-ÚV-AN II).
Directorate for Construction of Waterways 1903-1949 / Generální ředitelství pro stavbu vod-
ních cest (GŘVC).
Ministry of Transport
 Ministry of Transport, part I 1945-1953 / Ministerstvo dopravy I (MDI).
 Ministry of Transport, part II 1953-1+60 / Ministerstvo dopravy II (MDII).
 Ministry of Transport, part III 1963-1969 / Ministerstvo dopravy III (MDIII).
 federal Ministry of Transport 1971-1988 / federální ministerstvo dopravy (fMD).
Ministry of Public Works 1918-1942 / Ministerstvo veřejných prací (MVP).
Ministry of foreign Trade 1949-1990 / Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu (MZO-fMZO).
Ministry of Industry and Trade 1918-1942 / Ministerstvo průmyslu, obchodu a živností 
(MPOŽ).
Office of the reich Protector 1939-1945 / Úřad říšského protektora (UŘP).
Prime Minister’s Office.
Office of the Prime Minister 1945-1959 / Úřad předsednictva vlády – běžná spisovna 
(ÚPV-B).
Office of the Prime Minister 1969-1992 / Úřad předsednictva vlády Čssr/Čsfr (ÚPV-f).
Moravian Provincial Archive, Brno (MZA)
Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal / Průplav Labe – Odra – Dunaj 1903-1993 (h42).
Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Prague (AMZV).
1918-1939
section II League of Nations / sekce II společnost Národů (II).
section IV Economy / sekce IV Národohospodářská (IV).
1945-1955
International department, unrestricted / Mezinárodní obor, obyčejné (MO).
1955-1965
International department-Department for International Organizations / Mezinárodní 
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odbor-Oddělení mezinárodních organizací (MO-OMO).
1966-1970
Department for International Organizations / Oddělení mezinárodních organizací 
(OMO).
1970-1975
Department for International Economic Organizations / Oddělení mezinárodních eko-
nomických organizací (OMEO).
Security Services Archive, Prague (ABSČR)
Personal files.
United Nations Office Geneve (UNOG)
G.IX Transport and Communications (1946-1982).
Archive of the Czech Academy of Science, Prague (AAVČR)
Watermanagement Committee of the Czechoslovak Academy of sciences 1954-1970 / Komise 
pro vodní hospodářství ČsAV (KVh).
Archive of the Watermanagement Research Institute, Brno (AVUV)Bundesarchiv, Berlin 
(BA)
Archiv DDr
GDr Ministry of Transport 1952-1989 / Ministerium für Verkehrswesen (DM 1).
Personal archive of Jaroslav Kubec
Interviews.
1 Jaroslav Kubec (*1931)
Date: 28 september 2010.
Kubec started his professional career in Ostrava in late the 1950s, after his graduation from 
faculty of civil engineering, Czech Technical University, Prague. 1963-1993 he worked for the 
Transport research Institute, where he reached the position of the head of the water transport 
department. In this capacity at least since 1966 he has regularly attended meetings of various 
inter/transnational organizations (at first Danube Commission, from 1970’s UNECE ITC, 
etc. – surprisingly not Comecon). Currently a prominent proponent of the canal construction, 
Kubec has authored monographs on the DOE and waterways. he is also founder and chair-
man of the Danube-Oder-Elbe Association, co-founder of Porta Moravica and other “lobby” 
groups. since 1993 he makes his living as an independent consultant in water transportation, 
but still a member, or even chairman, of several UNECE committees in Geneve.
2 Václav Plecháč (*1932)
Date: 23 November 2010.
hydraulic engineer by training, Václav Plecháč entered civil service early after his gradua-
tion and spend his career in various position at International departments of Czechoslovak 
Ministries responsible for Water Management. regular at the UNECE and Comecon meetings, 
he was also a crucial figure in the evaluation of the General solution in the early 1970s.
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3 Evžen Polenka (1941)
Date: 12 December 2010.
son of hydraulic engineer Evžen Polenka, who worked for ŘVC in the 1930s and 1940s. After 
graduation in hydraulic engineering from Brno Technical University, he worked for various 
water management authorities located in Brno. In late 1960 he was involved in preparation of 
General solution and after 1972 he stood in charge of protection of DOE route at the VUV 
branch in Brno.
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AGN  European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways of International Importance 
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CCT League of Nations‘ Advisory and Technical Committee on Communications and  
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CEfTA  Central European free Trade Agreement
CEI  Central European Initiative
CID  International Danube Commission
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CzCP  Czechoslovak Communist Party
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DOE  Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal
DOECs  Danube-Oder-Elbe society (Společnost Dunajsko-Oderského průplavu)
DOEK  Danube-Oder-Elbe Committee (Dunajsko-odersko-labský komitét)
DOUV  German-Austrian-hungarian Association for Inland Navigation (Deutsch-
Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Verband für Binnenschiffahrt) 
DVO  Dnieper-Vistula-Oder waterway project
ECMT  European Conference of Ministers of Transport
EEC European Economic Community
EU  European Union
frG  federal republic of Germany
GDr  German Democratic republic
GIWE Inspector-General for Water and Energy (Generalinspektor für Wasser und Energie)
Gor  UNECE Group of rapporteurs
GOsPLAN soviet state Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyy planovyy komitet)
ILO  International Labor Organization 
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IWT  Inland Water Transport
LoN  League of Nations
MAP  Masaryk Academy of Labor (Masarykova Akademie práce)
MEI  Central European Institute for Promotion of Economic and Cultural 
rapprochement (Mitteleuropäische Institut, Mitteleuropa-Institut, Mitteleuropa-
Institut zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Annäherung)
MEW  Central European Bussiness Association (Mitteleuropäischen Wirtschaftsverein) 
MLVh   Ministry of forestry and Water Management (Ministerstvo lesního a vodního 
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MŘPs  Moravian river and Canal society (Moravský říční a průplavní spolek)
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MVB  Central European Assosication for Inland Navigation (Mitteleuropäischer 
Binnenschiffahrtsverband) 
MVP  Ministry of Public Works (Ministerstvo veřejných prací)
MWT  Central European Economic Conference (Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstagung)
NKVD  soviet secret police agency (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del)
PIANC  Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses
rMD rhine-Main-Danube Canal
ŘVC  Directorate for the Construction of Waterways (Ředitelství vodních cest, Ředitelství 
pro stavbu vodních cest)
sCT  Comecon standing Commission on Transport
stB  Czechoslovak secret Police (Státní bezpečnost)
sVP  National Water Management Plan (Státní vodohospodářský plan)
TrI  Czechoslovak Transport research Institute (Výzkumný ústav dopravní)
Vh  Vodní Hospodářství Journal
Vrs  Water Management Center (Vodohospodářské rozvojové středisko)
VUV Water research Institute (Výzkumný ústav vodohospodářský)
UNECE  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
ÚsVh Central Water Management Administration (Ústřední správa vodního hospodářství)
ZVfB Central Association for German Inland Navigation (Zentral Verein für Deutschen 
Binnenschiffahrt)
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European Coasts of Bohemia  
Negotiating the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal in a Troubled Twentieth 
Century
This book looks at the integration processes in Europe from the perspective of 
a single waterway project, the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal (DOE). In doing so, 
it draws on the recent strand of scholarly literature considering the process of 
European integration as an outcome of transnational networking, system build-
ing and infrastructure development. Two core assumptions of such an approach, 
labeled “hidden integration” claim: (1) that the process of integration (and frag-
mentation) of infrastructures on the continent began back in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and (2) the integration processes were driven by transnational expert orga-
nizations rather than diplomats representing nations states and their interests. 
The DOE Canal project, though never completed, traces the history of ef-
forts aimed at establishing an integrated inland navigation network in Europe. 
Unfortunately these proposals were promoted and performed with very different 
and often conflicting visions of Europe. The thesis identifies a set of four different 
integration frameworks used by transnational system builders to justify the need 
for integration: Mittel-Europeanization (Central Europeanization), Nazification, 
sovietization and Europeanization. These frameworks represented not only the 
distinctive spatial delimitations of the proposed waterway network, but also spe-
cific sets of values and ideas, each represented by a single dominant international 
organization, the transnational system builder. The canal, situated almost exclu-
sively on Czech territory, was planned at the junction of the national and trans-
national network development. The interplay between these two levels of gover-
nance in different periods forms the core of this thesis.
The book covers the entire twentieth century, a period framed by two major 
events: the Austrian Waterway Act of 1901, which launched the imperial waterway 
network program, and the 1996 European Agreement on Main Inland Waterways 
of International Importance (AGN), marking the establishment of the integrated 
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pan-European waterway system. The period from 1920 to 1970 is covered in more 
detail thanks to the availability and richness of archival material. Each of the four 
chapters deals in turn with a specific integration framework. The chapters are di-
vided to more or less correspond with general political history, bearing in mind 
that some of these integration frameworks co-existed for some time. 
Chapter one sketches the scene when the DOE was developed at transnational 
level as part of the envisioned waterway network in Central Europe. By the late 
nineteenth century, inland navigation was experiencing significant growth in 
the newly established German Empire. Navigable rivers had become part of the 
emerging national network. But such national systems required canals in order to 
overcome the watersheds dividing national territory. Initially the DOE was a typi-
cal example of a project driven by the Austrian-habsburg Empire.  simultaneously, 
on a transnational level, a group of experts fearing the negative impacts of such 
nationalization promoted integration efforts implicitly linked with the German 
Mitteleuropa concept. While World War I marked the end of the Austrian wa-
terway program and the hapsburg empireas such, the Mitteleuropean initiative 
survived and resurfaced in the late 1920s. Although Czech engineers promoting 
the construction of the DOE actively supported such transnational efforts, the 
new Czechoslovak state remained suspicious of any cooperation with Germany. 
however, the canal project was adopted by national authorities and re-designed 
according to German standards in the 1930s.
The construction works, however, only began in 1939, after Nazi Germany oc-
cupied the western part of Czechoslovakia. The canal design followed the aims of 
Grossraum planning, marking a departure from earlier versions. Instead of locks, 
Nazi engineers preferred ship-lifts to secure higher transport throughput.
The third chapter focuses on the sovietization of the canal project. At first, 
Czechoslovak engineers attempted to “sovietize” the canal to enable national au-
thorities to support the project. Although this initial attempt failed, with the estab-
lishment of COMECON came the idea of an integrated East European transport 
network. The DOE was supposed to link the two socialist countries Poland and 
the GDr separated from the Danube to this river and via the Black sea to Volga 
ports and the Ussr. But the canal project, developed to meet soviet standards as 
a “complex water management solution” was put aside in the re-orientation of 
COMECON transport policy. The canal route, however, was protected by a build-
ing ban.
After World War II, running parallel with Comecon efforts, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe was planning a pan-European waterway net-
work. Czech experts managed to place the DOE at the heart of the envisioned 
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network. however, national authorities tended to ignore the project, despite Czech 
experts’ numerous attempts to align UNECE and national development plans. 
Nonetheless, the Czech republic ratified the AGN agreement and the future real-
ization of the canal, at present fully Europeanized in its technical lay-out, remains 
open for debate.
This book demonstrates the crucial role experts played in aligning national and 
transnational interests and infrastructure developments. It shows how the DOE 
Canal project was continually developed as part of the wider transnational wa-
terway network on the continent despite unfavorable political circumstances. The 
continuity of European waterway integration across various political ruptures, such 
as the break-up of the Austrian-hungarian Empire, Nazification or sovietization, 
was secured by experts devoted to the concept of the canal. however, their ability 
was limited to keeping the project alive. 
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